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A NEW
TRANSLATION
OF
ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC;

WITH AN
Introduction and Appendix,
EXPLAINING ITS RELATION TO HIS EXACT PHILOSOPHY,
AND VINDICATING THAT PHILOSOPHY, BY PROOFS THAT ALL DEPARTURES
FROM IT HAVE BEEN DEVIATIONS INTO ERROR.

By JOHN GILLIES, LL.D.
F.R.S. & S.A. LOND. F.R.S. EDINB.
SOC. INSTIT. PARIS, ET ACAD. REGIÆ GOTTING. CORRESP.; AND
HISTORIOGRAPHER TO HIS MAJESTY FOR SCOTLAND.

Magna animi contentio adhibenda est in explicando Aristotele.
CICERO *Fragment. Philosoph.*

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AND W. BLACKWOOD, EDINBURGH.

1823.

*Aristoteles
Rhetoric*

506



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ERRATA.

- Page 5. line 2. from bottom, read "either" and "its."
 23. line 2. in note, read "princeps tenebrarum," and line 3. read
 "Geryon et bestia."
 55. line 4. for "proposition," read "propositions."
 91. line 8. from the bottom, for "belongs" read "belong."
 104. line last, for "track" read "tract."
 135. in note, line 4. for "exists" read "exist."
 189. in note, read "τῷ μείζονος ποιητικῷ εἶναι."
 192. line 7. from bottom, insert "to."
 256. line 17. from bottom, dele the comma, and for "that" read
 "than."
 391. middle, for "discoure" read "discourse."
 401. after the note, insert, "Vid. Poetic, cap. xxii. edit. Buhle."

*Upper Seymour Street,
 10th February, 1823.*

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INTRODUCTION

TO

ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC.

CHAP. I.

Motives to this Work. — Growing degeneracy of Literature. — State of public Criticism. — Aristotle's Rhetoric. — Its importance as a work of taste, criticism, and history. — Analysis thereof. — Its connection with his other writings. — General diffusion of these writings. — History of their reception in Asia and in Europe. — Fanciful appendages joined to them. — Corrupted by the Popish Scholastics. — Mistaken and vilified by the first Reformers. — Subsequent objections made to them. — These objections answered. — The difficulties of the Greek text obviated. — Aristotle's consistency and accuracy vindicated.

ABOVE thirty years ago, being in company with men of learning and knowledge of the world, decided enemies to what has been called the new or French philosophy, they regretted that works well calculated to counteract this speculative folly, which had then begun to mount into madness,¹ should not be brought before the public in a shape less repulsive than that in which

CHAP.

I.

Occasion
of this
Work.

¹ Insanientis sapientiæ.

CHAP.

I.

they had hitherto appeared. They alluded to the ethics and politics of Aristotle, of which we had been speaking, and of which Locke, in his letter to King, says, “to proceed orderly in politics, the foundation should be laid in inquiring into the nature and ground of civil society, and how it is formed into different models of government, and what are the several species of it. Aristotle is allowed to be a master of this science.” All present pronounced the encomium to be just, but all doubted the possibility of rendering the Greek works in question, popular, or even *readable* in English: I was inclined, however, to make the experiment, and for a reason that appeared to myself of considerable weight. At a time when so many random opinions were afloat, originating in transient but headstrong passions, there would be much propriety, at least, in interposing the sentiments of a great master of reason, widely remote both in time and place, from the concerns and the feelings of the present day. The remark made an impression; and I was encouraged to undertake an useful and arduous, rather than a very promising task.

I began with the “Politics,” but delayed printing my translation of it, till I had finished that of the ethics; because, in Aristotle, the two subjects are inseparably connected, and treated simultaneously as integral parts of one and the same work. In this delay, I was sensible of sacrificing a certain portion of popularity; but

I was not to be moved by such a consideration: the agitations of the public mind were not likely to subside speedily; and I had fondly destined my work to be an inheritance for ever², not a contentious struggle for contemporary fame. With a like purpose, I afterwards commenced a translation of Aristotle's critical works, perceiving that to strange opinions on morals and politics, others, analogous, and equally extravagant, had succeeded in matters of taste and criticism.

CHAP.
I.

From the boundless increase of books, and the indefinite variety of readers of all descriptions, it came to be regarded as an old and dull prejudice, that the labours of the several muses should be any longer confined to their distinct provinces, or directed to their specific ends. The love of wonder, novelty, and other popular passions, it was thought, would be better gratified by jumbling together all subjects and all styles, though to the same confusion in the productions of art, that would arise in those of nature, from the multiplication of monsters. In this manner, the public taste was gradually brought back to that decrepitude which is a second infancy, and was to be fed with food convenient for it; with rhymes in short verse, tales of wonder and witchery, and that motley brood of non-descripts, calculated to please the pruriency of wild and childish fancies: no longer tragedies or comedies,

Growing
degeneracy
of
literature.

² Κτήμα εἰς αἰεί.

CHAP. but DRAMATIC works not intended to be *acted*,
 I. wire-drawn *biographies* of such men as never
lived, histories without facts, philosophy without
 principles, poetry without harmony, and oratory,
 supplying by loquacity and petulance, the want
 of pathos and argument.

In the space of the last thirty years, literature
 has thus degenerated in the two most con-
 spicuous countries of modern Europe, more
 than it had done in Rome in the period of
 140 years, from Cicero to the younger Pliny;
 and more than it did in Greece in the course
 of many centuries. This applies generally to
 thought and diction; to compositions to be read
 in the closet, or pronounced in public assemblies;
 and it cannot be doubted that the inaccuracy
 and diffuseness of speeches, now so numerous,
 and by orators of all classes, has contributed to
 the deterioration of our written style, and, toge-
 ther with coarser blemishes, given to it that
 vaporous pomp and tinsel texture which charac-
 terised, of old, the Asiatic and Alexandrian
 school, and contrasted it with the pure Atticism,
 to which our classic authors, both in prose and
 verse, had long successfully aspired.

State of
 criticism.

We have, however, critics and critical review-
 ers in abundance: how comes it that their voice
 has not been raised against such vile innovations?
 I answer, these arbiters of elegance have gone
 over, themselves, into the camp of the enemy.
 They discerned the signs of the times. They
 discovered that the exclusive appetite for satire

and satirical novels, had destroyed all relish for any kind of food which had not the novel flavour:³ and that even works of learning must assume that form, if they aspired to be fashionable. Cultivating letters, not as the first of elegant pursuits, but as a mere trade, many of the workmen employed soon saw that this was a trade that might be carried on successfully, with little other stock but that of presumption and knavery. They did not combat an author to invest themselves in his spoils; they first stole his arms, then turned them insidiously against him. Instead of looking upwards to their superiors in knowledge for fair fame, they looked downwards to the multitude for sordid lucre: ridicule or ribaldry was opposed to truth and reason; the soundest arguments were encountered by a sarcasm or a sneer; and in favour of the new school, of which they were devoted partisans, many of our noblest authors were greatly depreciated, and some of the ablest of them treated with no small degree of studied contumely. There were no bounds to the idle loquacity of critics, without name and without shame; and no cessation to the thick vollies of words, which they emitted, without ever once hitting the point in question.

³ Mr. Knight, (*Inquiry into Taste*, Part iii. chap. iii. p. 452,) well observes, "that the habit which young people get, of reading for events, without any attention to language, thought, or sentiment completely unnerves all their powers of application, and makes them, incapable of learning or retaining any thing. The mind, like the body," he says, "may be thus reduced to a state of atrophy, in which knowledge, like food, may pass through it without adding either to its strength, its bulk, or its beauty."

CHAP.

I.

But it is idle to arraign writers, whom you may refute, but do not silence; whom you may stab in the vitals, but do not kill. For, month after month, or quarter after quarter, they revive periodically; enter the lists afresh, after all their errors have been exposed, all their sophisms detected, all their predictions falsified; and while their buffoonery, in the mask of erudition, amuses idleness or delights malice, they will preserve their influence, unimpaired, over readers of scanty education and lazy habits, of light minds and vicious characters.

Aristotle's
success in
this art.

When errors reach a certain height, they have a tendency to correct themselves; and their removal is said to be the work of time. But mere length of time is an inefficacious reformer. By time, on the contrary, all institutions will contract rust; and into the best of them, in the course of time, corruption will enter, merely through the love of change, and the fastidious preference of novelty to excellence. They ought all of them, therefore, in the words of a great and much injured author⁴, to be seasonably brought back to their first principles.

With this view, I have exerted my best endeavour to familiarize the modern reader with the most approved, and also the most ancient treatise extant, professing to explain, on correct philosophical principles, the merits and demerits of literary composition; to investigate the rules of taste, and establish the canons of criticism. This

⁴ This epithet is justified by my observations on the works of Machiavel, in various parts of "Aristotle's Politics."

treatise is degraded by the name of "Rhetoric," CHAP. I.
 in the present acceptation of that word. Taken
 in conjunction with the works of more exact
 science to which the author perpetually refers,
 the "Rhetoric of Aristotle" comprises, within a
 narrow compass, the absolute and unalterable
 principles of good taste⁵, the foundations of all
 correct moral reasoning, and, humanly speaking,
 the maxims of all sound practical wisdom.
 Here, especially, the Stagyrice is exercised, in a
 field which the condition of his times afforded
 advantages for cultivating, that were never
 united in any other: the agitations of many
 free states in the near neighbourhood of each
 other; the ardent and illustrious competitions
 in tribunals and public assemblies; the unri-
 valled elegance of national solemnities; and
 those high literary attainments, approved in all
 ages, themselves worthy of approbation, and
 never vilified by any but those ignorant and con-
 ceited persons, whose envious and feeble eyes
 were unable to endure their splendour. Such
 were the advantages of which Aristotle fully
 availed himself, in writing his treatise on prosaic
 composition; for he had before written his art
 of poetry, whose golden fragments have been
 translated and commented by some of the first
 names in modern literature. But his Rhetoric
 is not, like the Poetic, a fragment: it is a
 complete work, ample in detail, and strict in
 method, and comprised wholly in the three

⁵ Though *tastes* be variable to a proverb, *good taste* is ever and every where the same. How few *ages* have been adorned by it! But in these few the glory of the human species is concentrated.

CHAP. books, inscribed to Theodectes, which are here
 I. translated.

The Rhetoric inscribed to Alexander was written by Anaximenes⁶, of Lampsacus: it has little of Aristotle's depth or precision, and was edited in the body of his ample but ill-digested remains, to supply the place of his lost treatise that bore the same title: every thing of value in it is contained in the Rhetoric to Theodectes.

Analysis of
 the Rhetoric
 to Theodectes.

Of this inestimable work, the greater part turns on the three kinds of oratory first distinguished in Athens, but which retain, and must ever retain, their distinct place and character in all free states, indeed in all civilized countries. These are the deliberative and the judicial, words which sufficiently explain themselves; and that called demonstrative, because principally intended for demonstration or show, the display of high intellectual powers, the exhibition of generous and lofty sentiments.

The business of all oratory is to instruct or to persuade; but each of the three kinds has its distinct office and its peculiar end. The deliberative is employed in exhorting to certain measures, or in restraining from them; the judicial in accusation or defence; the demonstrative in praise or blame. Of the deliberative, the end is utility; it bears a reference to the present: of the judicial, the end is justice; it bears a reference to things past: of the demonstrative, which has not any appropriate time, the end is honour and glory. Each kind

⁶ Quintilian, *Inst. Orator.* l. iii. c. 4. Dionys. Halicarn. *Epist. ad Ammæum.* Compare *History of Ancient Greece*, p. ii. c. ix.

of oratory is considered by Aristotle apart, and its rules are explained under the separate heads of thought, diction, and arrangement, or method; an explanation equally evincing the vast reach of his invention, and the unerring solidity of his judgment. Boileau, himself so much distinguished by this faculty, that a cautious distributor of praise says emphatically⁷, that "Boileau will seldom be found mistaken," declares that he had learned more from Aristotle's Rhetoric, than from all the other books he had ever read in his life.⁸ This eulogy is hyperbolical, but expressive of that deep sense of gratitude, in which Horace, the precursor and the model of Boileau, would heartily have joined; for none ever turned the Rhetoric to better account than Horace, in his Satires, Epistles, and especially in his Art of Poetry.

CHAP.
I.

In treating the subject of deliberative eloquence, Aristotle takes an extensive view of the wide variety of discussions occupying senates and assemblies. He does not consider a commonwealth as a machine ingeniously contrived for multiplying riches; much less as a mere engine of war. He contemplates national prosperity under every possible aspect; divides it into its integral parts; resolves these parts into their constituent elements, and from this complete analysis deduces those topics of argument which may be successfully employed in every subject of political debate.

Deliberative eloquence.

⁷ Johnson, in his Life of Dryden.

⁸ Pour moi J'avoue franchement que sa lecture m'a plus profité que tout ce que j'ai jamais lû en ma vie.

CHAP.

I.

Judicial
eloquence.

The same process he pursues in treating the eloquence of the bar, whose end is justice. This bulwark of social life he examines and decomposes with singular perspicuity; distinguishing natural justice from that depending on positive institution, and from both of them, equity, the corrective of justice, which looks with an eye of compassion on human frailty, duly discriminating between errors and accidents on one hand, and errors and crimes on the other: errors that are committed without any pravity of purpose, and crimes that originate in willing villany; to which latter class, Aristotle refers the gratification of all inordinate and odious passions. He then explains the difference between public and private delinquency; and observes that in both, it is indispensable that terms should be clearly defined, in order to understand precisely what constitutes theft, murder, adultery, sacrilege, and treason; for in all crimes, the intention of the mind is the main point, not the external act: since the intention constitutes the whole turpitude of the transgression, and must therefore be always implied in the term by which the crime is denoted. Upon these and similar distinctions, containing the germ and more than the germ of the highest perfection to which jurisprudence ever can be carried, Aristotle builds the art of inventing those topics and arguments by which advocates may plead persuasively, and omit nothing calculated to prove that they have justice on their side.

Demon-
strative
eloquence
embraces
history.

Demonstrative eloquence may be supposed, in modern times, to have ceased. Whether destined to entertainment merely, or to entertainment

mixed with instruction, it was confined to the Olympic and other public solemnities, to which nothing parallel now exists in the world. But it should be remembered that, before the invention of printing, such rehearsals were essential to the wide and speedy diffusion of works courting celebrity. Herodotus thus read his account of the Persian expedition, at the Olympic games, where Thucydides, then in early youth, wept mingled tears of wonder and emulation. And “with what other voice, but that of demonstrative eloquence, is history, as contra-distinguished from the compilement of annals; history, the witness of time, the light of truth, the guide of life², to be delivered down from age to age, and transmitted with unimpaired effect, to the latest posterity?” Are men deserving of remembrance, that have not been distinguished by energy either in good or in evil? Can actions, entitled neither to praise nor to blame, be held worthy of commemoration? The document is taken from history, if stripped of its moral tendency, if it does not in particular describe generous and noble feelings, and by describing, inspire them. It must be acknowledged, indeed, that, in later times, a cold sceptical philosophy has infected the warmer regions of history: and writers, learned, elegant, and acute, have not exerted their highest powers in holding up good and great men to admiration, or in loading contrary characters with infamy. By a pretended balance of virtues and defects, by refined conjectures, by gratuitous suppositions,

² *Historia vero testis temporum, &c.* Cicero de Oratore, l. ii. c. 9.

CHAP. I. and sometimes by penetrating too audaciously into the hidden secrets of the heart, they would have laboured in vain to abolish the unalterable distinctions of things, but they have succeeded, in some degree, in placing historical characters more nearly on the same level. The contrary of this was the aim of an author, than whom none better understood the chief ends and uses of history. The actions of his patriots and heroes will live through all time, and keep alive for ever the flame of glory and of virtue. But the same author is not sparing in severity of censure; for he had observed “that by strong delineations of guilt and of misery, men are as powerfully restrained within the bounds of duty, as by the most engaging pictures of virtue and of happiness.”¹⁰

Depend-
ence of
oratory
on the
passions.

Aristotle's
account of
them.

Aristotle does not agitate what should seem to have become already a trite question, whether an orator must of necessity be a good man. But he maintains that he should appear to his hearers both able and willing to serve them, and should give them a favourable impression of himself, by assuming at least the semblance of virtue, and by touching their feelings in the way most favourable to his cause. It becomes necessary, therefore, to enter into an examination of the passions, in which disquisition Aristotle shows the deepest insight into human nature. He begins, as usual, with definitions, carefully collected from observation; and from them educes the causes, circumstances, and events, in which the various passions originate; the persons most likely to be actuated by them, and also the per-

¹⁰ Plutarch in Demetrio sub initio.

sons towards whom they are most likely to be directed; in other words, the persons who are their most natural objects. Having taken a general view of his subject, he proceeds to examine the passions in detail, whether simple or complex, and as differently modified by age, sex, and the external circumstances of birth, wealth, and power, or the direct contraries of these advantages. From this investigation, equally accurate and ample, sure rules are collected for exciting and managing the passions, and thus rendering them subservient to our purposes.

CHAP.

I.

Such is the *material* part of the Rhetoric; the *formal* relates to style and method: it is the counterpart of what the Poetic would have been, had that treatise come down to us entire; and it may be safely left, without any introduction, to the taste of the modern reader. Taken in the whole, the "Rhetoric" is the most complete didactic performance in existence, not excepting the elements of Euclid or the Georgic of Virgil.

But in another point of view, in which it has never hitherto been regarded, the same work is entitled to much importance. For many years back, students in antiquity have not been confined to mere philology. They have even extended their views beyond wars, negotiations, and the revolutions of empires. Their thoughts have been more seriously directed to the internal arrangements of free states, to the pursuits and attainments of their citizens; their arts, occupations, and turn of mind; their private lives and their domestic manners. Of all nations, the

The "Rhetoric," a picture of the mind and manners of the Athenians.

CHAP.

I.

Greeks, and of all Greeks the Athenians, have obtained the greatest share of regard, and excited the deepest interest; and this they unquestionably deserved, as being, of all people in the ancient world, those who approached most nearly to the actual state of modern civilization. But it appeared to me, that in the delineation of their character, the learned were too much swayed by unfair testimony; such as the profligate buffoonery of Aristophanes, and the lying whispers of Athenæus: and I presumed to point out a purer source of information in the copious remains of the Greek orators, whose speeches, of unrivalled excellence, were, I thought, too much neglected in the ordinary course of a learned education. Under this impression, nearly half a century ago, I translated the speeches of Lysias and Isocrates, which were accompanied with a discourse on the manners and character of the Greeks, from the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war to the battle of Chæronæa. In this discourse, my proofs and illustrations were taken chiefly, or rather wholly, from the Greek orators: and the period prescribed to it comprehended almost the entire lifetime of Aristotle. His treatise on popular eloquence may be considered, therefore, as a new and valuable kind of history; a history, not of battles, sieges, and seditions; not of military movements, or of civil commotions; but a history of opinions, of judgments, and of feelings; forming, as it were, the concentration or essence of all the most noted speeches and pleadings,

either in his own times, or in the age immediately preceding them. Under this aspect, an elaborate didactic work assumes a degree of historical importance, scarcely belonging to any other. It is a picture of the mind of the Athenians; a living monument of the habits of thinking, the sentiments, and maxims which prevailed among that most ingenious, and most interesting people.

CHAP.

I.

With such high recommendations, how does it happen, we may ask, that the Rhetoric is little read, and less understood? The same question may be asked, with regard to Aristotle's works in general; and a distinct answer can be given, which will include a very curious disquisition, illustrative of the most whimsical aberrations of the human understanding. Various causes have concurred to diminish the popularity of those works, originating sometimes in the very qualities which constitute their principal merit. The causes alluded to may, therefore, be divided into the internal and external: the internal, depending on the style and method of the works themselves; the external, on the singular circumstances and events, which I shall proceed presently to relate. The Stagyrice's style, and still more his method, is totally different from that to which the caprice of fashion, even in writing on philosophy, has given its temporary sanction. This, however, by no means arises from his ignorance of the rules fit to be observed in speaking, or writing, popularly. In all addresses to the multitude, he teaches, that not

Causes of the neglect of Aristotle's writings. First, the internal.

CHAP.

I.

only much extraneous matter may be introduced, but that many things really essential to the subject, may be skilfully omitted. The hearers or readers will thus be flattered with the seeming exercise of their own powers, and made to fancy that they have investigated and invented, when they have merely pursued the train of thought traced, or suggested, by another. In such compositions, impatience must not be tired; the consciousness of weakness must not be provoked; the reader must rather be left to conjecture, that he may be pleased with the notion of his own penetration. If he hits the mark, it is well; and the evil is not great, should he miss it. The contrary of all this is to be done in compositions destined to instruct. Here the learner must be led, by the rules of strict method, to a clear perception that the whole of the subject has been brought before him: by which only he can be assured that the instruction which he has received, is not partial, and deceitful, and more dangerous, perhaps, than even complete ignorance. Knowledge, thus solid and satisfactory, is laborious in the acquisition, but delightful on the review, and most profitable in the use; and for the communication of such knowledge, the style of Aristotle, chaste, sober, severe, and flowing in the clear stream of unadorned reason, is better adapted than any other, by its nicer discrimination of all the relations of things, and of all the modifications of thought; and by its power of expressing them all, with equal brevity and brightness.

The external causes which have diversified the fortunes of the same works, form a subject of vast extent. They commenced above two thousand years ago; they have operated through all succeeding centuries; and some of them are continuing to operate powerfully at the present day. From whence it has happened, that the same performances which, in some ages, were held in veneration, have, at other times, and particularly in our own, been treated with contempt. To explain the matter clearly, the following portion of this discourse must be partly historical, and partly critical. In the critical, the difficulties in the Greek text will be obviated; the erroneous interpretations of it accounted for; and the objections, I hope, clearly answered, that were made to it in remote times, and which have been much aggravated in the last and present centuries. This discussion will prepare the way for the third and last part of the present disquisition, which is to show the connection between Aristotle's Rhetoric and his exact philosophy; and to vindicate that philosophy by proofs, that all departures from it have been deviations into error.

C H A P.

I.

The external causes
— division
of the
subject.

In former works I endeavoured to explain how Aristotelism, which had flourished under the immediate successors of Alexander, was corrupted, in the following reigns, by the sect of Pythagoreans¹⁰, and afterwards, under the declining empire of Rome, still more perverted

Philosophy corrupted by the Pythagoreans and Platonicians.

¹⁰ See History of Ancient Greece, p. ii. vol. ii. c. xi. pp. 331. et seq. 8vo. edit.

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Aristotel-
ism in the
age of
Cicero and
Augustus.

and darkened by the kindred sect of Platonicians.¹¹ But between these periods of obscurity, there was an interval of distinguished brightness. The writings of Aristotle, having been carried to Rome, by Sylla, the Dictator, acquired in the age of Cicero, and maintained through that of Augustus, a similar regard from Romans qualified to appreciate them, which they had enjoyed among Greeks in the reign of Alexander. By the study of them at Rome, men of the finest genius, and the soundest judgment, enlarged their views, improved their taste, and sharpened their natural acuteness. From the corrupt state in which they were edited, part of those works, indeed, could not be understood without more painful contention of mind than men of the world, and in the higher ranks of society, are usually willing to exert on matters of mere speculation. But much also, remained, clear, copious, and easily accessible, concerning the affairs of human life, and the practical business of the world. This failed not to make its due impression on congenial minds, and established a sort of perennial philosophy, altered, however, considerably from the original, by transmission from one tongue to another, and from one writer to another, on the subjects of morals, politics, jurisprudence, and criticism.

Communi-
cated
through
the medi-

The great corrupters of Greek philosophy, as I have shown in another work, were the Platonicians, or Eclectics, who began with the third

¹¹ See Supplement to the New Analysis of Aristotle's Works, pp. 132, et seq. 3d edit.

century in Alexandria, and who flourished in that city, in Athens, and in Rome, for three hundred and fifty years, till their schools were silenced by the Emperor Justinian, in the middle of the sixth century. The abolition of their schools did not destroy the credit of many eminent members of the sect itself, whose wildest visions were eagerly adopted by the credulous Greeks of Constantinople, and by them frequently combined with the spurious Christianity¹² long prevalent in that licentious yet gloomy capital. From Constantinople, they passed to Bagdad¹³, where, in the ninth century, under the Caliph Almanon and his successors, many Greek books of science were translated into Arabic, chiefly by Greeks themselves, particularly the physician Honain, with the assistance of his sons and disciples.¹⁴

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um of the
Eclectics
to Con-
stantino-
ple, Bag-
dad, and
other cities
of the East.

Every thing relative to morals or to taste, was equally abhorrent from the religion and from the policy of the Moslems. But from the ninth century to the thirteenth, the abstract sciences of the Greeks were cultivated in the great cities professing the Mahometan faith, both in Asia and in Europe. The physics and metaphysics of Aristotle attracted their especial regard, and were interpreted and commented by Alpharabius, Avicenna, and Averroes, the three successive luminaries of the three learned ages of

The Phy-
sics and
Metaphy-
sics com-
mented by
the learned
among the
Moslems.

¹² Michael Psellus affords a striking example of this mixture in his book, *Περὶ ενεργείας δαιμονίων*.

¹³ Giannone *Historia del Regno de Napoli*, vol. ii. p. 93. Edit. Venet.

¹⁴ D'Herbelot *Biblioth. Orientale*. Article, Honain.

CHAP. I. the Saracens. These Arabic versions, fraught with many follies, speedily found their way into Europe, where they met and mixed with the monkish learning of the West, with which they were well calculated to amalgamate, since both, as far as concerns philosophy, were derived from the same polluted eclectic source.

The science combined with monkish learning.

The Scholastics totally deviated from Aristotle in speculation and practice.

They were long the bulwark of the Roman Catholic church.

Their authority

In the thirteenth century, the heavy heterogeneous mass, brightened by occasional sparks of false subtilty, assumed a Latin dress in the ponderous tomes of Albertus Magnus the German, Thomas Aquinas the Italian, and Duns Scotus, whose name was once deemed an ornament to his country. These, and other distinguished scholastics, had the name of the Stagirite perpetually in their mouths, while they greatly mistook his speculative tenets, and equally neglected his practical admonitions. It was his counsel, with which his example conformed, never to intermix the concerns of philosophy with those of the popular religion.¹⁵ But the scholastics universally regarded philosophy as a mere handmaid to vulgar superstition; and their main drift was to uphold the dominion of the Pope, and the belief of those erroneous doctrines, on which it had been erected. For the space of nearly four centuries, a mistaken Aristotelism was thus rendered the bulwark of the Roman Catholic faith, and the Stagirite's name was preposterously employed in defence of the two things which he most abominated, — superstition and tyranny.

The first general assault made on the scholas-

¹⁵ Metaph. ii. 4. et passim.

tics, happened at the revival of letters in the fifteenth century. In the middle of that century, Constantinople, after being long threatened, was finally taken by the Turks. The danger and distress of that imperial city filled Europe with Greeks, craving public protection and private bounty; but whether they appeared as ambassadors, or as needy exiles, always ready to perform the functions of professors¹⁶ in any of the great schools of the West. In Rome and Florence, and other Italian cities, Manuel Chrysoloras, the Cardinal Bessarion, and the venerated master of both, Gemistus Pletho, are celebrated for the introduction of a new and more liberal philosophy¹⁷, instead of the Aristotelism which had long reigned in Christendom. The new doctrines were embraced by many of the great and learned, and by none more zealously than by Cosmo de Medici, who founded in Florence the Platonic academy, the first literary institution in modern Europe, not erected under the auspices of the Church. But the same delusions which had deceived the old age and dotage of the declining empire of Rome, again seduced the childhood and imbecility of newly-revived Italy. Of the boasted Platonic academy, Marsilius Ficinus continued, during four generations of the Medici, to be the ornament, or rather the oracle; but his works, and those of his contemporaries,

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feebly attacked by Greek Platonists in the fifteenth century.

¹⁶ Hodus de Græcis illustribus, pp. 25. et seq.

¹⁷ Tiraboschi Histor. Litterar. vol. vi. p. 259. and Roscoe's Life of Lorenzo.

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afford abundant proof, that this new sect is little entitled to the encomiums that have been lavished on it. Adverse, indeed, to the Popish superstition, but thereby rendered hostile to Christianity itself¹⁸, the thoughts of these Italian Platonists perpetually turn on the reveries of Pythagorean members or Platonic ideas; and their writings, like those of their Greek masters, are deformed by the mystical powers of words or sounds, by sympathies and antipathies, by the dreams of astrology and the dogmas of theurgy¹⁹: a mistaken Aristotelism had been enlisted in the service of the Church; a more fanciful Platonism was now arrayed against it.

The Reformers in religion confounded Aristotle with the School divines.

These light skirmishers made but a feeble impression on the sacred edifice, and on the scholastic divinity by which it was upheld. Both were destined to be assailed speedily by more efficacious arms. With the light of the Gospel, the champions of reformation dispelled the pestilent exhalations, and disparted the gorgeous but cloud-built castles, with which the schoolmen had surrounded a fortress of adamant. For the genuine philosophy of Aristotle remained entire, unhurt, and alike concealed from the combatants on either side. The reformers, engaged in an infinitely greater undertaking, were not concerned in distinguish-

¹⁸ Leo Allatius de Georgiis apud Fabricium Biblioth. Græc. tom. x. p. 751.

¹⁹ Vid. Marsilium Ficinum de Vita cœlitus comparand. The chapters de virtute verborum ad beneficium celeste captandum, are worthy of Plotinus himself.

ing the master from his unworthy scholars, and in separating the gold from the dross. All truth, indeed, is necessarily consistent; and reason and revelation, coming from the same God of truth, can never possibly announce themselves in contradictory propositions. Real religion, therefore, can have nothing to fear from true philosophy. But in the zeal for reformation, these plain truths were not sufficiently regarded. Great and good men are obnoxious to human frailty; and the highest-minded among them, invulnerable to pleasure, are not equally secure against the disturbance of anger.

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It was sufficient to provoke this anger, that Aristotle's name had been employed for many centuries, as the prop of a church that affected to be universal, headed by a man who pretended to be infallible. To retaliate for this imputed injury, there is no excess of invective, no extravagance of calumny, no grossness of abusive ribaldry, to which the first reformers did not descend, and employ bitterly against his writings and his person.²⁰ A large portion of the same spirit, corrected only by the more softened manners of the times, was imbibed by the theologians who followed them. From these learned divines, the hostile disposition was communi-

Their bitter censures taken on trust by the world.

²⁰ Nisi caro fuisset Aristoteles, vere diabolum cum fuisse, haud puderet dicere.—Aristoteles princeps tenebrarum, triceps Cerberus, tricorpor Geryon bestia, et quidem teterrima. Such was the style in which Aristotle is treated by Luther and his followers. The learned Melancthon formed an exception. See the articles, Luther and Melancthon, in Bayle.

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cated even to the ingenious and liberal of other professions; and by them diffused through society at large, especially among those individuals who aimed at distinction by refinement of taste and elegance of literature. At length the reading of Aristotle, which too was made an object of reproach, was confined within the walls of a few colleges, whilst every writer who piqued himself on being fashionable, or aspired to become so, must have a sneer at the organum, and a fling at the Stagirite.²¹

²¹ Of this carping disposition the examples are innumerable. I shall be contented with the following quotation from an ingenious and popular work, in which it was least to be expected. "Aristotle has observed that, in poetry, that which is credible but impossible, is preferable to that which is possible but incredible.¹ This great philosopher's acuteness seems, however, in this instance, to have forsaken him; for, in reasoning from experience or analogy, possibility is only a degree of credibility; and the greater degree must necessarily include the less; wherefore, that which is thought to be credible, must previously be thought to be possible. A negative, too, in its nature, excludes all degrees whatever; for, where there is none, there cannot be either more or less: and though a negative on one side may, in some cases, imply an affirmative, either contingent or necessary, on the other, it is surely most absurdly paradoxical to assert, that an absolute negative on one side, may include a contingent affirmative on the other side. Yet this is the conclusion to which we must come, before we admit of a *credible impossible*. But the nature and extent of human knowledge had not been ascertained in the time of the Stagirite; it being to the profound investigation of our own countrymen, particularly Locke, that we owe these most important discoveries in philosophy." Thus does this elegant scholar go out of his way to exalt Locke, at the expense of Aristotle; and even engage in the rash attempt of overwhelming the latter by the weight of his own syllogisms. But he forgets what Aristotle has taught, that the show of syllogism may exist without the substance. The impossible in Mr. Knight's premiss, are things *believed* to be impossible, which it would be a contradiction in terms to call *credible*. The impossible in Aristotle, are things *impossible* in their own nature;

¹ Knight on Taste, part II. c. ii p. 269.

It happened, unfortunately, that the only writers who ventured to oppose this popular current, had deeply imbibed the errors of the

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Mr. Harris
and Lord

but which, he teaches, may, by the admirable skill of the poet, be rendered credible²: and had Mr. Knight advanced a little further in the same chapter, he would have found the following words, which distinctly trace up what he calls Aristotle's absurdity, to the confusion in his own mind.³ "In things apparently contradictory, we must examine whether the same thing be spoken of; whether in the same respect, and in the same sense."

In opposition to such criticisms, for they are all alike founded on misconception, I cannot refrain from citing a passage from an author not less eminent in erudition and in science, than in rank and character. In 1816, Dr. Magee, now archbishop of Dublin, having bestowed his approbation on my interpretation of Aristotle, subjoins, "It has been singularly the fate of the Greek philosopher, to be at one time superstitiously venerated, and at another contemptuously ridiculed; without sufficient pains taken, either by his adversaries or his admirers, to understand his meaning. It has been too frequently his misfortune to be judged from the opinions of his followers, rather than from his own. Even the celebrated Locke is not to be acquitted of this unfair treatment of his illustrious predecessor in the paths of metaphysics; although, perhaps, it is not too much to say of his well-known Essay, that there is scarcely to be found in it one valuable and important truth concerning the operations of the understanding, which may not be traced in Aristotle's writings; whilst, at the same time, they exhibit many results of deep thinking, which have entirely escaped Locke's perspicacity. Indeed it may be generally pronounced of those who have within the two last centuries been occupied in the investigation of the intellectual powers of man, that had they studied Aristotle more, and (what would have been a necessary consequence) reviled him less, they would have been more successful in their endeavours to extend the sphere of human knowledge." Magee on Atonement, vol. ii. p. 4., fourth edit.

² Confer Poetic. c. xxv. p. 269, and p. 277. edit. Buhle. The English reader may consult Twining's translation, part iii. sect. vi. p. 119. and part iv. sect. vi. p. 130.

³ Mr. Knight acknowledges "that very ignorant persons may think even probable, what the learned know to be impossible." Knight, *ibid.* But according to Aristotle, a great poet will produce this effect on the learned and unlearned.

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I.

Monbod-
do guided
by the
Alexan-
drian com-
mentators.

My design
was to do
for philo-
sophy what
the Re-
formers
had done
for reli-
gion.

The
objections
against
Aristotel-
ism renew-
ed and
embodied

Alexandrian school, and never ceased to view the Stagirite's writings through the antic trappings in which those visionary commentaries had disguised them. In this manner the labours of two ingenious and learned men, the elegant Mr. Harris and the acute Lord Monboddo, had a tendency rather to increase the evil than to remedy it.

Under these circumstances, to a translation of the Ethics and Politics, I prefixed a life of the author, and a new analysis of his speculative works. This I did, that the efficacy of his important practical lessons, instead of being weakened by the false subtleties and glaring absurdities erroneously ascribed to him, might receive additional authority from his virtues as a man, and his pre-eminence as a philosopher. My undertaking, indeed, was not a light one. I was ambitious of doing for philosophy what the reformers had done for religion; to remove an oppressive weight of cumbrous and incongruous appendages, and to show the original text of truth in its genuine purity. With the success of my work, I had no reason to be dissatisfied: it was read by the learned; recommended by the general voice of public criticism; and, what was of real importance, Aristotle again became an author in some degree popular. Not many years before my publication, his writings had been attacked in a manner more marked than ordinary, by three men of much eminence, Lord Kames, Dr. Reid, and Dr. Campbell; and since that publication, to which he does me the honour

frequently to advert, Professor Dugald Stewart, long considered as the chief ornament of the University of Edinburgh, has re-enforced the attack, by repeating all the strictures of his precursors, and combining with them many new objections of his own. This circumstance will afford me an advantage which every author should much prize; it will enable me to consult the conveniency of my readers, by referring them solely to the well known and justly admired volumes of Mr. Stewart. I shall endeavour, therefore, to show every one of the strictures or objections contained in them to be founded on misconception; and should this be done to the complete satisfaction of my readers, their minds will be prepared for entering on the more important part of this discourse; I mean that abstruse but accurate science, to which the treatise on Rhetoric perpetually refers; a science which, rightly understood, would have stifled in their birth many romances that have long passed for philosophy.

C H A P.
I.

by Mr.
Stewart.

I know not whether it be worth while to advert, in the outset, to an observation, in which Mr. Stewart's candour would not have allowed him to indulge, had he read attentively the words that gave occasion to it. In the preface to my translation and analysis, I say that the present work is a fit counterpart to my history of ancient Greece, since "the learning of Greece properly terminates in the Stagirite, by whom it was embodied into one great work; a work rather impaired than improved by the labours of

Objection 1.
answered.

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succeeding ages.”²² Mr. S. cites these words with a point of admiration²³, as if I had intended to insinuate that no improvement had been made in learning or science since the days of Aristotle. The possibility of this erroneous construction was anticipated by the words immediately preceding, in the same preface; where I say, “it is time to draw the line between those writings of Aristotle, which still merit the attention of the modern reader, and those of which the perusal is superseded by more complete information.” The question, therefore, is not about learning in general, much less concerning modern science: I speak of the learning or philosophy of Greece, which, I think, instead of advancing, has been fully shown in the supplement to my analysis to have been almost uniformly retrograde from the period that I specify.

Objection 2.
answered.

The following objection appears to me not less frivolous. I had said in my analysis, “that Aristotle’s logic, instead of being derived from any thing analogous to mathematical axioms, was founded on the natural and universal structure of language.”²⁴ Upon quoting these words, Mr. S. exclaims, “Is it possible that Aristotle should have thought of applying to mere grammatical principles the epithets, necessary, immutable, and eternal?”²⁵ This question implies an un-

²² Aristotle’s Ethics, &c. preface, p. x. 3d edit.

²³ Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. ii. p. 327

²⁴ Analysis, p. 64. and the Greek texts there referred to.

²⁵ Elements, vol. ii. p. 251.

intentional²⁶, but exact coincidence of thought, CHAP. I.
 with the following passage in the far-famed }
 "Diversions of Purley." "Truth is that which
 is trowed: that every man in his communications
 with others, should speak what he troweth, is of
 so great importance to mankind, that it ought
 not to surprise us, if we find the most extrava-
 gant praises bestowed upon truth. But truth sup-
 poses mankind, for whom, and by whom alone the
 word is formed, and to whom only it is appli-
 cable. If no man, no truth. There is, there-
 fore, no such thing as eternal, immutable, and
 everlasting truth; unless mankind, such as they
 are at present, be also eternal, immutable, and
 everlasting."²⁷ Now one and the same remark
 will serve to answer this captious sophism of
 Horne Tooke, and to obviate Mr. S.'s objection.
 It is well known, that the same word in Greek
 denotes both reason and speech, because in
 speech the acts of the mind are marked, ex-
 pressed, and recorded, namely, those analyses
 and inductions, those comparisons, abstractions,
 and conclusions, which constitute, collectively,
 the whole body of reasoning.²⁸ By confounding


²⁶ I say *unintentional*, because Mr. S. has animadverted at great length, and I think with great justice, on the general scope of Mr. Tooke's Philology. I wish, however, that his answers were more precise; and I hope that what he says in reply to Mr. Tooke, with regard to the point in question in the text, will appear more intelligible to many readers than it does to me. See Stewart's Philosophical Essays, Essay v. p. 181: "With regard to abstraction," &c.

²⁷ Diversions of Purley, vol. ii. p. 404. 2d edit.

²⁸ Aristot. Metaph. l. iv. c. iv. p. 874. Isocrates ad Nicoclem, p. 28. edit. Wolf. holds the same doctrine; which Horace also countenances in his fanciful and frightful picture of men ignorant of language. Satir. l. i., Satir. 3.

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I.



the rules of grammar with the intellectual principles of man, to which language owes its *formation*, Mr. Tooke says, “I think I have said enough to discard that imagined operation of the mind called abstraction, and proved that what we call by that name, is only one of the many contrivances of language for the purpose of more speedy communication.” I would ask Mr. Tooke, or Mr. Stewart, whether the thing called language did, of itself, create these *contrivances*. Mr. T. speaks here²⁹ as if it did so: but, such personifications, allowable in poetry and rhetoric, are mere quibbles in philosophy.³⁰

Answer to
objec-
tion iii.

Akin to this objection is another, which will require a little, and but a little, more length of discussion. Having observed that Aristotle’s object was not merely to multiply or collect facts, but to arrange and to explain them, I subjoin, “this can be done only through the medium of a well defined and highly cultivated language, and the language of Aristotle will be found the most copious and complete, the most

²⁹ Diversions of Purley.

³⁰ A question has been agitated, whether God taught man language, or whether he only endowed him with the mental powers and bodily organs calculated to invent and frame it. The text in scripture, as it runs in Hebrew, Greek, and English, should seem to admit of either interpretation: “And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air, and brought them to Adam, to see what he would call them; and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof.” Genesis ii. 19. If we adopt the former interpretation, language is derived from the infinite intelligence of God; if we adopt the latter, language is derived from that limited portion of intellect communicated by God to man: by either interpretation my answer to Mr. Tooke is fully justified.

precise and accurate, ever employed by any philosopher, serving at once as the readiest channel of conveyance, and the fittest instrument of discovery. In his physical and moral works, facts known and ascertained are reduced to their simplest expressions, and those doubtfully inferred or suspected, are, according to the true spirit of analysis, denoted by words expressive merely of relations to facts previously established."³¹ I had said before, that when terms are chosen with that propriety which shines in the works of the Stagirite, language became an analytic art, in which light Aristotle himself viewed it: "an opinion which philosophers had begun very generally to adopt." When I used these words, I had in view Lavoisier's Chemistry, which I had just happened to read in Mr. Kerr's translation, not having at hand the original. Lavoisier's words are, "while engaged in this employment, (the composition of his Elements of Chemistry,) I perceived better than I had ever done before, the justice of the following maxims of the Abbé de Condillac. "We think only through the medium of words. Languages are true analytical methods; algebra is at the same time, a language and a method; the art of reasoning is nothing more than a language well arranged." To this opinion Mr. S. gave his sanction, in the first volume of his Elements; but, in the second, published twenty years afterwards, he was induced to make recantation, upon reading the Baron Degerando's improvements on Condillac.

³¹ Analysis, p. 161.

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CHAP. I. He observes, therefore, "that after Dr. Gillies's strong and explicit assertion of the priority of Aristotle's claim to the opinion, which philosophers have begun very generally to adopt, it is to be hoped that Mr. Degerando will be allowed to enjoy the undisputed honour of having seen a little further into this fundamental article of logic than the Stagirite himself."³²

To what then do Mr. Degerando's improvements amount? Take them in his own words, as cited by Mr. S.³³ "In asserting that languages may be regarded as analytical methods, I have added the qualifying phrase, in a certain sense, for the word method cannot be employed here with exact propriety. Languages furnish the occasion and the means of analysis; that is to say, they afford us assistance in following that method, but they are not the method itself. They resemble signals, or finger-posts, placed on a road to enable us to discover our way; and if they help us to analyse, it is because they are themselves the results of an analysis which has been previously made; nor do they contribute to keep us in the right path, but in proportion to the degree of judgment with which that analysis has been conducted." With the whole of this doctrine I agree, and think that, in explaining Aristotle, I had completely anticipated it. The analysis, of which language is the monument, will certainly, like every other, be more or less perfect in proportion to the attention and

³² Elements, vol. ii. p. 137.

³³ Elements, &c. p. 135.

judgment with which it has been conducted; and in proportion to the same circumstances, will the power of language be augmented, when used as an instrument of thought; for general or abstract terms, verbal analogies, no, nor algebraic equations, do not operate spontaneously. They are not like the statues of Dædalus, or the tripods of Vulcan, efficient powers and living energies, which,

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I.

Wondrous to tell! instinct with spirit, roll'd
From place to place, around the blest abodes,
Self mov'd, obedient to the beck of Gods!³⁴

In the New Analysis,³⁵ I observe that Aristotle's logic has been strangely perplexed by mistranslating a sentence highly perspicuous. According to this sentence, one term is said to be contained in another, when the second can be predicated of the first in the full extent of its meaning; and one term is predicated of another in the full extent of its meaning, when there is not any particular denoted by the subject to which the predicate does not apply.³⁶ Dr. Reid, on the contrary, following the ordinary misinterpretations, tells us that the being in a subject, and the being truly predicated of a subject, are used by Aristotle, in his Analytics, as synonymous phrases.³⁷ But the truth is, that these phrases are so far from being used as synonymous,

Answer
to objec-
tion 4.

³⁴ Iliad viii.

³⁵ P. 71.

³⁶ Analyt. Prior. l. i. c. i. p. 134. edit. Buhle, and c. iv. p. 140.

³⁷ Kames's Sketches, vol. iii. p. 316.

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that the meaning of the one is directly the reverse of the meaning of the other. Upon this criticism of mine, Mr. S. observes, "While I readily admit the justness of this criticism on Dr. Reid, I must take the liberty of adding, that I consider Reid's error as a mere slip of the pen. That he might have accused Aristotle of confounding two things, which, though different in part, had yet a certain degree of resemblance or affinity, is by no means impossible: but it is scarcely conceivable, that he should be so careless as to accuse him of confounding two things which he invariably states in direct opposition to each other."³⁸ I commend Mr. S. for his zeal in the defence of his adopted guide in philosophy, and of so wise and good a man, as from personal acquaintance, I knew Dr. Reid to be. But the defence is rendered altogether ineffectual by the words of Dr. Reid himself, who subjoins, "Aristotle's distinction between the phrases 'being in a subject, and being said of a subject,' in the 'Categories,' have led some writers to conclude that the 'Categories' were not written by Aristotle."³⁹ Dr. Reid's mistake, therefore, being a matter of deliberation, could not proceed from a mere slip of the pen; it runs through the rest of his work, and sometimes becomes the cause of his speaking with much disrespect of the author, whose work he professes to illustrate.⁴⁰ For this task, Dr. Reid possessed

³⁸ Elements of Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 268.

³⁹ See Kames's Sketches, as above.

⁴⁰ Kames's Sketches, vol. iii. p. 364. Comp. New Analysis, p. 84.

many requisites; patience, candour, learning, and science. What he wanted was a deeper and more intimate acquaintance with Aristotle's writings. He adopted such erroneous accounts of them as, for reasons above given, had been generally received⁴¹; and was contented with the Latin version, instead of critically examining the Greek text. Even in the latest version of all, that of the laborious and learned Theophilus Buhle, I find the same radical error that I had previously detected in Dr. Reid.⁴²

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I.

The following animadversion is also founded entirely on a mistranslation, and one that could not have been easily committed by any person at all conversant with Aristotle's works. It relates to a most important subject, that of induction, the direct primary source of all our knowledge. Mr. S. dwells on this subject in all his volumes, comparing, and, as he thinks, contrasting the induction of Aristotle with that of Lord Bacon, for the declared purpose of proving the great superiority of the latter. It does not appear, however, that he has thought it worth while to peruse the problems, the mechanical questions, the various treatises on the affections of brute or organised matter; above all, the original and most accurate inquiries into sensation, memory, fancy, reminiscence, and intellect, in all of which Aristotle's reasonings are inductions

Answer to
objection
5. on the
subject of
induction.

⁴¹ I say this not merely from his account of the Organum in Kames's Sketches, but from his Inquiry into the Human Mind. See particularly chap. vii. p. 366. et seq. 3d edit.

⁴² Unum in toto esse altero, et unum de omni altero prædicari idem est. Buhle, vol. ii. p. 87. Beponti, 1793.

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from observation, and from experience in its largest sense, accompanied often with those distinctions, exceptions, and exclusions, so strongly and so justly recommended by Lord Bacon.⁴³ Without entering into this boundless field, it will better answer the purpose of a discourse aiming at all possible perspicuity, to borrow my illustration from geometry, the clearest of all sciences. From this it will appear, that Mr. S. mistakes what he calls Aristotle's induction, and that his mistake is occasioned by an erroneous translation. "Dr. Wallis⁴⁴," he says, "justly observes, that inductions are of frequent use in mathematical demonstration; in which, after enumerating all the possible cases, it is proved, that the proposition in question is true of each of these considered separately; and the general conclusion is thence drawn, that the theorem holds universally. Thus, if it were shown, that, in all right-angled triangles, the three angles are equal to two right angles, and that the same thing is true in all acute-angled, and also in all obtuse-angled triangles; it would necessarily follow, that in every triangle the three angles are equal to two right angles; these three cases manifestly exhausting all the possible varieties of which the hypothesis is susceptible." For introducing this passage from Wallis, Mr. Stewart says, "his motive was to correct an idea which, it is not impossible, may have contributed to mislead some of Wallis's readers. As

⁴³ See the *Novum Organum*.

⁴⁴ Stewart's *Elements*, vol. ii. p. 347.

the professed design of the treatise in question was to expound the logic of Aristotle, agreeably to the views of its original author ; and as all its examples and illustrations assume as truths the Peripatetic tenets, it was not unnatural to refer to the same venerated source, the few incidental reflections with which Wallis has enriched his work. Of this number is the foregoing remark, which differs so widely from Aristotle's account of mathematical induction, that I was anxious to bring the two opinions into immediate contrast. The following is a faithful translation from Aristotle's own words : " If any person were to show, by particular demonstrations, that every triangle, separately considered, the equilateral, the scalene, and the isosceles, has its three angles equal to two right angles, he would not therefore know that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, except after a sophistical manner. Nor would he know this as an universal property of a triangle, though besides these, no other triangle can be conceived to exist, for he does not know that it belongs to it *qua* triangle : nor that it belongs to every triangle, excepting in regard to number ; his knowledge not extending to it as a property of the genus, although it is impossible that there should be an individual which that genus does not include." After giving this unintelligible translation from the clearest of all writers, Mr. Stewart proceeds to remark ; " For what reason Aristotle should have thought of applying to such an induction as this the epithet sophistical, it is difficult to

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conjecture. That it is more tedious, and therefore less elegant, than a general demonstration of the same theorem, is undoubtedly true; but it is not, on that account, the less logical, nor, in point of form, the less rigorously geometrical.”⁴⁵ Now I am compelled, much against my will, flatly to contradict Mr. S.: for Wallis’s doctrine of induction perfectly coincides with that of Aristotle. Had Mr. S. been better acquainted with the latter, he would have perceived that the words which he translates, “after a sophistical manner⁴⁶,” and “excepting in regard to number,” have a quite different meaning from that which his translation conveys to an English reader. Aristotle here uses the epithet, “sophistical,” without the least intention of saying that the reasoning is erroneous, or employed for the purpose of deceit. As, on other occasions, he clearly defines the word, by saying, that to reason “after the sophistic manner,” is to reason, not from the thing itself, but from its concomitants or accessories. In reasoning from the definition of the thing itself, he observes, that of two contradictory predications, one must be true, and the other must be false; but if we reason from mere concomitants, both may be true, and both may be false⁴⁷; a mode of argumentation which best suited the sophists who disputed, not for truth, but for victory. When a geometer, therefore, reasons from the isosceles,

⁴⁵ Stewart’s Elements, vol. ii. p. 347. et seq.

⁴⁶ Analyt. Post. l. i. c. 5.

⁴⁷ Analyt. Post. l. i. c. 6. p. 451. Edit. Buhle.

the equilateral, or the scalene, he reasons after the sophistic manner, because he reasons from mere accessories or appendages; from things, any of which may be taken away, still leaving the triangle itself, that is, the rectilineal figure, contained by three sides. Accordingly, in the same chapter⁴⁸, which Mr. S. has in part translated, Aristotle tells us that the proposition in question, namely, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two rights, is as independent of their being equilateral, or scalene, as of their being composed of brass or of wood. This, however, does not in the least invalidate his doctrine of induction, to wit, that our knowledge ascends from particulars to generals; and his perfect agreement with Dr. Wallis, that, when the enumeration of particulars is complete, the truths derived from induction are as firm and certain as those derived from demonstration itself.

In the philosophy of Aristotle, induction is the corner stone. He declares explicitly, indeed, that all correct reasoning must proceed from definitions; but whence come definitions themselves? He answers, from induction, that is, in other words, from intellect operating on experience.⁴⁹ In the sense in which the word idea is taken by the schoolmen, his pretended followers, and even by Mr. Locke⁵⁰, Aristotle

Definitions
formed by
induction.

⁴⁸ Analyt. Post. l. i. c. 5.

⁴⁹ Ethics, l. vi.

⁵⁰ As objects present to the mind in thinking; impressions or images on the mind analogous to those of external objects on the visual nerve, &c.

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denies the existence, not only of innate ideas, but of any ideas whatsoever. But we have, he says, perceptions of things around us, the memory retains these perceptions, and many acts of memory coalesce into one experience⁵¹; the understanding classing and assorting the various objects perceived, and marking those that are alike by a common name; a name that recalls to the mind its own acts, and the individual things on which these acts had been exerted; and thereby lays the foundation of true propositions concerning them.⁵² In this manner, without instruction and without a master, without the form of syllogism, or conscious deduction of any kind, the mind comes to the knowledge of those radical truths, admitted by all reasonable creatures: which truths are the foundations of definitions, as definitions, again, are the foundation of all correct science.⁵³

Answer
to objec-
tion 6.

Had Mr. S. paid any attention to these observations, he would not have written as follows: "The idea that all demonstrative science must rest ultimately on axioms, has been borrowed with many other erroneous maxims from the logic of Aristotle; but is now, in general, stated in a manner much more consistent (though perhaps not nearer to the truth) than in the works of that philosopher. According to Dr. Reid, the degree of evidence which accompanies our

⁵¹ In Libro de Memor. et Reminiscentia, c. i. ii. p. 680. and 685. Conf. Analyt. Post. l. ii. c. 15. and Problem. Sect. xxv. p. 797.

⁵² See New Analysis, p. 63. et seq.

⁵³ Metaph. l. iv. c. 4. p. 873. Conf. p. 881. and l. xi. c. 5. p. 959.

conclusions, is necessarily determined by the degree of evidence which accompanies our first principles; so that if the latter be only probable, it is perfectly impossible that the former should be certain. Agreeing, therefore, with Aristotle in considering axioms as the basis of all demonstrative science, he was led at the same time to consider them as eternal, immutable truths, which are perceived to be such by an intuitive judgment of the understanding. This, however, is not the language of Aristotle; for while he tells us that there is no demonstration but of eternal truths, he asserts that the first principles which are the foundation of all demonstration, are got by induction from the informations of sense. In what manner this apparent contradiction is to be reconciled, I leave to the consideration of his future commentators.”⁵⁴ Upon this passage I have to observe, that Aristotle nowhere says that demonstrative science must rest on axioms, but always says that it must rest on definitions. His uniform practice is agreeable to this maxim. In all his treatises, as well as in the Rhetoric here translated, he will be found to reason constantly from definitions, and from them only. This proceeding was the necessary result of his notion of definitions and of axioms, the former being, as he says, those primary truths or principles from which innumerable secondary truths may be said to flow⁵⁵: whereas, axioms are those simple elements im-

⁵⁴ Elements of the Philosophy, &c. p. 260.

⁵⁵ Metaph. l. v. c. 1. and 3.

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plied in all our reasoning⁵⁶, but from which no new truth can possibly be derived. Mr. S., after discussing this subject at great length, through several sections⁵⁷ of his work, comes at last to the same conclusions, which both Aristotle and Mr. Locke had drawn before him.⁵⁸ In one important particular, indeed, he differs from them widely; pronouncing all demonstrative reasoning to be merely hypothetical; which, because so wise and good a man as Mr. S. has said it, I am unwilling to call a monstrous error, and fraught with monstrous consequences. But of this there will be a fitter occasion to speak hereafter. At present I shall digress a little, by way of relaxation, to notice a very whimsical opinion of Mr. Stewart's, derived from his mistaken notion of Aristotle's doctrine of induction.

Answer to
objection
7. that
Aristotle
stole his
logic from
India.

This doctrine, as understood by Mr. S., is certainly at variance with the doctrine of syllogism, of which Aristotle claims the invention, but which Mr. S. is disposed to refuse him, and to assign to the ancient natives of India. The Stagirite's claim is stated by himself, with his usual precision. Having noticed the slow progress of arts in general, he remarks, "that those who have given to them their last improvements, are often more

⁵⁶ *Ἦν δ' ἀναγκὴ εἶναι ὅτιον μαθησομενον, ἀξίωμα.* Analyt. Post. l. i. c. 3. p. 439. But the word axiom has been employed to express not only a simple intuitive truth, but also a truth of importance and dignity, and most worthy to be known. In this latter sense, it is much used by Lord Bacon; it is sometimes so employed by Greek writers, and of this ambiguity, Mr. S. is the dupe, when he considers "the fabric of syllogism as built on an axiom." Vol. ii. pp. 245. and 258.

⁵⁷ Sections ii. iii. iv. vol. ii. p. 28. to p. 99.

⁵⁸ Compar. Aristot. ubi supra. Locke's Essay, b. iv. c. 7. p. 280.

in esteem than those who first laid their foundations; though this is the matter of chief importance, since in all things the beginning is the principal, the most difficult; small, indeed, in appearance, but mighty in power. On the subjects of politics and rhetoric, much had been said by preceding writers, but nothing whatever on the subject of syllogism. He had, therefore, begun and treated this art to the best of his abilities, sparing neither time nor pains. Should a performance, therefore, thus unaided by any preceding exertions, stand a comparison with works which many had concurred to elaborate, he trusted that his hearers would be grateful for what was done, and indulgent to his omissions.”⁵⁹ What does Mr. S. set in opposition to this strong averment? A hearsay of the Hindoos of the Panjab, a people whose history is mere mythology, and whose errors in geography and chronology are monstrous. This hearsay is, however, countenanced by Sir William Jones, the great orientalist, as he has been called, and whose talents have been appreciated at a just and high value from an union, not very common, of the eastern tongues, with a critical knowledge of Greek. I had the pleasure of his acquaintance many years ago, when his studies, however, were not so much directed to the philosophers, as to Greek orators and poets. The passage from Sir William’s Discourse to the Asiatic Society, cited by Mr. Stewart, is, indeed, highly poetical.⁶⁰ “We now

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⁵⁹ Aristot. vol. v. p. 640. Edit. Buhle.

⁶⁰ Elements, vol. ii. p. 304.

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live among the adorers of those very deities who were worshipped in Greece. On one hand we see the trident of Neptune, the eagle of Jupiter, the satyrs of Bacchus, the bow of Cupid, and the chariot of the Sun. In more retired scenes, in groves and in seminaries of learning, we may perceive the Brachmans and the Sermanes, disputing in the forms of logic, or discoursing on the vanity of human wishes, on the immortality of the soul, her emanation from the eternal mind, her debasements, wanderings, and final union with her source." In a subsequent discourse, the same flowery writer mentions, on the authority of a Mahometan historian, a report that Callisthenes, nephew, as he is called, to Aristotle, and who accompanied Alexander into Asia, transmitted to the philosopher a technical system of logic. "If this be true," Sir William observes, "it is one of the most interesting facts that I have met with in Asia."⁶¹ Upon this fact, taken for granted, Mr. S. grounds his notion that Aristotle stole his doctrine of syllogism from the Brachmans; a doctrine totally incongruous, he thinks, to his other tenets. He subjoins, "that the author of the *Organum* was fully aware of this incongruity, there can be little doubt; and it was, not improbably, with a view to disguise or to conceal it, that he was induced to avoid as much as possible any reference to examples; and to adopt that abstract and symbolic language, which might divert the attention from the inanity of his demonstrations, by occupying it in a perpetual effort to unriddle the terms in

⁶¹ *Elements*, p. 502.

which they were expressed.”⁶² Dr. Reid had before said, in fewer words, “Aristotle’s rules of syllogism are illustrated, or rather, in my opinion, *purposely darkened*, by putting the letters of the alphabet for the several terms.”⁶³ To this I had replied in my *New Analysis*,⁶⁴ by observing that the terms are commonly expressed by letters of the alphabet, for the purpose of showing that our assent to the conclusion results, not from comparing the things signified, but merely from comparing the relations which the signs, whether words or letters, bear to each other: those, therefore, totally mistake the drift of Aristotle’s logic, who think that, by employing letters instead of words, he has purposely darkened the subject.” Mr. Stewart says, “he is at a loss to conceive how this answer bears on the question between Dr. Gillies and Dr. Reid.” How it bears on the question! Most directly; for verbal examples, if trite, would be superfluous; if abstruse, they would not answer the purpose of elucidation; whereas letters, in themselves altogether insignificant, show the absolute unconditional connection, in every legitimate form or mode of syllogism, between the premises and the conclusion: they also habituate the mind to those philosophical abstractions, in which the essence of logic, and, indeed, of all general reasoning, consists. On these solid grounds, as I said, they were commonly employed by Aristotle,

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I.

⁶² Elements, vol. ii. p. 304.

⁶³ Kames’s Sketches, vol. iii. p. 631.

⁶⁴ P. 89.

CHAP. I. and not from the most unworthy and incredible motive “of darkening the subject,” gratuitously ascribed to him, both by Mr. Stewart and by Dr. Reid.

That the Brachmans may be found reasoning in the forms of logic, as they are described by Sir William Jones, I have no inclination to deny. The question of most importance is, how they acquired this science. It may *possibly* have been invented in Asia, as well as in Greece. Certain rules of logic grow out of the structure of all languages, more or less cultivated; and a sagacious Hindoo, considering that in mere ratiocination, one man is the counterpart of another, may have diligently attended to the intellectual process that brought conviction to his own mind, with a view completely to analyse this process, and formally to explain it. He may have defined, as Aristotle did before or afterwards, terms universal and particular; propositions marked by these epithets, and also, as affirmative or negative, pure or modal; he may have distinguished the three figures of syllogism, and have enumerated all their various modes; and, contemplating each mode separately, have examined how the truth of the conclusion was affected by each specific arrangement. That he may have done all this, is possible, but it is barely possible; and ought not to be admitted for truth, if there is an easier way of accounting for the fact stated by Sir William Jones, that the Brachmans continue, to the present day, to reason in the forms of syllogism.

Aristotle, it is well known, preferred a philosophic residence in Athens to the glory of accompanying Alexander in his eastern triumphs. But in the conqueror's train, one of his disciples is named, and many others, in the course of twelve years, would gradually follow in it. His successors, particularly those of the house of Seleucus, were surrounded by learned men of the Peripatetic school. They maintained a firm hold of his eastern conquests; and the Satrapies of Bactria and Sogdia, formed into Greek kingdoms, established and long upheld an extensive and animated intercourse with India itself.⁶⁵ Independently of this chain of connection between the East and West, we know, on incomparably better authority than that of the Hindoos in the Panjab, that, in the sixth century of the Christian era, and three centuries before the Arabic translations of Aristotle, above mentioned,⁶⁶ Sergius, the monophysite and philosopher, translated his works into Syriac⁶⁷, and that Uranius, a Syrian, soon afterwards propagated the Peripatetic philosophy in Persia, and persuaded the emperor Chosroes to become its zealous abettor.⁶⁸ Uranius is expressly declared to have maintained the important Aristotelian tenets concerning the spiritual and impassive nature of Deity⁶⁹, and to have reasoned, in the forms of syllogism, as the Hindoos do at

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I.

How Aristotle's Logic was introduced into various parts of Asia.

⁶⁵ History of Ancient Greece, part ii.

⁶⁶ See p. 19.

⁶⁷ Abulpharagius, Hist. Dynast. p. 94.

⁶⁸ Agathias de Reb. Justinian, l. ii. p. 48.

⁶⁹ Το απάθητον και ασυγχυτον. Id. ibid.

CHAP. I. present; and by the latest oriental testimonies, we are assured that Aristotle's syllogism still constitutes the logic of all the nations in Asia, professing the Mahometan faith.⁷⁰ The same argument, therefore, that Mr. S. deduces from Sir William Jones's testimony in favour of the Hindoos, will assign the invention of syllogism to many other nations of Southern Asia: they reason, to the present day, in the forms of logic; and even many nations of northern Asia, nay, the Tartars themselves, disputed in those forms, two centuries ago, when the works of Aristotle, translated into the Tartar language, were read in the college of Samarkand, the capital of the Usbecks.⁷¹ Should any of those tongues, therefore, either of the East or West, into which the *Organum* has been translated, claim the honour of originating that work, it is probable that, independently of any external proof, real scholars would be inclined to resist the pretension. They would observe that, though certain rules of logic result from the universal structure of speech, yet many doctrines of the *Organum* appear to have a specific connection with the analogies of the Greek tongue, and that all its terms not only sound more gracefully, but apply more fitly, in that language, than in any other. But without placing conjectures of this kind in the rank of facts, they would appeal to the Stagirite's own words, "That on various subjects

⁷⁰ See Mr. Balfour's Discourses, in vol. viii. of the Asiatic Researches.

⁷¹ See La Mothe le Vayer, vol. i. p. 475. Edit. Paris, 1656.

of his inquiry, preceding writers had left much for his use; but nothing whatever on the doctrine of syllogism. This was a new art, which he had begun and completed to the best of his ability, sparing neither time nor pains."⁷² Had Aristotle stolen this art from the Brachmans, would he have uttered such falsehoods in the face of Greece, of India, and of the world? Would he have provoked certain detection and disgrace, and especially the scorn of his friend Alexander, then accompanied by Indian Brachmans as well as Greek philosophers; a prince who abominated every kind of deceit⁷³ as much as he admired his preceptor, and who, about that very time, had bestowed on him six hundred talents for prosecuting his inquiries into natural history; a sum that may be computed at the fifth part of his annual expenditure on an army by which he had conquered Asia?⁷⁴

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I.

But what was the character of the man himself, who is supposed to have been degraded by such an excess of vileness? A smart saying, indeed, of Lord Bacon's has been repeated a thousand times, "that Aristotle, like the Ottomans, did not think he could reign secure, unless he destroyed all his brethren." But Bacon not only followed the current that, for reasons above given, in those times ran strongly against

Aristotle's character most remote from plagiarism, or any kind of deceit.

⁷² Aristot. vol. iii. p. 640. Edit. Buhle.

⁷³ He disdained even to steal a victory: fired with the enthusiasm of truth and honesty, like his admired Achilles,

"The man who one thing thinks, and does another tell,

"My soul detests him as the gates of hell!"

⁷⁴ See History of Ancient Greece, p. ii. vol. i. c. i.

CHAP. I. Aristotle, but, aspiring himself to be the prince of philosophers, viewed the Stagirite with no small portion of jealousy. There is, certainly, no writer whom he has so frequently copied, and certainly none whom he has so unsparingly abused. In opposition to his unwarranted allegation, I will maintain that, in none of all Aristotle's various works, are there the smallest marks of jealousy or envy towards any of his predecessors, or contemporaries; nor can it be made to appear, that he ever disputed any of their tenets captiously, or ever made any false criticism on any one of their performances. The contrary of this, I know, continues to be said every day; and is admitted, in some measure, by the latest of his editors: for the learned Buhle takes it for granted that he was actuated by the greatest hatred⁷⁵ to Isocrates: though this false opinion is founded, as I have shown, merely on a misnomer⁷⁶; and there is no orator to whom Aristotle refers so often, as he does to Isocrates,⁷⁷ and always with due praise. What, then, was the character of Aristotle, not as misrepresented by those who laboured to abolish the absurd idolatry with which he had been long worshipped by the schoolmen and the Romish church; but what was his character with regard to honesty, and consistency, the two points in question, as exhibited by himself in his various writings, and

⁷⁵ Probabile est Aristotelem, maxime Isocrati infensum, eum carpere voluisse. Buhle, vol. iv. p. 433.

⁷⁶ Of Isocrates for Xenocrates. *Life of Aristotle*, p. xxx.

⁷⁷ *Rhetoric*, passim.

confirmed by the authentic history of his life⁷⁸ as delivered down from antiquity? As to consistency, his works are so closely united, and the fabric of his philosophy so firmly compacted, that few parts of it can be fully understood, unless the whole be clearly comprehended. As to honesty, the man accused of the vilest of thefts, was distinguished by signal integrity in all his transactions; was conspicuous for the noblest and most generous proceedings in all the relations of life, whether public⁷⁹ or private; and is extolled for his kindness, liberality, gratitude, inviolable fidelity in friendship⁸⁰; and has given a system of ethics unrivalled by any uninspired pen, in which he hails truth and sincerity as of all things the most estimable; announces justice as the great law of the moral world; and declares, that in the eye of him who has steadily contemplated this virtue, neither the evening or morning star⁸¹ will beam so beautifully. Calm, sober, dispassionate, yet not therefore the less energetic or lofty, he writes to Alexander, in the midst of his triumphs, "those are less entitled to be high-minded, who conquer kingdoms, than those who have learned to entertain just notions of Deity:" and in speaking of happiness, pronounces it to be most compatible with mediocrity of extraneous circumstances; not requiring any greatness of wealth or of power, by

⁷⁸ See my Life of Aristotle.

⁷⁹ Life of Aristotle, pp. vi. xix. & xxii. et seq.

⁸⁰ Ibid, p. xxxvi. et seq.

⁸¹ Ethic. Nicom. l. v. c. i.

CHAP. I. which it is less likely to be promoted, than very sadly obstructed ; but, in like manner as beauty accompanies the perfection of external form, essentially resulting from virtue, intellect, the well regulated affections of the mind, and its exalted energies.

Objections
8, 9, & 10,
answered.

But were Aristotle's logic the thing that Mr. S. has made of it, there would be folly in disputing the honour of its invention. I shall give his three objections together, that they may strike with their full force. "The first remark," he says, "which I have to offer on Aristotle's demonstrations, is, that they proceed on the obviously false principle of its being possible to add to the conclusiveness and authority of demonstrative truth."⁸² His second remark is, "that not one of these demonstrations ever carry the mind forward, a single step, from one truth to another ; but merely from a general axiom to some of its particular exemplifications : nor is this all, they carry the mind in a direction quite opposite to that in which its judgments are necessarily formed. The meaning of a general axiom, it is well known, is seldom, if ever intelligible, till it has been illustrated by some example ; whereas Aristotle in all his demonstrations, proceeds on the idea, that the truth of an axiom, in particular instances, is a logical consequence of its truth, as enunciated in general terms. Into this mistake, it must be owned, he was naturally led by the place which is assigned to axioms in the elements of geometry, and by the manner in which

⁸² Elements, vol. ii. p. 246.

they are afterwards referred to in demonstrating the propositions.”⁸³ Mr. S. again observes, not very consistently, “The idea, that all demonstrative science must rest ultimately on axioms, has been borrowed with many other erroneous maxims, from the logic of Aristotle.”⁸⁴ In answer to the first objection, that Aristotle’s demonstrations suppose the possibility of adding to the conclusiveness of demonstrative truth, I am obliged to reply by a flat contradiction; they do no such thing. They show, on the contrary, wherein demonstrative truth consists, and the mental process by which it is obtained. An able precursor of Mr. Stewart’s, has given to the objection a different shape: he says more sily, but not more sensibly, “in every syllogism there is a *petitio principii*, that is, a taking for granted the thing to be proved.” This quibble, for it is nothing better, is anticipated and refuted by Aristotle in his *Analytics* and in his *Rhetoric*.⁸⁵ Every syllogism, he shows, consists of three propositions, distinct and different from each other. This is the primary and only complete form of reasoning; namely, the syllogism containing three propositions, not the enthymeme, containing two propositions only. For how can the connection between two propositions be demonstrated, without considering the band that connects them? How can the agreement or disagreement of two ideas or two

CHAP.
I.

⁸³ *Elements*, vol. ii. p. 257.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* p. 259.

⁸⁵ *Analyt. Prior*, l. i. c. 22, 23, 24. *Rhetoric*, l. i. c. 1.

CHAP. I. terms be proved, without the assistance of a third, by which these conclusions are respectively evinced? The philosopher's meaning is clearly stated in a late publication by an eminent French writer, who does not advert to Aristotle, and who will not be suspected of partiality in favour of his opinions. I shall cite the words, because they indicate an auspicious return to the sound sense of antiquity, in scornful opposition to erroneous innovation. "I know,"⁸⁶ says the Baron Gerando, "that, in pronouncing syllogism to be the primary and essential form of reasoning, I contradict the opinion in vogue. But I will venture to oppose this opinion, or rather prejudice; and to maintain that the ancients analysed better than we do. It may be useless to express in discourse the connecting proposition, when simple and evident in itself, but this inutility does not prove that the proposition in question must not be present to the mind when it reasons, to complete the connection of the ideas which it compares. Let those who would refer all reasoning to the enthymeme, explain how the first proposition could lead them to the second, unless, by a secret operation of the understanding, they perceived the tie which exists between their terms. Let them propose their enthymeme to a child, or to a man of weak understanding, and they will see clearly, that the apprehension of this tie, is essentially necessary to the reasoning,

⁸⁶ "Je sais qu'en présentant le syllogisme," &c. Gerando des Signes & de l'Art de penser, considérés dans leur rapport mutuel, vol. iv. p. 14.

though it will often be more fitly left *under-* CHAP.
stood, than verbally expressed.”⁸⁷ I.

According to Aristotle, all reasoning must be carried on by proposition, and all propositions that can enter into a syllogism must employ, at least, one general term; since no one individual term can be said of another, that is, can be employed, as a predicate or attribute.⁸⁸ The great business, therefore, of logic is with general terms; and Dialectic, the synonymous word, means properly the art of using these terms fitly, in dialogue or discourse.⁸⁹ According to the structure of all languages, things that have a common nature, receive a common name; and to predicate one term of another, is merely to say that there is not any thing contained under the name of the subject to which that of the predicate does not apply. This is the principle on which logic is founded: but to say that so simple a truth comprehends the whole art, is indeed to put the *Iliad* in a nut-shell; and analogous to

⁸⁷ This is the case in mathematics, when we lay down a proposition, or produce an equation; and from these, immediately infer a new proposition or a new equation. The reasoning seems to consist of two parts only. For in those cases, the mind readily supplies the principles established, for example, concerning the transformation of equations, without expressly announcing them; because these principles being universally agreed on, and always present to the understanding, would tire and disgust by perpetual repetitions. From inattention to this circumstance, some mathematicians have spoken slightly of Aristotle's logic; but in mentioning this subject a few months ago, in the French Institute, to the first geometer of the age, he said, “*La Logique d'Aristote est son grand ouvrage; c'est un chef-d'œuvre.*”

⁸⁸ *Categor. c. ii. p. 448. Edit. Buhle.*

⁸⁹ See my *New Analysis*, p. 62. 5d edit.

CHAP. I. the whim of certain mathematicians who have imagined the whole of geometry to be contained in Euclid's fourth proposition, because the whole science depends on that proposition, and may, by strict reasoning, be deduced from it.⁹⁰

The second objection is akin to the first, "that Aristotle's demonstrations, instead of carrying the mind forward, carry it in a direction quite opposite to that in which its judgments are formed." If this were a valid objection, it would at once destroy all synthetic reasonings whatever; for they all proceed, as syllogisms do, from cause to effect, from generals to particulars. Both of these remarks bottom on Mr. Stewart's third observation, namely, "the idea that all demonstrative science must rest ultimately on axioms, has been borrowed with many other erroneous maxims from the logic of Aristotle." In direct contradiction to this, I had shown in my Analysis, that the logic in question was founded on a principle totally different from axioms, in the ordinary and proper sense of the word. I acknowledged, indeed, that all the modern systems which had fallen into my hands, employ in demonstrating the theory of syllogism, the two following axioms, to wit, that things agreeing to the same third, agree with each other, and that when one of them agrees to the same third, and the other does not, they do not agree with each other. But instead of using these axioms as the foundation of his

⁹⁰ "Deduced," by the principle of superposition, as it is called
See D'Alembert, *Melange*, vol. iv. p. 165.

theory, Aristotle tells us that they do not at all apply to the predication of terms, the one of the other, unless these terms denote mathematical quantities; and the reason why in this single case they apply, is, because in reference to mere quantity, equality is sameness. He had formerly divided quantity into discrete and continuous; to the discrete, belong numbers; to the continuous, space and time: these, he says, are the only proper quantities; since to them all other things, admitting the denominations of greater or lesser, are referred; and by them they are all measured. The notion of quantity is perfectly simple; it includes not contraries, as several of the other categories do; its parts are entirely uniform; they exactly measure the whole and each other; they are characterised solely by equality or inequality: in these, their very essence consists; so that equal quantities are precisely the same; or, in Aristotle's words, the definition of their first substance is the same, which technical expression he explains elsewhere, to mean that the definition of any one individual object denoted by the one, is precisely the same with the definition of any one individual object denoted by the other.⁹¹ It was objected to geometers that they made false suppositions, since there is not any line perfectly straight, nor any circle perfectly round. Aristotle answers, that geometers did not reason from the lines or circles exhibited in their dia-

⁹¹ Aristot. Categor. c. iii. p. 453. Edit. Buhle. Conf. Metaph. l. v. c. 8.

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grams, but from the definite lines and figures of which those in their diagrams were mere signs. These signs would, of course, be more or less accurate; but the things signified by them, that is, their definitions, were always one and the same⁹²: and from this sameness and simplicity of mathematical quantities, the axioms above mentioned, apply exactly in our reasonings with regard to them, and them only. In the New Analysis, I acknowledge that from the corruptness of Aristotle's text, I have sometimes been obliged to invert the order of words, and even of sentences. The same freedom, I am also compelled to use, even in the following translation of his Rhetoric, one of the best edited of his works. But the judicious reader, I hope, will always perceive the reason why I have done so; and that I have never taken any liberty with the form of any of his writings, but the better to preserve their substance. Mr. S. thinks

⁹² Analyt. Poster. l. i. c. x. p. 472. Edit. Buhle. Conf. Metaph. l. xi. c. iii. pp. 956. and l. xiii. c. iii. 983. Locke and his followers say, simple ideas cannot be defined. Aristotle teaches that all our notions, or the words expressing them, may be defined, when they can be arranged or assorted into genera and species; for every species belonging to a genus, and every individual belonging to a species, must have something common and something peculiar. This holds with respect to what Locke calls the most simple ideas; tastes, flavours, &c. Dr. Grew proved that there were at least sixteen different simple tastes. See Philosophical Transactions for 1675. But when our notions, or the words expressing them, cannot be arranged into genera and species, what is to be done? Such things are to be known and defined by a different kind of investigation; of which Aristotle gives an example in his definition of the improper quantity called motion, explained fully and clearly, I hope, in my New Analysis, p. 133. et seq.

that I have fallen into an error, in my translation of the short sentence explaining the reason why, in mathematical figures, equality is sameness. The force of his criticism, which I subjoin⁹³, had

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⁹³ “*Εν τούτοις ἡ ἰσότης ἐνότης*, in mathematical quantities, equality is identity. This passage has furnished to Dr. Gillies, (when treating of the theory of syllogism,) the subject of the following comment, in which, if I do not deceive myself, he has proceeded upon a total misapprehension of the scope of the original. In mathematical quantities, Aristotle says that equality is sameness, because, *ὁ λογος ὁ τῆς πρώτης ἑσίας εἰς ἐστὶ*. ‘The definition of any particular object denoted by the one, is precisely the same with the definition of any particular object denoted by the other.’ Gillies’s Aristotle, vol. i. p. 87. In order to enable my readers to form a judgment of the correctness of this paraphrase, I must quote Aristotle’s words, according to his own arrangement, which, in this instance, happens to be directly contrary to that of his interpreter. *Ἐτι δὲ ἀν ὁ λογος ὁ τῆς πρώτης ἑσίας εἰς ἦ, ὅιον αἱ ἰσαι γραμμαὶ εὐθεῖαι αἱ αὐταὶ, καὶ τὰ ἰσα καὶ τὰ ἰσογώνια τετραγώνια, καὶ τοὶ πλείω. ἀλλ’ ἐν τούτοις ἡ ἰσότης ἐνότης*. The first clause of this passage is from its conciseness obscure; but Aristotle’s meaning on the whole seems to be this: ‘that all those magnitudes that bear the same ratio to the same magnitude, though, in fact, they may form a multitude, yet, in a scientific view, they may be regarded as *one*: the mathematical notion of equality being ultimately resolvable into that of unity or identity.’ It was probably with a view to obviate any difficulty that might have been suggested by diversities of figure, that Aristotle has confined his examples to straight lines, and to such quadrangles as are not only equal, but similar.

Let us now consider the paraphrase of Dr. Gillies: ‘In mathematical quantities, equality is sameness; because the definition of any particular object denoted by the one, is precisely the same with the definition of any particular object denoted by the other.’ Are we to understand by this, that to all things which are equal, the same definition is applicable; or conversely, that all things to which the same definition is applicable, are equal? On the former supposition, it would follow, that the same definition is applicable to a circle, and to a triangle having its base equal to the circumference, and its altitude to the radius. On the latter, that all circles are of the same magnitude; all squares and all equilateral triangles. There is, indeed, one sense, wherein those geometrical figures, which are called by the same name, (all circles, for example,) may be identified in the mind of the logician; inasmuch as any theorem, which is proved of one, must hold

CHAP. I. been anticipated and obviated; and his difficulties, I trust, will be entirely removed by what has been now said.

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answered.

This is not the only criticism in which I am accused of looseness of paraphrase, when I translate literally the precise terms of my author. Aristotle says, that for the purpose of demonstration, it is not necessary to suppose general ideas, but only that one general term can be applied with truth, and in the same sense, to many species, or to many individuals.⁹⁴ Things that have a common nature, receive a common name: and on this principle of classification, whatever is predicated of a genus, may be said of every species and every individual comprehended under it. Mr. S., after speaking, with no more respect than they deserve, of those fanciful writers, who talk of one idea being contained in another as one box is inclosed in another, and who found logic on the axiom that the whole is greater than any of its parts, subjoins, “if we have recourse to Dr. Gillies for a little more information, we shall meet with a similar disappointment.”⁹⁵ According to him, “To say

equally true of all the rest; and the reason of this is assigned with tolerable correctness in the last clause of the sentence quoted from Dr. Gillies. But how this reason bears on the question with respect to the convertibility of the terms *equality* and *sameness*, I am at a loss to conjecture.”

⁹⁴ Analyt. Poster. l. i. c. 11.

⁹⁵ It would be mortifying to have disappointed such a man as Mr. S. in my account of syllogism, if there was not reason to believe that his discerning mind had, on this occasion, been warped by prejudice. I venture to say this, because I could appeal to the general

that one term is contained in another, is the same CHAP.
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as saying that the second can be predicated of the first in the full extent of its signification, and one term is predicated of another in the full extent of its signification, when there is not any individual denoted by the subject to which the predicate does not apply." Mr. S. proceeds, "In order, therefore, to make use of Aristotle's idea, we must substitute the definition, instead of the thing defined, that is, instead of saying that one term is contained in another, we must say that the second can be predicated of the first in the full extent of its signification. In this last clause, I give Aristotle all the advantage of Dr. Gillies's very paraphrastical version; and yet such is the effect of the comment, that it at once converts the axiom into a riddle. I do not say that when thus interpreted, it is altogether unintelligible, but only that it no longer possesses the same kind of evidence which we ascribed to it, while we supposed that one thing was said by the logician to be contained in another, in the sense in which a smaller box is contained in a greater."⁹⁶ Upon this criticism I must take the liberty to observe, that the words which Mr. S. is pleased to call my very paraphrastical version, and of which he indulges Aristotle with the ad-

voice of public criticism in the year 1798, when my Analysis appeared, and also to the authority of men held in equal estimation with Mr. S. himself, who have said that I gave a just and truly philosophical view of the subject: such as no man can collect from the works of my precursors, even of Dr. Reid.

⁹⁶ Vol. ii. p. 264.

CHAP. I. { vantage, are the ipsissima verba, the precise terms of my author⁹⁷: and this principle, so expressed, is the foundation on which he builds his logic, and not on any thing akin to mathematical axioms. I have changed the order of words, and sometimes that of sentences; I have elucidated the passages in one treatise by similar passages in another; but it has always been my endeavour to adhere strictly to his sense, and to select the precise clause in which it is most clearly conveyed: a precaution indispensable towards translating his invaluable and always consistent writings, I will not say agreeably, but intelligibly.

Aristotle's
doctrine of
demon-
stration.

I have thus endeavoured to show that, concerning axioms and definitions, and also concerning induction⁹⁸, Aristotle did not materially dif-

⁹⁷ Το δὲ ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ, καὶ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι θατερον θατερον, τὸ αὐτὸν ἐστὶ. Λεγομεν δὲ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι, ὅταν μηδὲν ἢ τὸ υποκειμενον λαβεῖν, καθ' οὗ θατερον ἢ λεχθησεται. *Analyt. Prior.* l. i. c. 1. p. 134. Edit. Buhle.

⁹⁸ On this last subject Mr. S. cites a passage from the Asiatic Researches, vol. viii. p. 89, et seq. Not having that volume now by me, I copy from Mr. S.'s Elements, vol. ii. p. 339, et seq. The ingenious author in the Researches, says, "that the Baconian method of induction was perfectly known to Aristotle, and distinctly delineated by him, as a method of investigation that leads to certainty and truth: that Aristotle was likewise perfectly acquainted not merely with the form of induction, but with the proper materials to be employed in carrying it on; facts and experiments." The Memoir from which the above passage is taken, consists of extracts, it should seem, of a lost work of Aristotle's, "On the Essence of Logic," first translated from Greek into Arabic, and then from Arabic into Persian. Mr. S. proceeds, "When this memoir was first presented to the Asiatic Society, the author informs us, that he was altogether ignorant of the coincidence of his own conclusions with those of Dr. Gillies; and he seems to have received much satisfaction from the proofs alleged

fer from Mr. Stewart. But wide, indeed, is the difference between them, with respect to the nature of demonstration. Mr. S. maintains, “that demonstrative evidence belongs only to mathematics. It is not founded on absolute or unalterable truths, but on definitions or hypotheses; and implies nothing more than the necessary connection between the premises which we assume, and the conclusions which we deduce from them. The word “demonstration” cannot, therefore, be applied to reasonings concerning matters of fact, which, how convincing soever they may be, afford only the highest degree of probability.”⁹⁹ From this very limited notion of the subject, he seems, however, afterwards to depart; and, in speaking of the Pythagorean or Copernican system of astronomy, he says, “that the discoveries of the last century afforded many

in support of their common opinion by that learned writer;” adding “From the perusal of Dr. G.’s wonderful work, I have now the satisfaction to discover, that the conjectures I had been led to draw from these scanty materials, are completely confirmed by the opinion of an author, who is probably better qualified than any preceding commentator, to decide on this subject.” In conversing, August last, in Paris, with Baron Cuvier, the illustrious successor of Buffon, and far his superior in exact science, he said, it is ridiculous to think that Aristotle did not employ induction in the physical sciences, when he always employs it with such signal success in the moral. On the contrary, he appeared to this excellent judge, to be the greatest collector of facts from his own observation, that perhaps ever existed; and always to reason from them, consequentially. He was unacquainted, indeed, with many facts and many instruments which time has brought to light; but how wonderfully he supplied the want of them, is proved in my New Analysis, p. 147. third edit.

⁹⁹ Compare Elements, vol. ii. p. 151. et seq., & p. 251.

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I.

Analyt.
Posterior.

new proofs of a direct and even a demonstrative nature.”¹⁰⁰ But, waving this apparent inconsistency, I would observe that Aristotle’s account of demonstration is altogether different. Its object, according to him, is not conditional or hypothetic, but absolute and immutable truth. From principles deserving those epithets, he deduces, by the cogency of clear argument, conclusions demonstratively certain ; thus preparing, in the preliminary books, for example, of what have been called his metaphysicks, the way to what he himself calls his first philosophy, or theology ; and rearing, on accurate and firm definitions of cause and effect, mind and matter, his glorious demonstrations of the being and attributes of Deity. Descending from this sublime speculation, he investigates, in other treatises, truths not demonstrative, indeed, but by no means *purely* hypothetical. It is thus that, in his physicks, his problems, his meteorology, and in his history of animals, taken in the largest acceptation of that title, as containing not only history, but the philosophy of that history, he draws innumerable conclusions more or less probable, according to the different degrees of evidence belonging to his premises ; and passing from physical science to the moral world, and the practical affairs of life, deduces from definitions carefully established on facts, the duties and interests of men, whether considered as individuals, or as members of the same commu-

¹⁰⁰ Elements, vol. ii. p. 421.

nity. Such are his important reasonings on ethics and politics, and also on the subject of rhetoric, which he observes is a natural adjunct to politics, since it serves as one of the main instruments by which the managers of free states are enabled to guide and govern them. Having thus delineated an encyclopædia of science, under the heads of God, man, and nature, Aristotle analysed the intellectual operations by which all this had been effected, and recomposed them into the form called syllogism. He anticipates and scorns the vain boast of his pretended followers, of teaching men to argue and to reason.⁹⁸ He protests no less distinctly against the perverse use which, after the example of even his best⁹⁹ Greek commentators, the schoolmen made of his syllogism. To see the justness of a conclusion, the movement of thought quicker than lightning, needs not to be expanded verbally into all the various steps of an argument. In most cases this is unnecessary, in many it would be awkward; in some it would be intolerable.

The modern oppugners of abused syllogism have, therefore, a great authority on their side, namely, Aristotle himself. He says explicitly, that some sciences¹⁰⁰ need not its aid; and that even in those matters¹⁰¹ which Lord Bacon allows to be its proper and legitimate province, it ought

⁹⁸ Rhetoric sub initio.

⁹⁹ See Johannes Philoponus, *υπομνημα εις τα περι ψυχης βιβλια*, l. iii. edit. Venet. 1535.

¹⁰⁰ Anlyt. Poster. l. i. c. 10. *ενιας μεντοι επισημας, κ. τ. λ.*

¹⁰¹ The affairs of civil life and arts, consisting in talk and opinion. Bacon, *Novum Organum* in Præfat.

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to be employed sparingly.¹⁰² When any proposition is so obvious, that it cannot fail to occur spontaneously, it would savour of the rustic or the pedant¹⁰³ to declare it : but expressed or understood, the elements of syllogism are essential to all demonstration, for all reasoning whatever, implies a subject about which we reason, premises from which we reason, and a conclusion that is drawn from them.¹⁰⁴

Answer to
Objection
11.

If Mr. S. had not too much despised logic, to be a proficient in that art, he would not have found fault with Aristotle's phraseology in dividing syllogisms into demonstrative and dialectical. He says, "For the sake of those who have not previously turned their attention to Aristotle's logic, it is necessary, before proceeding farther, to take notice of a peculiarity, (and as appears to me, an impropriety) in the use of the epithets demonstrative and dialectical, to mark the distinction between the two great classes into which he divides syllogisms ; a mode of speaking which, according to the common use of language, would seem to imply, that one species of syllogism may be more conclusive and cogent than another. That this is not the case, is almost self-evident ; for if a syllogism be perfect in form, it must of necessity be not only conclusive, but demonstratively conclusive. Nor is this, in fact, the idea which Aris-

¹⁰² Rhetoric, l. iii. cap. 18. p. 389. edit. Buhle. et pasim.

¹⁰³ I have resolved the epithet *φορτικον* because it implies both notions.

¹⁰⁴ Analyt. Poster. l. 1. c. 10. p. 270. edit. Buhle.

¹⁰⁵ Elements, vol. ii. p. 249.

totle himself annexed to the distinction ; for he tells us, that it does not refer to the *form* of syllogisms, but to the *matter* ; or, in plainer language, to the degree of evidence accompanying the premises on which they proceed. In the two books of his last Analytics, accordingly, he treats of syllogisms that are said to be demonstrative, because their premises are certain ; and in his topics of what he calls dialectical syllogisms, because their premises are only probable. Would it not have been a clearer and juster mode of stating this distinction, to have applied the epithets demonstrative and dialectical to the truth of the conclusions resulting from these two classes of syllogisms, instead of applying them to the syllogisms themselves ? The phrase *demonstrative syllogism* certainly seems, at first sight, to express rather the complete and necessary connection between the conclusion and the premises, than the certainty or the necessity of the truths which the premises assume."¹⁰⁶ This reason is a very illogical one. In every legitimate syllogism, the conclusion is indeed necessarily connected with the premises ; but, as every syllogism must consist of premises, as well as of a conclusion, nothing more than a dialectical or probable syllogism can be the result of dialectical or probable premises.

A demonstrative syllogism, therefore, requires premises that are necessary and certain ; since, in the words of Aristotle, these qualities could not

¹⁰⁶ Elem. vol. ii. p. 250.

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¹⁰⁷ How justly did Sam. Johnson suspect, that the Peripatetic Logic had been condemned without a candid trial. See Johnson's Works, vol. ii. Preface to the Preceptor.

¹⁰⁸ See New Analysis, p. 91. comp. p. 234.

CHAP. II.

ARGUMENT.

Character of Mr. Stewart's Writings. — The Paris and Edinburgh Encyclopedias. — Speculative Philosophy. — Its nature and use. — That of Aristotle, on what grounded. — His Doctrine of Causes mistaken, and misapplied, by the Schoolmen. — His Doctrine of the Association of Ideas, or Custom, mistaken, and misapplied, by modern Metaphysicians. — Their History. — Des Cartes, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume. — Modern Scepticism vainly combated by Drs. Reid, and Beattie, Lord Kames, and Mr. Stewart. — Bacon, his supposed Reformation in Philosophy. — His real Merits. — His Physical induction not applicable in Metaphysics. — Locke's Method, wherein consonant to Aristotle's. — Supposed consciousness of many original principles. — Story of Sir William Johnstone and the Indians. — The acknowledged necessity of returning, in some points, from the school of Locke to that of Aristotle. — The Materialism of Diderot, Helvetius, Priestley, and Darwin, anticipated and refuted by the latter. — Transition to his Practical Philosophy. — Ethics, Politics, and Rhetoric. — The Moral Constitution of Man more correctly explained by him, than by Clarke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, or Paley. — Abstract and Estimate of his Philosophy. — Conclusion.

IN the former chapter I obviated every one of Mr. Stewart's objections, whether against the doctrines of my author, or my own interpretation of them. The character of the objector, and the rank which he holds in the republic of letters, merited this complete ex-

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II.

Character
of Mr.
Stewart's
writings.

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amination. While professor in the university of Edinburgh, Mr. Stewart was regarded (and I think most justly) as the principal ornament of that illustrious school. His writings also, are in high estimation; most readers may derive profit from them, and all receive much “rational entertainment;” for, being well acquainted with the French and English metaphysicians, many of them men of genius and fancy, from Hobbes and Des Cartes downward to the writers of the present day, Mr. Stewart has selected from them with taste and judgment, and embodied, by way of citation, into his own works, many of their most ingenious remarks and most brilliant passages. The object of his own philosophy, is “to ascertain the simple and uncompounded faculties, or principles, of which the mind consists; and his method of prosecuting this study is the way of observation and experiment recommended by Lord Bacon, for ascertaining the properties of bodies.”¹ Whatever may be thought of this undertaking, or of his own and Dr. Reid’s success in conducting it, Mr. Stewart will be acknowledged to have embellished many parts of his subject, by natural and apt comparisons, and to have adorned the whole with a style, less attic and various indeed than that of Locke or Hume, but clear, flowing, and harmonious. To me it appears, that the authors on whom he has formed his taste, are not of native growth; much less has he looked back to Greece or Rome; France should seem to have

¹ Stewart’s Elements, passim.

had his decided preference; and I should be inclined to believe that D'Alembert, a geometer and metaphysician like himself, had been his favourite model; except that in Mr. Stewart you may discern, I think, more warmth of heart and affection, and more native eloquence; but, on the other hand, too frequently recognize the academic lecturer in unbounded diffusion, and in endless repetitions.

In the year 1751, D'Alembert first printed his preliminary discourse to the French Encyclopédia. Within these few years, Mr. Stewart performed a somewhat similar office for the Encyclopédia Britannica. In D'Alembert's Review of Philosophy, in many respects highly valuable, he gives reason to believe, as I shall have occasion to shew hereafter, that he was little, if at all, acquainted with Greek philosophy, and particularly with that of Aristotle. Mr. Stewart's undertaking precluded the necessity of any such acquaintance whatever, since his "view of the progress of metaphysical, ethical, and moral science," is confined to the period that has elapsed since the revival of letters in modern Europe. We shall see, by and by, whether the preliminary discourses of both these eminent men, would not have been more complete and more satisfactory, had they been better qualified in their reviews to extend the retrospect.

I now come to the most important branch of this disquisition, to examine into that abstruse, but exact science, to which Aristotle continually refers in the popular work here translated. Upon this subject, having much to say, I must

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The Paris
and Edin-
burgh
Encyclo-
pedias.

Transition
to the ac-
count of
Aristotle's
speculative
philosophy.

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strive to compress my matter to the utmost, lest this introduction to the Rhetoric should appear to be a frontispiece too vast for the building.

Its nature
and use.

This science, then, whether it be called metaphysics, the first philosophy, the intellectual system, or the knowledge of human nature², has never been depreciated, but either by perversity or ignorance. Bacon declares it to be the key to all other knowledge³, and an illustrious disciple of Bacon, pronounces it to be the basis of all the other sciences, and essential to the formation of distinct and exact notions on any subject whatever.⁴ It remounts to the origin of all these notions; classes or assorts them; distinguishes those that afford demonstration, from those that lead us only to different degrees of probability; and, discerning the various energies of thought, contemplates in the noble works effected by them, the fair edifice of arts and sciences; surveys the relations which they bear to each other; and thus appreciates the extent of human power in speculation, in action, and in production. For, as of speculative philosophy truth is the object, so of practical philosophy the object is truth accompanied with works; whether these works terminate in the actions of men, and what is called moral virtue, or in skillful productions of the arts.⁵

² It has recently received the new name of *Idéologie*. See "Elemens D'Idéologie, par M. Destutt Comte de Tracy."

³ De Augment. Scient. l. v. c. 1.

⁴ D'Alembert, Discours sur L'Encyclopedie.

⁵ Conf. Aristot. Metaph. l. i. c. 1. l. vi. c. 1. Ethic. Nicom. l. vi. c. 4. and Moral, Magna. l. i. c. 55. p. 170. In the last chapter of his Essay,

Aristotle rejects the doctrine of innate ideas, and maintains, that all our direct information originates in perceptions of sense.⁶ But this information could not carry us a single step in science or in art, without higher principles than sensation, memory, fantasy, and the capacity of being disciplined and instructed by associations, or custom, all which are shared in common with man, by many inferior tribes of animals.⁷ Even reason itself, thereby meaning the discursive faculty which infers one proposition from another, would never, of itself, enable us to rear any part of the intellectual edifice ; for, to this end, there must be a firm foundation to rest on : unless this were the case, reasoning would be endless ; to cite Aristotle's emphatic words⁸, “ It is ignorance not to know in what things demonstration is required, and in what it is not.” To suppose all truths obtained by demonstrative reasoning,

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Intellect
its office.

Locke gives a division of the Sciences, or, as he says, of all that can fall within the compass of the human understanding. The first is *φυσικη*, or natural philosophy, which consists in the knowledge of things, as they are in their own proper beings. The end of this is bare speculative truth. Secondly, *πρακτικη*, the skill of applying rightly our own powers and actions, for the attainment of things good and useful. These two, together with the *σημειωτικη*, or doctrine of signs, otherwise called Logick, are, he says, the most general, as well as most natural division of the objects of the understanding. In this division, however, Locke omits the *ποιητικη*, the productive ; *πραξις* and *ποιησις*, action and production, are neither of them mere speculation, yet totally different from each other.

⁶ New Analysis, p. 68. et seq.

⁷ Aristot. in libro de Memoria et Reminiscentia, c. 1, 2. p. 680. Conf. Problem, sect. xxv. p. 797.

⁸ Aristot. Metaph. l. iv. c. 4. Confer. Analyt. Poster. l. ii. c. 15.

CHAP. II. implies a progress to infinity, *a thing impossible*⁹; and therefore takes away all demonstrative reasoning whatever. The author, therefore, infers a better and higher faculty in man than that merely discursive; the faculty, by which we obtain the knowledge of immediate or *intuitive*¹⁰ truths; namely, those truths which are the basis of demonstration itself. “Of the intellectual habits, by which truth is discovered, some are firmly relied on, as demonstration and science; others are found, by experience, frequently to deceive us, as reasoning and opinion. All science, however, is accompanied by reasoning: there cannot, then, be any science of first principles; that is, of those immediate truths, on which all others hinge. Intellect, therefore, is the source of science, being the only thing more bright, and more divine than science itself¹¹: and, as the human hand is the instrument of instruments; that is, the instrument that enables us to fashion every other¹², so the intellect is the form of forms; in plainer words, that supreme faculty in man, in which all his accurate knowledge originates, and by which, solely, its solidity is established.¹³

⁹ The words in Italics, are used by Aristotle a little below, in going over the same subject.

¹⁰ Immediate truths are those obtained without any medium of proof: in modern language, called intuitive, by a metaphor.

¹¹ Metaph. l. xiv. c. 9. Conf. Analyt. Posterior, l. ii. c. 15. et Ethic. Nicom. l. vi. c. 6.

¹² De Anima, l. iii. c. 9. p. 656.

¹³ This doctrine of intellect was shown to be essential to an explanation of the phænomena of mind. See my New Analysis, p. 53. et seq. To refer these phænomena to mere sensation, is an abuse of

On this foundation is raised the first stage of Aristotle's philosophy, his doctrine of causes; which, after being grossly mistaken, has been very unjustly stigmatised by writers, from whom better things might have been expected. According to Aristotle, the notion of a cause, though one of the most general that we entertain, is also one of the very first in formation. It is a notion impressed on us by all our sensations and reflections, and discovers itself so early, that the actions of a child imply a familiar acquaintance with it. Every change that appears in the objects around us, intimates some cause of that change; whether the change be the simplest of all, merely that of place; or whether it consists in alteration, which is change of quality; in augmentation or diminution, which are changes of quantity; in generation, or corruption, which are changes of substance.¹⁴ In every one of these cases alike, to infer the action

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Aristotle's
doctrine of
causes.

terms. This, however, is attempted, in one of the newest and most elaborate works of modern metaphysics, (the *Ideology of Count Tracy*); in perusing which ingenious performance, it is impossible not to join with the present Archbishop of Dublin, when he says, "Had those, who within the two last centuries, employed themselves in investigating the intellectual powers of man, studied Aristotle more, they would have been more successful in their endeavours to extend the sphere of human knowledge." Magee on Atonement, vol. ii. p. 4. fourth edit.

¹⁴ This substance, essence, or *εἶδος*, may either be the principal characterising property, from which things commonly derive their names, and from which all their other sensible qualities, as well as latent powers, are supposed to flow, or it may be a real individual substance, as the soul of man. When this departs, the body changes and rots. Aristot. de Anima. l. iii. c. 9.

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of an efficient cause, is one of the first perceptions of intellect operating on experience; and to deny the force of this conclusion, would lead to the most palpable absurdity, and prepare us to believe that this fair world could have begun, of itself, to exist; a work without a maker, a contrivance without a contriver; propositions so monstrous, that they are thrown out by every sound mind, and rejected with the utmost scorn. A cause is essentially prior to its effect; but, as causes or agents operate in perpetual succession, that may be a cause considered under one aspect, which is barely an effect considered under another. This succession, however, cannot be endless; for, in such a succession, every cause being merely the effect of the cause preceding it, when the chain is endless, there can be no first link, and therefore no cause at all. In this progression of causes, therefore, the first link is held by the hand of the Almighty, whose essence is absolute self-derived power, independent and never-ceasing energy.¹⁵

Vindicated
against the
objections
of Dr.
Reid.

An able and acute writer has said, "Many of Aristotle's distinctions are merely verbal. Of this kind is his distinction of causes, of which he makes four kinds, efficient, material, formal,

¹⁵ Metaph. l. xiv. c. 7. and 8. In conformity with this doctrine, the ablest, perhaps, of modern metaphysicians says, "The course of nature is nothing but the will of the Almighty, operating in a continued, regular, and uniform manner." Samuel Clarke. The great Sydenham speaks to the same purpose, in a passage which I shall have occasion to cite hereafter. Sydenham, Opera Universa, p. 139. Leyden, 1754.

and final. These distinctions may deserve a place in a dictionary of the Greek language; but in English or Latin, they adulterate the language.”¹⁶ Yet a very little attention will enable us to perceive, that these distinctions, instead of being merely verbal, are founded in the real nature of things, and the uniform process of thought in all rational creatures. If truth be the end of philosophy, it must consist in the investigation of causes; for we know any proposition to be true, only when we have discovered the causes that make it to be so; and our knowledge of sensible objects, how remote soever from perfection, will, notwithstanding, be the greater in proportion to our acquaintance with the materials, from which they are made; with those characterising properties which constitute their nature, and from which they derive their name; with the external agents that have produced, or that preserve them; and with the ends and uses which they are calculated or intended to answer.¹⁷ A cause, therefore, is defined briefly, that through which any thing exists, or is made, or is known. These distinctions are just and solid; they are not barren generalities, but, as will presently appear, of all truths the most fruitful.

They were, however, grossly mistaken by the schoolmen, who, from Aristotle's doctrine of causes, concluded that we ought to reason from

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Mistated
by the
schoolmen,
against

¹⁶ Dr. Reid in Kames's Sketches, vol. iii. p. 338.

¹⁷ New Analysis, p. 131.

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both the
letter and
the spirit of
Aristotle's
text.

them, synthetically and by syllogism, on all subjects, not excepting physicks. This error they fell into, notwithstanding the perpetual warnings of their great master to avoid it. In the very commencement of his Physicks, he observes, "Since we are said to understand any thing when we know its causes, it might seem that the study of nature ought to begin with causes or principles; and this would certainly be the case, if things absolutely most knowable, were likewise so relatively; that is, if things the simplest and clearest in themselves, were also the most easily comprehended by the human understanding. But, as this does not hold, we must pursue a different course, and proceed from things the most readily seized by our own faculties, to things far more simple and more intelligible, absolutely. Man is so formed, as first to perceive things in the gross, and to view all objects around him, promiscuously, in confused heaps. By degrees he learns to unfold complexity, and to analyse the objects of his perception. A similar process is carried on in the acquirement of language. General names are used, before we limit them by definitions. The name is vague and doubtful; the definition ascertains its application. Very young children call every man that notices them, *papa*; and every woman, *mama*. With the progress of intelligence, they come to distinguish, and to know the right use of these appellations."¹⁸ In

¹⁸ Physica, l. i. c. 1.

his works throughout, he reasons to the same purpose, declaring that knowledge is only to be acquired by patient observation; by examining, comparing, and classing individual objects.¹⁹ In this manner the mind is led from sense and memory to experience, from experience to art, and from practical arts to the speculative sciences, till it finally reaches the loftiest speculations of all, concerning the first principles of the universe.²⁰ In direct opposition to this doctrine, the schoolmen audaciously followed the *priori* road; and regardless of induction from experience, exclusively cultivated the discursive faculty, attempting to explain nature by syllogisms, built on substantial forms, elementary virtues, sympathies and antipathies, and an endless variety of other occult qualities.

This extravagant folly was justly stigmatised from the end of the fifteenth century downward, by a succession of eminent writers; Patricius of Ferrara, Gassendi, Hobbes, Glanville, Le Clerc, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. "It was not," these writers observed, "from the definition of fire, for instance, that we know it to be productive of heat; but from its being productive of heat, that we ascertain its nature or definition. This definition, if good for any thing, must be collected from observation and experience:" and this just remark was barely an appeal to Aristotle himself, against the perverters of his philosophy.

The detection of their errors, was but an appeal to Aristotle himself, against his pretended followers.

¹⁹ Metaph. l. ii. c. 2. 11. 13.

²⁰ Metaph. l. iii. c. 3.

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Aristotle's
doctrine of
custom.

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misapplied
led to
error.

History of
modern
scepticism.

Des Cartes.

In the edifice of that philosophy, the next stage is the theory of custom, or of what, in modern phraseology, is called the association of ideas. Aristotle is the first author who enumerated and explained the principles of this association, and shewed its mighty effects in the formation of language, and regulating the whole moral, as well as intellectual system.²¹ This branch of his philosophy, overlooked by the schoolmen, met with particular attention from the writers whom I have just named, as their opponents; but, notwithstanding the respect due to the characters of many of these writers, and to the ingenuity of all of them, the force of truth obliges me to declare, that his theory of association has been by them not less mistaken and misapplied, than was his doctrine of causes by the schoolmen. The explanation of this matter will involve a short history of the progress of modern scepticism, and of the ineffectual endeavours to refute it, on any other principles than those which Aristotle, above two thousand years ago, had established.

The mischief of scepticism may be traced in modern times to a country fruitful in great men, and also in great errors. The most ingenious, but fanciful Des Cartes, unwilling to receive any thing for truth, that could not be proved by reasoning, pronounced, "I doubt, therefore, I exist;" not being aware that, in this proposition, he was guilty of the sophism, which takes for

²¹ See New Analysis, p. 63. et seq. and Ethics throughout.

granted, the thing to be proved: he was guilty also of another grievous error, in pronouncing that all truth must be obtained by demonstration, which, as above proved¹⁹, is to take away all demonstration, and all truth whatever. Contemporary with Des Cartes, was the philosopher Hobbes, who not only sought all knowledge from reasoning, but reduced all reasoning to computation merely. According to Hobbes, words served the same purpose with arithmetical ciphers; all knowledge was obtained by addition and subtraction; the epithets true and false, were applicable solely to words, not to things; independently of words, neither truth nor falsehood could have any existence. This paradox had been anticipated and refuted by Aristotle, who taught that, though all reasoning must be carried on by words or signs, yet this did not destroy the reality, or specific distinctions of things. Nothing but individuals exist in nature; by examining and comparing these individuals, we are enabled to class and name them: this general name, has not, indeed, any general archetype; it is merely a sign to recall the mental operations, by which external objects have been classed and assorted; and thus arranged into genera and species; but whatever can be predicated of a genus, will hold true of every species comprehended under it; and whatever can be predicated of a species will hold true of every individual comprehended under it. Truth

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Hobbes.

¹⁹ See above, p. 74.

CHAP. and falsehood, therefore, consist not in words,
 II. but in the right or wrong application of these words to individual persons or things, the only realities in nature.²⁰

Locke.

Locke, the philosopher next in renown, but far superior in solid worth and in lasting fame, rejected the scholastic doctrine of innate ideas. He compared the mind to a sheet of white paper, open to any characters that might be written on it. But though he combated victoriously the chimæra of innate ideas, he entertained not any doubt of the existence of acquired ideas, both general and particular. These ideas he defines “the objects present to the mind in thinking; the furniture with which the mind must be supplied; and the only objects about which thought can be employed.”

Berkeley.

In combining this error with the many important truths contained in his immortal work, Locke unadvisedly infringed a maxim perpetually inculcated by Aristotle, “that nothing is practically more pernicious to the cause of truth, than mixing it with ever so small a quantity of palpable falsehood.” The acuteness of Berkeley, readily perceived, that Locke’s general ideas were absolutely and altogether inconceivable.²¹ How was it possible to form an idea

²⁰ *Εν εἰδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητὰ εἰσι.* Aristot. de Anima. l. iii. c. 9. Conf. Analyt. l. i. c. 11.

²¹ Berkeley’s Principles of Human Knowledge were published in 1710, and his Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in 1713. But I have a book before me, published in 1702, entitled “Anti-scepticism,” or Notes on Locke’s Essay, showing that his doctrine of ideas is untenable, and must lead to scepticism. The author is

of an animal that belonged to none of the tribes of animals; or of a triangle, neither isosceles, equilateral, nor scalene, nor possessing any of the properties by which triangles are affected? Berkeley therefore declared general ideas to be equally chimerical with the innate; and pronounced, as Aristotle had done before him, that for the purpose of general reasoning, it was not necessary to introduce such fictions, but only to know that one general term, that is the name of a genus, might be predicated of many species, and that the name of a species might be predicated of many individuals.²²

Berkeley, however, still retained and employed the word "idea" in its application to particular objects; and, instead of barely stating the fact, that we perceived, remembered, and considered them, he said "we had ideas of them:" adding "that by our senses, we have the knowledge only of our sensations or ideas, call them which you will: but the senses do not inform us that things exist without a mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived. On the contrary, as there can be no notion or thought, but in a thinking being, so there can be no sensation but in a sentient being; it is the act of a sentient being; its very essence consists in being felt. To believe that any

Henry Lee, rector of Tichmarsh, in Northamptonshire; an inelegant writer certainly, but, as to the non-existence of ideas, pithy in argument.

²² Principles of Human Knowledge. Conf. Aristot. Analyt. l. i. c. 11. p. 141.

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Hume.

quality in a thing inanimate can resemble a sensation is absurd, and a contradiction in terms.”²³

Reasoning on the principles of Berkeley, who was no sceptic in religion, Hume prosecutes the argument: “The mind has never any thing present to it, but its perceptions, (sensations or ideas,) and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with objects. The supposition, therefore, of such a connection, is without any foundation in reasoning. To have recourse to the veracity of the Supreme Being, in order to prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making a very unexpected circuit: if his veracity were at all concerned in this matter, our senses would be entirely infallible; because it is not possible that he can ever deceive: not to mention that if the external world be once called in doubt, we shall be at a loss for arguments, by which to prove the existence of that Being or any of his attributes.”²⁴

D’Alembert.

D’Alembert, the contemporary, and the friend of Hume²⁵, speaks to the same purpose, only with more tenderness for the external world, whose physical laws had been the great object of his study. “A resistless propensity, (he says,) forces us to admit the existence of the objects to which we refer our sensations, and which we believe to be their causes; a propensity which

²³ Principles of Human Knowledge, sect. xiii.

²⁴ Essay on the Academical Philosophy.

²⁵ I often heard them speak with much respect, and much philosophical affection for each other. When Hume died in 1776, he left D’Alembert his diamond ring.

many have regarded as the work of a superior being, and as the most convincing proof of the existence of external objects. In effect, as there is not any relation between each sensation and the object which occasions it, or to which, at least, we refer it, we cannot possibly, by reasoning, obtain a passage from the one to the other. It is by a kind of instinct only, a thing surer than reason itself, that we are forced to take this wide step.”²⁶ In all this there is a mixture of truth and of error. As to the part which is true, namely, that our sensations are not resemblances of external objects, Aristotle had declared it explicitly, though modestly. “To say that external objects are not like to our perceptions of them, *may* be true”²⁷; for our perceptions or sensations are affections of the percipient or sentient being; but to deny that there are external causes producing our sensations, and existing independently of them, is absurd; for sensation cannot be its own work: it must be caused by something that is prior to it; for the principle of motion necessarily

²⁶ Melange de Philosophie, &c. vol. i. p. 16. Edit. Amsterdam.

²⁷ Notwithstanding this passage, Mr. Stewart writes boldly, “For my own part, I see no good reason for supposing that Locke did not believe our ideas of primary qualities are really resemblances or copies of these qualities, *when we know for certain that, till our own times, this has been the universal doctrine of the schools, from Aristotle downwards.*” Stewart’s Essays, E. i. p. 23. We, see, however, that Aristotle by no means maintained the doctrine ascribed to him; we see farther, that his philosophy soared above, and superseded the distinction of primary and secondary qualities, as explained by Locke in his Essay, l. i. c. 8.

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precedes the movement communicated.”²⁸ It may be admitted, therefore, without falling into scepticism, that our sensations, or ideas, do not in the least resemble external objects; but, nevertheless, Alembert errs in saying “that there is not any relation between each sensation and the object to which we refer it.” The relation between them is the strongest of all, namely, that of cause and effect: the soul could no more have sensations, without something exterior and distinct from itself to cause them, than it could create itself.

The ideal system, and scepticism, opposed by Dr. Reid and Dr. Beattie.

The ideal system of Mr. Locke, with the consequences deduced from it by Berkeley and Hume, were professedly attacked in this country by two writers of just celebrity: by Dr. Reid, the first in point of time, and also the more accurate and more profound; and by Dr. Beattie, the more eloquent, and, therefore, the more popular. The doctrine of ideas had been called by Aristotle a metaphor.²⁹ Reid showed it to

²⁸ Metaph. l. iv. c. 5. p. 879. Our sensations are excited by motions in the organs, occasioned by impulse. See what is said in New Analysis, p. 49—52. “With regard to impulse,” Mr. Stewart (vol. ii. p. 311.) says he has the misfortune to differ from his very learned and highly respected friend, Mr. Prévost, of Geneva, whose opinion on this point may be collected from the two following sentences. “La cause diffère du simple signe précurseur, par sa force et son énergie productive; l’impulsion est un phénomène si commun, soumis à des lois si bien discutées, que toute cause, qui s’y réduit, semble former une classe éminente, et mériter seule le nom d’agent.” Essais de Philosophie, t. ii. p. 174, 175. But Aristotle’s reasoning in this place will be equally convincing, whether we consider causes as real efficient, or merely as constant forerunners.

²⁹ See New Analysis, pp 64. and 96.

be a mere hypothesis, and one altogether untenable; and yet, strange to tell, after demolishing the theory itself, he, as well as his follower, Dr. Beattie, and more recently Professor Stewart, admit the reasonableness of all the sceptical inferences that have been drawn from it. "We cannot," says Dr. Reid, "by reasoning from our sensations, collect the existence of bodies at all, far less any of their qualities. This hath been proved by unanswerable arguments, by the Bishop of Cloyne, and by the author of the *Treatise of Human Nature*."³⁰ Mr. Stewart speaks to the same purpose. "It is but justice to Mr. Hume to acknowledge, that his *Treatise* furnished to Dr. Reid all the premises from which his conclusions are drawn; and that he (Mr. Hume) is therefore fairly entitled to the honour of having reduced logicians to the alternative of either admitting his sceptical inferences, or of acknowledging the authority of some instinctive principles of belief overlooked by Mr. Locke."³¹ We shall see presently, what these instinctive principles are, and what degree of authority is due to them. But method requires, that I should first prosecute, a little farther, the progress of scepticism.

It was formerly observed, that in the vicissitudes of the world, and in all the changes of things around us, we see not the band that knits the event which precedes to that which commonly follows it. All we perceive is, the fre-

Custom, or association, its power unlimited, according to Hume.

³⁰ Reid's *Enquiry*, c. v. sect. 3. p. 92.

³¹ *Elements*, vol. ii. p. 332.

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quency of their conjunction ; but, by no means, their necessary connection.³² Of this necessary connection, Mr. Hume, therefore, denies the existence. There is no real nexus among events : cause and effect, in their usual acceptations, are words without a meaning ; mere fictions of the brain ; phantoms conjured up by the power of association or custom. “ Custom then, and not reason, is the ground of all our conclusions concerning existence, or matter of fact. ’Tis custom that renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact, beyond what is immediately present to the memory or senses.”³³ Indeed ! this certainly is to carry the power of custom far beyond the limits assigned to it, by the first author, who not merely discriminated its effects, but explained its laws of action. Mighty are those effects in disciplining the appetites and affections, and reducing them to that harmony with reason, which constitutes moral virtue. Mighty also, are those effects in forming the intellectual habits, and in adorning the mind, with arts and sciences. But custom cannot supersede the office of intellect in supplying those primary truths, on which all others hinge. The firmest of these is, that for every change in the universe there must be an adequate cause. To deny this, subverts all the powers of the

³² See above, p. 79.

³³ Essay, vol. ii. p. 54. Edit. 1767.

understanding. It is a truth original and transcendent; no proposition clearer than itself can be employed to prove it; no argument against it, is at all intelligible; and in every step of ratiocination, and every action of life, we are guided by its influence, or controuled by its authority.

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To Mr. Hume's theory of cause and effect, his doctrine of belief is a natural corollary. All truth is consistent; and, in an ingenious and powerful mind, there will be found a certain consistency among the greatest errors. "The imagination," he observes, "has the command over all its ideas. It can mix and vary them in all the ways possible. It can paint them out to itself with every circumstance that belongs to an historical fact, which is believed with the greatest certainty. Wherein therefore consists the difference between such a fiction and belief? It lies not in any peculiar idea; for the mind having a command over all its ideas, could easily annex this idea, and consequently be able to believe whatever it pleases. It follows, therefore, that the difference between fiction and belief³⁴, lies in some sentiment, or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure. It must be excited

Hume's
doctrine of
belief.

³⁴ There is, in the text, a little inaccuracy of expression: fiction is contrasted with belief, whereas it ought to be contrasted with reality; and a fictitious story set in opposition to an authentic fact; but I wave this objection, for Mr Hume's language may be here understood, and is, in general, eminently perspicuous.

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Antici-
pated and
refuted
by Aristo-
tle.

by nature, like all our other sentiments; and must arise from the particular situation in which the mind is placed at any particular juncture. Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses, it immediately, by the force of custom, carries the imagination to conceive that object which is usually conjoined to it; and this conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment, different from the loose reveries of the fancy. In this consists the whole mystery of belief.”³⁵ Had Aristotle foreseen that, at the distance of two thousand and four hundred years, such a person as Mr. Hume should come into the world and write the above passage, he could not have anticipated and refuted his sophistry in more plain words than the following:—“Belief,” (or rather the Greek word exactly corresponding to it), “is derived from the Greek verb, signifying to persuade; it, therefore, implies persuasion; but persuasion implies reason; wherefore, belief is a conviction of the understanding, not a mere feeling or sentiment, or unaccountable irrational propensity, proceeding entirely from custom.”³⁶ It must here be remembered, that Aristotle was the first philosopher who proved custom to be a specific principle of action, which, independently of the understanding or the will, leads us to repeat, with facility, and with pleasure, such actions of the mind and body as have been often repeated

³⁵ Hume's Essays, vol. ii. p. 57.

³⁶ De Anima, l. iii. c. 4. Conf. Rhetoric, passim.

before³⁷: it is a principle, he says, “that operates powerfully on man, and on many of those inferior animals, with which he is best acquainted. Fancy, or rather phantasy³⁸, is also common to man and the better sort of brutes. Phantasy is the revival, more or less vivid, of preceding sensations; an involuntary train of images succeeding to one another, in consequence of their usual conjunction by resemblance, contiguity in time or place, or any other bond of association whether natural or artificial. Operating on the coarse and complex intimations of sense, without analysis and without any kind of reasoning, the phantasy, through the seen, is conducted to the unseen; from the antecedent, it is led to represent the ordinary consequent; and brutes disciplined by custom and phantasy perform, on many occasions, the actions of reasonable creatures. Astonishing, however, as may be their effects, phantasy, custom, association, all originate in the sensitive part of our nature, and are clearly distinguishable from intelligence, science, reasoning, opinion, which belongs exclusively to the understanding. Of these four, opinion is to be regarded as the lowest stage of operations intellectual, and phantasy as the highest stage of operations merely sensitive: but these two, notwithstanding their near approximation, may be clearly discriminated; for opinion implies belief; belief, persuasion; persuasion, rea-

³⁷ Rhetoric, l. i. c. 10.

³⁸ The good old English word agreeing in sound and sense with the Greek, *φαντασία*.

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II.

The philo-
sophy of
common
sense, as
explained
by Dr.
Reid and
Dr. Beat-
tie.

son ; which last cannot subsist in natures irrational.³⁹

I have thus endeavoured, with brevity, and I hope with perspicuity, to demolish the foundations and groundwork of scepticism. The design of my present undertaking forbids me to enter into details ; nor is the thing at all necessary ; for, if the corrupt source is destroyed, its cloudy exhalations will disperse by their own levity. I now proceed to examine the arguments of those who have professedly answered the sceptics on principles different from those which the Stagirite had established. In this examination the philosophy of Dr. Reid, and that of Mr. Stewart, will deserve especial attention ; and I am compelled to declare in the outset, that notwithstanding many excellent collateral speculations, with which that philosophy abounds, I have insuperable objections to its solidity as a system, and also much doubt the possibility of reaching any sound philosophical truth by the method in which those most respectable writers have proceeded. Dr. Reid's enquiry into the human mind originated in the praiseworthy purpose of refuting scepticism. He says, " I did not think of calling in question the principles commonly received with regard to the human understanding, until the Treatise of Human Nature was published in 1739. The ingenious author of that treatise, reasoning upon the principles of Mr. Locke, who was no

³⁹ Παση μεν δοξη ακολουθει πισις, πισει δε το πεπεισθαι, πειθοι δε λογος, &c. Rhetoric, l. i. c. 10.

sceptic, hath built a system of scepticism, which leaves no ground to believe any one thing rather than its contrary. His reasoning appeared to me to be just; there was therefore a necessity to call in question the principles on which it was founded, or to admit the conclusion."⁴⁰ In what manner, then, does Dr. Reid oppose M. Hume's principles? Not by reason; for this he allows to be on the side of his adversary; but by the supposed existence of a great number of "original instinctive unaccountable propensities to believe,"⁴¹ constituting collectively what he calls common sense. This phrase is by no means synonymous with good sense, which implies intellect, reason, and experience; whereas, "common sense," in the meaning here assigned to it by Dr. Reid, and as it is still more completely defined in the words of the nearest of his followers, "is a power that perceives truth and commands belief, not by progressive argumentation, but by an instantaneous, instinctive, and irresistible impulse, derived neither from education nor from habit, but from nature; acting independently of our will, whenever its object is presented, according to an established law, and therefore properly called sense; and acting in a similar manner upon all, or at least a great majority of mankind, and therefore called common sense."⁴²

Accordingly Dr. Reid and Dr. Beattie enu-

⁴⁰ Reid's Enquiry. Dedication, p. v.

⁴¹ Reid, *passim*.

⁴² Beattie on Truth, p. 45. Fifth edit.

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And by
Mr. Stewart.

merate a great many of these “original instinctive principles, or ultimate grounds of belief.”

Mr. S. is more circumspect and more cautious with regard to their number, but compensates by the great weight which he allows to those few instinctive principles which he admits. Throughout all his volumes, he dwells “on an instinctive expectation of the continuance of the laws of nature⁴³,” which he pronounces, though a thing of late discovery, to be the foundation of the new inductive logic, destined to supersede the logic of Aristotle, which Mr. Stewart, as we have seen, has continually confounded with the contemptible jargon of the schools. This instinctive principle, he says, was first acknowledged for an original and ultimate law of our constitution by Dr. Reid, and by Mr. Turgot, the famous French controller of finance. But is this discovery, so very late in being made, any discovery at all? Is it not a mere corollary from the doctrine of causes above established? Our expectation of the continuance of the laws of nature, is a deduction from the more general truth, that all effects must have their causes, and that these causes will never cease to operate, till some new causes interpose to counteract the force, or change the mode of their operation. In these conclusions, Newton⁴⁴ agrees with Aristotle, and admits them for the foundations of his philosophy. Mr. Stewart’s groundwork of the inductive logic, is

⁴³ Elements, vol. ii. p. 330.

⁴⁴ See his Regulæ philosophandi. Principia, l. iii. sub initio.

not therefore an ultimate principle in our nature, for which no reason can be given ; it is a principle, not instinctive, but rational : it is a proposition flowing from a more general proposition ; to deny which, is a contradiction in terms, and this more general proposition is not barren, as Mr. Stewart acknowledges the foundation of his inductive logic and all other axioms to be⁴⁵, but productive of new and most important truths ; witness the use made of it by mathematicians,⁴⁶ and the application of it by the acute⁴⁷ Butler, in his discourse on the immortality of the soul ; wherein he shows the justness of the inference, that the soul will continue to exist till the operation of some cause able to destroy it, and that death is not such a cause.

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The schoolmen failed signally in their attempt to explain natural philosophy by logic. More modern metaphysicians have experienced a failure not less signal, in applying the rules of physical investigation to subjects purely intellectual. This appears to me to have been remarkably the case, since their adoption of the new theory of causes, which resolves them into mere conjunctions ; a theory commonly ascribed to Mr. Hume, from the celebrity given to it by that elegant and acute writer. "In physical events," he says, "how closely soever they may seem to be concatenated we perceive not any real nexus, any necessary bond of connection. All we perceive is their ordinary

The new
inductive
philoso-
phy.

⁴⁵ Vol. ii. c. 3. p. 244. et seq.

⁴⁶ See Wallis's Algebra, p. 308. Edit. 1685.

⁴⁷ Butler's Analogy, chap. i.

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conjunction, that certain events precede, and others commonly follow them. This frequency suggests the idea of constancy; and when the conjecture of constancy is verified, as far as our experience reaches, we flatter ourselves with having discovered a general law of nature, until further experience enables us to resolve this supposed general law into one still more general. In this manner we proceed generalising our knowledge, till we reach the ultimate limits of physical science. But after all our efforts, we come not, by a single step, nearer to the discovery of any real connection among the phenomena. They still remain, in themselves, insulated facts, associated only in the mind by frequent or constant conjunction, by no means indissolubly linked together, the necessary effects of various powers competent to produce them." It is childish therefore to say, with Virgil,

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas;

or to define, with Aristotle, "philosophy to be the investigation of causes," since no real cause can ever be discovered.

How far it
was intro-
duced by
Lord
Bacon.


The new inductive philosophy, founded solely on observation and experiment, and substituting "customary conjunctions," for causes, is ascribed by Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart, as it had previously been by D'Alembert and Diderot, to the original and profound genius of Lord Bacon. This great man, however, will be found to speak of causes and effects, as all rational enquirers into nature had done before him. He uses the

words in the same sense in which they are taken by Aristotle, and in which that philosopher, according to his constant practice, has been at pains to define them. To obviate this apparent inconsistency, Mr. S. maintains, that Bacon, while he adopted the letter of the old doctrine, yet followed, in all his writings, the spirit of the new one.⁴⁷ This remark, notwithstanding repeated perusals of all these writings, I am unable to verify. Bacon no where identifies concomitancy with causation; but, as causes are things deep and hidden, he exhorts those who prosecute the study of nature, not to put up with the first that may occur, but to search to the bottom, till the true causes are discovered by observation, accompanied, when necessary, by experiments. With experiments, however, it should seem that he was not himself much occupied, nor does it appear, from his works, that he made a single discovery. But he recommended experimental philosophy to the world with all the efficacy of his powerful and fervid mind, at a crisis when Europe advanced, by wide steps, to emancipation from monkish superstition and warlike barbarity, and when, its several states having been formed into a political system, and kings having obtained a full command over the national force, the ravages of unceasing internal discord were restrained, and the finer spirits in each country were permitted in secure leisure to cultivate, unobstructed, the pursuits of science. Hence the

⁴⁷ Elements, vol. ii. p. 314, & seq.

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many individuals and private bodies of men which distinguished themselves in this honourable career ; and hence, according to the natural progress of society when impelled in a favourable direction, the numerous public institutions established for the express purpose of cultivating experimental knowledge.

Wherein
he agreed,
and where-
in he dif-
fered from
Aristotle.

With the glory of those institutions, and of the illustrious individuals composing them, the name of Bacon is most justly associated. His renown has long been in the ascendant ; but it is not likely to be heightened with posterity by his eagerness to combat the imputed errors of Aristotelism, instead of profiting, still more than he has done, from its substantial truths. Concerning the contradistinction, however, of efficient causes and customary conjunctions, the two philosophers thought alike. For in interpreting the secrets of nature as well as in exploring those of the human heart, Aristotle had, before Lord Bacon, considered “ customary conjunctions ” under the heads of symptoms, signs, and criterions, or proofs⁴⁸ : a view of things from which he was denominated nature’s interpreter or secretary.⁴⁹

With regard to final causes, indeed, Aristotle and the modern supplanters of his philosophy, thought quite differently. Des Cartes totally excluded final causes from his inquiries⁵⁰ ; and Bacon pronounced them to be, like the virgins

⁴⁸ Συμπτώματα, σημεία, τεκμήρια. Physic. & Rhetor. passim; and his treatises De Somno, &c. p. 685 to 700.

⁴⁹ Suidas in Aristot. & Diogenes Laertius in Aristot. p. 286.

⁵⁰ See his Meditations. Medit. iv.

dedicated to God, barren.⁵¹ But in the works of Aristotle throughout, these vilified virgins are honoured as the sources of light and truth, as the principles of all order and beauty in the material world, and of all harmony and happiness in the moral.⁵² In this instance, at least, antiquity, as Cicero says on another occasion, being nearer to a divine origin, more clearly discerned the truth⁵³; for the deposed final causes are reinstated in their just authority by the great Newton, and recognised by all his legitimate successors⁵⁴: and in physiology, anatomy, and the other sciences most progressive in modern times,⁵⁵ the contemplation of these causes is well known to have been fruitful in many new and important discoveries.

The wonderful improvements of natural philosophy during the course of the last two centuries, should seem to have inspired the vain hope of making similar improvements in the sciences of morals and metaphysics. This it was expected might be done by analysing the mind itself, according to the Baconian method in physicks, by observation and experiment. But

Why the Baconian method is inapplicable to metaphysics.

⁵¹ De Augment. Scientiarum, sect. vi. Bacon says this in regard to physicks: in metaphysics, he acknowledges the importance of final causes. See the same work, sect. v.

⁵² Metaphys. l. ii. c. 2. p. 857. & Physic. passim.

⁵³ Antiquitas, quæ quo propius ad divinam originem, eo magis quæ vera erant, cernebat.

⁵⁴ Confer. Newton's Optics, Query 28. S. Clarke on the Being and Attributes, &c. Maclaurin's Philosophical Discoveries, b. i. c. 2. pp. 29 & 30.

⁵⁵ See particularly the Baron Cuvier's Theorie de la Terre, passim.

CHAP. II. the workings of the mind are invisible and impalpable; their existence is altogether fugitive; they cannot be caught in the fact, nor in the way of experiment, be subjected to the torture. If we would know them, it is not by their transient imperceptible actions, but by their plain and permanent works:—the classification of the various objects of thought; the formation of language; the discrimination of the different orders of truth, moral and metaphysical, contingent and necessary; and the glorious edifices which they have reared of arts and sciences.

Aristotle's method in metaphysics, from which Locke did not essentially deviate.

In this way Aristotle had steadily contemplated them: and Locke, the most approved of modern metaphysicians, notwithstanding his declared hostility to the logic of the schools, did not, in consequence of the *Novum Organum* of Lord Bacon, essentially deviate from the Aristotelian mode of examining the powers of the understanding. In his admired essay on that subject, he never once mentions the name of Bacon; while an attentive and discerning reader will find that his departures from the Stagirite are chiefly in point of phraseology. For what was called sensations⁵⁵, he substituted the word ideas; for general terms or definitions, general ideas; for compound words, complex ideas; for custom, the association of ideas; and for the truth or falsehood of propositions, the agreement and disagreement of ideas.

⁵⁵ *Αἰσθησεις*, perceptions by sense.

This language, though very inadequate to the real nature of things, has become so familiar to our ears, that we are not offended by the perpetual recurrence of the word "idea," often in different meanings, in almost every page of Mr. Locke's writings. Even a greater fault, however, would have been compensated by his merit in detecting many pernicious errors of the schoolmen, and in exposing their vile logomachy, false subtleties, and intolerant dogmatism. Of Aristotle, their reputed master, he speaks in terms of the highest respect: and though in mentioning some of his doctrines, he is plainly misled by the scholastic interpretations of them, yet, by his own native sagacity, he was guided into the same and only right path for prosecuting metaphysical studies. His admirable work is recommended by clearness of conception, soundness of judgment, accuracy of reasoning, and a richness of fancy equal to the illustration of every subject, yet which never runs wild! When we add to all this, the purity, aptness, and variety of his style, it is no wonder that the *Essay on Human Understanding* should have formed a new epoch in philosophy.

Whether the labours of Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart, shall obtain the same credit in the world, must depend not merely on their own excellent abilities, but on the instrument which they have employed in prosecuting their inquiries. As Bacon recommended observation and experiment for analysing bodies, so these eminent men would explain the phænomena of

Consciousness not a sure instrument of analysis.

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mind, and investigate its component principles, by internal observation or consciousness. Of this word, "consciousness," I would in the first place observe that it is altogether unknown to the Greek language⁵⁶, the primary language of philosophy; and that two of the most acute modern metaphysicians, Locke and Butler⁵⁷, entertain very different notions of its import. By consciousness, it is acknowledged by Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart, that we perceive not our own existence; and it has often been said by philosophers, ancient and modern, that the mind is like the eye, which sees all things but itself. We can remember or recall, however, our past thoughts, which are acts of the mind, all and every one of which imply an agent. But these acts of reflection can never prove the existence of "many primary fundamental principles, separate, distinct, and independent of a common cause, and of each other, the elementary laws of human thought, the original stamina of human reason."⁵⁸ For the

⁵⁶ *Συνειδησις* and *συνεσις* in Greek, *conscientia* in Latin, *coscienza* in Italian, *conscience* in French, and our own word *conscience* in English; none of all these correspond with "consciousness" in the sense in which it is taken by many English philosophers, and also by Condillac, in his Supplement to Locke. But the thing meant by it, namely, the knowledge of what passes in our own minds, is referred by Aristotle to memory, or rather, that act of memory called *αναμνησις*, by which we have the power of recalling our past thoughts, and of considering and reflecting on them. See my New Analysis, p. 53, et seq.

⁵⁷ Compare Locke's Essay, b. ii. c. 1. p. 37. § 19. & b. ii. c. 10. p. 146. and Butler's First Dissertation, annexed to his Analogy, &c. p. 439, et seq.

⁵⁸ Reid and Stewart, *passim*.

mind, as Aristotle says, is a thinking substance, one and indivisible⁵⁹; and the various first truths, as they have been called, such as the existence of the material world, the uniformity of the laws of nature, the certainty of mathematical axioms, may be all clearly traced to one sole intellectual source: they have not so many separate independent causes, but as the sun emits both light and heat, softens one class of bodies and hardens another, so the human understanding simpler and purer, and more active than the sun, operates in different ways on the different objects of our knowledge, and affords the primary truths respectively adapted to each of them.⁶⁰ It is erroneous, therefore, to believe that the mind can be decomposed and its distinct principles ascertained by consciousness, as bodies are analysed and their distinct elements or powers are ascertained by observation and experiment.⁶¹ If this indeed could be done, the philosophers possessed of the secret, would have an easy work

⁵⁹ Whatever is immaterial is indivisible, as the human mind. *Metaphys.* l. xiv. c. 9. *Conf.* p. 1,003.

⁶⁰ *Ethic.* l. vi. c. 6.

⁶¹ Diderot, who began his chequered career rather as a *physicien*, or natural philosopher, than as a man of letters, had recourse to "the Baconian method" in metaphysics. What did he make of it? He shall tell himself. "Often," he says, "I have endeavoured to examine what passed in my own head, and in thinking, to catch my mind, as it were, in the fact. Absorbed in the deepest meditation, I endeavoured to retire into my mental frame with the most eager contention of thought. But all my efforts were useless. It appeared necessary to be at the same time within myself, and without; to represent at once the observer, and the machine observed. But the mind, like the eye, sees not itself. God only knows, how syllogisms are formed in the human understanding."

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with the most sceptical adversaries. They would only have “to retire with deep attention into the inmost recesses of their mental frame⁶¹,” and bring back with them from thence, original instinctive principles of belief able to surmount every paradox. In this way Dr. Reid and his followers appear to have dealt with David Hume. That philosopher advanced hypotheses which left no reasonable ground for believing any one thing rather than another : these authors advanced hypotheses calculated to produce the fullest conviction, whatever arguments reason may urge to the contrary.

Story of
Sir Wil-
liam John-
stone and
the Indi-
ans.

This curious controversy, as conducted by men certainly of the first rate abilities, cannot fail to remind those who have ever heard it, of a noted story which, though not exactly suited to the gravity of the present subject, yet affords in other respects so very apt a parallel, that indulgent readers will not be offended by the relation of it. The traveller, Sir William Johnstone, is known to have made a long residence among the North American Indians. These Indians are great observers of dreams ; and when any of them happens to dream that he has received a present from another, the owner is thought ill bred, if he refuses to bestow it on him. An Indian chief happened to dream that some glittering trinket had been given him by Sir William. The latter acted handsomely, and desired his acceptance of it ; but shortly after, had a dream in his turn, that the chief had ceded to him a large track of

⁶¹ Reid and Stewart, *passim*.

country. The Indian granted the land ; but declared that he would never again dream with Sir William Johnstone.

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In explaining Aristotle's doctrines concerning the origin and nature of government, and also concerning political economy, I had occasion to observe that Locke's notions on those subjects were less accurate than the Stagirite's ; to which the most approved writers in modern times had, by the force of truth, been compelled to return.⁶² On that occasion, I ventured to remark that it was time, in other matters not less important, to leave the modern for the ancient school. From Locke's doctrine, that ideas are the sole furniture of the mind, and the only objects about which thought can be employed⁶³, naturally and conclusively flowed the scepticism of Berkeley and Hume ; and from another of his doctrines, or rather opinions, for he gives it only as his opinion, that the soul may be mere matter endowed with thought⁶⁴, have flowed as naturally and conclusively the materialism of Diderot, Helvetius, Priestley, and Darwin. This opinion of Locke's was given in direct opposition to the decisions of the two greatest names in ancient philosophy. From the operations of the mind, Plato inferred its simplicity ; and from its simplicity, its spirituality. But this doctrine in Plato, like all his other doctrines, is blended with his fanciful hypothesis of ideas,

Spiritu-
ality of
the soul ;
Locke's
opinion.

⁶² See Aristotle's Ethics and Politics, vol. ii. pp. 3 & 12.

⁶³ Locke's Essay, book iv. c. 3. et passim.

⁶⁴ Ibid. book iv. c. 3. s. 6.

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Aristotle's.

exemplars, and intellectual forms; and through this admixture of fictitious error, is less fitted for operating conviction on men of sound understanding. Aristotle, on the contrary, rejecting every unwarranted hypothesis, and reasoning only from the clearest perceptions and from facts, and without pretending to know, any better than did Locke and his followers, all the qualities with which matter may be endowed, firmly maintained, however, that incompatible and contradictory qualities could not possibly belong to it. This, he observed, must be the case, if matter, essentially extended and divisible, were capable of forming the simplest syllogism. For every such act of reason implies the comparison of two objects, or, in modern phrase, two ideas, and the simultaneous inference that is drawn from it. The mind, therefore, is susceptible of many ideas at once; it does not merely pronounce that the objects of comparison *now agree, or now differ*, but it⁶⁵ *now pronounces* that they agree or differ; the *now*, the indivisible instant, is not accessory, but essential; and the perception of truth so necessarily one simple energy, that it cannot without absurdity be supposed capable of division in point either of space or of time, by which matter and all its operations are divisible indefinitely. The acute mind of M. D'Alembert seized the full force of this argument; and without suspecting the quarter from which it came, pro-

His argument approved by D'Alembert.

⁶⁵ See my New Analysis, p. 55, et seq.

nounces it to be altogether conclusive.⁶⁶ He subjoins, however, the following observation, very little to the credit of his erudition. "It is surprising that the soul's immortality should be acknowledged by many ancient philosophers, while the soul's spirituality, a truth purely philosophical, should not have been distinctly known by any of them."⁶⁷ Mr. Stewart does not speak positively, but is disposed rather to doubt the fact on which Aristotle's argument is grounded. Having proposed the question, "whether the mind has the power of attending to more than one thing at one and the same instant," he subjoins; "This question, if I am not mistaken, has been decided by several philosophers in the negative; and I acknowledge, for my own part, that although their opinion has not only been called in question by others, but even treated with some degree of contempt, as altogether hypothetical, it appears to me to be the most reasonable and philosophical that we can form on the subject."⁶⁸

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Mr. Stewart's doubt on the subject.

Into this way of thinking Mr. Stewart was possibly led by his "desire of extending to mind

In what they should seem to have originated.

⁶⁶ It appears, he says, from every syllogism, "que notre esprit peut non seulement avoir plusieurs idées à la fois, mais encore appercevoir à la fois l'union ou la discordance de ces idées. C'est un des mysteres de la metaphysique, que cette multiplicité instantanée d'operations dans une substance aussi simple que la substance pensante." *Melange de Literature, &c.* p. 40. edit. Amsterdam.

⁶⁷ Il est surprenant que plusieurs anciens philosophes aient cru l'ame immortelle, tandis que la spiritualité de l'ame, que est une verité purement philosophique, n'a été connu distinctement d'aucun d'eux. *Ibid.* p. 74.

⁶⁸ *Elements of the Philosophy, &c.* vol. i. p. 128. 4to edition.

CHAP. II. the same mode of inductive reasoning that had been successfully applied to matter. The laws of gravitation, impulsion, magnetism, and electricity are merely general facts, gathered from experience; and facts which, for any thing we know to the contrary, may be independent of each other; and proceed from causes altogether different. But it is the same individual active being that perceives through the intervention of the different senses; that desires through the different appetites and affections; that observes, compares and concludes, either by induction or by argument, through the various powers of the understanding.⁶⁹ The sovereigns, therefore, of human life, and the sources of all that men can know or feel, are sensation, appetite, and intellect.⁷⁰ These are general properties clearly inferred from the phenomena, and as properties must belong to a substance active and indivisible!" The word "substance," in this sense, is also used by Des Cartes; but, Mr. Stewart thinks, inconsistently. "I use the word substance," he says, "in conformity to the phraseology of Des Cartes, though I am aware of the strong objections to which it is liable, not only as a deviation from popular use, which has appropriated it to things material and tangible, but as implying a greater degree of positive knowledge concerning the nature of mind, than our faculties are

⁶⁹ See New Analysis, p. 54, and the passages there referred to; adding to them De Anima, l. iii. c. 9. p. 656.

⁷⁰ Ethic. Nicom. l. vi. c. 2. *Τρία δε*, &c.

fitted to attain.”⁷¹ How far the word “substance” is consistently used by Des Cartes, I am not concerned to enquire. But “it corresponds,” as Mr. Stewart justly observes, “to the Greek word by which Aristotle denotes the first of the Categories;” and, he might have added, to the word by which Aristotle denotes God and the human mind.⁷² If Mr. Stewart had adverted to these meanings, he would not, I am sure, have applied to them Dr. Arbuthnot’s pleasantry, directed against the Scholastics, then the common butt of wise men and of fools. “When Cramb  was told by his master Cornelius that a substance was that which was subject to accidents, ‘then Soldiers,’ quoth Cramb , ‘must be the most substantial people in the world.’”⁷³ In opposition to this pitiful pun, put into the mouth of a very pitiful fellow, I shall cite the same Dr. Arbuthnot’s fine verses, exactly conformable to the doctrine which, in Martinus Scriblerus, is supposed to be laughed at.

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The expression of
“thinking
substance
justified.”

“ Am I but what I seem, mere flesh and blood,
A branching channel and a mazy flood?
The purple stream that through my vessels glides,
Dull and unconscious flows like common tides.
The pipes, through which the circling juices stray,
Are not that thinking I, no more than they.
This frame compacted with transcendent skill,
Of moving joints obedient to the will,
Nursed from the fruitful glebe, like yonder tree,
Waxes and wastes; I call it mine, not me.

⁷¹ First Prelimin. Dissert. to Encycloped. p. 88.

⁷² *Εν οὐσία μὲν ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νῦς*, &c. Moral. Eudem. l. i. c. 8. p. 201.

⁷³ Martinus Scriblerus, cited in Preliminary Dissertation to Encyclop dia, p. 15.

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Immorta-
lity of the
soul.

New matter still the mouldering mass sustains;
The mansion changed, the tenant still remains;
And from the fleeting stream, repaired by food
Distinct, as is the swimmer from the flood."⁷⁴

From the immateriality of the mind, Aristotle inferred the impossibility of its dissolution. It would separate from the body, to which it had communicated motion and life; and, in this state of separation, would be better and happier than before, being purified from corporeal corruptions, and unobstructed by corporeal impediments in the exercise of its noblest energies.⁷⁵ Even in this life, man has thoughts and affections totally unrelated to the preservation of the body, to its wants, or its pleasures. This is his true pre-eminence, this is the specific difference distinguishing the human, from inferior minds; whose capacities, both of intellection and volition, terminate in the body solely. Of such minds, though we do not perceive indeed any efficient cause of their destruction, so neither, on the other hand, does there appear to be any *final cause* of their preservation. But were the human mind destined to mortality, there would be a deficiency, a botch, a gap, in the works of that Supreme Intelligence which does nothing in vain; affections never to be gratified, hopes never to be realised, capacities without corre-

⁷⁴ First published in Dodsley's collection, vol. i. p. 180.

⁷⁵ New Analysis, vol. i. p. 58. In the true spirit of Aristotelism, Abbadie, in his excellent work, "Traité de la vérité de la Religion Chrétienne," says, that life is more astonishing than death; the conjunction of two such heterogeneous substances, than their disjunction, vol. i. c. 12. p. 89. Edit. de la Haye.

spondent energies, means without correspondent ends;—suppositions rejected by all reason and experience, as absurd and monstrous. Such are the Stagirite's conclusions, very wide of those ascribed to him by some of his unworthy interpreters⁷⁶; and in this manner does genuine and sound philosophy bring men to the threshold of Christianity, and prepare the rational enquirer for entering, with unspeakable delight, into its divine doctrines.

In the works of Aristotle, practical as well as speculative, the rationale⁷⁷ of causes is the great central arch on which the whole edifice is supported. With regard to this important subject, Locke is less circumstantial and satisfactory. In his Essay on the Human Understanding⁷⁸ he agitates the question, what it is that immediately determines our actions; and he answers the question, not, as he says, had been done by philosophers before him, by assigning for the cause of this determination, what we suppose “to be our greatest good,” but “some present and immediate uneasiness.” Aristotle thought it necessary to enter into a far greater detail, not contenting himself with the barren generality “of the greatest good,” proposed by those philosophers, or with “the uneasiness” of Mr. Locke. Both by induction and argument, he is at the utmost pains to prove, that all the actions of man

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Aristotle's
practical
philosophy.

The seven
causes to
which all

⁷⁶ Alexander of Aphrodisias, &c. See Supplement to New Analysis, 224, &c.

⁷⁷ Αἰτιολογικῶτατος παρῶν ἐγένετο, Laert. in Aristot.

⁷⁸ Book ii. c. 21. par. 30. et seq.

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human
actions
must be
referred.
Force.

Nature.

may be referred to one or more of the seven following causes : force, nature, chance, custom, reason, anger, and appetite. Of such of his actions as are performed forcedly, the real impelling cause is external. Of such of his actions as are performed naturally, in the philosophical sense of that word, the immediately moving cause is, indeed, in himself; but the final cause, (the end and use, the purpose and intention) lies infinitely beyond him. Of nature thus operating we have continual proofs, not only in man, and all other animals, but even in plants, when they fix their roots in the earth, rear their stems, expand their leaves, and scatter their seeds; which acts, were these organised bodies endowed with intelligence, could not be more fitly performed for the preservation of the individual, and the propagation of the kind. They thus act naturally, by an intelligence not their own, but one communicated to them, as the principle of their nature, by the first cause of all motion, of all order, and of all beauty.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Τῆ χρόνῳ αἰεὶ προλαμβάνει ἐνεργεῖα ἕτερα πρὸ ἑτέρας, ἕως τῆς τῆ αἰεὶ κινεῖντος πρῶτως. Metaph. l. ix. c. 8. p. 939. Aristotle's doctrine of nature was so strangely perverted and abused by the schoolmen, that the great Sydenham, who adopted it, subjoins, as necessary to obviate their mistakes, the following explanation:—"As often as I name nature, I mean thereby merely to express the connection of natural causes, which, though in themselves unconscious and insensible, are guided by the utmost wisdom in performing their respective operations, and in producing their appropriate effects. The Supreme Divinity, by whose power all things were made, and on whose will they all depend, hath in his infinite wisdom so disposed and regulated the whole of those causes, that they proceed in a certain order and method to the execution of the works assigned them, never

This principle of their nature always does what is best for the individual, for the species, and for the general system of things; and never, when left to itself, acts in vain.⁸⁰ But, as the most skilful artist will sometimes fail in his productions, so of nature, far more skilful, the works will sometimes be marred.⁸¹ This is said to happen by chance or fortune, words merely expressive of nature or of art, producing through the concurrence or accession of circumstances, indefinite in number, (since things innumerable may accede to the same thing,) unintentional and unusual effects. Chance and fortune, therefore, would be words without meaning, independently of intention and design; wherefore, Aristotle concludes sublimely, if the heavens themselves were effects of chance, this would only prove that intelligence had been the cause of many still nobler works.⁸²

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II.
Chance &
fortune.

To these causes, force, nature, and chance, such of our actions are ascribed, as are altogether unconnected with any inclination, or choice, or purpose of our own. It is otherwise with regard to custom, reason, anger, and appetite. These causes all originate in ourselves; for though custom is called a second nature, yet our

Custom.

doing any thing in vain, and never doing but what is best both in respect of the particular natures in which they reside, and the general system of things." See the original, beginning with the words, "In precedente nempe diatriba, Naturæ nomine sæpius utor," &c. Sydenham, Opera Universa, p. 129. Leyden, an. 1754.

⁸⁰ Natural. Auscult. l. ii. c. 8. p. 336. and c. vi. p. 335.

⁸¹ De Republic. l. i. c. 6. p. 302. Conf. Metaph. l. v. c. 3. & l. vi. c. 2. and Natural. Auscult. l. ii. c. 4, 5, 6.

⁸² Natural. Auscult. l. ii. c. vi. p. 335.

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Anger, ap-
petite, and
reason.

Aristotle's
doctrine of
causes su-
persedes
the ques-
tion of
liberty and
necessity.

own voluntary acts have made it such. By frequently repeating the same acts, they become, merely in consequence of this repetition, both easy and pleasant. It is thus, that the mind is disciplined into virtuous habits, things more permanent than even the sciences, and next to nature herself in stability.⁸³ Daily experience shows, that men often act from anger, and from appetite. The worst and most brutish of the species, however, are the only habitual slaves of these unworthy tyrants. For man has, for his legitimate master, a nobler principle, to teach him the due distinctions between right and wrong, truth and falsehood. He is a rational reflecting creature; and some degree of deliberation and choice will, for the most part, influence his actions, and determine them to a different course from that into which they would be hurried by the blind impulse of his passions. In this manner, the voluptuary will often be restrained in his profligacy; and the ruffian, in his outrage. He compares the present transient gratification with the future permanent trouble or danger. He is at liberty to choose the one or the other; and that which, on comparison, he prefers, is called his will.⁸⁴ This will, therefore, is not a primary cause of action. It implies the comparison of two at least of these causes, and is merely the result of this comparison; or, as the word in Greek denotes, an act of choice

⁸³ Ethic. Nicom. l. i. c. 10.

⁸⁴ De Anima, l. iii. c. 10. Ethic. Nicom. l. iii. c. 5.

or preference, more or less deliberate. Hence CHAP.
 the absurdity of disputing whether the will be II.
 free : the will itself is freedom ; all will is free
 will ; and nothing can be more free, than that
 which is voluntary.

Aristotle's doctrine of causes thus supersedes the abstruse and idle question of liberty and necessity, which has descended from the false subtilty of the schoolmen who corrupted his philosophy, to the congenial minds of those modern metaphysicians who have neglected or despised it. The same important doctrine explains accurately and completely, the nature and origin of our moral sentiments : — wherein virtue consists ; by what faculty we discern it ; above all, how we may be confirmed in the practice of it. Among the causes of human action above enumerated, four only are voluntary or dependent on ourselves ; custom, reason, anger, appetite or affection. Custom, as above observed, is a second nature ; because, by custom, habits are established, which become as strong, sometimes much stronger, than many of our natural appetites ; yet custom is voluntary, because the several acts, from which its whole power is derived, are all and each of them voluntary. It is plain also that our passions, appetites, and affections, are all of them causes of action inherent in ourselves, and voluntary ; since we may either obey their impulse, or, according to circumstances, direct, modify, diminish, or completely resist it. The passions, even the most unruly of them, are implanted by

Explains
 clearly the
 moral con-
 stitution of
 man;

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This sub-
ject illus-
trated.

the wisdom of nature, for good ends. They may, however, all of them transgress or go beyond these ends; they may also, on many occasions, fall short of them. But to discern the means fitted to attain ends of any kind, is the office of reason. The passions, desires, affections, and sentiments, or by whatever names we characterise the emotions of our merely sensitive frame⁸⁵, are all of them blind in themselves; but when enlightened by the understanding, they are qualified to combine with reason, and to obey the authority of this higher power, as young children obey the authority of their parents or teachers. When, therefore, either their excesses are moderated, or their dullness and insensibility are roused, so as to reduce them to that middle temperament, which is alone fitted to attain their proper ends, they then assume the character of virtue, and impel us to the performance of praiseworthy actions. By a repetition of such acts, we are so constituted by nature, that they come to be the objects of our fondest love, and to be performed, not only with facility, but with the highest pleasure. Virtue, therefore, is a thing to be acquired or learned; a science, or rather an art, since, like all other arts, it is gained by practice only; improved and perfected by a right practice; marred and destroyed by a wrong one. It belongs not exclusively, either to the intellectual,

⁸⁵ More properly, appetitive; a word that better expresses what Aristotle calls the orectic.

or to the sensitive part of our frame ; it is the combined work of both : when the passions and affections are adapted to their proper objects, under the direction of reason, and through the power of custom. This is that happy temperament, which, though a state of mediocrity in respect to the strength or weakness of desire, is, in respect of manners, life, and conduct, the summit of perfection. “By different philosophers,” Aristotle observes, “virtue is ascribed to different causes ; to nature, to instruction, and to custom. The virtue proceeding from nature is not properly our own, but rather accedes by a certain divine disposition, to those most truly fortunate. Instruction, again, can operate effectually only on those prepared for receiving it. As the soil is elaborated for receiving the good seed, so men, before they can benefit by good advice, must be previously exercised in good affections and good actions. Their virtue will then grow up and flourish, under the admonition and authority of parents and superiors, in consequence of good examples and good laws ; above all, through their own unceasing practice. Happy, if, through all these concurring causes, they may at length be confirmed in a possession of such inestimable value !”⁸⁶

If this, then, be the nature of moral virtue, it is plain that no simple power of the mind, whether cognitive or active, can be the principle of moral approbation, or, in other words, can

⁸⁶ Ethic. l. x. c. ult.

CHAP. II. explain how it comes to pass that the mind prefers one tenor of conduct to another, and denominates the one right, and the other wrong. To discern what virtue is, we must be ourselves virtuous; and in this great art of life, as in all the inferior arts contributing to use or pleasure, there can be no other fit judge but an artist, perfected by practice.

Aristotle's
a more cor-
rect ac-
count than
that of Dr.
S. Clarke;

Notwithstanding the cogency and clearness of this reasoning, very different systems have been proposed by authors of the first rate abilities, and of the greatest celebrity. The illustrious Samuel Clarke, with many able and acute followers, rightly considered virtue as the fitness of man's character to his place in the creation; but erroneously pronounced reason, as being altogether competent to discern this fitness, to be the sole principle of moral approbation. These writers seem not to have sufficiently attended to the distinction between decisions of the understanding and moral preferences. Our judgments or opinions bear a reference to truth and falsehood; our moral preferences, to right and wrong. Men are not denominated good or bad, from their opinions; they are so characterised, most justly, according to their moral preferences. Our opinions and judgments may be in favour of virtue, and yet we may pursue a vicious course of life; but moral preferences are the immediate causes of action.⁸⁷

Contemporary with these writers, the elegant

⁸⁷ Ethic. Nicom. l. iii. c. 2.

Lord Shaftesbury talked of the moral charm, and of the moral sense; and this loose and popular language was converted into a philosophical system by the benevolent Dr. Francis Hutcheson⁸⁸; who first revealed to mankind a power of perception unknown to them before; an internal sense analogous to the external senses, and which, when attended to, as surely informed us of the moral qualities of our affections and actions, as the ear informed us of sounds, or the eye of colours. By looking, however, into the world around us, it was easy and lamentable to observe, that innumerable individuals, and even whole nations, paid little or no regard to this supposed power of sensation; a remark which could not fail to end in very pernicious consequences, since those who had taken for granted, the existence of this innate moral sense, were liable to be much disconcerted upon finding the weakness and hollowness of what they had been taught to regard as the great prop of morality.

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or that of
Dr. Francis
Hutche-
son;

Two subsequent theories of moral sentiments, more plausible than that of Dr. Hutcheson, but equally at variance with that of Aristotle, were proposed by two late authors of much celebrity, and recommended by great ingenuity of thought, and the greatest propriety and beauty of expression. In these respects it is not easy to decide which of the two is the more admirable; but certainly there are few compositions in our

or that of
Mr. Hume;

⁸⁸ He placed all moral virtue in benevolence solely. His system is well known.

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or that of
Dr. Adam
Smith.

language, in which the combined powers of talent and of taste shine so conspicuously. The first of these theories is that of Mr. Hume, which resolves all our moral perceptions into a sense of utility; the second is that of Dr. Adam Smith, which refers them all ultimately to sympathy. It is remarkable that neither of these theories is new: that founded on utility is expressly mentioned by Plato⁸⁹, and that founded on sympathy is fully stated by Polybius.⁹⁰ But it is of more importance to observe, that in all these moral systems⁹¹, the authors entirely lost sight of Aristotle's doctrine of cause and effect, a doctrine approved and adopted by the great Newton, as the only solid foundation of philosophy on any subject whatever. This connection of cause and effect is not merely a customary conjunction, but a connection continual and necessary; so that where the cause precedes, the effect must follow; and where the effect has followed, the cause must have preceded: the connection is perpetual and unalterable. Yet, in opposition to this rule, it is a matter of fact, that there may be utility both in persons and in things, without the smallest degree of moral approbation; and that there may be the highest moral approbation, without the smallest degree of utility. It is also a plain

⁸⁹ Plato de Republica, l. v. p. 655. Edit. Ficin. Compare my Translation of Aristotle's Politics, in note, p. 19.

⁹⁰ Histor. l. vi. c. 6.

⁹¹ The system of utility is espoused by a great variety of authors: it is the foundation of works of the most opposite tendency; of Paley's Moral Philosophy, and Godwin's Political Justice.

matter of fact, that there may be sympathy without moral approbation, and the greatest approbation, nay admiration itself, without the slightest sympathy. That Mr. Hume should have been regardless of these objections was a matter of course, because he considered the word "cause," in its ordinary acceptation, to be a name without any corresponding archetype; a phantom originating in the association of our own ideas, a mere illusion of the fancy, which led us to believe things seen often together, to be connected indissolubly; although, in reality, no such necessary connection, for any thing that it was possible for us to know, existed in the works of nature.⁹² The contrary of any matter of fact, he maintained, to be a thing still possible: the non-existence of Deity was, therefore, a thing still possible; an argument which Lord Kames, his friend and ingenious fellow-labourer in the new philosophy, was able to answer, only by the supposition of a new internal sense, analogous to the moral sense of Dr. Hutcheson, which gave to us a direct and immediate perception of Deity.⁹³ So hostile are the most enlightened partisans of the modern school to the doctrine of cause and effect, on which all conclusive reasoning must be founded!

This hostility should seem also to have set the philosophy of Adam Smith at the utmost distance from that of Aristotle, though the modern writer had irradiated the subject of political

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The circumstance that set Dr. Smith's philosophy at variance

⁹² See the passages in his Essays above referred to.

⁹³ Essays on Morality and Natural Religion.

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with that
of Aris-
totle.

economy, by adopting the Stagirite's notions of money and national wealth ; of value in use, and value in exchange ; and of human labour as the best measure of the latter. Yet with regard to science in general, both their sentiments and their views differed most widely. With the one, truth was the great, or rather the sole object ; his daily pursuit, his nightly dream, in the investigation of which, the variety of his exertions is altogether unparalleled. With Dr. Smith, on the contrary, " truth consists merely in systematic connection and consistency ; and the ultimate end of philosophy is nothing but the repose and tranquillity of the imagination. " To the more complete attainment," he says, " of this end, than had been done by the cycles and epicycles of the Greeks, and by the vortices of Des Cartes, even the astronomy of Newton owes its unrivalled credit in the world. For this credit was deserved and gained, not by the *agreement of the Newtonian doctrines, with the real nature of things*, of which we are *totally ignorant*, but by its connecting agreeably in the fancy the various and seemingly discordant phænomena of the heavens. This Newton effected in a manner so superior to that of all former philosophers, that even we," says Dr. Smith, " who have been endeavouring to represent all philosophical systems as mere inventions of the imagination, to connect together the otherwise disjointed and discordant phænomena of nature, have been insensibly drawn in, to make use of language to express the connect-

ing principles of this one, as if they were the real chains which nature makes use of, to bind together her several operations.”⁹⁴ CHAP.
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In commenting a passage of Aristotle's *Ethics*, in which he calls “moral preference appetite, or affection, combined with and controuled by reason,” I had occasion to remark, that the sagacious Polybius, also, analyses the moral faculty into reason or intellect, operating on the social and sympathetic nature of man.”⁹⁵ When children,” he says, “attempt to injure the parents by whom they have been reared, their ingratitude must be highly offensive : for man, who, among all the various kinds of animals, is alone endowed with reason, cannot, like the rest, pass over such actions with indifference ; but will make reflection on what he sees ; and comparing likewise the future with the present, will not fail to express his indignation at this injurious treatment ; to which, as he foresees, he may also at some time be exposed. Thus, again, when any one has been succoured by another in the time of danger, instead of showing the like kindness to his benefactor, endeavours at any time, to destroy or hurt him, it is certain, that all men must be shocked by such an unworthy proceeding, through sympathy with the resentment of their neighbour, and from the apprehension, also, that the case may be their own. And from hence arises in the mind of

Answer to
Mr. Stew-
art's criti-
cism on my
account of
Dr. Smith's
Theory of
Morals.

⁹⁴ Smith's *History of Astronomy*, p. 93. 4to edit.

⁹⁵ See Aristotle's *Ethics*, p. 302. 3d edit.

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every man, a certain notion of the nature and force of duty, in which consists both the beginning and the end of justice." Upon this passage, I remark, that the doctrine contained in it is adopted by Dr. Adam Smith, and expanded by him into a theory of moral sentiments: but that Dr. Smith *departs from his author*, in placing the perception of right or wrong in feeling, ultimately and simply; whereas Polybius maintains, with Aristotle, that none but a reasonable creature can be a moral agent; and that the moral faculty is appetite or affection modified by reason or intellect; in other words, that instead of being any thing as simple as Dr. Smith's sympathy, or Dr. Hutcheson's moral sense, that it is of a compound nature, and had been resolved by Aristotle, into two simpler principles of action." Mr. Stewart is pleased to admit this criticism to be perfectly correct, but finds fault with the words, that *Dr. Smith departs from his author*, as proceeding from my unwillingness to do justice to the originality of that great modern moralist.⁹⁶ To disavow such an *imputed* motive, would be idle and useless; but I shall mention two *real* motives by which I was actuated on this, and several similar occasions. First, I wished to encourage the reading of books, long too much neglected, by showing how

⁹⁶ I omitted to note the page, and cannot, therefore, cite the precise words. Mr. Stewart's volumes are not provided with indexes, or with any serviceable tables of contents; the want of which is to be regretted in his valuable, but very immethodical, works.

much a few, and but a few, of the acutest men of our own times had profited from the perusal of them; secondly, I hoped to add some little weight to opinions of practical importance to mankind, by proving that such are not the creatures of fancy, nor the belief of certain individuals and of a certain age, but have been delivered down from the learned ages of antiquity, and recognised by congenial minds in very remote periods, and the most distant countries. If it delights the geometer and astronomer to connect the discoveries of Galileo, of Kepler, and of Newton, with those of the ancient mathematicians who flourished under the dynasty of the Ptolemies⁹⁷, to trace the filiation of moral truth must be not less pleasant, and still more useful; since the mathematical sciences repose firmly on their own solid basis; but there are few moral maxims, that will not be found more or less impressive on the multitude, in proportion to the weight of authority by which they are sustained.

Adam Smith, I had the honour to know well. Of the new school of speculative politicians, or economists, in France and England, he was perhaps the individual most conversant with the writings of the Greek philosophers, as his admired friend, David Hume, was with those of the Greek orators and historians. With the grand principles and the correct reasoning of the Greeks, Dr. Smith united the copious detail and diffusive illustration of the French; and

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Dr. Smith's judgment sometimes warped in explaining Aristotle.

⁹⁷ See History of Ancient Greece, part ii. vol. ii. pp. 128, et seq. pp. 330, et seq.; and vol. iv. p. 177, et seq.

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Exemplified in his account of the invention of nouns appellative.

produced his elaborate work, "On the Wealth of Nations," to which the circumstances of the times, their extravagance, debts, and difficulties at length procured, both at home and abroad, an unrivalled popularity. I am doubtful, however, whether his conduct was judicious at such a crisis, in directing the public attention exclusively to the multiplication of riches. Riches form but one of the elements of national prosperity; and there are certainly other constituents of public felicity, not less important, independently of which riches can neither be securely preserved, nor fitly employed, nor a source of any real enjoyment to those in the highest degree possessed of them. But this is a topic foreign to my present subject; which was to observe, that though Dr. Smith had in the early part of his life, diligently read Aristotle, yet his strong understanding had been so much warped by the new French theories with which he was become more familiar, that he is sometimes led unintentionally to drag the Stagirite himself within their fanciful vortex. Of this I think there is an example in his ingenious and elegant discourse on the formation of language. This subject, and particularly the invention of nouns appellative, had been recently much discussed by Du Marsais, Rousseau, Turgot, and other French encyclopedists. Upon a question certainly of the highest interest, not only to grammarians, but to all who speculate concerning the progress of the human understanding, Dr. Smith observes, that, among men in the rudest

state of society, those objects only that were familiar to them, and which they had the most frequent occasion to mention, would have particular names assigned to them. The particular cave whose covering sheltered them from the weather, the particular tree whose fruit relieved their hunger, the particular fountain whose water allayed their thirst, would first be denominated by the words, cave, tree, fountain, or by whatever other appellations they might think proper in that primitive jargon to mark them. Afterwards, when the more enlarged experience of these savages led them to observe, and their necessary occasions obliged them to make mention of, other caves and other trees and other fountains, they would naturally bestow upon each of these new objects, the same name by which they had been accustomed to express the similar object they were first acquainted with. The new objects had, none of them, any name of their own, but each of them exactly resembled another object, which had such an appellation. It was impossible that those savages could behold the new objects, without recollecting the old ones, to which the new bore so close a resemblance. When they had occasion, therefore, to mention or to point out to each other any of the new objects, they would naturally utter the name of the corresponding old one, of which the idea could not fail to present itself, at that instant, to the memory, in the strongest and liveliest manner. And thus those words, which were originally the

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proper names of individuals, would each of them become the common name of a multitude. A child that is just learning to speak, calls every person that comes to the house, its papa, or its mama, and thus bestows upon the whole species those names which it had been taught to apply to two individuals."

His opinion controverted by Archbishop Magee.

This opinion is controverted by a writer of much learning and ability, Dr. Magee, Archbishop of Dublin, who considers Dr. Smith's theory as more ingenious than solid⁹⁸: "The name given to an individual," he says, "being intended exclusively to designate the individual, it is a direct subversion of its very nature and design, to apply it to any other individual known to be different from the former. The child, it is true, may give the name of father, to an individual known to be like to the person it has been taught to call by that name; but this is from mistake, not from design; from a confusion of the two as the same person, and not from a perception of resemblance between them, whilst known to be different. The object with those whose terms or signs refer only to individuals, must naturally be to take care, that every such term or sign be applied to its appropriate individual, and to none else. Resemblance can produce no other effect than to enforce the greater caution in the application of the particular names, and therefore has no natural ten-

⁹⁸ Discourses on the Scriptural Doctrine of Atonement, vol. ii. pp. 63 and 64. third edition.

dency to lead the mind to the use of general terms." CHAP. II.

The question decided so very differently by these two most acute writers, is agitated incidentally in the first chapter of the first book of Aristotle's *Physicks*. In this chapter the Stagirite shows that the study of nature must be carried on analytically. I had occasion, therefore, to translate it, as proving that his real sentiments were completely at variance with the doctrines erroneously ascribed to him. The chapter concludes; "man is so formed as to perceive, at first, all the objects around him promiscuously, in confused heaps⁹⁹: he sees things only in the gross: and it is by slow degrees, that he learns to disentangle complexity, and to analyse the various objects of his perceptions. He must begin therefore with wholes, the things most obvious to sense, before he proceeds to decompose them into their more simple constituents. It is the same process that takes place in the learning of languages. Words of a very general import are made use of, before we learn to limit them by definitions. The name is vague and doubtful; the definition ascertains its application.¹⁰⁰ Children, at first, call every man that notices them *papa*, and every woman *mamma*. They learn afterwards to distinguish the individuals to whom alone these appellations belong." Mr. Stewart, certainly no partial admirer of

The question decided accurately by Aristotle.

⁹⁹ Συγκεχυμένα, *Physic.* l.i. c. 1.

¹⁰⁰ Πεπονθε δε τ'αυτο, και τα ονοματα προς τον λογον, *Aristot. Ibid. Conf. Metaphysic.* l.iv. c. 4. p. 873.

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Aristotle, says, "it must be acknowledged that the Greek writer has viewed this matter in a juster light than Dr. Smith."¹⁰¹ But he is inclined "to suspect that both of those philosophers¹⁰² have, in this instance, trusted more to theory than to observation, and assumed as a general fact an accidental occurrence, which, if it ever happened, may be justly regarded as an exception to the usual history of the species." This remark, however, I am convinced, will not be approved by Mr. Stewart's calmer judgment and experience; for every goodnatured man, a lover of children, must, I think, recollect that he has sometimes been mistaken by them for papa, and addressed by that fond appellation.

By whom
Condorcet's obser-
vation was
anticipat-
ed.

There is not any reason to doubt that Dr. Smith erred through an imperfect recollection of the chapter in Aristotle's *Physicks* above cited; and Mr. Stewart, if he had read this chapter with attention, certainly could not have written as follows: "Dr. Smith's remark concerning the transformation of proper names into appellatives, becomes, in my opinion, much more luminous and important by being combined with another very original one ascribed to Turgot by Condorcet, and which I do not recollect to have

¹⁰¹ Vol. ii. p. 180. in note.

¹⁰² To these two philosophers, Mr. Stewart must join a third, Baron Gerando. His words are—"When a child has learned to pronounce the word 'papa,' it gives this name to all men who take notice of it. It is only by attention and a sort of study, that it learns to reserve the name exclusively for its father." "*Lorsque un enfant, &c.*" Gerando sur la Generation des Connaissances Humaines, p. 236.

seen taken notice of by any later writer on the human mind. It was the maxim of Turgot, that some of our most abstract and general notions are among the earliest that we form. What meaning he annexed to this maxim, we are not informed. But if he understood it in the sense in which I am disposed to interpret it, he appears to me to be entitled to the credit of a very valuable suggestion with respect to the progress of human knowledge. The truth is, that our first perceptions lead us to confound things together, which have very little in common; and that the specifical differences of individuals do not begin to be marked with precision, till the powers of observation and of reason have attained a certain degree of maturity."¹⁰³ Wherein, then, does this maxim of Turgot, as explained by Mr. Stewart, differ from that contained in the chapter of Aristotle's Physicks above translated?

I have now discussed the subjects proposed in the present discourse. The faults found with Aristotle's doctrines have been shown to originate wholly in mistaken interpretations of them. The connection has been explained between the work here translated, and that which the author names his exact philosophy; and that philosophy has been vindicated by proofs, that all departures from it have been deviations into error. The plausible and popular objection to Aristotelism, is the use and abuse of syllogism by the schoolmen. But for this error they alone

The popular objection to Aristotelism answered.

¹⁰³ Vol. ii. p. 232.

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are answerable. In the treatises formerly translated by me, and also in the following treatise on Rhetoric, though all of them turn on subjects in which even Lord Bacon approves the use of syllogisms¹⁰⁴, Aristotle never employs them himself, and fails not to exhort, that they should be used sparingly by others. The same course he pursues in all his other writings, whether physical or moral. He indeed perfected the theory of logic; as his glorious aim was to perfect that of all the other sciences. But the rules resulting from this theory, were not, he thought, to be ostentatiously, because unnecessarily, exhibited; any more than a well-bred gentleman should pedantically carry with him into life the graces that, in early youth, he had learned from his dancing-master. The effect of good instruction is then most striking, when the secret springs by which it has been wrought, are the least displayed to observation.

Recapitulation of the heads, bearing a reference to the Rhetoric.

Notwithstanding these conclusions, which must be drawn by every attentive reader, it is said “to have been a fundamental error of Aristotle, in which he has been followed by almost every logical writer since his time, to confine his views entirely to reasoning, or the discursive faculty, instead of aiming at the improvement of our nature in all its various parts.”¹⁰⁵ In opposition to this severe judgment, I hope that, after what has been proved in the preceding discourse, I may be permitted to declare my humble opinion,

¹⁰⁴ See above. p. 65.

¹⁰⁵ Preliminary Dissertation to Stewart's Essays, p. lxxvii.

that no one man ever aimed more directly than the Stagirite, at the general improvement of our nature, or with more signal success. To aid the reader's recollection with regard to this matter, I shall enumerate a few of the principal heads of a multifarious, I hope, rather than abstruse disquisition, and those bearing a particular reference to the subject of the Rhetoric, here translated. Many, it must be allowed, of these speculations have been adopted, prosecuted, and even carried a great deal farther by modern writers; but the main question is, whether they have not been carried too far; and whether, in their imaginary improvements, our philosophers have been sufficiently observant of that golden mean, so steadily pursued by their precursor, as the best of all things both in theory and practice.

It appears to me that no writer has explained, so accurately as Aristotle, the office of language as an instrument of thought and the source of knowledge. The inward acts of the mind, or what Mr. Locke calls ideas, are of an obscure and fugitive nature: they cannot be long retained in the memory, much less recalled and steadily contemplated, without association with some sort of external signs, of which words are infinitely the most perfect. By means of words, our ideas are revived at pleasure, compared, classed, defined, made objects of reflection and reasoning; and the concealed internal scene passing within our own breasts is laid open and exhibited, more or less clearly, to the understandings of our fellow creatures. By comparing

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1. The power of language as an instrument of thought, truly ascertained.

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individual persons or things, the only real existences in nature, the mind perceives their agreements, and ascribes those that are alike to the same species, marked by a common name; a name which, according to Aristotle, has no other archetype but the agreements perceived in the individuals that have been submitted to our examination, and our remembrance that these individuals have been viewed simultaneously, compared and classed. To explain the process of reasoning, it is therefore altogether unnecessary to admit the impossible supposition of general ideas¹⁰⁶; nor, because words only are general, do we thereby lose sight of the reality and specific distinctions of things. The intelligible species, as Aristotle briefly expresses it, are embodied in the sensible¹⁰⁷; and the specific name is, for all purposes of reasoning, truly

¹⁰⁶ Locke says, "Knowledge consists only in perceiving the habitudes and relations of ideas one to another; the intervention of a sound helps nothing to it." Locke's Works, vol. i. p. 94. In the last chapter, however, and at the very close of his immortal Essay, he finds out his error, and acknowledges that the comparison of ideas alone is inadequate to the effect which he had ascribed to it. He says, that "to communicate our thoughts to one another, as well as to record them for our own use, signs of our ideas, or words, are necessary." Vol. i. p. 342.

¹⁰⁷ *Εν τοις εἶδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητὰ εἰσι.* De Anima, l. iii. c. 9. This doctrine is admirably illustrated by the great physiologist, Cuvier, in his Theory of the Earth. His observations go to prove that every organised individual forms an entire system by itself, all the parts of which mutually correspond, and combine towards the production of the same end. Hence none of these separate parts can change its form, without a corresponding change in the other parts of the same system. From any one of these parts or organs, and from almost every fragment of them, we may, therefore, discover all the other parts or organs that existed simultaneously with it in

applicable to the individuals, or real existences, comprehended under it: the only requisite is, that the name be rightly defined, and always employed precisely in the same sense. In this manner a most important function is assigned to language as an instrument of thought, without maintaining, with Hobbes and other sceptics, the discursus mentis to be verbal merely, and resolving all truth and falsehood into empty sound.¹⁰⁸

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Another principle, first unfolded in its full extent by Aristotle, is the power of custom. This principle, under a different name, occupies much space in the works of modern metaphysicians, by some of whom all reasoning is said to be mere association of ideas, or custom.¹⁰⁹ Aristotle, on the contrary, denies that its agency extends thus far: man is, indeed, much his own work; but a higher principle than custom is necessary to his making even the first steps in science. The power of association, therefore,

2. Association of ideas or custom; extent of that principle ascertained.

the same animal; in other words, ascertain the kind or species to which that animal belonged. Though the classing of objects, therefore, is the work of human understanding, yet the genera and species into which they are intellectually divided, exists in the objects of sense, that is, in the several individuals composing the genus or species. Neither Locke nor Buffon were fully aware of these truths. See particularly Locke's Essay, b. iii. c. 6. § 3. et seq.: and Buffon says, "there are, perhaps, as many living creatures produced by a fortuitous concourse of little organic parts of matter, (molecules organiques) as of animals and vegetables proceeding from a regular succession of generations." *Supplement à l'Histoire Naturelle*, tom. vi. p. 18.

¹⁰⁸ See above, p. 81.

¹⁰⁹ Hartley, Hume, and Knight on Taste, p. 264.

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must not be permitted to encroach on the province of intellect; nor, in our metaphysical analyses, must any thing be allowed to supersede that primary source of knowledge, communicated to man by his maker. Custom, however, is, according to Aristotle, an original and most efficient principle, qualifying us to perform innumerable actions easily and with pleasure, merely because they had been performed before, and had been frequently repeated. In this manner, custom contributes mainly to the formation of all our faculties, moral and intellectual.¹¹⁰ These faculties do not, as many should seem to think, grow with our growth, and strengthen with our strength: they grow and strengthen by exercise; they are weakened by disuse; they decay, and, in a manner, perish, through long continued and obstinate neglect.

3. Aristotle's doctrine of causes, the most accurate of any.

A third important article, is the doctrine of causes, in which the philosophy of Aristotle has been shown to refute, by anticipation, that of Berkeley and of Hume; and to be more strictly

¹¹⁰ After the explanation of the philosophical import of the words "custom" and "habit," and the very detailed account given by Aristotle, in various parts of his works, of the formation of habits by custom, or association of ideas, the following difference of opinion is remarkable. Mr. Stewart says, "Dr. Reid seems to think that the association of ideas has no claim to be considered as an original principle in our nature; that trains of thinking, which, by frequent repetition, have become familiar, should spontaneously offer themselves to our fancy, seems to require no other original quality, but the power of habit." Mr. Stewart subjoins, "With this observation I cannot agree; because I think it more philosophical to resolve the power of habit into the association of ideas, than to resolve the association of ideas into habit." *Elements of the Philosophy, &c.* vol. i. p. 281. 4to. edition.

accurate than that of Des Cartes, or even than that of Bacon.¹¹¹ It is the firm conviction of every reasonable creature, that nothing can begin without a cause, and that every change in the universe, must have a cause adequate to its production. He who shall reject this truth, will never, Aristotle maintains, be able, by any other, to supply its place; but will be prepared and disposed to deny all substantial existence whatever, that of the external world around him, and that of the self-existent spiritual Being, the eternal unceasing cause of motion, life, harmony and happiness.

In the most useful science of all, that of human nature, Aristotle's writings are not less satisfactory than ample. He treats fully and clearly of the senses, memory, imagination, understanding, and affections; maintains the spirituality and dignity of the mind of man; and asserts the exalted station which he is qualified for reaching, by the proper improvement of his intellectual and moral powers.¹¹² His Ethics neither err on the side of indulgence, nor are they, on the other hand, impracticable. His Politics neither leaves the origin of government incomprehensible, nor its stability precarious. His critical observations relative to taste in the arts, and in literary composition, have always

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II.

4. Aristotle's science of human nature, copious and consistent.

¹¹¹ See above, p. 99.

¹¹² He says, "the being virtuous from nature, can mean only the being so from a divine cause;" and, speaking popularly, "*the gods* will most love and reward those who cultivate their understandings and practise virtue." Ethic. Nicom. l. x. c. 8 & 9. Conf. Metaph. xiv. p. 1000.

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II.

risen in estimation, in proportion to the discernment of those, by whom they have been studied ; and his conclusions concerning the more important business of life, the affairs and duties of men, are neither cramped by the narrow spirit of system, nor perverted by its wildness ; they are clear and safe inductions, flowing from a copious and pure source of well-digested experience.

5. His method of instruction, the best calculated to enlarge and liberalise the mind.

Of all methods of instruction, that of Aristotle has the most direct tendency to enlarge and liberalise the mind. By his complete and accurate classifications of the various objects of thought, and his impartial contemplation of them, he counteracts that littleness and meanness of conceit which is apt to prevail in those devoted to particular branches of knowledge ; and who, because some pursuits are lucrative, and others happen to be fashionable, imagine them to be exclusively entitled to cultivation ; with a scornful neglect of far wider, perhaps, and nobler domains in the intellectual kingdom. In all his enquiries, his advice and uniform practice is, to examine things as they are in themselves, disengaged from accidental concomitants, and viewed through a medium undisturbed by passion, prejudice, interest, fond admiration for novelty, or fearful veneration for antiquity.

6. With him, practice deemed indispensable, or rather all in all.

There is, in man, he teaches, an inborn desire of knowledge, and an inborn disposition to virtue. But it must be his own work, by his own voluntary acts, to cherish these native capacities, and to convert them

into firm habitual powers. He does not appear to have thought, that from metaphysics any important assistance would be derived towards improving our faculties, independently of strenuous and persevering exertion. That knowledge which becomes a part of ourselves, and is ever and intimately present, can result only from our own industry. It is not like water, that may be poured from one vessel into another; it more resembles fire, that is struck out by collision. By patient analysis, indeed, the intellectual phænomena, may be simplified ¹¹²; by attention and reflection, the laws of mental action may be investigated, and generalised ¹¹³: but the rules flowing from any such discoveries will avail nothing without practice; by this only, dormant capacities can be changed into active energies, and the mind either sharpened for the pursuits of science, or established and confirmed in those of virtue.

This habitual exertion, seemingly laborious and painful, might be a repulsive quality in Aristotle's philosophy, if he had not clearly

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II.

7. Action and pleasure intimately, and

¹¹² He thus analyses, for instance, the complex passions into the simple ones. Anger, an unpleasant passion, contains a mixture of joy, from its imagined gratification: hope, a pleasant passion, contains a mixture of pain, from its imagined disappointment. See Rhetoric.

¹¹³ When he had discovered, for instance, that law of mental action, which brings objects to the memory, in consequence of their contiguity in time or place, their resemblance or similarity, their contrariety or contrast, and had ascertained the momentous power of custom in general, it was easy to perceive that, by dwelling on the association of things, and the analogies of words, and their reciprocal influence on each other, we might wonderfully improve the faculty of reminiscence or voluntary recollection, a faculty which he regarded as the primary barrier between man and inferior animals.

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indivisibly
connected,
and the
worth of
the one to
be measur-
ed by that
of the
other.

shown that it was accompanied with a certain and abundant reward. The two great principles that excite and animate mankind are, the love of action and the love of pleasure ; and Aristotle exerts the utmost diligence to prove, not only that these two are inseparable ; but that the worth and value of our pleasures are to be measured exactly by the worth and value of their corresponding energies¹¹⁴: the higher and nobler the one, the higher and nobler the other ; the more pure and more stable the one, the more pure and more stable the other. Energies, he affirms to be more identified with pleasures, than even the desires¹¹⁵ which precede them, and which they are calculated to gratify. For pleasures and energies are simultaneous ; they are not distinguishable in time, scarcely in thought ; the pleasures heightening and perfecting the congenial energies from which they flow, not as pre-existent habits, but as supervenient ends¹¹⁶ ; and as intimately and indivisibly connected with them, as is beauty with the spring of the year or with the flower of youth.

This doctrine not approved by the vulgar, or those

This language will not be approved by the vulgar, nor by those philosophers who condescend to speak with the vulgar. By them, pleasure is placed in our passive sensations, and

¹¹⁴ Ut ad cursum, equum ; ad indagandum, canem ; sic hominem ad duas res, ut Aristoteles ait, ad intelligendum et agendum esse natum, quasi mortalem deum. Cicero de Finibus, l. ii. c. 13.

¹¹⁵ Aristotle speaks often of the *ορμη*, the appetite or desire for knowledge, &c.

¹¹⁶ Ethic. Nicom. l. x. c. 5.

made solely to arise from the keenness of the passion which happens to be uppermost, and the completeness of its gratification. Mr. Hume says, with his usual perspicuity, "It is not from the value or worth of the object that any person pursues, that we can determine his enjoyment, but merely from the passion with which he pursues it, and the success which he meets with in his pursuit. Objects have absolutely no worth or value in themselves. They derive their worth merely from the passion. If that be strong, and steady, and successful, the person is happy. It cannot reasonably be doubted, but a little miss, drest in a new gown for a dancing-school ball, receives as complete enjoyment as the greatest orator, who triumphs in the splendour of his eloquence, while he governs the passions and resolutions of a numerous assembly."¹¹⁷ It may happen, indeed, that the orator is actuated by passions as petty as those of the little girl, and not quite as innocent. In that case, it is not much worth while to examine the difference between them. But something more than bold assertion will be requisite to prove, that pleasures are not akin to the sources from which they spring; that those of passions, which must be transient, are equivalent to those of energies habitual and permanent; in fine, that enjoyments are to be estimated by quantity, without any regard to quality; and that those are not the most valuable, which surpass in

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philoso-
phers who
speak with
them.

¹¹⁷ Essays, p. 189.

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II.

purity, stability, dignity, and duration. Plausible things, indeed, may be said in support of all such paradoxes; and the following passage, which is a mere corollary to Mr. Hume's proposition, is an instance, I think, how much fine writing¹¹⁸ may be at variance with good sense. "The pleasures of imagination are much higher than any that can be derived from rectitude of judgment. The judgment is, for the greater part, employed in throwing stumbling blocks in the way of the imagination, in dissipating the scenes of its enchantment, and in tying us down to the disagreeable yoke of our reason; for almost the only pleasure men have in judging better than others, consists in a sort of conscious pride and superiority, which arises from thinking rightly: but then, this is an indirect pleasure, a pleasure that does not immediately result from the object that is under contemplation. In the morning of our days, when the senses are unworn and tender, when the whole man is awake in every part, and the gloss of novelty fresh on all the objects which surround us, how lively, at that time, are our sensations, but how false and inaccurate the judgments that we form of things! I do despair of ever receiving the same degree of pleasure from the most excellent performances of genius,

¹¹⁸ I mean what passes for such, and, with many, answers the end as well. —But,

Scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons.

Horace adds,

Rem tibi Socraticæ poterunt ostendere chartæ.

In which verse he has the writings of Aristotle plainly in view.

which I felt at that age from pieces which my present judgment regards as trifling and contemptible."¹¹⁹

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With a view to a summary of the purport of this discourse, I shall avail myself of a division of the sciences in the last chapter of Locke's Essay. "All that can fall," he says, "within the compass of human understanding is either, first, the nature of things as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation; or, secondly, that which man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent for the attainment of any end, especially happiness; or, thirdly, the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these are attained and communicated. I think science may, therefore, be divided into three sorts; *Φυσικη*, or natural philosophy, the end of which is bare speculative truth; and whatever can afford the mind of man any such, falls under this branch, whether it be God himself, angels, spirits, bodies, or any of their affections. Secondly, *Πρακτικη*, the skill of rightly applying our own powers and actions for the attainment of things good and useful, which is the seeking out of those rules and measures of human actions which tend to hap-

Locke's division of the sciences.

¹¹⁹ Burke on the Sublime and Beautiful. Introduction, p. 117. edit. 1808. Of the whole of which work it may be said, *eloquentiæ satis, sapientiæ parum*. Two writers of most extensive celebrity in their own and in foreign countries (I mean Hume and Montesquieu) tinged, imperceptibly, to many authors themselves, the writings of the eighteenth century. The judgment of Burke is, perhaps, in the passage cited, warped by what he had read in Hume; and I think he is often misled by Montesquieu's notions concerning the paramount power of climate and other external causes on the mind, in his mechanical explanations of our sentiments of the sublime and beautiful.

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II.

piness, and the means to practise them. The end of this is not bare speculation, and the knowledge of truth, but right, and a conduct suitable to it. Thirdly, the third branch may be called *Σημειωτική*, or the doctrine of signs, the most usual whereof being words, it is aptly enough termed, also, *Λογική*, or Logic." Thus far Mr. Locke.

Applied to
the esti-
mate of
Aristotel-
ism, and
the im-
prove-
ments on it.

1. In natu-
ral philoso-
phy.

In order to apply his observations to the estimate of Aristotelism, and that of the additions made to it, I shall comply with common use in limiting the name of Natural Philosophy to the knowledge of body, and in employing the word Metaphysics to denote the knowledge of mind. Our knowledge of bodies is derived solely from observation and experience. It is naturally progressive; every age, every year may be expected to augment it; though not to bring us nearer to any more perfect science, or to discover more fully the real nature of bodies, or that substantial essence, from which all their sensible qualities are supposed to flow, and on which all their mutual powers, or actions, are supposed to depend. The knowledge of bodies, however, cannot be considered as merely speculative, in the ordinary sense of that word; since it has procured for man, and is daily procuring for him, many advantages and conveniences, and since it is continually giving to him a greater dominion over nature, and thereby tending continually to exalt him in the scale of the creation.

2. In meta-
physics.

With metaphysics, as above limited, the case is quite different. In this science, if the first inquirers chose the right path, and were favour-

ably circumstanced for pursuing it with diligence and perseverance, future discoveries of importance were scarcely to be expected. The phenomena were always present; the data were all before them; the only instruments that can be usefully employed, were ever ready at command. To this, the following exception may perhaps occur, but it is only an apparent one. In the latter part of the last century, metaphysicians paid much attention to what has been called the philosophy of sensation. They divided our perceptions by sense, into the natural and the acquired: they observed that the acquired were far more numerous than the natural, particularly those acquired through the eye; and that the natural or original perceptions through this organ served only as signs to introduce the acquired. Newton's great optical discoveries had naturally directed the attention of the philosophical world to the subject of vision; and a boy blind till the age of fifteen, successfully couched by the anatomist Cheselden, furnished an opportunity for making such experiments as established the above-mentioned, and many other conclusions. But the whole of this philosophy of the senses resulted from observations and experiments, made by means of the senses themselves; and was, therefore, not less susceptible of new discoveries than any other branch of natural philosophy. Among its successful cultivators, Dr. Reid¹²⁰ holds the most distin-

¹²⁰ See his Inquiry into the Human Mind, particularly his Geometry of Visibles, chap. vi. sect. 9. p. 168. et seq.

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II.

guished place; and if his disquisitions on this subject shall be ascribed to metaphysicks, they will certainly constitute an advancement in that science, but the only one that has been made in it by the application of what he and Mr. Stewart call the new inductive or Baconian logic. In all other respects, the state of metaphysicks remains as Aristotle and Locke had left it: no addition has been made to the speculative knowledge of the mind; no new rule has been established for the practical improvement of its faculties.

5. In semiology
or logic.

The third part of philosophy, according to Locke, is the doctrine of signs, or logic. In this department, Aristotle appears to me to have done more than any author before or after him. Not to speak of the *Organum*, his other writings collectively contain, on abstruse and important subjects, a greater number of complete divisions and accurate definitions, than is perhaps to be found in the most voluminous of our Cyclopædias. With regard to one science, indeed, but that of the loftiest kind, it must be gratefully acknowledged, that logic, or the doctrine of signs, has been carried, since the days of Aristotle, or even those of Archimedes, to a stupendous and almost indefinite extent; and the elevation to which this noble science of geometry has attained in modern times, is to be ascribed chiefly to the ingenious labour bestowed on the invention of signs to denote ratios comprehending the result of many others, and in simplifying the signs by which our notions of quantity in general are compared, and the results

of our comparison surely drawn, and clearly expressed.¹²¹ CHAP.
II.

The fourth branch of science, and incomparably the most important, is that which comes home to the business and bosoms of men¹²², and which Locke, adopting Aristotle's phraseology, denominates the Practical. Upon this article, it would be improper in me to dilate, having exerted my best diligence in endeavouring to make publicly useful the Ethics and Politics; and now, last of all, the Rhetoric, in which three treatises, Aristotle's practical works are comprised. In Politics, the Stagirite was regarded, even by Locke, as a master¹²³; and with regard to the Ethics, I shall be contented with a single observation. In many Christian universities, a professor's chair has long been established, from which Ethics are taught as a matter of science, independently of that light of revelation, in comparison with which, all human knowledge is darkness. It happened, as might well be expected, that this academic department should sometimes fall to the share of men of distinguished abilities¹²⁴, who have favoured the world by the publication of their respective

4. In practical philosophy, comprising Ethics, Politics, and Rhetoric.

¹²¹ The Marquis de Laplace, the great master of the science at present, appeared to think that semeiology (l'Analyse Moderne) might be carried a pitch higher than it has yet been, by considering "body generally, leaving the laws as they stand, of its particular affections; gravitation, impulsion, elasticity, &c." But our conversation at the "Institut," happened to be interrupted, and on the day before I left Paris.

¹²² Ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία. Aristot.

¹²³ See above, p. 2.

¹²⁴ Need I mention the names of Hutcheson, Smith, Paley, &c.?

CHAP.

II.

Conclu-
sion.

systems. Yet, which of these systems can vie with the Ethics of Aristotle, in compactness and solidity, any more than in beauty, utility, and sound science?

Many parts of this discourse might have been extended with pleasure to myself, and perhaps with some little profit to my readers. But in this age of novels and party-politics, enough has probably been said, at one time, on philosophy: and being now in my seventy-sixth year, I would avoid, if possible, being tiresome in, perhaps, my last publication. I give it to the world without cold indifference, and without anxious solicitude. The gratification of communicating to others, truths that delight my own mind, is a pleasure that praise will not greatly augment, or censure considerably diminish. My chief aim has been to make Aristotle more read, and better understood; and thereby to confer a benefit on men of letters, which may possibly, in course of time, circulate through other classes of the community. His various writings, when carefully collated, and studiously meditated, will be found highly consistent with truth and with each other. They proclaim a genius truly admirable; equally penetrating and comprehensive; and, in the longest succession of time, their use can never be superseded, nor will their value ever sink in the estimation of those capable of perceiving that, in the works of original thinkers, there is an intimacy of union between the thought and the expression, a raciness, a vigour, a calm intellectual elevation, and a persuasive authority, that is no where else, in the same degree, to be

met with ; and that the powers of the mind, whether belonging to reason or to taste, will be very differently exercised in studying such works, and in gathering, were that possible, precisely the same information from compilements and dictionaries.

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II.

In concluding this introduction, it is fit to observe that I saw not any necessity for speaking in it of preceding translators or commenters of the "Rhetoric," not having derived any assistance, or borrowed a single sentence from any of them.

ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC.

BOOK I.

ARGUMENT.

Rhetoric, natural, how improved into Art. — Its connection with Logic. — Use of Rhetoric. — Its extensive nature. — Its artificial proofs. — Examples and Enthymemes. — Likelihoods, Signs, and Tests. — Topics general and special. — Three kinds of Oratory. — Principal Subjects of National Deliberation. — Analysis of National Prosperity. — Utility differently modified by different Forms of Government. — Demonstrative Oratory. — Moral Beauty. — Sources of Eulogy. — Judicial Oratory. — Human Action, seven causes thereof. — Injuries. — Laws Written and Unwritten. — Justice and Equity. — Witnesses Ancient and Contemporary. — Contracts. — Oaths — with the Propositions or Enthymemes, relative to all these subjects.

RHETORIC is the counterpart of logic; for both are conversant with subjects not falling within the distinct province of any particular science, and are superficially understood by all, even the most unlearned. To a certain degree, all men are rhetoricians and logicians, all being ready, on occasion, to provoke or to sustain an argument, to praise or to blame, to accuse or to de-

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I.

Rhetoric,
natural,
improvable
into art.

BOOK
I.

fend. This, indeed, is performed ill, and at random, by the multitude; a few only do it tolerably well, and that chiefly through practice. A way, however, is thus laid open for attaining higher proficiency; for when a speaker has fortunately hit the mark at which his discourse aimed, we may investigate and discover the causes of his success; and from the contemplation of these causes, derive rules of art, productive of like success in all similar cases.¹

This art ill understood, and worse prosecuted.

Hitherto, writers on Rhetoric have confined themselves to the least important parts of the art. Enthymemes or arguments, form the main central body; the rest is mere outwork. Yet of enthymemes, in which the whole weight of proof consists, dependent on the speaker's skill², they make not any mention; while they expatiate on calumny and aggravation, pity and anger, and other extraneous matters not bearing any essential reference to the merits of the cause, but calculated solely to bias the decision of the

¹ This passage is highly extolled by Mr. Stewart in the Preliminary Dissertation to his Philosophical Essays. He ascribes it "to an obscure author quoted by Sir Joshua Reynolds, and placed in the front of his Academical Discourses." The supposed obscure author is no less a man, however, than Aristotle, in the very first chapter of his Rhetoric. I subjoin the Latin translation, as quoted by Mr. Stewart, (Essays, Preliminary Dissertation, p. lxiii.) "Omnia fere quæ præceptis continentur ab ingeniosis hominibus fiunt; sed casu quodam magis quam scientia. Ideoque doctrina et animadversio abhibenda est, ut ea quæ interdum sine ratione nobis occurrunt, semper in nostra potestate sint; et quoties res postulaverit, à nobis ex præparato adhibeantur."

² Other proofs, such as writings, witnesses, &c. will be spoken of hereafter.

judges. Before tribunals, constituted as some CHAP.
I.
tribunals are in well regulated states, such rhetoricians would not have a word to say.

The principle of these tribunals is universally approved, and the Areopagus strictly conforms to it in practice. This court confines the pleaders before it, to the points in debate: an ordinance most fit, since to pre-occupy and pervert the judge by pity, envy, or anger, is nothing better than to make crooked the very ruler that was to be employed for making other things straight. It is plain, therefore, that litigant parties have only to state correctly the matter of fact, to show that certain things have been done, or that certain transactions have taken place. To ascertain the nature and quality of these actions, that they are just or unjust, important or trivial, when the law itself has not explicitly pronounced, is the proper function of the judge. Such things he is not to be taught by the parties concerned.

The Areopagus determined the respective duties of litigant parties, and of judges.

Good laws are clear and comprehensive, leaving the fewest points possible to the decision of judges. Of this description, the grounds are, first, that one or a few good law-makers are more naturally to be expected, than a long succession of upright and able judges. Secondly, legislation is a work of time, of long and patient consideration; whereas, judges are called to decide on the spur of the occasion, and therefore less likely to discriminate the exact points of justice and utility. A third difference, and the greatest of all, is, that laws pronounce generally,

Definition of good laws; and why nothing that can be determined by them, ought to be left to judiciary discretion.

BOOK
I.

and concerning the future ; judges, particularly, and concerning the present : magistrates in their respective tribunals, the people in their public assemblies, have to decide of immediate interests, and of individuals before their eyes ; and are thus liable to be perverted in their judgments by love, hatred, and other unworthy personal motives. Nothing, therefore, ought to be left to their discretionary power, which can be brought within the verge of sedate legislative contemplation. But enough of work will remain for them ; since, whether certain alleged events have taken place, whether they are likely to happen, and what are the actual circumstances belonging to each particular cause, in all such matters not possibly to be foreseen by the legislator, the judge must of necessity determine.

Differences in the views of those who respectively decide in deliberative assemblies, and in tribunals of justice ; and what occasions this difference.

If these distinctions be well founded, writers on rhetoric must have widely wandered from their subject, when they treat largely of proems, narrations, and other parts of discourse calculated chiefly to affect the passions, or please the fancy ; but forget the doctrine of enthymemes, the ready invention of which constitutes the whole power of argumentation. From this omission, their rules of art apply only to judicial pleadings, though rhetoric comprehends also, deliberative eloquence, a thing of a wider scope and loftier aim, than the adjustment of personal claims and private contracts. But in public deliberations, which involve the interests of all present, there will be less indulgence in deviating from the question, and less room for

imposition. In popular assemblies, the people sit in judgment on their own concerns: they need only to be taught by the speaker, that the matter really stands, as he states it; and that the advice which he gives, is built on sound argument. Courts of justice decide, on the other hand, not concerning their own affairs, but the affairs of the litigant parties; their personal interests are not at stake; their passions may be moved, their affections conciliated; and judges, actuated by many improper motives, will give away, or sell, that substantial justice, which it was their duty honestly to administer.³ Wherefore, in many states, the pleaders before courts of justice are compelled by law to confine themselves to the points at issue. In deliberative assemblies, this precaution is unnecessary; the interest of the judges, that is, of the people themselves, is deemed a sufficient safeguard.⁴

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I.

There is an art, then, in finding proofs to inspire belief and operate persuasion. But to produce these effects most completely, is the work of demonstration; for we most firmly believe that which has been demonstrated. The proofs employed in rhetoric, therefore, are

Skill in logic, how preparatory to that in rhetoric.

³ Courts of justice were very differently constituted in Greece, and in England. See History of Ancient Greece, chap. xxxiii. & passim.

⁴ I had occasion often to observe in my History of Ancient Greece, how acute the people of Athens were in their apprehensions, and how correct in their judgments. The truth is, their powers, both of reason and of taste, were formed by the great orators whom they were so much delighted to hear. The orations of Demosthenes before what has been called *the Athenian mob*, are more elaborate, more severe, and more subtile, than those of Cicero before the Roman senate.

BOOK

I.

a sort of demonstration; and enthymemes, or rhetorical arguments, are a sort of syllogism. But demonstration and syllogism form the proper subjects of logic, which correct science naturally prepares the way for the more popular doctrine of rhetoric; for, since the same powers of the understanding are employed in the discovery of absolute truth, and of that moral certainty which nearly resembles it, whoever is most acute in abstract reasoning, and most habituated to the deductions of accurate science, will also be most dexterous in the invention and application of enthymemes, when his mind has been fitly stored with that probable and practical knowledge which can alone supply their materials. The human understanding is naturally framed for the reception of truth; and those, whose powers are best fitted to perceive the force of demonstration, will also be the best qualified for balancing probabilities, and appreciating the strength of moral arguments. It is plain, therefore, that former writers on rhetoric, neglecting enthymemes, the firmest of all proofs dependent on the speaker's skill⁵, have omitted the largest and most important part of their subject; on which account their treatises are adapted mainly to judiciary eloquence.⁶

Use of rhetoric.

That rhetoric is an useful art, cannot be a matter of doubt, if truth and justice be allowed to be better things than falsehood and iniquity,

⁵ For the sake of perspicuity, this clause is transposed.

⁶ To help the pleaders in courts of justice to gain the judges, by addressing their passions. See above, p. 153.

which must often prevail against us, unless rhetoric supplied us with arms to oppose and surmount them. With many descriptions of men, strict philosophical reasoning cannot be advantageously used: the language of science is unintelligible to ignorance: common-place thoughts, and superficial arguments, will better succeed with the multitude, as we have shown in our topics, in speaking of the best way of holding conversation with the unlearned. It is the office of rhetoric, besides, to seize opposite probabilities, and to reason persuasively on contrary sides. This it does, not from any indifference to right and wrong, but because its business is to discover the real state of the case; to discern its strength or weakness, that we may be able to assert our own cause, and to untie the knotty arguments of our adversaries, when they would have recourse to sophistry. Of all sciences, logic and rhetoric only, maintain contradictory positions. But, in thus changing sides, the disputant will not find the matter of his discourse equally manageable: for, to speak absolutely, things true and good will always be most easily moulded into legitimate argument. To conclude, if disgrace accrue from awkwardness in using material arms in defence of our persons, how much more disgrace will result from unskilfulness in defending our rights by reason and speech, those intellectual weapons more peculiar to man, and the source of his many pre-eminences? An objection, however, has been started, that this power of speech may be ill em-

Its abuse no
argument
against it.

B O O K

I.

Distinction
between its
end and its
proper
function or
business.

Different
functions
of the rhe-
torician,
the logi-
cian, and
the sophist.

ployed: but this is an objection equally applicable to all other powers, whether corporeal or mental, except the power of virtuous habits. All good things, save moral virtue alone, are liable to abuse, and especially those most valued, health, strength, wealth, and great military talents. By the application only of these powers, their doubtful character is determined, as sources of glorious good, or of mighty mischief. Such, then, is the nature of rhetoric, an art highly useful, and, in its application, most extensive.⁷

Its end is persuasion, but its proper work or business consists in discovering and employing the means best fitted to attain this end, not in actually attaining it. The same thing holds, with regard to other arts. Medicine consists not in curing disease, which is often beyond the physician's power, but in applying the means best calculated to cure it; and in palliating, when that is possible, evils which admit not of remedy. Patients, whose maladies are neither removed nor alleviated, may yet have been treated with the utmost medical skill.

As logic comprehends the doctrine of apparent or spurious syllogisms, as well as of those which are genuine, so rhetoric must be conversant with flimsy and fallacious arguments as well as with those that are solid. The logician, the orator, and the sophist, differ from each other, not in their powers, but, in their purposes. The sophist's purpose is falsehood; the logician's

⁷ He again says that it agrees in extent with logic.

truth ; the orator's persuasion. The logician, therefore, departs from the right use and end of his art, when he reasons falsely ; not so the advocate, or rhetorician, who may employ arguments fraught with error, provided they be popular and persuasive.

C H A P.
I.

We now proceed to the main business of this treatise, the method by which skill in rhetoric is to be acquired ; resuming the definition above given, as the foundation of our discourse.

LET rhetoric, then, be the power of investigating all that may be urged, persuasively on any given subject. This latitude belongs not to other arts or sciences, which persuade or instruct, with regard to their respective subjects only. Physic thus treats of health or sickness ; geometry, of the relations of magnitude ; arithmetic, of those of number : but the field of rhetoric is boundless ; its scope is not confined to particular classes of things, or to particular regions of science.

C H A P.
II.

Extensive
nature of
rhetoric.

Persuasion results either from proofs that are artificial, or from those void of art, existing antecedently to any exertion of human ingenuity : such are testimonies, confessions, writings, and other evidences of that nature. The artificial proofs are invented by ourselves, through the art which I have undertaken to explain. These the orator must create ; those he has barely to employ. When effectuated through the speaker's skill, persuasion can be ascribed to three causes only ; either to the impression which he gives of himself, or to the disposition which he produces in

Two kinds
of proof,
operative
of persua-
sion.

Artificial
proofs ori-
ginate in
three
sources.

B O O K

I.

1. The speaker's exhibition of his own character.

his audience, or to the point in question, when he confirms, or seems to confirm it, by argument.

The first mode of persuasion takes place, when the speaker's discourse shows him to be a man deserving of confidence. On all occasions we confide most in men of worth; but in matters highly ambiguous this ground of conviction is paramount to every other. Yet the proof from authority, here meant, must result, not from the speaker's past behaviour, but from the actual exhibition of his sentiments and manners; not from his established credit in the world, but from the immediate power of his discourse. When established character concurs, this, doubtless, will heighten the effect; and, without agitating the trite question, whether an orator must, of necessity, be a good man⁸, we may conclude with certainty, that one of the surest means of gaining belief must always depend on good morals, real or apparent.

2. His power over the passions.

The second mode of persuasion is, when the minds of the hearers are pre-occupied and changed through the excitement of some affection or passion. Men's judgments vary with love or hatred, with joy or sorrow; insomuch that writers on rhetoric have hitherto confined the art wholly to address in moving the passions; and what powerful influence the passions have on our opinions and decisions, will appear hereafter, when we come to treat of them in general, and

⁸ The text is defective; but, from the words, *ενιοι τιθεασι την επιεικειαν*, there is no doubt that this question was agitated.

of each passion in particular. The third mode of persuasion relates solely to the point in question, and is employed when this point is either proved, or disproved, by the arguments respectively adapted to these opposite purposes. Such, then, being the three modes of persuasion, three requisites must concur in him who would effectually produce it; the power of argumentation, the general knowledge of ethics, and a particular acquaintance with the passions; their nature and quality, the causes in which they originate, and the manner in which these causes naturally operate. Rhetoric should thus seem, as it branches from logic on one side, so to germinate, on the other, from that complex theory of morals dependent on the various arrangements of men in political society. On this account, rhetoricians have sometimes affected the rank of profound political philosophers; ignorantly, indeed, or ostentatiously; for rhetoric is the counterpart of logic, and resembles it in not sounding the depth of any one science, physical or moral: but of this distinction we have above spoken.⁹

In logical disquisitions we can argue only by syllogism or by induction. In the rhetorical, therefore, we must prove or persuade either by examples or by enthymemes: for example is the rhetorical induction, and enthymeme the rhetorical syllogism. The difference between induction and syllogism, as explained in our analytics, will also explain the difference between examples

C H A P.
II.

3. His ability in argumentation.

Rhetoricians ignorantly considered as political philosophers.

Rhetoric persuades either by examples, or by enthymemes.

⁹ See above, p. 151.; part of which is here repeated.

BOOK
I.

and enthymemes. When the proof of any position is attempted by showing that it holds true in one or more instances, we reason from example or induction: on the other hand, we reason by syllogism or enthymeme, when we show that from certain propositions, true or probable, other propositions necessarily flow.¹⁰ Each mode of proceeding has its advantages; and each its partisans. Examples are highly persuasive; but the impression of enthymemes is more overwhelming, and more resistless; of which difference, the reason will be explained hereafter, and also the different occasions to which these modes of reasoning are respectively adapted. We now proceed to the more complete investigation of their nature and properties.

How these
are to be
employed.

The means of persuasion must bear a reference to the particular persons on whom it is intended to operate; either by the simple declaration of truths, which by them will readily be received, or by the deduction from these truths of fair and legitimate consequences. But rhetoric, which is the art of persuasion, cannot, any more than other arts, contemplate mere individuals, whose multitude, or rather infinity, would elude its grasp. Medicine establishes rules, not for Socrates or Callias, but for men of a given habit of body, of certain ages, complexions, and temperaments. In the same manner, rhetoric investigates, not what will bring conviction to particular persons, but what will produce it in men

¹⁰ See what is said in my Introduction, p. 62, et seq. on the subjects of induction and demonstration.

of a given class, of certain moral habits, and certain intellectual endowments. Even logic argues not from propositions acknowledged by any individuals indifferently, for then the dreams of madmen might be made foundations of argument. But logic embraces abstract science, truths clearly demonstrable; while rhetoric turns chiefly on questions that fall under deliberation, which allow not of adjustment by precise rules, and which are agitated before audiences incapable of remounting to general principles, or of following a long chain of deductions; all which, plainly, are matters of doubtful emergence, for about things that are necessary, whether past, present, or to come, no one ever deliberated, believing them to be such.

In all reasoning, we proceed either by many small steps, each of which is easily taken by the mind, or by strides longer and bolder, which are less readily apprehended. Both methods have their inconveniences with hearers of slender capacity. The many small steps, they have not patience to pursue; the longer ones, they have not strength to surmount: yet this latter evil must be risked, rather than tire them with long ratiocination; for, when other things are the same, popular discourse will always gain brightness by its brevity.¹¹ Upon this principle, indeed, the enthymeme is universally substituted for the syllogism. Thus, would we show that Dorieus will be honoured with a crown, we only say, he was

¹¹ Here is repetition and embarrassment; the former I have retrenched, and the latter I have endeavoured to remedy.

BOOK

I.

Likeli-
hoods,
signs, and
tests.

victor in the olympic games. The proposition necessary to complete the reasoning, "that all Olympic victors are so honoured," would be superfluous in speaking before a Greek auditory.

The practical affairs of life, which form the ordinary subjects of rhetoric, seldom admit of absolute certainty; and few of its enthymemes, therefore, afford conclusions that are necessary; which, as shown in our analytics, can flow only from necessary premises. Conclusions merely probable are founded on likelihood, and likelihood is ascribed to things which happen for the most part, being, not as some consider it, an absolute, but, a relative notion; and always bearing the same reference to that which happens less frequently, as the universal does to the particular, the rule to the exception. But all arguments depend on proofs or probabilities, that is, they are derived from signs more or less certain.¹² The certain sign is distinguished by the name of the test or criterion: when this can be produced, the matter is decided, and the question is at an end; for which reason the specific name of this sign is derived¹³ from a word, which in old Greek signified the end or boundary. All other signs beside the criterion have more or less of uncertainty, and bear to the points in question considered absolutely, the relation of

¹² Literally, "the grounds of enthymemes are either certain or probable; but all enthymemes are founded on likelihoods, or on signs: it is plain, therefore, that these things must correspond; the likelihood, to the probable; the sign, to the certain." But it appears from the context, that *one kind of sign only* corresponds to the certain.

¹³ τεκμηριον à τεκμαρ.

the particular to the universal. Thus, should we declare justice to be an attribute of philosophers, because the philosopher Socrates was eminently just, the thing most true of Socrates, an individual, would not afford any general inference. But should we say, the man is ill, there is fever in his pulse; or the woman must have been with a child, for her breasts teem with milk; these signs are indubitable: not so, should we reason, there is fever, for the breathing is short; since this may happen through other causes. Enough for the present purpose on the subject of likelihood, signs, and tests; of all which we have treated more largely in our analytics.¹⁴

As to examples, we have shown that they are a kind of induction, and have stated generally the subjects to which they apply. To the things meant to be proved by them, they bear the relation, not of a part to the whole, or of the whole to a part, nor of any one whole to any other whole, but simply that of one part to another nearly akin to it, the better known being employed to prove by example. Thus, would we show that Dionysius, with whose character we are but little acquainted, aspires to tyranny in demanding a body-guard, we may argue that Pisistratus, when he made a similar demand, had tyranny in view, and actually assumed it; that the same demand had been made, and the same object attained, by Theagenes in Megara; other

The nature of the assent proceeding from examples.

¹⁴ See the Introduction, p. 98. Conf. Analyt. Poster. l. i. passim, & l. ii. c. 14.

BOOK

I.

notorious examples may be cited to the same purpose; whence it may be concluded that Dionysius is pursuing a similar end through similar means; for all these particulars range themselves under the general head, that whoever demands a guard for his person, aims at usurpation. Such, then, are the various grounds of argumentative proof.

Topics general and special.

With regard to this proof, however, there is an important distinction, which has hitherto been very generally overlooked. Some arguments are merely rhetorical or dialectical, whilst others properly belong to particular arts and sciences, already in an improved state, or gradually advancing towards it. In the rhetorical use of the latter, much delicacy is to be observed; for if they are pushed so far as to be carried into the immediate province of their appropriate art or science, they will mar the work of persuasion, which is the orator's main drift. To explain this more clearly, we must distinguish between topics that are general, and those that are special. The general are those sources of argument, which are alike applicable to many sciences, physical and moral: the special are those adapted to particular sciences only, and which cannot be rightly transferred. Thus, there are topics in natural philosophy, from which it is impossible to reason in morals or politics. The converse of this is true, and the same holds in all other instances. But any general topic, as that of arguing from the more to the less, and maintaining that, since things more difficult have been done, the less

difficult may, therefore, be effected, can be employed with equal advantage in all reasoning whatever. These general topics, indeed, not having any determinate object, cannot be expected to impart any specific knowledge: they cannot communicate either skill in art, or comprehension in science¹⁵, but yet they are indispensable in all argumentation, and fall particularly within the scope of rhetoric. So, also, do the special topics when employed with moderation; but, in proportion to their depth or subtilty, they become less calculated for the orator's purpose, relinquishing the plain rhetorical field, and ascending to the higher regions of those more abstruse sciences whose principles they unfold. Most arguments are deduced from special topics; the general afford, comparatively, few. We shall treat of both, beginning with the special¹⁶, after we have analysed eloquence into its different kinds, and thereby prepared ourselves for selecting the elements and materials adapted to each kind respectively.

CHAP.
II.

PUBLIC speaking must be divided into three kinds, according to the three descriptions of hearers. Every discourse, indeed, implies a speaker, also, and a subject; but its end and drift bear an especial reference to the audience. Audiences assemble, either simply to hear, by way of pastime or amusement; or not only to

CHAP.
III.

Three kinds of oratory, distinguishable according to their respective subjects, times, and ends.

¹⁵ See what is said in the Introduction on axioms and definitions, p. 39. et seq.

¹⁶ Here are some useless repetitions, or rather interpolations.

BOOK
I.

1st, Their
subjects.

2d, Times.

hear, but to judge and pass sentence, and to exercise these powers concerning either things that are past, or those likely to happen. In our popular assemblies, citizens convene to deliberate about the propriety of their future proceedings: in tribunals and courts of justice, magistrates or judges meet to examine into the nature and quality of actions that are past: and crowds flock to our national solemnities with no other view but that their fancies may be agreeably entertained, or their senses elegantly gratified. According to this threefold distinction, eloquence is divided into the deliberative, the judicial, and that called demonstrative, being calculated for demonstration and show, the exhibition of great and noble powers, of generous and exalted sentiments. Of deliberative eloquence, the business is exhortation and dehortation; either to excite to some particular actions, or to restrain from them. One or other of these is implied in every deliberation. Of judicial eloquence, the important subject is accusation and defence, on which two points all litigation turns: and demonstrative eloquence is almost wholly employed in praise or blame, commendation or censure. Each kind of oratory has its appropriate time. With a view to the future, we deliberate and use our best endeavours to persuade. In reference to the past, that is, to actions already done, or already meditated, we accuse or defend: the present appertains properly to praise or blame, because actual existences are the fittest objects of either: yet here,

an extension is indulged on either side ; past glory is perpetuated by fame ; and future, anticipated by conjecture. In each kind of oratory there is also a specific end. That of the statesman is utility ; the measures proposed by him may be just or unjust, they may be followed by glory or by shame ; these topics are introduced only by way of accession, to augment and reinforce the main argument of utility. With the pleader or advocate, the chief consideration is justice : utility and glory are regarded by him as mere accessories ; whereas glory occupies, almost solely, the wide field of demonstration or panegyric. In proof of the justness of these distinctions, we may remark that the advocate, in his pleadings, will allow many other objections, but never will admit that his demands are unjust, which would bring at once complete ruin on his cause. The leaders of adverse parties in politics will also concede many points to each other, but none of them will ever allow that he has lost sight of utility. This he affects always to keep in view, even when exhorting to measures the most iniquitous, unprovoked aggressions and rapacious usurpations.¹⁷ But to the same utility poets and panegyrists pay so little regard, that their voice rises highest in praise of those who despise it, who scorn narrow considerations and selfish interests, nobly sacrificing, on occasion, every personal concern, and life itself. Achilles is thus extolled, because he

¹⁷ He says, "enslaving our neighbours, and those who have done us no wrong."

BOOK
I. preferred to the long life decreed him, the sacred warmth of friendship. To live was useful ; to die, glorious.

It is manifest, therefore, that the rhetorician must be provided with the specific propositions relative to the three kinds of oratory. These propositions afford the materials of enthymemes, or rhetorical syllogisms ; and consist, as above said, in likelihoods, in tokens, or in tests, accordingly as their evidence is more or less cogent. Farther, as possibility forms a limit to all our actions and undertakings, it is necessary, alike, for the statesman, the eulogist, and the pleader, to be familiar with the received maxims concerning the possible or practicable, because these have a direct bearing on all questions of fact, to ascertain either what has taken place, or what is likely to happen.¹⁸ Still farther, in our popular assemblies, the speaker endeavours to show, not only that benefit will accompany his counsels, but that this benefit will be great ; and the accuser in courts of justice, that the wrongs on which he demands punishment are great and aggravated ; and the eulogist in our public solemnities, that the achievements which he celebrates are great and glorious. On this account,

¹⁸ Possibility, though a limit to all that can be done, is not the limit to all that may be believed ; wherefore Aristotle says, in his Poetic. c. 24. "Poets should prefer things impossible in themselves that appear probable, to things possible which appear improbable : " and again, c. 25. " that the impossible probable is better than the improbable possible : " for the end of poetry being to please, (Poetic, c. xiv.) poets ought not to be debarred from attaining their end by every means in their power :

Pictoribus atque poetis quidlibet audendum. HORACE.

topics must be prepared, and ready at command, to evince, with regard to all such subjects, their weight, importance, and greatness; or, on the contrary, their unimportance, littleness, and levity. Such then, generally, are the sources of rhetorical argument. We proceed to investigate the propositions specially applicable in each of the three kinds of oratory, beginning with the deliberative.

CHAP.
III.

FIRST of all, let us ascertain the nature of those things that fall under deliberation. They extend not to goods and evils universally; for about goods unattainable, or evils unavoidable, no man in his senses deliberates; no, nor about any other things, in their nature *necessary*. Neither do all matters of a *contingent* nature, all advantages that may accrue, all evils that may happen, come within the scope of any rational consultation; for many are the benefits bestowed by nature, and many those bestowed by fortune, concerning which to deliberate, or consult, would be absurd, because altogether unprofitable. Deliberation is conversant about such things only as are dependent on human actions and human resolutions, of which the causes either exist in ourselves, or which may be effectuated through means and instruments that are at our own disposal. Our rational deliberations can never exceed the limit of this ability. But to class the objects thus limited, to mark them with their specific distinctions, and to ascertain their nature with phi-

CHAP.
IV.

Five principal heads of national deliberation.

BOOK
I.

losophical precision, is a nobler and more profound speculation than any appertaining to rhetoric ; to which, however, a wider scope is usually allowed than properly belongs to it. For rhetoric, verging to logic on one side, and to ethics on the other, is but a popular kind of dialectic, conversant with words rather than with things ; a practical power and ability, rather than an exact science ; and the greater depth or accuracy that is assumed by it, carries it but the wider from its mark. Without encroaching too far, therefore, on the science of politics, we shall examine the main points that fall under national consultation. These are the five following : the public resources, or revenue ; questions of war and peace ; establishments for defence and safety ; regulations respecting commerce ; and, lastly, legislation.

1. Finance.

With regard to the first of these objects, whoever presumes to give advice, ought to comprehend the various branches of public income, to what they amount, and wherein they originate ; that if any one channel has been obstructed, it may be again made to flow, or if any one source has been drained, it may be again replenished. He ought to be equally conversant with the public expenditure, that useless issues may be stopped, and those too enlarged may be narrowed ; for nations are enriched not less by judicious economy, than by well directed industry. To advise ably in such matters, the statesman's views must not be temporary or local ; he must have an historical knowledge of the various

measures pursued in distant ages and countries, and of the various consequences attending them. Practical good is most likely to result from an extensive and well digested experience.

C H A P.
IV.

In questions of war and peace, it is indispensable to know the national force; its actual state, and the height to which it may be raised;

2. Peace
and war.

the quality of the troops must be regarded not less than their number; and not only the improvements they have attained, but the degree to which they may be perfected. The history of former wars must be studied, especially of nations in our neighbourhood; their objects, operations, and consequences, that peace may be maintained when the chance of gain or glory is against us. This chance must be estimated by a comparison of the enemy's forces with our own; whether they are like or unlike, that is, of the same, or of a different nature; for by this chiefly will be determined the relation in which we stand to each other with regard either to sure defence, or successful aggression. The security of our territory, an object of the first importance, requires an accurate knowledge of local circumstances; of the various strong holds of the land, and the different descriptions of force best calculated to defend them, that useless positions may be abandoned, and appropriate garrisons disposed in essential or commanding posts. With a view to regulations of commerce, it is necessary to know how far the accommodations of life are supplied by the productions of our land and labour, and what

3. Territorial
safety.

4. Com-
merce.

BOOK
I.

proportion of them must be drawn from foreign countries. With nations desirous either to supply our deficiencies, or to purchase our superfluities, treaties of commerce ought to be contracted, and maintained, with scrupulous fidelity: for with two descriptions of states, it is expedient to cement amity; with those superior in power, and those indispensable in commerce.

5. Legisla-
tion.

The four points just considered are essential to the public safety; but a fifth, and not the least in importance, remains, I mean legislation. In this the safety, the very life of the commonwealth consists; for the preservation of which it is necessary to be acquainted with the different forms of government, the laws most congenial to each, and the means of anticipating those innovations which would ruin the constitution, not only by changes directly hostile to it, but by others in appearance most friendly: I say most friendly, because all governments, except that which is the best of all, may be destroyed by intension as well as by remission.¹⁹ Thus democracy, by tamely yielding to the rich and great, may be narrowed into oligarchy; and, on the contrary, by overstraining its popular maxims, it may cease to deserve the name²⁰ of government, and be converted into mere anarchy. With regard to legislation in general, the safest views are those which are the most enlarged and most liberal: for how laws may be adapted

¹⁹ See my translation of the "Politics," b. vi. throughout.

²⁰ A nose too camoys or too aquiline will at length, he says, lose its name and nature.

to governments, and the new laws moulded on the old, the experience of domestic transactions will not always afford the best means of investigation. A wider survey must be taken of various measures and their consequences in nations similarly circumstanced: the works of travellers describing men and manners, and political institutions, must be carefully examined; and the treasures of history, both civil and military, must be unrolled and studiously applied by all who presume either to advise in great public concerns, or practically to conduct them. Such, then, are the matters²¹ in which the statesman ought to be versed: we proceed to investigate the topics from which, with regard to all these, and also inferior subjects, he will be enabled persuasively to argue.

CHAP.
IV.

In the undertakings of men, whether individuals or communities, there is always an end in view. Happiness, taken generally, or analysed into its constituent elements, is our universal aim; the great director in whatever we are eager to attain, or anxious to avoid; and therefore the main source of argument in regulating all our pursuits: we are to do what will procure or increase it; we are to shun what will destroy or diminish it. Let happiness, therefore, be considered under different aspects, and defined "a state of virtuous and prosperous exertion," or "a state of independence and contentment," or one "overflowing with safe pleasures;" or one "abundant in

CHAP.
V.

Various
views of
happiness.

²¹ He repeats again, that to sound the depths of all these subjects, is the province, not of rhetoric but of politics.

BOOK

I.

Its numerous constituents.

worldly goods, with power to preserve and wisdom to enjoy them." From these delineations, commonly received, and acknowledged collectively, to embrace the whole nature of happiness, we may deduce the following enumeration of the constituents composing this very complex object: "A fair descent, numerous and worthy friends, affluent circumstances; many, and those promising children; health, strength, beauty, an athletic frame, a dignified presence, and the attainment of old age exempt from its infirmities; honour, glory, good fortune; virtue in all its branches of prudence, fortitude, justice, and temperance. Happiness will be thus accumulated by the accession of intrinsic goods to those that are external; the intrinsic, those identified with our own minds, or our own bodies; the external, those derived from our connection with foreign objects, or our command over them. These are, a fair descent, worthy friends, wealth and honour, to which must be added power and good fortune, to round and complete the whole by the important circumstance of security. We shall now delineate, in their order, each of these particulars.

1. Ancestors, and descendants.

Splendour of descent is ascribed to a nation, when its ancestors are regarded as the original or very ancient tenants of the soil, and when many of them have acquired, by their achievements, a great and durable renown. A similar advantage belongs to private families, when descended from individuals conspicuous for the endowments of virtue or the gifts of fortune, and

C H A P.
V.


whose nobility has been diffused and perpetuated through many illustrious branches, all worthy of their stock. Parents rejoice in the deserved praise of their children ; and the state, a common parent, derives delight from its numerous youth, flourishing in strength, stature, and beauty ; expert in bodily exercises, and trained to those higher mental powers, the practical habits of courage and temperance, which constitute the chief and pre-eminent virtues of blooming years. When their children of both sexes are disciplined, as they ought, parents are, indeed, the objects of just gratulation : when not only the males display their appropriate merits, but when the females are of a graceful stature, fair and chaste, endowed with patient industry, exempt from sordid parsimony. Where the education of women is neglected, as is the case in Lacedæmon, a nation can be but half happy.

Wealth resolves itself into money, lands, furniture, and all possessions valuable for their use, their elegance, or their security. It consists not merely in the magnitude or multitude of estates or farms, but in the excellence of the instruments or agents necessary to render them productive. Slaves and cattle are differently estimated according to their number, size, or beauty ; and all sorts of property whatever are estimated accordingly as they are useful, elegant, or secure : the useful are those which afford rent or profit ; the elegant are those which afford

2. Wealth,
its different
kinds.

BOOK

I.



little other advantage besides the pleasure of enjoying and displaying them; the secure are those easily accessible, and always at our disposal. The right of property, indeed, implies the power of using it as we please, and therefore of disposing of it for a price, or of bestowing it in a gift: and the whole energy of wealth consists, not in the dormant possession, but in the active use.

3. Reputation and honour.

Good report arises from presumed endowment with qualities approved by mankind in general; especially by the good and wise. Its natural reward is honour, which seems to be particularly due to benefactors, but which is bestowed on those able to benefit, even though this power should not be exerted; and all things are regarded as benefits which contribute to life and safety, or which either afford, or augment advantages much desired, and not easily procured. But here, the circumstances of time and place are to be taken into account; for great honours may be gained by slight benefits, critically conferred. The external marks of honour are different in different nations. In Greece, they consist in sacrifices, eulogies in prose or verse, the pomp of funerals, allotments of public grounds, precedencies, statues, and a maintenance, as the reward of merit, at the expense of the state. Among barbarians, honour is denoted by humble prostrations of the body, by yielding place in the public ways, and by an anxious alacrity, on all occasions, to show a fearful re-

The marks of honour modified by national manners.

verence of their superiors.²¹ Presents suitable to their respective tastes are usual with both Greeks and barbarians; and, of such presents, avarice was never more greedy for the sake of gain, than ambition is emulous for the sake of glory.

CHAP.
V.

Among bodily endowments health holds the first place. This, however, must be compatible with ordinary employments and amusements; not a health like that of Herodicus²², who was well, only by abstaining from most of those things which men live to enjoy. Such a conditional health is not to be envied.

4. Health.

Beauty is relative to the different periods of life. Youth is beautiful, when it unites activity with strength, and adorns both with that elegance of form which creates emotions of delight in the beholder. It shines most in the pentathlete, because of that graceful symmetry resulting from combined excellence in all the various competitions of vigour and agility. In confirmed manhood, beauty is chiefly estimated by adaptation to strenuous exertions in battle; it ought to diffuse at once delight and terror. Even old age

5. Beauty.

²¹ Isocrates dwells on this subject in speaking of the Persians. "Slavery has depressed their minds, eradicated every sentiment of virtue, and left them timidity and baseness for their only principles of action. Vile retainers of a corrupt court, they prostrate themselves on the ground; they torture their invention to discover new ways of debasing human nature; adoring their king as a divinity, they provoke the Gods by their impious honours to a mortal." See my Translation of Lysias and Isocrates, p. 64.

²² Herodicus of Selymbria, a master of exercises, who, notwithstanding many natural infirmities, attained great old age by an exact regimen and gymnastics. Plato de Repub. l. iii. p. 622. edit. Ficini.

BOOK
I.

has its appropriate beauty, when qualified for performing, without uneasiness, the ordinary offices of life, and exempt from those infirmities to which advanced years are commonly obnoxious.²³

6. Strength.

Strength, which thus appears a main element in beauty, is the power of causing motion at pleasure, and is itself resolvable into the actions of drawing, pushing, lifting up, pulling down, and, lastly, of compression. To one or more of these actions every strong man must be competent. The advantages of bulk and stature are limited by that due measure of both consistent with activity. Excellence in bodily exercises will depend on this well-proportioned frame, since constituting the most complete union of strength and swiftness: though, strictly speaking, swiftness is only strength differently directed, that is, employed on ourselves, and exerted in giving motion to our own bodies. To move the limbs nimbly forward, constitutes merit in the foot-race; to retain and compress an antagonist, gives fame to the wrestler; to repel him, staggering, with blows, is the pride of the pugilist: the pancratiast boasts superiority both in boxing and in wrestling; and the pentathlete aspires to the unrivalled glory of pre-eminence in all the five gymnastic combats.

Description of the five gymnastic exercises.

7. *Euyηpia*,
a good old
age, where-
in it con-
sists.

A good old age is that which advances slowly, and without suffering. Both conditions are indispensable. It depends on bodily constitution, and on fortune; for, if the stamina are not sound, disease will soon ensue; and good fortune

²³ Viridisque senectus.

VIRGIL.

must concur to render life easy and long. Of longevity, however, there is, in many individuals, a principle independent of health and strength; but the influence of this principle, it is not our present business to explain.

CHAP.
V.

Of the value of friendship no one can doubt, friends being rightly defined those zealous to promote our good, and that from love towards us. Our happiness cannot fail to increase in proportion to the number and the worth of persons actuated by this favourable disposition.

8. Friend-
ship.

Good fortune is ascribed to those who participate largely in advantages deemed fortuitous. These advantages, however, are precisely the same with those derived from art or nature, and are ascribed to fortune, when either art or nature, from a concurrence of adventitious circumstances, act beside their intention, and thereby produce uncommon and happy results.²⁴ Thus medicine is the cause of health; nature is the cause of strength, of stature, and of beauty: yet all these and other good things are called the works of fortune, when they accrue to any individuals so unexpectedly, as to render them the objects of envy. Thus, when in an ugly race, one individual is eminently handsome; or when among many travellers over ground containing a rich treasure, one, at last, is the lucky finder; or when, among a deadly shower of darts, a single person escapes unwounded; or when, being used to frequent some dangerous place, without ever meeting harm, he should abstain

9. Good
fortune,
analysis
thereof.

²⁴ See Introduction, p. 112.

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I.
 from going to it at one unhappy hour, which proved fatal to all who then, for the first time, visited it. All such events are called fortuitous.

10. Virtue. Of virtue, as productive of utility, we defer at present to treat; because virtue, constituting the main source of glory, will be more properly considered under the head of demonstrative oratory. Such then, are the various advantages, either actual or expected, which the orator must keep in view in his endeavours to persuade; the direct contraries of which will answer the purpose of dissuasion, when shown to be the likely consequences of any proposed measure.

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VI.

Good, absolute, delineation thereof.

OF deliberative eloquence, utility is the end, but to promote this end is its proper business; for deliberation is employed not about ends, which are taken for granted as things fit to be pursued, but concerning the means best calculated to attain them. But utility itself, the statesman's great aim, is but one species of "good²⁴;" a still more comprehensive object, which must be considered absolutely and apart, in order to investigate the elemental propositions that may be deduced from it, in the way either of proof or of refutation.²⁵ Let good, then, "be that which is pursued for itself, for the sake of which other things are pursued, indifferent in their own nature; the universal desire of beings endowed with reason, or even with sense; that which the intellect in each in-

²⁴ Good is a genus, comprehending under it the pleasant and the honourable, as well as the useful.

²⁵ See Introduction, p. 35, et seq.

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VI.

dividual recommends as most suitable to its particular state ; contentment, self-sufficiency, independence, the best constitution of our nature ; and all things effective of any of these goods, or naturally followed by them ; and all things preventive or destructive of the contrary evils." Things follow each other either simultaneously, as life is implied in health ; or by way of natural consequence, as knowledge is the fruit of study. Things are effective of each other in three ways : health, for instance, is the effect of a sound constitution ; in another way, it is effected by diet ; in a third, by exercise.

These truths being premised, the following propositions naturally flow from them : " That we are alike benefited by the acquisition of good, and by the riddance of the contrary evil ; for the acquisition of the good implies the simultaneous exemption from the contrary evil, and deliverance from the evil is followed afterwards by the contrary good. Secondly, it is alike advantageous to exchange a lesser good for a greater, and to exchange a greater evil for a lesser ; for the excess in the one case, is the gain of so much good ; and the excess in the other, is the riddance of so much evil. It is evident, that all the virtues are good, as constituting the perfection of our nature, as productive of innumerable benefits, and as the source of our highest ²⁶ enjoyments. Pleasure also is good, being the object of pursuit with all

Proposi-
tions dedu-
cible there-
from.

²⁶ He repeats, that virtue will be considered particularly in a subsequent chapter.

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I.

animals; and whatever is fair and honourable, because either followed by pleasure, or immediately or intrinsically delightful. To speak more distinctively, “happiness is especially good, being round and complete in itself, eligible absolutely, and on its own account; and for the sake of which other things are desired and chosen. Next to this, justice, temperance, liberality, magnanimity and magnificence, the virtues of the mind; health, strength, beauty, the virtues of the body; either good in themselves, or implying other goods, as health implies life and pleasure, and therefore highly valuable, as productive of the two things which the bulk of mankind most cherish. Riches, in like manner, because effective of many enjoyments and many comforts; and because, in the right use of them²⁷, there is much virtue and much praise: and real friends, both as delightful in themselves and as the source of innumerable pleasures or advantages: and honour and glory, as gratifying on their own account, as productive of many other gratifications, but especially, as the signs of those virtues by which they have been earned: and the action and powers of thought, genius, memory, quickness of apprehension, presence of mind: and justice, that bond of the political life, and the natural life itself, the mere act of living, considered apart, and unaccompanied by any other gratification.”

²⁷ Αρετή της κτήσεως.

Such goods as these are not liable to controversy; but concerning others of a disputable nature, we may fairly pronounce that to be a good, of which the contrary is admitted to be an evil; and that to be useful to our friends, of which the contrary would redound to the advantage of our enemies: in these relations stand courage and cowardice; the one, as far as the public safety is concerned, the highest virtue; and the other, the deepest delinquency. Whatever things would gratify our enemies, whatever they would rejoice in, the direct contraries must be done to deserve well of our friends or fellow-citizens. Wherefore Homer says,—

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VI.

Contro-
versial
goods.

—What shame! What woe to Greece! what joy
To Troy's proud monarch, and the friends of Troy,
That adverse Gods commit to stern debate
The best, the bravest, of the Grecian state.²⁸

This, however, does not hold universally; for the proverb says, "woes unite foes." When involved in one common calamity, its removal will be their joint concern. The quality of good may be ascribed to all things in moderation, every excess being an evil; and to all for the sake of which much has been done, suffered, or expended, for such may be regarded as the ends aimed at in many past labours. Wherefore Homer says,—

Other
sources of
argument
with re-
gard to the
good and
useful.

Shall then the Grecians fly, oh, dire disgrace!
And leave unpunished this perfidious race?²⁹

²⁸ Iliad, i. 540.

²⁹ Ib. ii. 194.

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Not for their grief, the Grecian host I blame,
But vanquish'd ! baffled ! oh, eternal shame !³⁰

To this also the proverb alludes of letting the pitcher fall when just brought to the door ; this seems the height of misfortune. What the many desire or contend for, often passes for good, because *many* are confounded with *all* : and what is generally praised, especially what bad men and even enemies praise, for such praise must be extorted by undeniable merits ; and as those seem highly culpable, whom even friends condemn, so those will appear truly blameless with whom even enemies cannot find fault. Simonides said of the Corinthians, —

With them the Trojans have no fault to find—

a verse which the Corinthians, however, considered as a sarcasm, in the form of a compliment.³¹ It is a mark of goodness to be preferred by the good and wise ; as Ulysses was by Minerva ; Helen, by Theseus ; Paris, by the rival Goddesses ; Achilles, by Homer ; and every thing seems good which is the effect of deliberate preference ; injuries to enemies, not less than benefits to friends. But as in all delibera-

³⁰ Homer's own words, v. 298, quadrate still better with the proverb. "It is shameful to have wasted nine long years, and to return empty-handed."

³¹ The Corinthians explained the words, not as allusive to Glaucus who descended from Corinth, and who fought bravely for the Trojans, but as pointing at their own reluctance or inefficiency in combating the enemies of Greece, and thus branding them with cowardice.

tions, we reject things impossible, or nearly so, the easy will seem good rather than the difficult, whether difficulty be measured by the fatigue of the exertion made, or by the length of time during which it must be sustained ; and these two are the only constituents of difficulty. Good may also be predicated of “whatever is agreeable to the natural wish that no evil may befall us, or that the evil risked may be far less than the good which the risk is likely to procure ; that is, when the punishment is but a slight one, or when it is not anticipated ; and, also, of all objects to which none but ourselves can advance a fair claim, particularly when they are of an excellent nature, and do honour to the possessor, and likewise when peculiarly befitting our birth or dignity ; nay, very paltry objects, when the want of them denotes any singular deficiency, become matters of importance. The quality of good will also appear to belong to things of easy execution, that is, which have been done already by many of our equals or inferiors, for in such we are likely to succeed ; and to those which delight our friends or displease our enemies ; and to undertakings for which we are well qualified, and in which we have experience ; and to enterprises in which no worthless character would engage, for by this they are the fitter subjects of eulogy. Above all, things agreeable to the immediate passion appear not only the pleasantest, but the best, especially when this passion is the ruling one ; as victory to the contentious or the emulous, money to the

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VI.

B O O K

I.

Such are the sources of argument concerning good in general, and that species of it called utility.

C H A P.

VII.

Comparison of goods, and the propositions by which it is fairly made.

BUT the question often occurs, Of two goods, which is the greater? The greater is that containing the lesser, and something more: the lesser is that which is contained. The greater is always said in reference to a lesser, which it exceeds. But great and little are used differently, and have respect to the magnitude of objects compared with most others of the same kind. A similar distinction obtains between "more" and "fewer" on the one hand, and "many" and "few" on the other. Good, as above defined, is that at which all aim; desirable on its own account, and for the sake of which other things are desired; it is that which all creatures, acting according to reason, would prefer, and whatever has a tendency to acquire or to preserve this object of rational preference. Such is good generally; and individual good is that standing to individuals in the advantageous relation just specified. By the number and magnitude of these advantages, the greater good is determined; to exceed in them, is to surpass in excellence. It is thus we reason from the individual to the class, and from the class to the individual. If the largest man exceeds the largest woman, we conclude men to be larger than women; and conversely, if the latter is true, we conclude that the former will hold true also:

for classes of things commonly bear to each other the same relation which the greatest and best of the one class bears to the greatest and best of the other. Upon the same principle we conclude the greater good to be that which carries the other along with it. One thing carries another along with it in three ways: simultaneously, as health does life, though life does not imply health; successively, as study is followed by knowledge; or potentially, as sacrilege includes theft, since the villain who would dare to purloin things sacred, cannot be supposed scrupulous about stealing other property. Of two goods, that is the greater which most exceeds the same third³²; and that productive of the greater good³³, and that of which the greater good is productive; for if health is better than pleasure, the means conducive to the former are to be preferred to those conducive to the latter, and if the means are better, the ends will be so also; that is, health will be better than pleasure³⁴: and things desirable on their own account, as strength than gymnastic exercise or diet³⁵, for these are used as means to strength, but strength is desired for its own sake, which is the very essence of good; and

³² Literally, that which exceeds a greater than the thing with which it is compared, must be the greater, for it exceeds a greater.

³³ The text subjoins, *ταὐτο γὰρ ἀν ἢ τῷ μείζονος ποιητικῷ εἶναι*. This is the very essence of being productive of more good. Why, then, make a distinction? The words are superfluous; probably interpolated.

³⁴ I have supplied the ellipsis, for the sake of perspicuity.

³⁵ ὕγιεινός.

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things more sufficient in themselves, that is, requiring fewer, or more easily procured aids: and of two goods, when the second cannot exist without the first, but this may without the second, the first is the better. For which reason principles and causes deserve preference, since without them nothing could exist or be effected; and the better effect is from the better cause, and the better result from the better principle; and, conversely, of better effects and results, the causes and principles are better. Accordingly as pre-eminence is ascribed to origins, or to ends, plausible arguments may be alleged on either side. In the accusation of Callistratus, Leodamas³⁶ maintained that the author of a crime was worse than the agent, being its primary cause; but he reasoned otherwise in his prosecution of Chabrias; maintaining the perpetrator of evil to be worse than the contriver of it, since contrivance is only with a view to execution; this, he said, was the great end and substance of the delinquency, independently of which the mere contrivance was but a shadow. Again, "the rare is better than the plentiful," as gold than iron, because of the greater quantity of labour required in procuring³⁷ it: under another aspect, the abundant is better than the scarce, because of the greater variety

³⁶ Callistratus and Leodamas were rival orators. Leodamas is extolled by Æschines contra Ctesiphon. Orator. Græc. Reisk, t. iii. p. 635. Callistratus is mentioned by Xenophon, Hellen. p. 592. Edit. Leunclav., and will be again spoken of by Aristotle below.

³⁷ Μεζων ἢ κτησις, literally, the acts by which we become possessed of it are greater.

of its uses ; whence Pindar celebrates water as of all things the best. Objects of difficult attainment are preferred, when we contemplate their rarity ; and those of easy attainment, when we consider that they are circumstanced as we like, ever within reach, or always ready at a call. Goods are measured by the greatness of their privations, or by the greatness of the contrary evils. Virtue is a greater good than any thing unadorned by this inestimable excellence ; and vice a greater evil than any thing which vice does not deform : for these are ends peculiarly ; other things less properly.³⁸ Men are estimated by their actions ; the better the works, the better are the doers of them ; and the worse the former, the worse also are the latter. The converse of this holds ; by the worth of causes and agents, we estimate that of consequences and performances. Things are appreciated, also, by the comparative value of their highest intentions : thus, if great sharpness of eye be better than similar acuteness in the olfactory organ, the sense of sight is better than that of smell. To be a great lover of our friends is more praiseworthy than to be a great lover of money : friendliness, therefore, is better than parsimony, even when both are confined within due limits. And, conversely, in better things, any pre-eminence is better ; and in honourable things, more honourable ; and the better and more honourable our desires, the better and more honourable

³⁸ See Ethics.

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their objects³⁹; and those things are more important and serious, of which the sciences are entitled to such epithets; and, conversely, such as are the sciences in dignity, such also will be the subjects of which they treat; for these are exhibited, by their appropriate sciences, in their true light, and according to their real worth. Preference, therefore, is due to the judgments of the wise; all, many, most, or most distinguished; to whom it belongs to pronounce concerning the comparative magnitude or importance of things, as well as concerning all their other qualities and relations: for real good being that which each individual, if endowed with wisdom, would prefer, the greater good must be that to which the greater wisdom assigns the preference. And qualities inhering in better subjects, considered either absolutely, or in the respect in which they are better, are to be preferred to qualities belonging to inferior subjects; as strength of mind, or fortitude, is better than mere bodily strength: and the objects of preference to better men, either absolutely, or in the respect in which they are better, are themselves better; as to meet with injustice than be guilty of it; for all good men would choose the former. The more pleasant is also to be preferred, pleasure giving the impulse to all animals, and being pursued by all for its own sake, which constitutes the very definition of good: but pleasures must be appreciated by their duration and stability, and by

³⁹ These points are disputed by some modern moralists. See the Introduction above, p. 141.

their exemption from consequent pains: and the more honourable, to what is less so; for honour is accompanied with pleasure, and though alone and unattended, would be pre-eminently eligible in itself. And the greater of two goods is that of which we would more desire to be the cause to ourselves or to our friends; and the greater evil is that in which it would give us the deeper affliction to have involved them. And in all cases, the more stable good is, on account of its security, to be preferred to that which is less so; and the more durable to that which lasts for a shorter time, and therefore affords not the prospect of so many benefits. Comparisons of the same kind may also be drawn from conjugate terms, that is, from words branching by various inflections from the same root. The relations in which any two similar inflections stand, will afford those which all other similar inflections bear respectively to each other. Thus, if to behave *courageously*, is better than to behave *temperately*, *courage* will be better than *temperance*, and to be *courageous*, better than to be *temperate*. What the many desire is better than that desired by the few; for good being defined the desire of all, "the many" approach nearer to this definition. The same approximation takes place when we are approved by enemies or rivals; for if they commend, who will condemn? And by our natural and fit judges, or those specially deputed by them; for their decision is likely to be right. That advantage of which all beside partake, may be represented as

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the greater, because it is the deeper mortification to be singly deprived of it : but under another aspect, that may be pronounced the greater, of which few partake, its value being enhanced by its rarity ; and the more praiseworthy, for praise is the stamp of honour ; and the more honourable, for honour is the meed of merit : and conversely, of two misdeeds, the greater is that which is followed by the more disgraceful punishment. Goods are magnified, and evils aggravated, when shown to surpass things of their respective natures confessedly great. This is done, when they are drawn out and divided into parts⁴⁰, each of which appears an addition to what was great before. Thus the wife of Meleager rouses him by accumulation, to the reluctant defence of Calydon —

Shé paints the horrors of a conquered town,
The heroes slain, the palaces o'erthrown,
The matrons ravag'd, the whole race enslaved.⁴¹

Composition, though contrary to division, has the same magnifying power. It is thus that Epicharmus builds up⁴² and unites, consolidating into one cause or principle many great and important results. The topics of rarity and diffi-

⁴⁰ Minus est, totum dicere quam omnia. Quintilian, l. viii. c. 3.

⁴¹ Iliad, ix. 704.

⁴² This *εποικοδομησις*, or “building up” of Epicharmus is mentioned, I think, but not further explained, in another passage of Aristotle; and also by Athenæus, (l. ii. p. 36.) It formed a sort of climax or chain of many events dependent on each other, and all flowing from one source. From the sacrifice proceeded the feast; from the feast the drinking-bout; from this the revel; from the revel madness and fury; from these a trial; from the trial condemnation; and from this fetters, gangrene and death. Athenæus, ubi supra.

culty are magnified and multiplied by the circumstances of time, place, power, age, strength, or stature ; when under all, or any of those circumstances the most unfavourable, great deeds have been done, or great acquisitions made. Whence the inscription destined to honour an Olympic conqueror —

Often from Argos, burdened with a sack ⁴³,
I carried fish to Tegea on my back.

And Iphicrates seemed to heighten the eulogy bestowed on his illustrious merit, by adding, “ Who would have thought it ! ” in allusion to the meanness of his birth.⁴⁴ Excellencies which are the gifts of nature seem better than those which are the acquirements of industry ; they are more peculiar and more exclusive : whence Phemius says,

Self-taught I sing, by heaven and heaven alone
The sacred seeds of poesy are sown ⁴⁵ :

And objects are magnified when represented as the main or better part of what is deemed great. Thus Pericles magnified the loss of the young Athenians who had fallen in the war, by saying, that to take the youth from the city, was depriving the year of its spring. And of two services, that is the greater which is done in time of need, in old age, or in sickness ; and of two good means, that is the better which approaches nearer to the end in view ; especially to any

⁴³ The sack was, and has always continued the badge and emblem of meanness and drudgery in all countries of the East.

⁴⁴ He was the son of a cobbler.

⁴⁵ Odyssey, 22. v. 385.

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favourite end of our own : accordingly, as things seem beyond our reach, they sink in estimation, because thereby they lose their connection with ourselves ; and, on the contrary, they are the more prized when they occur towards the close of life, because they seem then to participate rather of the nature of ends than of that of means, which are always less valuable. And things good in reality are preferable to those good in opinion. Of goods merely opinative, the criterion is, that nobody would desire them were they to remain concealed or secret ; on which principle the vulgar reason when they think that to receive benefits is better than to bestow them, because the former would be pleasing universally, though unknown to all around us ; but to do good deeds in secret is not the general propensity : and justice has been itself, on the same ground, vilified, as a thing of which the appearance is more useful than the reality, and depreciated in comparison with health, of which the contrary is manifestly true. Of two goods, the greater is that which is conducive to the greater variety of valuable ends ; to life, a happy life, the enjoyment of pleasure, and the practice of virtue. Whence health and wealth seem to be goods pre-eminent, because in these so many others appear to be comprised. Of two pleasures, that is the greater which is not accompanied by pain, for this exemption from evil is a new or additional good. And of two goods, that is the greater which, being added to the same third, makes the whole greater ;

and that which, when it exists, makes its advantages to be really felt, is greater than the contrary; as wealth than the mere reputation of it; and that which is particularly cherished, being single in its kind: wherefore to blind a single eye is punished with peculiar severity. Such are the considerations by which different advantages are to be estimated, and such the sources of argument by which any proposed measure of utility may be supported or combated.

CHAP.
VII.

BUT in deliberative assemblies, there is nothing so conducive to the discernment of right measures, or so powerful in the enforcement of them, as a clear comprehension of the nature of different governments, their principles, laws, usages, and the various modifications of utility at which they respectively aim. This great end, which they all profess to pursue, will be modified in each state by a regard to its own preservation. For each state has its different form of government, and each form of government its different sovereign, whose will is law. The forms of government are democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy. In democracy the sovereignty, that is, the powers⁴⁶ of government, are distributed by lot among the citizens at large; in oligarchies, among those possessed of a certain income; in aristocracies, among those distinguished by that education which the

CHAP.
VIII.

Utility differently modified by different forms of government.

⁴⁶ Το κυριον και το κρινον, which sovereign powers must belong, he says, either to the whole state, or to a part of it. See Politics. p. 525. et seq.

BOOK. laws have enjoined, and which therefore must
I. have been deemed the best; whence the government is called aristocracy. Monarchy, as the name denotes, is where a single individual bears sway; whether regulated by constitutional laws, and then called royalty, or a government of arbitrary will, and then called tyranny. Of these different political arrangements, it is especially important to regard the various ends; for to these all things are referred. Of democracy the end is liberty; of oligarchy, riches; of aristocracy, education and virtue; of absolute monarchy, security⁴⁷: by which general ends, all particular transactions, every public deliberation, and every public measure, are continually and powerfully influenced. Since persuasion, then, is effected not merely by argument, but also by authority, the moral character of the speaker must be of great weight, when it appears good in itself, or actuated by goodwill towards ourselves and our friends, and towards those institutions to which we have given the preference. It is essential therefore to his success, to be familiar with the maxims and measures prevalent under different forms of government: men will always approve the sentiments most congenial to their own; and what these will be, under different models of policy, may always be inferred from the deliberate purposes of those who live under them; in other words, from the specific end of each form of

⁴⁷ In the text, the end of royalty is omitted.

government. Thus much concerning the advantages, actual or expected, from which arguments may be drawn in deliberative oratory; and also how these arguments are to be adapted to different constitutions of government: but the subject of government in general is explained with accuracy in our treatise on politics.

CHAP.
VIII.

WE proceed to speak of virtue and vice, of moral beauty and turpitude. These fall within the immediate scope of demonstrative oratory, that is, of all compositions dedicated to praise or censure. By unfolding the principles of eulogy, we shall at the same time explain by what means the orator is most likely to recommend himself, (which was the second requisite for persuasion;⁴⁸) since the same sentiments and actions by which the virtue of others is evinced, will be the fittest also for establishing the belief of his own. Praise or blame is exercised not only on serious subjects, but often on very frivolous ones, by way of entertainment or pastime. It is thus that we celebrate and magnify not only gods and men, but many inferior animals, and even things void of life. The field of panegyric being thus wide, we shall exhibit the propositions subservient to it rather popularly, in the way of example, than of accurate disquisition.

CHAP.
IX.

Demon-
strative
oratory.

“Moral beauty, then, is that which, being desirable on its own account, is also an object of

Moral
beauty.

⁴⁸ The three requisites are above enumerated; argument, authority, and an appeal to the passions.

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I.

Its con-
stituents.

praise; or that which, being good in itself, is pleasant merely because it is good." These descriptions correctly apply to virtue, which is besides the liberal giver and safe guardian of innumerable and great benefits, useful universally to all men, and in all manner of ways. Its main branches are justice, fortitude, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, meekness, prudence, wisdom; and if virtue be essentially beneficent, its highest powers must be exercised for the good of others: whence the just⁴⁹ and the brave are the pre-eminent objects of eulogy, the former as upholding all the enjoyments of peace, the latter as defending against all the dangers of war. Then follows liberality, which, instead of being tenacious and obstinate, is easy and yielding in all those paltry interests which engross the cares, and set on fire the passions of the vulgar. By justice each individual is secured in the advantages, which the law has assigned to him: injustice, in despite of law, would rob him of those advantages. Valour excites us to noble deeds, in defiance of danger, yielding a ready obedience to the military institutions of our country: cowardice is the direct contrary. By temperance we govern our bodily appetites according to established rules: intemperance spurns all regulation. Liberality consists in con-

⁴⁹ This doctrine is controverted by some modern moralists. Though they acknowledge "injustice" to be deserving of blame and punishment, they will not allow "justice" to be entitled to praise or reward. See Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, P. ii. sect. 2. c. 1.

ferring favours that may be estimated by money: illiberality withholds such favours even from the most proper objects of them. Magnanimity is displayed in signal exertions, productive of nobly beneficent effects: little-mindedness is the moral inaptitude for all such undertakings. Magnificence is a great and handsome expenditure on occasions really worthy of it: niggardliness is the opposite deformity. Of the intellectual virtues, we shall only mention prudence, which enables us to make a right estimate of things in their relation to our happiness or misery. Thus much concerning virtue and its several parts; a short and slight delineation, but sufficient for our present purpose.

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IX.

The remaining part of the subject, it will be easy to anticipate. It is plain that all those things must be fit ingredients in eulogy, which are naturally productive of virtue, or which naturally flow from it. The latter consists either in its signs or in its operations. The signs or marks by which virtue is known or recognised, are therefore beautiful and praiseworthy, as well as the acts or operations which proceed from it: topics of praise, therefore, may be found in the marks of valour, and in whatever valour makes us do or suffer; in the marks of temperance, and in whatever temperance makes us do or suffer: the same holds of the rest, with the exception only of justice; for the topic of praise is here confined to what justice makes us do, and extends not to what it makes us suffer, since to be

Topics of
eulogy.

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I.

punished justly, is worse than being punished unjustly.⁵⁰ Praise is derived from all actions accompanied with honour, or of which honour, rather than profit, is the natural reward; and by all exertions made for the sake of others rather than our own; whence nothing is more glorious than to sacrifice every personal consideration in the service of our country. Praise seems also to be more eminently due to advantages derived from nature, than to those which are adventitious⁵¹; and from such as diffuse themselves widely around, rather than from such as are confined within a narrow circle; and from such as belong more properly to the dead than to the living, as centering less in themselves⁵²; and from all offices undertaken for the sake of others, and from all kinds of good success in conducting their affairs, especially the affairs of those by whom we have previously been benefited, for here justice goes hand in hand with beneficence. All such deeds are fit subjects of eulogy, as not centering in self; and also all acts contrary to those productive of shame; for shame never fails to accompany base things, said, done, or meditated; as Sappho says,

⁵⁰ The sentence is transposed for the sake of perspicuity.

⁵¹ This is illustrated by what is before said by Phemius. See above, p. 195.

⁵² Temples, altars, festivals, &c. belong to the dead; houses, furniture, estates, &c. to the living: the former bear less relation to the owners themselves, than to the high opinion entertained of them by their contemporaries, and to the noble emulation which the monuments of their virtue may excite in posterity.

in her reply to Alcæus, who had addressed her thus,—

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IX.
}

I wish to speak, but shame restrains my tongue.

Sappho answers,—

Slow comes his speech whose purposes are wrong ;
If laudable desires had moved your mind,
Your words would flow, your voice were unconfined ;
The eyes are ne'er by inward shame deprest,
When conscious virtue animates the breast.

All things are praiseworthy which, without causing fear, are objects of eager contention ; for, of such generous emulation, the reward is glory : and the higher and more dignified are the classes, or individuals, their virtues and actions are the more illustrious ; as the virtues of men, than those of the weaker sex : and all virtues are praiseworthy, accordingly as they are fruitful in use or enjoyment rather to others than to ourselves ; hence the beauty and the praise of justice. We appear, therefore, to deserve praise when we punish enemies, instead of submitting to a dishonourable compromise ; when we chastise insult, and retaliate injury, for retaliation is a requital of like for like, which proceeds from justice ; and whatever proceeds from justice is fair and laudable. These epithets belong in a supreme degree to honour and victory, which are things desirable independently of consequences or concomitants ; and which always betoken a certain superiority in virtue : likewise to all good things worthy to be held in remembrance, and in proportion to the degree in which they deserve it ; and to those less calculated to benefit us when living,

BOOK
I.

than to grace our memories, and adorn our tombs; and to things of singular excellence, for these are more likely to be kept in perpetual remembrance; and to possessions affording enjoyment rather than profit, for such strike us with a stronger impression of liberal splendour; and to things held in particular estimation in particular countries; and to the signs and indications of such things, as the wearing of long hair among the Lacedæmonians, which was chosen for the mark of dignity⁵³, because flowing locks, instead of an ornament, would be an awkward incumbrance to persons employed in mean mechanical labour, or the low offices of domestic drudgery.⁵⁴ To exercise such occupations, is to lead a life of servitude and suberviency; to be exempt from them is honourable, as the proof of independence.

Sophistry
in praise or
censure.

The sphere of eulogy, and that of satire, may both be greatly enlarged by confounding, with the proper objects of praise or blame, things nearly allied to them. Thus a man brave, but cautious and full of stratagems, may be vilified as a crafty coward; on the other hand, a thoughtless fool may be praised for his honest simplicity, or a doltish idiot commended for his meekness. In this way every vice may be transported into the place of the neighbouring virtue. The impetuous stormy character may be extolled as a model of openness and perfect freedom from

⁵³ Ελευθερίας; but with the Lacedæmonians, liberty and dignity were the same; since the members of the sovereignty alone were free.

⁵⁴ The *εργον θητικον* includes both descriptions.

disguise : and a certain solemn colour of greatness may be thrown over presumptuous arrogance and scornful contumely. Every vicious extreme may assume the honourable middle seat ; rashness that of courage, profusion that of beneficence : and this verbal deception may be strengthened by a false argument ; for he who ventures life unnecessarily, and as it were, affronts danger, will he not expose himself fearlessly at the call of duty and of honour ? And of him who is prodigal to every petitioner, can it be suspected that he should be wanting in generosity to those needful and deserving of it ? His fault, it may be said, if any, is but an excess of virtue.

It must always be carefully considered among whom our eulogies are pronounced. Socrates used to say, it was easy to praise the Athenians before an Athenian auditory. But whatever hearers we address, Spartans, Scythians, or philosophers, we must take care that the endowments or excellencies most prized by them respectively, shall be ascribed to the objects of our panegyric ; and that these excellencies, arbitrary, perhaps, and conventional, shall be assimilated by the artifice of our discourse to the real substantial virtues which they most nearly resemble. Our praises will be heightened when we can show that those deserving of them acted suitably to their illustrious descent, or to their former noble achievements : for this is to have drawn out and augmented the splendid series of glory. The contrary, however, will

How eulogy is to be modified and amplified.

BOOK.

I.

produce a similar effect, when a man has acted better than was to be expected from his past conduct, or from the circumstances in which he is placed; when he has shown himself sober-minded in the midst of great prosperity, magnanimous in the midst of great calamities, and when, with the advancement of his fortune, and in the moment of victory, he has discovered more than ordinary meekness of temper, and a disposition more than ordinarily inclined to forgiveness or compromise. To this amplification of praise, from proceedings or events contrary to expectation, may be referred the saying of Iphicrates: "From the lowest humility, how unlikely my ascent to this envied height!" and the verses before cited of the Olympic victor, declaring that his shoulders had been often galled by the rough panniers in which he carried fish from the shore of Argos to the market of Tegea. Upon the same principle Simonides magnifies the worth of the royal and gentle Archedicé;—

To her, new glory condescension brings,
The mother, sister, daughter, wife, of kings.⁵⁵

Men are prized for their actions, the merit of which is heightened when they proceed from a deliberate purpose. The eulogist must contrive, therefore, to refer to this source, deeds done without reflection, and events altogether casual;

⁵⁵ She was the daughter of Pisistratus, the sister of Hippias and Hipparchus, and the wife of Æantidas, son and successor of the tyrant of Lampsacus. Thucydides, l. vi. p. 452. edit. Frank., where the epigram may be found at large.

and the more numerous are the occurrences of this kind, the stronger proof will be afforded of intention, and the wider scope for encomium. We celebrate, indeed, and extol great actions, but virtue itself is the real and only proper subject of praise. Good children are more likely to proceed from good parents; a fair descent and a well-directed education afford the probability of worth; but these and all external objects or actions that are most magnified, are to be considered merely as indications or signs of the inward habit of virtue, which, could we otherwise be fully assured of its existence, would alone, and unattended by any such consequences, be precisely as praiseworthy. We praise virtue, we celebrate the acts by which it is attested, but we laud, extol, and magnify happiness, which is its consummation and end. This⁵⁶ is the utmost extension of praise, comprehending eulogy, in the same way that happiness comprehends virtue.

Deliberative and demonstrative eloquence have one point of agreement. They may be converted easily into each other. That which, in deliberation, has been given as a counsel, may, by a slight verbal change, be employed as a topic of praise. Thus we may be exhorted, "not to value ourselves on the gifts of fortune, but rather on our own acquirements." By a mere change of construction, this sentence may be converted into eulogy; "He valued not himself

CHAP
IX.

Point of agreement in deliberative and demonstrative eloquence.

⁵⁶ The μακαρισμος or ευδαιμονισμος, which words, he says, have the same meaning; a meaning different from επαινος or panegyric, of which he has just treated.

BOOK

I.

Amplifica-
tion from
circum-
stances.

on the advantages bestowed by fortune, but on those acquired by his own industry.” When the business is commendation, you have only, therefore, to consider what you would enjoin ; and when the business is deliberation, you have only to consider what would be deemed worthy of praise: the injunction is, of course⁵⁷, prohibitory; the eulogy contains not any prohibition. In demonstrative eloquence, the eulogist must avail himself of every consideration that has a tendency to amplify merit ; as, when the doer of any noble deed is represented to have done it alone, or with the assistance of a few, or to have been the principal agent in it: the doing of it seasonably is also of much importance, as when “he did it in the very nick of time, or at a moment when least expected ;” and when such lucky interposition has come often from the same person, it is to be ascribed, not to his good fortune, but to the greatness of his merit : and when he has been the first for whom any new honour was invented, as Hippolochus⁵⁸ was the first on whom an encomium was pronounced by a public decree, and as statues were first erected in the market-place for Harmodius and Aristogeiton. His disgrace, on the other hand, will be aggravated, who has given occasion to the introduction of any new punishment. Should your subject have little variety or fertility in itself, you must

⁵⁷ The injunction of one thing implies the prohibition of its contrary.

⁵⁸ Who Hippolochus was, or to what country he belonged, is altogether unknown ; the name probably is corrupt.

diversify and enrich it by comparisons : this was the artifice of Isocrates, who succeeded in it the better, from being conversant with judicial pleading⁵⁹, which always implies, at least, two parties. But the comparisons should, if possible, be made with persons in high estimation, since there is the greater glory in surpassing them ; though no apt comparison should be neglected when it indicates superiority, which is always a sign of virtue.

CHAP.
IX.

ἀβυνήδεια
≡

Amplification, examples, and enthymemes, are common to all the three kinds of oratory : but amplification is peculiarly adapted to panegyric ; because the facts on which it is built, being of general notoriety, it remains only to expand and adorn them. Examples, again, are most powerful in deliberation ; for, by the experience of the past, we conjecture and judge most soundly of the future. Enthymemes or arguments, in the third place, are indispensable in courts of justice ; for here, the question turns on facts, on things already done, but liable to argumentation for proving in what way they were done, or from what motives they proceeded. Thus much concerning eulogy, and also concerning invective ; for by showing the objects to be kept in view in eulogy, and the materials of which it should consist, we, at the same time, sufficiently explain the nature of invective or satire ; since the topics of blame are the direct contraries of those of praise.⁶⁰

Amplification, examples, and enthymemes, how respectively adapted to the three kinds of oratory.

⁵⁹ See my Life of Isocrates, p. 122.

⁶⁰ And therefore, according to Aristotle's doctrine, explained by one and the same science.

C H A P.

X.

Judicial
oratory.

WE proceed next to enumerate and explain the grounds of argument in accusation and defence. Here, three points require attention: first, what, and how many, are the causes impelling to injury; secondly, how those are affected who yield to such causes; and, thirdly, what sort of persons are most likely to suffer by them. We begin by defining injustice. "Let this consist in hurting our neighbour willingly, and that contrary to law, whether particular or universal." I call particular law that which, being promulgated by writing, is established as a rule of justice in every particular state; and that universal law, which, though unwritten and unpromulgated, is acknowledged to deserve obedience from all mankind. To act willingly, is to act without coercion, knowing what we do. This, however, we may know, without acting deliberately, which consists in preferring, on comparison, one mode of action to another.

Bad ac-
tions, mo-
tives there-
to.

Men commit bad actions willingly and deliberately, either through confirmed habits of vice⁶¹, or through want of confirmed habits in virtue.⁶² The man rooted in villany, will be guilty of all sorts of enormity. He, also, who has allowed any one vice to gain the ascendancy, will inevitably be impelled by it into acts of turpitude. Thus, one will be disgraced by illiberality in his dealings; another, by intemperance in his

⁶¹ Κακία.⁶² Ακρασία. See the seventh book of the Ethics, where the distinction between weakness and wickedness is better explained than in any other system of philosophical ethics.

pleasures; a third, by his laziness and effeminacy; a fourth, by his timidity and cowardice, when fear makes him quit his post, or desert his companions in danger. In the same manner the votary of ambition⁶³ will err through the immoderate lust of power and honour; the contentious, through his undue eagerness for victory; the passionate, through anger; the implacable, through revenge; the senseless, through ignorance of right and wrong; the impudent, through disregard to opinion: all these will be deluded by their respective vices, and betrayed by them into various degrees of guilt and shame, as appears partly by what we have already said in our Ethics concerning the virtues; and will appear farther by what we are about to say, in the present treatise, concerning the passions.

It remains to consider the ordinary causes of injuries; the disposition and frame of mind of those who commit them, and of those towards whom they are committed. We shall first distinguish the motives, that is, the objects of desire or aversion, which tempt men to wrong; for it is the business of the accuser to show as many of those motives as possible to belong to the person whom he arraigns; and it is the business of the defender to show that his client could not be actuated by any such motives. Of the various actions of men, a part only can be ascribed to themselves; those cannot be ascribed to them which are done by chance, or

The principle of all human action, resolvable into seven causes.

⁶³ Ὁ φιλοτιμος.

BOOK

I.

by necessity, whether this necessity arises from the application of external force, or from the resistless impulse of their internal constitution. Men, therefore, cannot be deemed the causes of what proceeds from chance, from force, or from nature. But we may justly ascribe to them whatever proceeds from the habits which they have contracted, that is, from custom; and whatever proceeds from their various desires and affections, whether these be disciplined by reason, or left altogether loose and unbridled. Under the controul of this higher power, the will is determined to what is good; for good is the only object of rational desire. The irrational desires may all be referred to the impulses of anger or of pleasure. The causes of all human action thus appear to be seven; chance, force, nature, custom, reason, anger, and appetite. To enter into farther distinctions, and to refer the actions of men to their ages, their habits, or their circumstances, would be a superfluous refinement; for if the young be more obnoxious than the old to the allurements of pleasure or the transports of anger, the improprieties or the crimes into which they are thus precipitated, are to be ascribed, not to their youth, but to the ungoverned passions which are its ordinary concomitants. If the poor should be more addicted to pilfering and injustice, and the rich to intemperance and profligacy, their misdeeds are not immediately caused by their poverty or by their riches, but by the desire of acquiring property, which urges most in extreme want, and

Farther
distinc-
tions, how
far super-
fluous;

by the desire of unnecessary pleasures which too often accompanies superfluous opulence. The various moral habits of the mind, according to which men are said to act a right or a wrong part, how diversified soever they may appear, will be found, all of them, resolvable into reason, anger, and appetite: but when the habits are good, the principle of action resulting from them will be good also; when bad, the contrary. In a man of confirmed temperance, none but temperate impulses will be obeyed: the profligate, on the contrary, will yield to every temptation. Though we ought not, therefore, to consider the habits, circumstances, or ages of men as the immediate sources of their action, yet it is of much importance to examine how far these and other particulars are connected with the seven proximate causes above specified: that a man is fair or black, tall or short, has no connection whatever with his principle of action; but this, as we shall see hereafter, will be much influenced by the circumstances of poverty or riches, of youth or old age, of prosperity or adversity. At present, let us explain more fully the seven direct causes to which all actions may be ascribed.

CHAP.
X.

and how
far neces-
sary.

That is said to happen by chance, which proceeds not from any definite cause, and which is not directed to any determinate end; which does not occur always, nor even for the most part; and of which, it is impossible to judge, by any general rule, how it will fall out: all which particulars are implied in the definition of chance.

1. Chance.

- BOOK I. Nature, again, is a cause which operates with great regularity; an internal principle producing similar effects invariably; at least, with such rare deviations, that we need not in a practical work enquire, whether they proceed from particular, in opposition to general laws, or may not most fitly be referred to chance merely.
2. Nature.
3. Force. Force is the cause of those effects in which we are agents, in opposition to our own wills; that is, both to reason and appetite. Custom is a cause through which we do certain things, solely because we have often done them before.
4. Custom.
5. Reason. We act from reason, when our conduct is calculated to attain things either desirable in themselves, or conducive to desirable ends; but in such conduct, utility must be the moving and controuling principle; for profligates may do things useful to them, when actuated merely by the love of pleasure. Anger and animosity are the cause of all those acts that tend to revenge and punishment. Their sole drift is, that the passion of the doer may be gratified: chastisement, on the other hand, aims at correction, and is undertaken for the sake of the sufferer: what is here said of anger will be explained hereafter in our treatise on the passions. We do from appetite all things deemed pleasant; under which head may be arranged those done from custom; for many things, not pleasant by nature, become so through custom. In a word, real or apparent good, real or apparent pleasure, are the sources of all human action; of all those acts, whose principle being within ourselves, are
6. Anger.
7. Appetite or affection.

therefore termed voluntary, and of which we are regarded as the authors. For we must denominate good, that which delivers us from evil, or which substitutes a lesser evil for a greater; and the removal of pain, or the substitution of a lesser pain for a greater, must be numbered with real or apparent pleasures. In the affairs of human life, the main business, therefore, is with goods and pleasures; the former have been enumerated and explained under the head of deliberative eloquence: it remains to speak now of the latter; and the reader must be contented in this practical treatise, with definitions sufficiently perspicuous, though not always penned with philosophical precision.

CHAP.
X.

LET us, then, “suppose pleasure to consist in a certain movement of the mind, bringing us back by a sudden and perceptible change to the best frame and condition of our nature; and pain to be the contrary.” It is plain, therefore, that all those acts and objects must be pleasant, which are productive of this frame; and all those destructive of it must be painful. It necessarily follows, also, that the pleasure will be heightened by every nearer approach to this natural frame and constitution, and will be greatest of all at the moment of our actual reduction to it. Compliance with habitudes of early formation must likewise be agreeable, for such are transformed, as it were, into nature; since that principle which operates most frequently, nearly coincides with that which operates always; and

CHAP.
XI.

Pleasure
defined.

Its
sources —
Nature.

Custom.

BOOK

I.

Uncon-
strained
freedom.

such are the definitions, respectively, of custom and nature.

Things done without constraint are pleasant, because conformable to our natural inclination ; but all kinds of necessity and compulsion are disagreeable ; and it is rightly said, " Tasked work is hard." Careful diligence, studious application, strenuous contentions of mind or body, all these things carry in them a degree of force and necessity, and therefore are very unpleasant, unless we have been long accustomed to them : when this is the case, they assume a quite different character, and become highly delightful. But their opposites are agreeable, naturally ; I mean indolent relaxations from care and labour, pastimes and repose, and sweet sleep ; for no compulsion is required to drive us to such enjoyments. The gratification of appetite is pleasant ; whether this appetite be accompanied, or unaccompanied, with reason ; the appetites, unaccompanied with reason, are those which stimulate naturally by means of the body, without any mental motive. Such are hunger, thirst, and the craving for particular meats or drinks : such also, are the appetites impelling instinctively to the gratification of the other senses ; the touch, smell, sight, and hearing. Appetites are accompanied with reason, when they are suggested or fortified by some apprehension or persuasion of the mind : for, in consequence of such conviction through reflection or discourse, men are actuated with the desire of seeing or enjoying many objects, of which

Appetite,
unmixed
or mixed
with rea-
son.

they would otherwise have been altogether careless, or by which they would otherwise have been far less affected. Since pleasure consists in the perception of agreeable sensations, and that memory and fancy are but more feeble and fainter perceptions of the things remembered or hoped for, it is plain that these faculties also will be accompanied with their respective pleasures; and that pleasure universally must be referred not only to the enjoyment of the present, but to the recollection of the past, and to the anticipation of the future. Agreeable sensations occasion only agreeable remembrances; but sensations that were once painful, may be followed by pleasures of memory, when the pains previously endured are actually either useful or honourable. In this way "past labours are pleasant." It is pleasant also to reflect on obstinate exertion, or severe sufferings; because to be delivered from evil is a real good. Thus Homer:—

CHAP.
XI.

Memory
and fancy.

Here let us feast, and to the feast be join'd
Discourse, the sweeter banquet of the mind;
Review the series of our lives, and taste
The melancholy joys of evils past:
For he who much has suffer'd, much will know;
And pleas'd remembrance builds delight on woe." ⁶⁴

The joys of hope are derived from imagined conceptions, which, if realised, would either afford great pleasure, or any pleasure that is unmixed and pure. In general, whatever gladdens us, when actually present, the same will

Hope.

⁶⁴ Pope's *Odyss.* xy. 32.

BOOK

I.

Anger.

gladden, when remembered or anticipated.
Wherefore anger is pleasant, of which passion
Homer says,—

Far, far too dear to every mortal breast,
Sweet to the soul, as honey to the taste.⁶⁵

Love.

Anger is pleasant, because it anticipates its own gratification; for it is impossible to be angry with those altogether beyond the reach of punishment; nor are we disposed to this fiery passion with regard to those incomparably greater and more powerful than ourselves. Most other desires are the source of pleasure, not only in their actual gratification, but in their remembrance or expectancy. Thus in a burning fever, refreshing draughts are pleasant when remembered or hoped for: and a lover is delighted with the thoughts of his beloved, whether writing to her, speaking of her, or doing any thing in which she is in any remote degree concerned; for, in all such occupations, though pained by real absence, he enjoys, through memory, her ideal presence⁶⁶: to be delighted with which, is the principle and the test of a sincere affection. For the same cause, there is a pleasure in mourning for departed friends, or those far distant, under circumstances of distress and danger; they are thus brought, as it were, before us; and represented to the mental eye, speaking and acting and exhibiting all those

Melan-
choly.

⁶⁵ Iliad. xiii. v. 138.

⁶⁶ 'Οιον αισθανεσθαι οιονται.

qualities which had formerly excited our kindest affections. Thus Homer describes the tears of pleasing melancholy :—

CHAP.
XI.

He ceas'd; the gust of grief began to rise;
Fast streams a tide from beauteous Helen's eyes;
Fast for the sire the filial sorrows flow,
The weeping monarch swells the mighty woe.⁶⁷

Revenge is pleasant; for it is delightful to obtain that of which the privation is most painful; and men, highly injured, are tormented with the thirst of vengeance, the prospect of which gladdens their minds. Victory is pleasant, not only to the ambitious, but to all; for it impresses us with the notion of personal superiority, with which all are more or less gratified. Thence the delight taken in all kinds of competitions, whether serious or playful; in those of music, science, and philosophy, not less than in such light pastimes as cockals, foot-ball, draughts, and dice. Juridical altercation and logical wrangling are highly gratifying to those accustomed to such intellectual conflicts, and who, from practice, have learned to excel in them: and bodily contentions, accompanied with much danger as well as fatigue, the various modes, for instance, of hunting or combating wild animals, are heartily engaged in by many, as presenting them with an image of victory. Honour and reputation are pleasant, because they impress on us the notion of our own merit, and tend to persuade us that we are really the worthy men for whom we pass; hence such

Revenge.


Victory in
all compe-
titions,
even in
sports.

Honour
and fame.

⁶⁷ Pope's Odyss. iv. 49.

BOOK

I.



Friend-
ship.

Admira-
tion.

Change
and va-
riety.

distinctions are most prized from those most likely to judge right in conferring them ; from those best acquainted with us ; our countrymen, fellow-citizens, and companions ; from the many, rather than the few ; above all, from men of sound understanding ; for respect shown by fools is little better than the humble cowering of a dog, or the trembling awe of an infant : and when men seem pleased by praises or honours among very silly people, it is not for the honours themselves, but for some advantages likely to accrue from them. A friend and sentiments of friendship are to be accounted among things pleasant ; for we love that in which we take delight ; even with regard to inanimate things, he who delights in wine, is said to be a lover of it ; but to be the object of love and friendship is pleasant, in a different way ; for it tends to convince us that we are possessed of amiable qualities, and are endowed with real inward excellence, being loved for our own sakes, independently of casual appendages. The pleasure derived from admiration rests on the same ground with that derived from honour : and to be flattered is therefore pleasant, for a flatterer is a pretended admirer, and delights us under the disguise of a friend. Things often repeated are pleasant, we have said, from custom ; but change also is pleasant from nature, for the best constitution of our internal as well as external frame, requires a variety of occupations and exertions ; otherwise, some of our component parts would swell into excess ; others would be

proportionally extenuated; and thus the due balance of the system would be destroyed: whence Euripides says,—

CHAP.
XI.

In all things change delights us.

For this reason, persons and things are seen with more pleasure after a certain lapse of time; the sight of them thus presents us with unaccustomed objects; and, being of more rarity, becomes of greater value. To learn and to wonder are delightful in the highest degree; for the desire of knowledge originates in wonder; the former is excited by the latter; and in gratifying this desire by learning, we improve our highest faculties, and perfect our nature. Both to do good offices, and to receive them, must be accounted among pleasures: to receive them is the completion of our wishes, and to do them, is a proof of abundance in things prized by others. Under this head, we may class the pleasure of admonition and correction, of reforming mental error, and thus supplying not merely physical, but intellectual wants. Since there is a pleasure in gratifying curiosity by learning, it is plain that the imitative arts must be a great source of delight; I mean, painting, sculpture, and poetry, when, in any of these, there is a skilful representation of nature. The objects represented may have nothing delightful in themselves; yet they will highly please, through the excellence of the imitation. The minds of beholders are exercised in comparison, and gratified by discovery,

To learn,
delightful.

To do and
receive
good
offices.

The imita-
tive arts.

BOOK
I.

Conform-
ity to na-
ture, and
things con-
formable in
nature to
each other.

Self and all
related to
it.

Wisdom
and skill.

wherein the form and character of the originals are happily seized and judiciously expressed. Since there is delight in the marvellous, it is plain why the poets should so much deal in sudden revolutions of fortune, and hair-breadth escapes from danger. But the great source of delight is conformity to nature; and things of the same kind are conformable to the nature of each other; thence the pleasure that they mutually give and receive, men delighting in the society of men; boys, in that of boys; horses and other animals assembling into herds; for, according to the proverbs, "Like draws to like," and "Fowls of a feather flock together." But of all conformities, the greatest is that of each individual with himself, for this is perfect coincidence. Self-love, therefore, is most natural; and must subsist, more or less, in all. On this account, all things connected with self are pleasant; our productions⁶⁸, exertions, compositions, the honours with which we are invested, the friends who love and respect us, even the flatterers who only excel in the mimicry of such sentiments. For the same reason, we rejoice to finish what has been left imperfect; for thus it becomes our own work. Since to exercise power is a thing highly pleasing, men cannot fail to delight in the reputation of wisdom, that great commanding principle peculiarly qualifying them for functions of authority and dignity. This universal passion affords them much pleasure in

⁶⁸ Thence φιλοτεκνοί, lovers of our children.

admonishing or reprimanding those around them ; and, after they have acquired superiority above others in any useful or elegant art, in labouring still farther to outdo past performances of their own ; and, as Euripides says,—

CHAP.
XI.

The greater part of every day consume
In skilful struggles to surpass themselves.

Since we all require relaxation and amusement, it is plain why we derive pleasure from playful pastimes, and from all those persons who, by their words or actions, have the power of provoking laughter, or exciting merriment. But the subject of “ridicule,” has been explained in my Treatise on Poetry : so that enough has been said concerning pleasure, from which we may easily deduce the doctrine of its contrary, pain : and having thus analysed both pleasure and utility, I have completed the first branch of my subject, and explained the various objects, for the sake of which, men are tempted to the commission of injuries.

Merriment
and laugh-
ter.

LET us next consider who are the individuals most likely to commit them, and also, who are the individuals most exposed to suffer them. To the former class belong those who think that the wrong intended is possible, and by them, practicable ; who think that they may do it without discovery, or should they be discovered, that they may easily escape punishment ; or should punishment be incurred, that the weight of it will be far less than the advantage accruing from the crime, either to themselves, or to per-

CHAP.
XII.

Persons
most likely
to do, or
most liable
to suffer
injury.

BOOK
I.

The doers
of wrong,
men of
energy and
eloquence.

Persons
connected
in friend-
ship with
the judge
or party.

Those
placed in
circum-
stances un-
favourable
to the per-
petration
of the
crimes im-
puted to
them.

sons most dear to them. The doctrine of possibility, and the propositions relative to it, will be explained in a subsequent part of this work; for this is a subject alike essential to all the three branches of rhetoric. But supposing the wrong intended to be practicable, impunity in doing it, is most likely to be expected by men of energy and eloquence, rich, popular, and thoroughly versed in all the chicane of litigation; or by those who have such persons for their friends and abettors, their dependents and followers. With instruments of this kind at their command, they will expect to be safe in the commission of wrong; sometimes to escape detection, and often to elude punishment. The same expectation will be formed by those who enjoy the friendship of the injured party, or that of the judges. The unsuspecting nature of friendship is open to offence, and its benignity will prefer compromise to harsh legal proceedings. Judges, again, united in friendship with the delinquent, will be disposed to favour him, either by mitigating his punishment, or by entirely remitting it. Those delinquents are likely to be concealed, whose circumstances are most opposite to their crimes: a sorry pithless fellow will not be easily supposed guilty of an assault, nor a miserable mortal, deformed at once by ugliness and poverty, readily suspected of adultery. Nor will a man be suspected of purloining things so much exposed to the public eye, that the utmost audacity could scarcely risk the attempt; nor, indeed, of any crime so

enormous, that hardly any example of it is recorded : usual maladies are the objects of prophylactic medicine, and usual crimes of prohibitory law ; few precautions are taken against evils of rare occurrence. As to the commission of crimes with impunity, he who has enemies innumerable, stands nearly on the same footing with the general favourite. The latter is above suspicion ; the former is so generally suspected, and so closely watched, that, while in his senses, he will not be believed to have incurred the certainty of detection and of consequent punishment.

In theft, impunity will be expected when the things stolen may be easily hid or disposed of ; when they may be easily transferred from one place to another, or converted from one form into another ; when, in case of discovery, sentence may be set aside, or delayed, or the judges corrupted ; and, if a fine is in question, when payment may be resisted or postponed, or the culprit is too poor to pay even the smallest amercement. There is temptation to injustice, when the gain is great, manifest, and immediate ; and the danger slight, uncertain, and remote ; especially when all danger disappears in the vastness of the desired object, as the attainment of sovereignty over free states. Certain individuals will commit crimes, which produce pecuniary advantage at the risk merely of reputation : others, again, will not be deterred from criminal actions that expose them to fine, forfeiture, or banishment, provided that, instead

Various
and oppor-
site mo-
tives from
which guilt
is incurred.

BOOK

I.

of subjecting them to disgrace, such actions rather redound to their glory ; as happened to Zeno, who rendered himself amenable to law, for the sake of avenging his parents. Thus it is that guilt is incurred, from most opposite motives, by different classes of persons, differently affected. Those who have often been fortunate in escaping detection or punishment, will be encouraged to adventure anew ; while others again, who have been peculiarly unsuccessful in all their iniquitous attempts, will thereby be stimulated to fresh enterprise ; and, as happens to the vanquished in battle, impelled by misfortune itself, to hazard once more the chance of arms. Some men are guided solely by present pleasure, or present profit, with a total disregard of enjoyments and advantages much greater, but future. These are the obnoxious to all tumultuary assaults of passion. Others, again, having acquired the virtue of temperance, obey its dictates, and reject lesser present goods, to secure far greater in prospect. Crimes are committed in the hope that they will be ascribed to mischance, necessity, nature, or custom ; in short, to any of those causes that are exclusive of wilful and deliberate villany ; and when rash confidence is reposed in the equity and lenity of magistrates. The needy are always liable to the suspicion of wrong ; but the needy are of two kinds, those extremely indigent, and those rioting in superfluity of abundance : the former are led astray by natural wants, the latter by the insatiable demands of pampered passions. Men

of high reputation, and those sunk to the depths of infamy, are liable to the same suspicion for opposite reasons: the character of the one is too bright to be sullied; that of the other, too low to be degraded.

CHAP.
XII.

Such, then, for ordinary, are the doers of wrong; and those most obnoxious to it, are individuals possessed of objects and advantages of which the doers stand in need.⁶⁹ Neighbours are exposed to mutual injuries, because the gain is speedy; and those widely remote, because the vengeance is slow: thus our pirates reason, who plunder the distant Carthaginians. The incautious, the credulous, the slothful, and those modest to timidity, all such are open to injury; because it is easy to elude their observation, or to avert their prosecution: the slothful are reluctant to engage in troublesome litigations; the modest are ashamed of them. Those who have often submitted to injuries without making reprisals, thereby expose themselves to new wrongs: whence the ordinary proverb of "being a prey even to the Mysians⁷⁰," expressive of that cowardly submission which provokes rapacity. Both those who have fortunately escaped injuries, and those who have often suffered them, are thereby put off their guard: the former

The individuals most liable to injury

Neighbours, and the far distant.

Those often injured with impunity.

⁶⁹ He has above said that the needy are of two descriptions; those wanting in necessities, and those rioting in abundance; the former tempted by natural wants, the latter by artificial passions that are insatiable.

⁷⁰ The most effeminate people of Lesser Asia, itself the most effeminate country of antiquity. See History of Ancient Greece, Pt. ii. vol. i. p. 127.

BOOK
I.

Those by
whom a
fair pre-
tence for
injury is
afforded ;

or a fa-
vourable
opportuni-
ty ;

imagine that they are not likely to be sufferers, the latter that they will not continue always to be so : all such, therefore, are peculiarly exposed to injustice. The same may be said of those who have often been accused or calumniated, or who are extremely open to accusation or calumny : such persons will scarcely venture on a trial at law, through fear of the judges ; and should they venture on it, will have little chance to prevail : they are nearly in the same case with individuals, who are the objects of general hatred or general envy. Injuries will be offered when there is a fair pretence for them, for villany, according to the proverb, wants but a pretence ; and this will be afforded, not only when a man himself, but his forefathers or friends, have done or meditated wrong towards ourselves, our forefathers, or any of those whose persons or memories are dear to us. Friends are liable to injury, because towards them it is easy ; and enemies, because towards them it is pleasant. The friendless and feeble, persons alike deficient in energy and eloquence, are peculiarly exposed to wrong, because they will rather agree to any compromise, than venture on a prosecution in which they could entertain little hope of success. The same observation applies to those, who, from their circumstances and situation, cannot wait the delays of law, or conveniently incur its expenses : such is the case of strangers and travellers, and of poor mechanics, subsisting on the wages of their daily labour. Persons in this condition will gladly

embrace the first opening to agreement. The violators of laws and morals are peculiarly liable to violence and outrage; and when they become the victims of the same evils which they have often inflicted, they scarcely appear to have received an injury. Who pities a quarrelsome bruiser, who has met with a thrashing, even when he did not deserve it? The injury also disappears which is offered to those who have either done us wrong, or who are meditating mischief against ourselves or persons dear to us. Instead of severe condemnation, we seem entitled to the fair praise of anticipating unjust aggression. For the same reason we are prompted to injuries which redound to the satisfaction of those beloved, admired, or feared by us; in a word, all such as it is our delight to please. Singular mildness of temper, which ought naturally to be most exempt from wrong, is peculiarly liable to suffer it, because from persons of this description it is easy to obtain pardon. Friends from whom we have separated our interests, and of whom we have become the enemies and accusers, are exposed from us to the greatest injuries, in the infliction of which we shall seem only to ward off the evils ready to fall on ourselves: thus Callippus, after separating his interests from Dion, and having become his accuser, anticipated the vengeance that he dreaded, by the assassination of his adversary. Neither shall we be reputed injurious in taking from others those things of which their enemies are ready to deprive them: whence Gelon re-

CHAP.
XII.

or a just
cause;

or easy re-
concilia-
tion;

or evil
dreaded.

Injuries
even re-
warded by
those hos-
tile to the
injured.

BOOK

I.

Excused
in trifles,
when there
is a great
compen-
sation ;

or when
conceal-
ment easy ;

or unwil-
lingness to
complain
through
modesty.

ceived presents of honour from Enesidemus⁷¹, because he had got the start of him in reducing a city, which Enesidemus himself was just ready to assail. Injustice also will be excused, when the effects of it may be more than compensated ; as Jason said, “ I did a few acts of injustice, that I might display justice habitually in a high station.” Offences, indeed, are easily pardoned, that proceed from human infirmity, being incident to all men, at least to the greater part. Things easily concealed afford temptation to pilfer ; such are eatables that may speedily be consumed, or objects that may easily be disguised under new shapes or colours, or as ingredients in new mixtures ; or which may easily be transported, and hid in the smallest corner ; and those to which the pilferer previously possessed many things so similar, that what has been stolen is undistinguishable from what really belonged to him. Very slight injuries also will be frequent, for which none but the most litigious persons would think it worth while to demand redress ; and even the greatest will be committed towards those imagined to have too much modesty to complain of them : such are the shameful insults offered to youth and beauty.⁷² We have thus, in the analysis above given of pleasure and utility, enumerated and explained the causes impelling men to injury : we have shown what are the circumstances and dispositions of those most

⁷¹ Enesidemus was tyrant of Leontium: Gelo, king of Syracuse. See History of Ancient Greece, Pt. i. vol. i. c. xi.

⁷² Γυναικων οικειων υβρεις, &c.

likely to commit, and also of those most liable to suffer, wrong; adding the reasons why they should respectively be so. CHAP.
XII.

WE now proceed to the analysis of justice and injustice, in other words, to the explanation of the different sorts of rights and wrongs. Every thing comprehended under these terms bears a reference to two kinds of laws, the civil and the natural; and also to two kinds of persons, or rather to the same persons considered under two different aspects, either as separate individuals, or as aggregate members of the same commonwealth. The civil or particular law is that which each community has enacted for the government of its own citizens; and is either written, or merely traditional, and established by custom; the natural or universal law is that which prevails universally, through the ordinance of nature; and which all men recognise, by a sort of divine impulse⁷³, independently of any political partnership, or social compact. To this law Antigone alludes in Sophocles' tragedy of that name, when she maintains that the prohibition of Creon, though an absolute king, ought not to prevent her from complying with the law of nature in burying her brother Polynices:—

CHAP.
XIII.

Justice and injustice bear reference to two sorts of laws.

Laws, particular and civil;

or natural and universal.

The latter exemplified.

⁷³ 'Ο μαντευοῦνται πάντες. Here, as on other occasions, Cicero expands and illuminates Aristotle's deep sense: "Est hæc non scripta, sed nata, lex; quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus; verum ex natura ipsa arripuimus, hausimus, expressimus; ad quam non docti, sed facti; non instituti, sed imbuti sumus." He speaks of the law of self-defence, in the pleading for Milo.

BOOK
I.

CREON. — And dar'st thou then to disobey my law?

ANTIGONE. — This law came not from Jove, nor the just Gods
Who rule below; nor could I ever think
A mortal's law of power or strength sufficient
To abrogate th' unwritten law divine,
Immutable, eternal; not like these,
Of yesterday, but made ere time began.⁷⁴

To the same voice of Nature, Empedocles referred the maxim, "Thou shalt not kill;" just and venerable, he says, not in particular ages and countries only, —

But a rule controlling earth and heaven,
The boundless fields of æther, and the tracts
Of all-pervading light.——

Alcidamus alludes to the same comprehensive unalterable laws, in his oration for the Messenians.⁷⁵

Delinquency
public or
private.

In their relation to persons, laws guard the rights, either of communities at large, or of individuals belonging to those communities. The man guilty of assault or of adultery injures the individual; the soldier who quits his ranks endangers and injures the commonwealth. To be

⁷⁴ Antigone, act ii. scene 4. Franklin.

⁷⁵ Cicero's eloquence flowed from the purest Grecian springs, when he penned the following admirable passage. "Est quidem verò lex, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat; quæ tamen neque probos frustra jubet, aut vetat, nec improbos jubendo, aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec abrogari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest. Nec verò, aut per senatum, aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus. Neque est quærendus explanator aut interpret ejus alius: nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium Deus ille,

injured, is to receive a wrong done voluntarily; for we before observed, that to injure, implies spontaneity and volition on the part of the agent: on the part of the sufferer again, to constitute an injury, the thing done to him must be against his will. In what points men may be wronged, may easily be understood from the enumeration above given of advantages and pleasures; for we suffer wrong, when deprived of such things, or subjected to any of their contraries: and as all injuries are committed with regard either to the public or to individuals, so we may injure the one or the other, either willingly and knowingly, or unwillingly and ignorantly; and when in the latter way, we may act either from the sudden impulse of passion, or from deliberate purposes of malice. Of the passions we shall treat in a subsequent part of this work; and the motives to deliberate malice have already been explained, as well as the peculiar circumstances and situation of those most likely to harbour it, and of those most liable to be its victims. In judicial trials, the defendant,

CHAP.
XIII.

Wrongs may be done willingly, or the contrary; deliberately, or from sudden impulse.

legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator: cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, et naturam hominis aspernabitur, atque hoc ipso luet maximas pœnas, etiamsi cetera supplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit." Cicero de Repub. l. vi. c. 8. p. 1315. edit. Olivet.

Whoever has meditated, and made his own, Aristotle's Rhetoric, will recognise its principles, either as to matter or to style, in almost every page of approved subsequent writers on the subject. I mean in the copious works of Cicero, Dionysius, and Quintilian; and in the small treatise "De Interpretatione," ascribed to Demetrius Phalareus, and the golden fragments of Longinus.

B O O K

I.

The facts
may be ad-
mitted, yet
the delin-
quency de-
nied.

In crimes
the inten-
tion and
quo animo
more to be
regarded
than the
external
act.

though he admit the facts alleged against him, may often deny that he has done an injury; or, though convicted of a crime, may deny that it is the crime with which he is charged in the indictment: thus, that he has indeed possessed himself of what was another's, but that he did not steal it; that he indeed gave the first blow, but not with that contumelious or vengeful spirit which is necessary to constitute an assault: that he had indulged in his amorous passion, but was not an adulterer; that he had been guilty of theft, indeed, but not of sacrilege, the property stolen not being consecrated; that he had extended his culture to land not his own, but that this land, however, was not the domain of the public; that he had been in conference with enemies of his country, yet was guiltless of treason. For the purpose of substantial justice, it is essential to have terms accurately defined, and to know precisely what constitutes theft, assault, adultery, and other legal crimes. In all of these, the intention of the mind is the main point, and not the external act: it is this intention that constitutes the whole turpitude and injustice of the act, and which is therefore always implied in the word denoting the crime. Thus, as to the words "theft" and "assault" in the Athenian law, to beat another is not an assault unless the blows are inflicted with a view to disgrace the sufferer, and to gratify the wanton insolence of the agent; to carry away secretly a thing belonging to another, is not theft, unless the doer of this act entertain the purpose of en-

riching himself at the other's expence. The same holds with regard to all other crimes. To constitute them, it is always necessary that there be a pravity of purpose, whether they be defined and denounced by edicts or statutes, or merely declared and established by what is called unwritten law. Of this there are two kinds, one of which bears a reference to actions not merely just, but meritorious, the performance of which is entitled to approbation, honour, and reward; whereas the doing of things contrary to them is followed by dishonour, degradation, and disgrace. Such are the warm returns of gratitude to a benefactor, which are accompanied with praise; while any injuries done to him are deserving of peculiar infamy: in the same way, to relieve the distresses of our friends, and to promote their views, is honourable; whereas nothing can be more odious than to obstruct their views, and aggravate their misery. The second kind of unwritten law bears a reference to the law established by statute, and may be regarded merely as its supplement. It is equity supplying the defects of strict legal justice, and deciding as the legislator himself would have done, had the whole subject been in his contemplation: for many particulars escape the notice of the legislator, and occasion the enactment of unjust laws, much against his will: even with his will and consent, laws good in general are enacted, but which, because they are general, may be found unjust in particular cases: and it is altogether impossible to comprehend all that

CHAP.
XIII.

Unwritten law of two kinds;—one kind respects all moral duties in general;

another is corrective, or supplemental to written law.

B O O K

I.

Equity in
contradis-
tinction to
law.

indefinite variety of circumstances and conditions which, in each particular application, would render law conformable to the dictates of substantial justice. Thus it is enacted, that no one shall strike another with iron, without ascertaining the weight or shape of this iron, for the variety here is endless: the law, therefore, must be contented with the general term; so that one who should strike, wearing an iron ring on his finger, would be guilty in law, but not so in equity. Whence we may see what sorts of person and things deserve to be characterised as equitable. Equity, in opposition to strict law, should be exercised in all those cases in which there is room for pardon. Equity will not appreciate alike, but make all due distinction between errors and crimes on the one hand, and between errors and accidents on the other. Accidents are things that happen unforeseen and unexpected, and that imply no malice of intention in him who occasions them. Errors take place, not indeed without thought and expectation, but without any deliberate design or pravity of purpose. Crimes are committed not only with consideration and knowledge, but with a premeditated design of mischief: and to this class is to be referred the gratification of all inordinate passions. Equity looks with an eye of compassion on human frailty: it considers itself as representing, not the deaf insensible law, but the living, merciful lawgiver, and pays more regard to the intention of such a lawgiver, than to his mere words. With re-

spect to the delinquent, also, it is more regardful of his designs and purposes than of his proceedings and actions: it is not contented with a partial view, but examines the whole patiently, regarding not only what, in the present transaction, he appears to be, but what, in most others, he has habitually been. In the person injured, equity will direct the attention rather to benefits previously received, than to the evil immediately suffered: it will be reluctant in prosecution, and desirous of adjusting differences by persuasion and argument, rather than by compulsion and force. It will always prefer arbitration to judicial process; for arbiters decide according to equity, and are resorted to, that equity may prevail over strict law. Thus much on the subject of equity.

CHAP.
XIII.

THE greater wrongs are those which spring from a more aggravated injustice. Wherefore the least in pecuniary estimation are often the greatest in turpitude; as Callistratus arraigned Metanopus for defrauding, to the value of three half-pence of sacred money, the poor mechanics employed in repairing the temple. The wrong is here estimated by the disposition which it infers; for what must be his turpitude, who could commit so base a crime through so slight a temptation? In little matters, the littleness itself thus magnifies the injustice: it is quite otherwise with justice, which shines most conspicuous in transactions of importance and magnitude. Thus crimes are

CHAP.
XIV.

How wrongs are aggravated — From the little temptation to them;

BOOK

I.

From their
being with-
out reme-
dy.

From the
pain in-
flicted by
them.

From
being com-
mitted by
one alone,
or for the
first time.

From the
horror ex-
cited by
them.

sometimes measured by the pravity in which they originate, and sometimes by the bad consequences which flow from them ; and when no punishment can be inflicted adequate to the mischief done ; and when this mischief is of a nature not to be remedied ; and also when the injured party is not entitled to legal redress ; for punishments inflicted by law are to be considered in the light of remedies. When the person insulted, unable to brook disgrace, has become an object of aversion and punishment to himself, the more severe the penalty imposed by the sufferer, the greater weight of vengeance seems due to the perpetrator. In the affair of Euctemon, who laid violent hands on himself upon meeting with a disgraceful outrage, Sophocles maintained in court, that the offender ought not to escape with a less punishment, than the victim of his brutality had inflicted on himself. The crime of that man is aggravated who commits it alone, or with a few, or who is the first cause of it ; or who has often been found guilty of the same offence : also, if, through his delinquency, occasion has been given to the enactment of a new law, preventive or corrective of any similar disorder ; in fact, the Argives made it a rule to hold him for guilty, through whose misbehaviour it became necessary to enlarge the criminal code by new penalties. Injuries rise in magnitude above each other, in proportion to their ferocity and brutality ; in proportion to their slow deliberate malice ; and accordingly as they excite more of horror than of pity. The

aggravation of the orator is also of mighty effect; as when he arraigns complicated turpitude, and shows the crime committed to sap the foundations of justice, good faith, oaths, marriages, and all those principles and institutions, by which the edifice of society has been reared, and through which only it can be upheld. Crimes are aggravated by their commission in the very place appointed for their punishment: in this consists the enormity of false witnesses; for where will men respect truth and justice, if not in the places destined to elicit the one, and to administer the other? Crimes may be measured by the degree of shame accompanying them: those are the basest of which the bulk of mankind would be most ashamed. He who injures a benefactor is doubly guilty; because he has done ill, where it was his duty to do good. A man may be represented as more unworthy and odious for having violated the unwritten, than the written law; because it is more honourable to obey the former, which, as we have seen, is not armed with the same coercive authority: under another aspect, the violation of written laws may be regarded as the greater crime of the two; for he who has not been deterred from injustice through fear of punishment, can scarcely, in the absence of such fear, be expected to maintain his integrity. Thus much on the comparison of crimes, and the estimation of their relative magnitudes.

CHAP.
XIV.

From the
address of
the ac-
cuser.

CHAP.
XV.

Of proofs
independ-
ent of the
rhetorical
art.

1. Laws,
particular
and uni-
versal;
how their
respective
authorities
are to be
enforced
or invali-
dated.

It follows to speak of proofs; I mean those independent of the art and skill of the orator, for these are peculiar to judicial pleadings. They may be all referred to five heads; laws, witnesses, contracts, examination by torture, and oaths. Let us begin with the first, and see how, according to circumstances, laws may be employed with a view to persuade or dissuade, to accuse or to defend. If the written law be unfavourable to our cause, it is plain that recourse must be had to general principles, and to the rules of natural equity. That a judge should use his discretion, is a maxim, we may observe, established for the purpose of setting aside written law, in cases where the application of it would be a grievance. This may be the effect of written laws, which are variable, depending on the will or caprice of particular legislators; but can never take place with regard to those universal and natural laws, which Antigone pleads in justifying her disobedience to Creon's edict. —

Nor could I ever think

A mortal's law of power or strength sufficient

To abrogate th' unwritten law divine,

Immutable, eternal; not like these

Of yesterday, but made ere time began.

Shall man persuade me, then, to violate

Heaven's great commands, and make the Gods my foes? ⁷⁶

Justice, it may be further said, must rest on the solid basis of reality: it is not mere show and appearance; so that what is not useful and

⁷⁶ Antigone, act ii. scene 4.

just deserves not to be regarded as a law ; since it performs not the functions of law : as the office of assayer is established to separate true gold from the false, so judges are appointed to detect counterfeit laws, and to maintain against their authority the rules of substantial justice : by these a good man will be guided, and to these he will invariably adhere. It must also be examined, whether the written laws be not at variance among themselves. Some of these declare all contracts to be binding ; others prohibit all contracts of an odious or immoral nature.⁷⁷ We must also consider whether the law be ambiguous, and explain it in that sense which suits the purpose of our client. Further, if the law be against us, we must inquire whether the circumstances still subsist which occasioned its enactment ; for laws often remain after the causes of them have long ceased, in which case it is not difficult to combat their authority. When, on the contrary, the written law operates in our favour, we must then allege that the permission granted to the judge of using his discretion, by no means implies that he may set aside the laws of his country, when they speak plainly and decisively, but only that he may use his best judgment in the interpretation of them, when they are obscure or ambiguous ; by which means he will maintain the sanctity of his oath of office, and decide according to law. In legislating for particular communities, the consideration is not what may appear just and right generally and

CHAP.
XV.

⁷⁷ Παρα τον νομον.

BOOK

I.

abstractedly, but what is just and right for a certain people, particularly circumstanced. To set aside the laws of such a people, on views of abstract fitness, is entirely to deprive them of the benefits of law and government, and virtually to dissolve society. In the other arts and sciences, for instance, in the art of medicine, the pretensions of being more skilful than your physician will generally be convicted of folly: those are not less extravagant of being more wise than the legislator, whose very errors are to be respected, since laws operate as practical principles of morality, and occasional inconveniences in them are nothing, compared with the dreadful evils that would result from teaching men to disregard and disobey them. The tendency to this disposition is what all political experience, and the collected wisdom of ages, most pointedly condemn.⁷⁸ Witnesses, constituting the second class of inartificial proofs, are either ancient or modern, that is, contemporary; and the latter may be again divided into those exempt from danger, and those who run the same risk with the parties in whose cause they give evidence. Ancient witnesses consist of the poets and other celebrated writers, whose authority for certain facts or opinions are embodied in their immortal works. Thus the Athenians produced the testimony of Homer for their right of dominion over the isle of Salamis, in opposition to the pretensions of the commonwealth of Megara: and, in a recent transaction, the citizens of Tenedos pleaded the authority of Periander, the wise

2. Witnesses ancient and contemporary.

The former consist of poets, historians, and philosophers.

⁷⁸ See "Politics," Translation, p. 117.

Corinthian, in a dispute with the inhabitants of Sigeum, concerning their common boundaries ; and Solon, the contemporary of Periander, was adduced as a witness by Cleophon, in the impeachment of Critias, the chief of the Thirty Tyrants, to prove that his family had long been notorious for profligacy : for Solon would not otherwise have said, —

CHAP.
XV.

Bid Critias his father's blushes spare,
And curb the ringlets of his yellow hair.

These bear evidence of the past ; for the future, men hearken to oracles, and their expounders ; as the Athenians to Themistocles, when he said that “ to betake themselves to their wooden walls,” was to have recourse to their fleet, and combat the enemy by sea. Proverbs, the sure deductions of time and experience, have also much weight : thus, would we dissuade from courting the friendship of an old man, —

Cold is the gratitude of age⁷⁹ —

and would we exhort to the destruction of those whose resentment has been provoked, —

'Tis mad to stab the sire, yet save the son.

Sentiments, recently expressed by venerated characters, have much influence in all parallel cases. Thus Eubulus, in the impeachment of Chares⁸⁰, employed with much effect the words of Plato against Archibios, “ that through his example, villany dared to walk the city, in broad day, unmasked.”

⁷⁹ The Greek proverb having here the same sense, has too savage a sound, “ Never do good to an old man.”

⁸⁰ See Hist. of Ancient Greece, P. i. vol. iii. p. 479, &c.

BOOK

I.

These
more ex-
empt from
suspicion
than con-
temporary
witnesses.

How testi-
mony is to
be assailed
or upheld.

Witnesses, liable to punishment in case of false testimony, and who thereby share in danger with the contending parties, are examined only to learn from them whether a position is, or is not, true; whether an event has, or has not, happened. Their business is simply to declare the things said or done; but, concerning the quality of those things, their justice or their utility, they are not deemed impartial enough, or intelligent enough, to be consulted. It is quite otherwise with witnesses remote from the cause; their judgment is of avail precisely in those particulars, especially the judgments given in preceding ages of the world, and, therefore, totally exempt from the suspicion of corruption or partiality. The arguments relative to witnesses, are, in the first place, when not sufficiently provided with them, that decisions ought to be guided by probability and reason; that evidence of this kind is not to be bought, deceived, or intimidated; a judge will best evince his discretion in listening to proofs beyond exception, and which cannot, as often happens to witnesses, be convicted of falsehood and perjury. The party best provided with witnesses must view the matter under another aspect. He will allege that probabilities and conjectures may deceive as well as witnesses; and when they do so, are not, like witnesses, obnoxious to punishment: that if arguments drawn from signs and likelihoods were alone sufficient to substantiate the truth of facts, the wisdom of all ages would not, for this purpose, have had recourse

to testimony. The declarations of witnesses may relate either to our client, or to his adversary; either to the transaction itself, or to the manners and character of the agents. Under all these variations, the evidence of witnesses may generally be turned to account: they may be made to explain the business in the way most favourable to our own views, or most prejudicial to those of our opponent; and to indicate dispositions fair and good on our side, iniquitous and mischievous on the part of our adversary. As to the other distinctions concerning witnesses, whether they be friends, enemies, or altogether impartial; whether persons respectable, contemptible, or of an intermediate character, the argumentation regarding these and other differences, with a view that the evidence given may be either fortified or invalidated⁸¹, must be entirely drawn from the topics above produced, concerning virtue and utility, and those that will immediately be exhibited, concerning the affections and passions.

CHAP.
XV.

In contracts, the third kind of inartificial proofs, the pleader's address may be employed to enforce or weaken the obligation of them; to show that they have, or have not, been entered into. When they make in our favour, our endeavour must be to show the reality of their existence, and the expediency of maintaining them; when against us, they must by all means be discredited, which is done in the same way in

3. Contracts how to be attacked or defended.

⁸¹ Aristotle says, "the topics from which enthymemes are taken;" meaning those specified in the text.

BOOK ^{I.} which we discredit the testimony of witnesses :
for faith in a contract depends solely on our confidence in those who have signed it, and those who have been its depositaries. The contract being sufficiently substantiated, and its conditions being favourable, the necessity of maintaining it may be clearly evinced, since contracts are nothing but particular and private laws, binding those who enter into them. These partial engagements, indeed, do not give authority to public and general laws ; but the latter fully sanction the former, when made in the spirit of them ; and the written law of states is itself a species of contract, so that to destroy the power of contracts, would be to abrogate and abolish law. Of human transactions, almost all those that are voluntary depend on stipulation and mutual engagement, so that were the authority of compacts to be easily invalidated, all those reciprocal aids would be taken away and destroyed, which men render to each other in the endless variety of their complicated exigencies. These and similar arguments may be employed, when the covenant is in our favour : but when it ranks on the side of the adversary, we may combat it by the same weapons that are used against an iniquitous law. Strange, indeed, that even laws should be set aside when they appear to militate against justice and utility, and that contracts, equally reprehensible, should still be sustained ! As in the Olympic games there are umpires to decide the prize of strength and velocity, so the judge is an umpire to decide

the prize of justice: superiority in this virtue ought to be the sole object of his regard; this alone ought to command his decision, especially since the clear dictates of justice are neither to be warped by fraud, nor broken through by force, being indelibly impressed by nature on the human heart: whereas contracts are the work, sometimes of fraud, and sometimes of compulsion. We must also consider whether the contract in question be not in opposition to some written law or custom, or to some rule of equity; and whether it be not invalidated by some other contract, prior or posterior to it; for as both cannot be supported, we should thus have an opportunity of urging the arguments against either of them which we desire to invalidate. It is essential, also, to examine whether the contract we resist be not at variance with the public conveniency and interest, or with the interest and credit of the judges before whom we plead; which, and other topics of a similar kind, the nature of the subject will readily suggest.

As to the question, or examinations by torture, the fourth kind of inartificial proofs, the whole reasoning concerning them may be included within a narrow compass. They are seemingly entitled to much weight, because, in them, the truth appears to be extorted by force: whoever would avail himself of such evidence must dwell, therefore, on this circumstance, and amplify confession by torture, as the surest and most irrefragable of all convictions. The adverse party, again, will maintain, and maintain with truth, that the qua-

4. Examination by torture, — arguments concerning it.

BOOK

I.

lity of the evidence, true or fallacious, has nothing to do with the force by which it is obtained ; that men of firm minds will resolutely conceal what is true, and that men of an opposite character will weakly confess what is false, the sooner to get rid of their immediate sufferings. Of this the pleader may easily furnish himself with examples, many of which cannot fail to occur to the judges.

5. Oaths ;
the simple
cases con-
cerning
them, and
their com-
plications.

Evidence on oath, the fifth and last of inartificial proofs, comprehends the four following cases : a man may be ready alike to take his own oath, and to refer the matter to his adversary's ; he may refuse to do either ; he may be willing to refer to his adversary's oath, but unwilling to take his own ; or, the reverse of this, he may be willing to take his own, but unwilling to refer to that of his adversary. Besides these, the only possible distinctions, the pleader has also to consider, whether either of the parties has already made oath in the cause, and which of them has done so. To justify the refusal of an appeal to the conscience of our adversary, we may maintain that the voice of this internal monitor is but too often stifled through passion or interest ; that our opponent wishes nothing better than to be allowed to give his oath, in order to withhold from us our right ; that confiding in the goodness of our cause, we trust, that without the formality of swearing him, the judges will see abundant reason to condemn him ; and that, if we were reduced to the necessity of trusting to such proofs as oaths, we should far rather confide in those officially taken by our

judges: they are men to be believed; not so, our adversary. Again, a man may decline taking his oath, on the ground that he disapproves of making appeals to heaven in matters of mere pecuniary interest; that if he had less reverence for the gods, he would swear most readily, since by this he would obtain the object in view; and a villany with gain is better than one altogether unproductive. This reluctance to swear will thus appear to proceed from virtue, and not from any apprehension of being convicted of perjury: he will seem, not to fear the oath, but to disdain it through honest scorn; and his refusal will seem to illustrate the saying of Xenophanes, that, in a dispute between honest men and knaves, a reference to oaths is no better than a judicial combat between address and awkwardness. Of the third case, that in which a man is ready to make oath in his own cause, the propriety may be enforced by saying, that, however distrustful of his adversary, he is sure of himself, and sure that the judges may perfectly rely on his integrity; and then converting the proposition of Xenophanes, maintain that litigant parties can never be put more on a foot of equality, than when a man, fearless of the gods, is obliged to defer to the oath taken by a man of piety: and why should the latter feel reluctance to swear, since the judges, how respectable soever their characters, must themselves be sworn, before they can exercise their honourable functions? If it suits our purpose to defer to the adversary's oath, we may then allege, that nothing can bet-

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I.



ter become persons of religion and virtue than to submit their interests to the gods; that we desire no other judges, nor ought our opponent to desire them, the whole matter being referred to his own religion and oath; that it would be absurd in him to decline this attestation, which even his judges must make, before they can pass sentence in his cause. Having shown what is to be said in these simple cases, it is plain how we must proceed when any two of them are coupled; as when a man is willing to make oath himself, but unwilling to defer to that of his adversary; or when he is willing to abide by his adversary's oath, but unwilling to take his own; or when he is alike willing to give and take, or absolutely refuses to do either; all these are merely combinations of the cases treated above, so that the arguments must be precisely the same, only expressed conjunctively.

Arguments
for and
against
correcting
evidence
on oath.

When, upon the discovery of some error in our evidence, we wish to alter the affidavit before made, we may repel the reproach of perjury, by maintaing that all perjury is injustice, and that all injustice is voluntary; but nothing can be more involuntary than the result of compulsion and deception: perjury, therefore, is in the mind and intention, not in the mere words that are uttered. But should our adversary wish to correct his former declaration, it is then that we must magnify the sanctity of oaths, to tamper with which is to dissolve all those ties which hold society together. From oaths, the laws them-

selves derive their validity, and oaths are indispensable in all who administer them ; and “ can it be endured while you, who are judges, must abide by your decisions, because of the oath which you have taken, that oaths, made in your presence, should be set at nought by the contending parties ? ” These and other amplifications will be here in their proper place : such are the general doctrines concerning inartificial proofs.⁸²

⁸² Conf. Cicero de Partit. Orator. & Quintilian, Instit. l. v. cap. 4, 5, 6, 7.

ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC.

BOOK II.

ARGUMENT.

Deliberative and Judicial Eloquence ; on what their respective success depends.—The three requisites to Persuasion, independently of Argument.—Transition to the Doctrine of the Passions.—Anger ; —Its Definition — Causes — Its natural Subjects and Objects.—Love and Hatred. — Fear. — Shame. — Pity. — Indignation. — Envy. — Emulation. — Passions and Characters, as modified by Age — Birth — Riches — Power ; and their contraries. — The Sources of Argument respectively appropriate to the three kinds of Oratory. — The Topics common to all the three kinds :— 1. The Topic derived from the nature of contraries ; — 2. From that of conjugate terms ; — 3. From relatives ;— 4. A fortiori ;— 5. Parity of reason ; — 6. From consistency in will and conduct ; — 7. Ad hominem ; — 8. From definition ; — 9. From diversity of signification.— 10. From division. — 11. From accumulation of instances ; — 12. From precedent ; — 13. From resolution of the genus into its several species ; — 14. From consequences ; — 15. From the consequents of contraries. — 16. From variance in the opinions of men, expressed and secret ; — 17. From analogy ; — 18. From identifying things with their consequences ; — 19. From inconsistency with previous resolutions ; — 20. From substituting a probable motive for the real cause ; — 21. From the general causes impelling all human action ; — 22. From improbability itself ; — 23. From incongruity ; —

24. *From explaining false appearances ; — 25. From the improbability of the cause to that of the effect ; — 26. From the contrast of designs ; — 27. From inconsistency with former actions ; — 28. From names. — Arguments less convincing than Replies ; and why. — The most impressive are those natural, but not obvious. — The eight kinds of sophisms. — Solutions and Objections ; their nature and number.*

THE topics to be employed to impel or to restrain, to praise or to blame, to accuse or to defend, have now been enumerated and explained : the objects ever to be kept in view, are utility, honour, and justice ; on approved notions of which, respectively, all propositions must turn, calculated to persuade and prevail in the three kinds of oratory. But as every discourse is proposed to the judgment of the hearers, for, in matters of deliberation, the advice which we give is submitted to their consideration, and in judicial trials, we plead and argue with a view to obtain their favourable sentence ; it is of mighty importance that we should exhibit ourselves to these hearers in an advantageous light, and appear to be actuated by great good-will towards them ; and also that they, on their part, should be in a frame of mind and temper consonant to our views. The effect of political speeches, that is, of deliberative eloquence, depends mainly on the opinion conceived of the orator or statesman : in pleadings before courts of justice, on the other hand, the principal point is the favourable disposition of the judges ; for their decisions will vary according

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I.

Deliberative eloquence mainly depends on a favourable opinion of the speaker, and judicial eloquence on a favourable disposition in the hearers.

BOOK
II.

to their love or hatred, and accordingly as they are stirred to the asperities of anger, or soothed into the softness of pity. Through those different affections their opinions will be shaken, and sometimes totally changed. Thus, under the impression of good-will or compassion for a delinquent, his judges will often declare him innocent, and always regard him as far less culpable than hatred or bare indifference would represent him. To a man goaded by desires, and sanguine in hope, the prospect of imagined pleasures will appear to be easily realised, and to be fraught with the purest joy: the reverse of this will appear to men of despondent tempers, adverse to such pleasures, or barely indifferent to them.

The three
requisites
for gaining
credit to a
discourse,
independ-
ently of
argument.

To procure credit for our discourse through means of our own character, and independently of proofs or arguments, there are three requisites: the hearers must repose confidence in our wisdom, and in our virtue, and in our good-will towards themselves. If any of these three be wanting, the speaker may be safely disregarded; for either through ignorance, he will be incapable of discerning what is best, or careless of proposing it; and that, either through the general pravity of his nature, or through want of zeal in the cause. Beside these three, there can be no other source of deception; so that he who is exempt from them all, must be entitled to complete credit.

Transition
to the doc-
trine of the

How the speaker is to give this favourable impression of himself, has partly been explained

above, in treating of the virtues, for, with the same propositions and inferences by which he has set off and emblazoned the merits of others, he may exhibit, and do justice to his own: but how he is to create the opinion of his goodwill for his hearers, and their favourable disposition towards himself, we proceed now to explain, in the following disquisition on the passions. The judgments of men change with these agitations of the mind, and their accompanying pains or pleasures; I mean, with anger, pity, fear, and all such like emotions, and their contraries. In explaining each of them distinctly, three points must be attended to: in anger, for example, we must first consider who are the persons most susceptible of this passion; secondly, who are they most likely to be its objects; thirdly, what are the causes and circumstances which most naturally produce or occasion it. The knowledge of one or two of these things will not suffice: they must be all known exactly in order, to manage any of the passions; to move or to appease them. We proceed, therefore, to investigate the topics relative to this subject, in our accustomed manner.

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I.

passions :
necessity
of treat-
ing it.

In explain-
ing the
nature of
each pas-
sion, three
points
must be
examined.

“LET anger, then, be defined an emotion accompanied with pain; impelling us to inflict open punishment for any apparent contempt towards ourselves or those belonging to us.” If this be an accurate description of anger, it follows, that individuals only can be its objects. We cannot be angry with things taken in the abstract; for in-

CHAP.
II.

Anger de-
fined — its
natural ob-
jects.

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II.

stance, with man in general, but with a particular man, as Cleon; who insults, or is prepared to insult ourselves, or those dear to us. It follows also, that all anger contains in it a mixture of pleasure, arising from the prospect of its gratification: for it is pleasant to obtain the objects of our desires; but manifest impossibilities can never constitute such objects. The passion of anger is directed, therefore, to things possible and practicable; the expected attainment of which darts a spark of gladness into the bosom. Wherefore, Homer says, —

—— But, oh! ye gracious powers above,
Wrath and revenge from men and gods remove;
Far, far too dear to every mortal breast,
Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste.¹

But, further, that this, the angry emotion working on the fancy, exhibits the desired vengeance as actually taking place; we dwell with delight on this illusive phantom till the waking dream assumes a character of reality.

Excited by
contempt,
testified in
three ways.

Contempt is the open expression of our opinions and feelings concerning objects of no value; things incapable of producing pain or pleasure, of doing good or harm; for whatever may cause much of the one or the other, will be treated, not with contempt, but, on the contrary, with very serious regard. Contempt may be testified in three ways; by disdain, by offence, and by insult. Things of no value are disdained as below our notice. Offence is opposition to the views of another, merely for the sake of opposing them. It is that wanton vexation, which

1. Disdain.

2. Offence.

¹ Iliad xviii. v. 140.

could never be exercised towards one supposed capable of hurting us, for then we should fear him ; nor towards one supposed capable of benefiting us, for then we should endeavour to conciliate his good-will. Insult consists in the infliction of such injuries as are accompanied with shame, and that, not from any past grudge, or for any future profit, but merely to enjoy the mortification of the person affronted. Those who retaliate, do not insult, but requite ; and are pleased in gratifying their resentment ; but the pleasure of him who affronts is derived from the conceit which the insult committed gives him of his own superiority. The young and the rich are therefore prone to insolence ; for thus they think that their respective advantages are most signally displayed. To affront, dishonours ; and he who dishonours, contemns, holding the dishonoured in no estimation. By this Achilles is provoked, not by the loss of Briseis. —

CHAP.
II.

3. Insult.

Who most
prone to
offer insult,
and who
most
strongly
provoked
by it.

O parent Goddess! since in early bloom
Thy son must fall by too severe a doom,
Sure to so short a race of glory born,
Great Jove in justice should this span adorn :
Honour and fame at least the Thund'rer ow'd,
And ill he pays the promise of a God,
If yon proud monarch thus thy son defies,
Obscures my glories, and resumes my prize."²

And again,

Oh! soul of battles, and thy people's guide,
(To Ajax thus the first of Greeks replied)
Well hast thou spoke ; but, at the tyrant's name,
My rage rekindles, and my soul's on flame:
'Tis just resentment, and becomes the brave,
Disgrac'd, dishonour'd, like the vilest slave."³

Iliad, l. 460.

³ Iliad, ix. 757.

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II.

Men, jealous of honour, are most commonly to be found among the noble, the powerful, the virtuous, and those in any other respect pre-eminent. All such think themselves entitled to respect, from persons deficient in the advantages in which themselves abound; as the rich from the poor; the persuasive orator from him who is unable to raise his voice, even in his own defence; above all, those vested with just authority, from their natural and proper subjects. Wherefore, Homer says, —

Beware! for dreadful is the wrath of kings.⁴

And again,

For though we deem the short-lived fury past,

'Tis sure the mighty will revenge at last.⁵

The conspicuous station which they hold, makes all such persons peculiarly sensible to any kind of affront. The same sensibility is increased, when the affront comes from those whose behaviour ought to have been respectful or grateful; on whom, we or our friends have bestowed favours, and towards whom we have before shown, or actually testify, a very favourable disposition.

The state of those most liable to anger, and the causes that render it most violent.

From the explanation thus given of the nature of anger, we may perceive what sorts of persons are most liable to be moved by it, by whom they are most easily to be provoked, and through what causes and circumstances the provocation is likely to occur. First, as to the actual state and disposition of those most liable to anger,

⁴ Iliad, ii. 236.

⁵ Iliad, i. 105.

they must be persons suffering under some sort of uneasiness, and therefore needing relief. C H A P.
II.
 Whatever stands in their way towards the attainment of this relief, can scarcely fail to excite their anger. Not only direct opposition will exasperate them; but, like persons panting with thirst, they will regard as their direct opponents, all who in any manner obstruct their gratification, or who do not readily assist them in procuring it. In this situation are the sick, the poor, lovers, in a word, those actuated by strong desires, and unfortunate in the gratification of them. All such are prone to offence, particularly in matters regarding their immediate urgency; as the sick in regard to their health; the poor in regard to their fortune; the lover in regard to the object of his passion; those harassed in war, in regard to the means of surmounting and repelling the enemy: in these and all similar cases, the anger will receive its impulse and direction from the uneasy desires immediately preceding it. A circumstance which must increase the passion, is the unexpectedness of its causes; for surprise heightens all our pains, as well as all our pleasures. Whence we may infer what are the times and seasons, the dispositions and ages, that contribute to excite or encrease the paroxysms of anger; and also the occasions and circumstances through which they will be rendered more intense. With regard, again, to its objects, they are those who mock, deride, and scorn us, for this is manifest insult; or those who commit towards us such injuries as

Those naturally the objects of anger:

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II.

Circum-
stances by
which pro-
vocations
to anger
are aggra-
vated.

are the marks of contempt; these injuries must not be done, however, by way of retaliation, or with a view to any advantage or interest; they must proceed solely from wanton vexation, and a pleasure in offering affronts. Offences are greatly heightened, when they occur in those particulars on which men most value themselves; as to depreciate the studious in regard of their attainments in learning; to disparage the professed beauty in regard of her personal attractions.⁶ The same may be said of all other things, in which individuals are used to plume themselves and take pride. To vilify them in these particulars is the greatest mortification, especially when they are doubtful of their own excellence, or imagine that it is not sufficiently acknowledged by the world: for when conscious of their own superiority, and when the opinion of this superiority is generally and firmly established, they will set detraction or mockery at defiance. Affronts are particularly painful when offered by friends, because from them an opposite behaviour was to be expected; or by those accustomed to regard and honour us, because, when they cease to do so, it must be suspected that we have, through some real misconduct, incurred their contempt. Favours not returned by our equals, and marked opposition from our inferiors, are things equally provoking: the for-

⁶ From the ambiguity of the word *ἰδέα*, which may be applied either to Platonic ideas, or to external beauty, this passage is equivocal. I have given to it the meaning most conformable to the context. It may refer, however, to the doctrine of ideas, of which Aristotle, notwithstanding his love for Plato, was the declared adversary.

CHAP.
II.

mer degrade us to inferiority, the latter elevate those beneath us to the same level. Equal marks of disrespect are more offensive when they proceed from inferiors; for anger, we have seen, is excited by misbecoming insolence, and will, therefore, be exceedingly exasperated by contempt, where respect was due. From friends, every kind of offence or opposition, in word or deed, hurts us in the extreme, particularly when they forget us in moments of distress. In Antiphon's tragedy, this is Plexippus' ground of quarrel with Meleager, that he forgot him in his time of need; the most provoking of all forgetfulness. It is offensive, to rejoice amidst our misfortunes, even not to feel a tender sympathy with them; nay, to seem careless of giving uneasiness on any occasion, however necessary; for the messenger of bad news will often excite our displeasure. We are provoked, also, by those who are willing witnesses of our disgrace, and whose ears are open to any tale told against us: had we been held in proper respect by them, they would have turned away from such things, as all wish to do from objects painful to themselves. Offences are aggravated when offered in the sight of competitors or rivals, of those whom we admire or revere, or of those by whom we are admired or revered. They are particularly grievous, when committed towards individuals whom it is our duty to protect; aged parents, helpless children, women, dependents. Nothing is more provoking than a tone of playful irony when others are seriously occupied;

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II.

this indicates contempt for their employments and themselves. We are particularly hurt when those noted for civility or liberality shall show to us nothing of either: the exception seems a declaration of their scorn for us. The most trifling forgetfulness, even that of names, is sufficient to provoke anger; forgetfulness being a mark of neglect; and neglect, of contempt. So much concerning anger, its causes, its objects, and the disposition of those affected by it. We may perceive, therefore, by what means it may be excited, and by what means it may be directed; excited in our hearers, by reducing them to a frame of mind prone to anger; and directed against our opponents, by showing them to be persons of that description, and to have been guilty of those proceedings, which render them, naturally and justly, the objects of this passion.

CHAP.
III.

Of meek-
ness and
placability.

The ob-
jects of
those affec-
tions.

A MEEK forgiving temper stands in direct opposition to an angry one; we therefore proceed to explain the state and disposition of those inclined to placability; towards whom this disposition is most naturally manifested; and the causes and circumstances most likely to give it birth. Placability consists in the cessation or abatement of anger; and as anger is excited by voluntary neglect, real or apparent, so the contrary affection must be felt towards those who hold us in observance, or who, having done any thing verging on contumely, shall appear to have done it contrary to their intention; or to have done nothing in our case, which they would not

have done in their own ; for, of offering affronts to himself, no man will be suspected. Anger is appeased towards those who repent their offences, and impose on themselves, by way of atonement, much voluntary sorrow ; wherefore, we relent towards slaves, who confess their faults, but inflict double punishment on those who impudently deny them ; for impudence is contempt of the individuals before whom it is exhibited ; little shame, at least, is felt in the presence of persons altogether contemptible. Assent and humiliation are assuasive of anger ; for humiliation implies inferiority ; inferiority fear ; and fear is incompatible with contempt. Even in the animal creation, dogs will not bite those who crouch and humble themselves at their approach. We are placable, also, towards those who become serious as soon as they perceive that we ourselves are in earnest ; who have cancelled past offences by greater benefits ; who petition for our forgiveness, or testify their regard, by making any petition to us whatever ; whose characters are remote from all sorts of mockery or insult, and who would least of all be guilty of such contumely towards men of worth, or such men as we take ourselves to be. The means employed for softening anger must be directly the reverse of those by which it is provoked. It cannot subsist towards those whom we fear or reverence ; and it will easily be remitted towards those who have themselves acted under its hasty impulse ; for the misconduct of such persons cannot be ascribed to

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II.

disregard or neglect, since neglect and anger cannot be felt simultaneously for the same persons: for neglect is unaccompanied by pain, but anger is painful. The circumstances⁷ conducing to placability must also be directly the reverse of those which exasperate anger: such are the soothing seasons of games and festivals, of pastimes and merriment, the accession or remembrance of agreeable occurrences; in short, whatever gratifies the mind with serene pleasures, or elates it with fair and honourable hopes.⁸ The causes of anger are the more powerful, accordingly as they are near and recent; for time mitigates anger, and vengeance freshly inflicted. Wherefore, amidst the rage testified against him by the Athenian assembly, when Philocrates was asked why he did not rise in his own defence, he observed, "This is not the moment."—"What moment, then, can be more seasonable?" He replied, "When the fury of the people has spent itself on some other victim of their calumny and persecution." This was illustrated in the impeachment of Ergophilus. The people were more enraged against him than against Callisthenes himself: but, for no other reason than their condemnation of Callisthenes on the preceding day, they acquitted Er-

⁷ *Και τοις αίσχυνομένοις αυτοῖς*, is a superfluous repetition.

⁸ *ἐλπίδι ἐπιείκει*. The hope of attaining good and laudable objects; for when the ends are base and bad, the hope of attaining them will indeed be pleasant; but the pleasure will flow from a corrupt source, and thereby be itself corrupted, and rendered of no real value; it will be what Aristotle calls "*ἡδύνη ὑβριστικῇ*," and Virgil, the "*mala gaudia mentis*." *Æneid*, vi. 278.

gophilus. Anger against delinquents is diminished by their conviction; also, when they have suffered some greater evil than even the injured would willingly inflict on them. They thus appear to have paid the forfeit of their offences. We are not provoked to anger by sufferings brought on us by our own misconduct: for such sufferings are just; and according to the definition of anger, it is to be excited only by ill treatment unmerited. Wherefore the exposition of faults ought to precede their chastisement; thus even slaves may be made to perceive the fitness of their punishment. Anger is weak and faint, unless the objects of it can be made sensible of its effects, and of the causes through which, and the agents by whom, these effects are produced. For anger is a passion that, according to the definition given of it, bears a reference to individuals merely. Wherefore Homer invents, with his usual insight into human nature; —

But I, of mind elate, and scorning fear,
Thus with new taunts insult the monster's ear;
Cyclop! if any pitying thy disgrace
Ask who disfigur'd thus thy eyeless face,
Say 'twas Ulysses, 'twas his deed, declare,
Laertes' son, of Ithaca the fair;
Ulysses, far in fighting fields renown'd,
Before whose arm Troy tumbled to the ground.⁹

Ulysses did not, it seems, feel himself fully avenged, unless the Cyclop knew by whom and on what account his woeful calamity had been occasioned. Upon the principle that we cannot

⁹ Odyss. ix. 585.

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II.

be inflamed with anger against objects not endowed with perception, it is impossible to be actuated by this passion towards the dead. These appear to be placed beyond the reach of perceiving the angry man's drift, and of feeling the sufferings which, in his passion, he would inflict. Wherefore Homer well arraigns the absurdity of the abominable treatment, by Achilles, of the lifeless remains of Hector. —

Lo! how his rage, dishonest, drags along
Hector's dead earth, insensible of wrong.

Such, then, are the topics for producing placability. Those whom we would appease, must be moulded into the frame and temper above described; and those with whom they are inclined to be angry, must be shown to be the natural objects either of their fear or of their respect; to be persons who, on former occasions, were their benefactors, or who, having now unwillingly offended, feel deep regret at this misfortune.

CHAP.
IV.

Love and
hatred de-
fined.
Their re-
spective
objects.

LET us proceed to enumerate the objects of love and hatred, and to explain the causes of these affections, beginning, as usual, with a definition. "To love any one, is to wish him all good things for his own sake, and to be desirous of affording him efficacious aid towards their attainment." Friendship implies a reciprocity of affection; that both friends love, and both be beloved. It is the part of a friend to rejoice in our prosperity, and grieve at our adversity; for all naturally rejoice at the attain-

ment of their wishes, and grieve at disappointment; insomuch that, from our pleasures or pains, grief or joy, our wishes and inclinations may always most certainly be inferred. It is the mark of friendship, when goods and evils are common, and when the same things are considered by different individuals under precisely the same aspect; as when they have the same friends and the same enemies; for with regard to these, their wills must accord. All men naturally love their benefactors, or those of the persons most dear to them; and this love is commensurate with the greatness and seasonableness of the benefits, or with the readiness and disinterestedness with which they are conferred. We love also the friends of our friends, and those who either love, or are beloved by the objects of our own affection. In like manner enmity to the same persons is a bond of friendship. We are disposed to good will towards those who hate the same persons that we do, or who are hated by them; for between such and ourselves a conformity of will prevails; their good coincides with our own, so that the desire of the one implies that of the other, which agrees with the definition of friendship. There are benefactors with regard to money, and others with regard to safety. The brave, therefore, are naturally honoured not less than the liberal: the just, too, are recommended to our love and regard; and such as live, not at the expense or through the exertions of others, but subsist through the skill and labour of their own

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minds and bodies, through the exercise of agriculture, and all other usefully productive arts. Temperance and frugality are also entitled to good will, for with such virtues there can be little temptation to injustice. For the same reason, we approve men mindful of their own affairs, not officious intermeddlers in those of others; and all those on whom we would willingly confer our friendship, should they be disposed to accept it: such are the pre-eminent in virtue, and those in high estimation either with the world in general, or the better and wiser part of it; the individuals whom we ourselves admire, or those who are our admirers. We are similarly disposed towards persons agreeable in society, and the daily intercourse of life; such are the men of easy pliant tempers, remote from censure and contradiction; not talkers for victory, and pugnacious disputants, who live as at perpetual variance with all around them. We are disposed to friendship, also, with regard to those who are dexterous at raillery, whether in the way of assault or of defence: when they excel in both, they are doubly agreeable, by gracefully directing at others the flashes of inoffensive pleasantry, and by receiving with perfect good humour those cast on themselves. We are similarly disposed towards those who delight in praising our advantages and good qualities, especially if ourselves are at all doubtful of them: towards those, also, adorned by elegant neatness in their persons, and all external accommodations: towards those not reproachful of our

mistakes or misbehaviour, nor too frequent remembrancers of their own benefits; both such being of a captious disposition; towards those who do not harbour resentment, nor are ready at taking offence, but on the contrary exhibit an easy conciliatory temper; for such as they have shown themselves towards others, such each expects to find them in his own case: with regard to those, also, who have such a disgust at backbiting and obloquy that they willingly shut their eyes and ears to manifest faults; whereas they are diligent in remarking merits, and eager to declare them; this is the characteristic of real goodness: with regard to those, also, who seasonably give way to our anger, and are careful to avoid all opposition or obstruction to us on occasions where the least contradiction will seem the height of contumacy: with regard to those, also, who behave towards us with that respectful gravity due to characters of weight and worth; or who take delight in our conversation, as if it flowed in a vein of easy good humour and sportive pleasantry; and chiefly those who do so in matters wherein we are most desirous of displaying our wisdom or our wit. We are inclined to make friends of men of congenial characters and of similar pursuits, unless where an interference of interests takes place; for then, the proverb applies, —

Potters hate potters; bard envies the bard.

So likewise of those who desire the same objects that we do, when such objects may be ob-

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ship, mark
thereof.

tained by both ; for, when this is not the case, the same proverb will be again applicable.

It is a mark of friendship, not to be ashamed of exposing misfortunes or distresses, which are such rather in opinion than in reality ; nor to be ashamed of things, shameful only in opinion, provided the exhibition of them cannot be construed into contempt of the persons before whom they are exposed. But friends will be most reluctant in exposing to each other any real inherent evil, any deep and manifest turpitude. Men are inclined to friendship towards their competitors in point of honour ; those with whom they have a rivalry, devoid, however, of envy : with such they either are, or are disposed to become, friends : with those, also, towards whose advancement they would readily co-operate, if it did not obstruct their own : and with those who show equal love towards the absent and present, whence all commend the fond cherishers of departed worth ; with such, in fine, as approve themselves in friendships, warm and zealous and persevering, for of all good things, the best is a good friend : with those, also, devoid of affectation or disguise ; such are they who do not dissemble their own losses, misfortunes, or errors ; for it was before said, that friends are not ashamed of discovering those ills to each other, which are ills only in opinion. If dissimulation then be incompatible with friendship, he who is frank in his confessions, will at least wear the appearance of a friend : lastly, we are disposed to friendship with those

whom we can approach with confidence, and who are not fearful to us; for the same man cannot be at once feared and loved. Friendship is different according to the difference of relations on which it is founded; of those, for instance, who are companions in the same enjoyments and pursuits, who are inmates in the same family, who are kindred of the same blood. The causes of friendship are good offices, especially when conferred without solicitation, and when concealed by the doer of them; for, in this way, they seem done through pure good will.

The theory of hatred is to be deduced from opposite principles; it may be caused by ill-natured molestation, by anger unappeased, or malignant calumny. Anger, however, bears a reference to self, and arises always from some personal offence; hatred does not bear any such reference: we may hate those who have never done us any harm, merely because their characters are odious. Of anger, the objects are individuals only, but hatred applies to whole kinds and classes; thus, all hate thieves and informers. Anger is to be appeased by time, but hatred is permanent and incurable. Anger aims at inflicting pain; hatred, at doing harm; for the angry man burns in desire to make the object of his anger feel its effects, and perceive from whom his sufferings proceed: to the man who hates, these circumstances are unimportant; he is gratified, if the evil really takes place, and the greatest evils are often the least perceptible;

Hatred
contradis-
tinguished
from an-
ger.

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witness folly and injustice ; whereas all great pains are objects of distinct perception : anger, again, is a perturbed and uneasy passion ; not so hatred. Should grievous misfortunes assail the individual with whom we are offended, the anger against him may be converted into pity : but persons truly odious, whatever may befall them, can never excite any real sympathy. Anger hastens to chastise those who have willingly provoked it, and is satisfied when they have paid the forfeit of their offences : but hatred knows not any limitation, and does not cease but with the existence of the odious objects. From these observations, it is plain how we may evince the reality of friendship or hatred, where they actually subsist, or make them appear to be, even when they are not to be found ; and how we may detect and convict those who falsely pretend to the one or the other : and thus show, according to the purposes in view, by which of these two, anger or hatred, men, on any particular occasion, have been actuated. We proceed to consider the nature of fear, what things and persons are formidable, and under what circumstances men are disposed to feel the impressions of this passion.

CHAP.
V.

Fear ; its definition, and deductions flowing from it.

“LET fear be defined the pain or disturbance arising from such an imagined evil, ready to fall on us, as is calculated to produce great suffering, or totally to destroy us.” All evils are not the objects of fear ; for example, injustice or stupidity ; but those only, which threaten us

with pain or destruction, and these near at hand ; CHAP.
 for very remote objects are not formidable : all V.
 know they shall die ; yet because death seems at
 a distance, men make no account of it. From Its objects.
 the nature and definition of fear, it follows that
 such objects only are formidable as have the
 power of causing keen and severe sufferings ;
 and of these the appearances and signs are
 frightful to us, because they indicate that we
 are in danger which is nothing but the accession
 and near approach of evil. We are alarmed at
 the appearances of anger or hatred in men
 armed with power, for the effects of these
 passions seem ready to be exerted ; of injustice
 vested with authority, for injustice is actuated
 by a deliberate propensity to injure ; even of
 virtue unworthily treated or insulted, when fur-
 nished with an opportunity of requiting its
 wrongs ; of all who have it in their power to do
 us signal harm, since they are so far prepared
 against us ; and as the greater part may be
 easily overcome by the love of gain or the dread
 of danger, it is sufficient to create fear of any
 one, that we are greatly dependent on him for
 our well-being or safety. On this principle, ac-
 complices or confidants in any base or unlawful
 action, are mutually objects of fear, lest they
 should denounce, or in any way forsake and be-
 tray each other. Men prone to injure are for-
 midable to those open and obnoxious to injury,
 since few will always abstain from injustice,
 where they have the prospect of committing it
 with impunity : and those who have received

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any injury real or apparent, since they will naturally watch an opportunity for revenge; and those also who have done injuries, since they will naturally fear retaliation: competitors for the same object, which cannot be enjoyed by both, for such are continually at variance. Those formidable to our superiors, or by whom our superiors have been undone, must to us also appear formidable, because they could hurt us more easily: even those by whom the rights of our inferiors have been often invaded; for, with an increase of power, they will be ready to invade our own. Of enemies, rivals, competitors, or those smarting under wrongs, we are not to dread the men of warm tempers and undisguised boldness of speech, but rather the smooth-tongued smiling hypocrite, and crafty dissembler. As we cannot possibly tell how near such may be to wound us, the danger from them ought always to be regarded as imminent. The most formidable evils, again, are those for which there is no remedy, or a remedy not depending on ourselves, but rather on those unfavourably disposed to us; evils which cannot be repaired, or which are not to be repaired without the greatest difficulty; in fine, evils which, when they befall others, excite in ourselves the highest commiseration.

The state
of those
most dis-
posed to
feel it.

This may serve for an account of the causes or objects of fear; after which it follows to explain how the fearful are disposed. As fear proceeds from some apprehended suffering, it is plain that those will be exempt from fear, who

are exempt from apprehension, deeming their condition of prosperity too firm to be shaken by any adverse occurrence; at least, who entertain this opinion with regard to certain events, persons, and times. To engender fear, on the contrary, it is necessary to consider ourselves not only as obnoxious to general or distant evil, but to evils immediately in view, from certain persons, and at given times. The highly prosperous are apt to conceive themselves above misfortune, and to indulge in all the wanton insolence of thoughtless audacity, trusting to their wealth, strength, popularity or power. Such fearlessness is also engendered by the opposite extreme of deep and helpless adversity, in those who have become callous to calamity, and who, in the acute misery of the present, lose all care and all fear of the future. The wretch on the rack no longer fears; for with fear, there must always co-exist some glimmering of hope; wherefore fear is of a deliberative nature, casting about by what means to escape impending but not unavoidable evils; for those which appear inevitable cannot possibly form the subject of deliberation. When the passion of fear is to be excited, men must be impressed with the conviction that they are not more invulnerable than others; that their equals or betters have been assailed by the sufferings against which they are now warned, and with such sufferings as seemed little likely to happen, especially through such persons, and at such times. Knowing the causes and objects of fear, and the circumstances of those most disposed to

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its nature.Sources
thereof,
and state
of those
most sus-
ceptible of
it.

feel it, we may easily explain the nature of boldness, which is the feeling directly contrary to it.

Boldness originates in a belief or strong hope actuating the fancy, that the means of safety are in our power, and at hand; and that the dangers threatening us are very distant, or altogether vain. It is inspired by the imagined facility of repairing our failures, and by confidence in the number or power of our aids and auxiliaries, or in both circumstances united. It contributes to boldness, to have a mind void of offence: to be conscious that we have been neither the doers nor the sufferers of injuries; that antagonists, or competitors, we have none; or that they are unarmed with power; or that they are well disposed towards us, through an actual intercourse of good offices; or should we not be totally exempt from enmities, that the greater or better proportion of mankind is inclined to view us favourably, and to espouse our cause. The persons most easily susceptible of courageous sentiments are those who have generally prevailed in all their undertakings, and who have never known any of the sufferings of adversity; or who have often been involved in great distresses or dangers, but always successful in surmounting them; for fearlessness may arise either from great experience, or from the total want of it. Thus at sea, the ignorant landsman remains unterrified at the threatening skies; the skilful mariner is alike fearless, because his experience inspires him with the hope of weathering out the storm. Men will not fear that which has not

appeared formidable to their equals or their inferiors; and such those are deemed, whom we have already surpassed, or whose equals or superiors we have surpassed in any honourable competition. Fear will be excluded by abundance in those possessions, or pre-eminence in those qualities, which render men formidable; as wealth, strength, friends, warlike preparations: it will be excluded also by conscious innocence, by the fewness, at least, of our offences, and these never committed against persons likely to resent them. Above all, the fear of the gods excludes all other fear; especially if their favour has been announced to us by signs, omens, and oracles. In these cases, two circumstances conspire to fill us with boldness; for anger is a principle of courage, and anger will be excited in the innocent when they are unworthily treated; and divine justice appears to be concerned in protecting good men, and in avenging their wrongs. The last source of courage to be mentioned, is, when being aware of the designs of our adversaries, we seize a favourable opportunity of anticipating those designs, and of commencing the struggle with a fair prospect of success. We have thus finished the subjects of fear and boldness.

CHAP.
V.

WE now proceed to show the nature and causes of shame, the persons most liable to feel it, and those, also, in whose presence it is most naturally felt. "Let shame be defined the painful perturbation arising from such evils as have

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Shame defined.

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Deducti-
ons from
this defini-
tion.

a direct tendency to disgrace, whether these be present, past, or future.” The shameless are careless of such things, and contemplate them with perfect apathy. From this definition it follows, that we must necessarily be ashamed of all things accompanied with ignominy, whether to ourselves, or to those in whom we take an interest: and to this class of evils belongs the whole catalogue of vices; as to fly in battle, or throw away our defensive armour, for these are effects of cowardice; to secrete and appropriate a deposit, for this is the work of injustice; to indulge amorous desires with those that are improper objects of them, or at improper times, or in improper places, for all these are proofs of profligacy; to catch at pitiful gains from low and mean sources, from the poor, the needy, the helpless, nay even from the dead; whence the proverb expressive of any one’s sordid rapacity, that “he would filch a winding-sheet;” to deny a part of our own superfluity to friends in distress, or to help them in a niggardly manner; to owe pecuniary obligations to persons less wealthy than ourselves; all these are marks of meanness, as also to ask a loan of money from one who comes to borrow of you; or to ask to borrow from one who comes to demand a debt already incurred; or to demand what he owes, from one who comes to beg a new loan; or to praise any thing belonging to another, in such warm terms, as are equivalent to begging it; to renew any of these low attempts, after they have been more than once defeated. Such pro-

ceedings betray illiberality. Flattery, again, is betrayed by praises of those present; by emblazoning their merits, and throwing their imperfections into the shade; by such excessive condolence with their misfortunes as would indicate that our sympathy surpassed even the sorrow of the persons principally concerned. We are ashamed, also, at not being able to bear those hardships or labours which are endured by persons more in years than ourselves, or who have been educated more delicately, or who are in a situation and rank of life entitling them to more indulgence; for, thus, we give manifest indications of unmanly weakness. We are ashamed of receiving unmerited favours, and those frequently conferred by the same person; or of reproaching others with the good offices that we have done them; for these are signs of lowness and littleness of soul. To speak much of ourselves, or to make lofty promises, or to assume, as our own, the merits belonging to others, all such proceedings are disgraced by ostentation; and, in the same way, we shall find that every particular vice, whether shown plainly in itself, or indicated by its signs and symptoms, is sure to carry shame in its train. The same humiliating sensation arises also from the consciousness that we do not partake of the advantages enjoyed by the greater part of our equals, that is, our countrymen, fellow-citizens, relations, companions; in one word, all who under any aspect are brought naturally in comparison with ourselves; we are ashamed of being inferior

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to them in point of education, or in any thing useful or ornamental. The greater shame will accrue if this inferiority proceeds from any fault of our own, or through any such we are deprived of benefits past or present, or only in future prospect. Shame, also, accrues from whatever is accompanied with dishonour and reproach, past, present, or future. Such are personal insults, of which those originating in profligate intemperance are disgraceful, whether willingly or unwillingly submitted to; blows, wounds, and mere acts of violence, bring no disgrace, on the other hand, when willingly and patiently endured; when received unwillingly they are disgraceful, because, in that case, they indicate cowardice. Such, then, are the causes of shame, all bearing a reference to disgrace, considered simply in itself, and independently of the consequences resulting from it.

With what persons, and on what occasions, shame is most likely to be excited.

Our honour or ignominy is nothing but the high or low opinion conceived of us, and the importance of this opinion depends wholly on the characters of those who entertain it. Our shame, therefore, will be proportional to the respect in which those characters are held, and will be greatest with regard to those whom we most value: such are those whom we admire, who are our admirers, or by whom we wish to be admired; who are our rivals in competitions of honour, and whose opinions it would be presumption to despise.

We naturally hold in esteem, and wish to be esteemed by, all endowed with any of those

goods conferring distinction and honour; by all to whom we are earnest petitioners for something which it depends on them solely, to refuse or to grant; and this is the case of lovers: our rivalry in point of honour is with those near to our own rank; we make account of the wise, because of the correctness and truth of their judgments; whether proceeding from the experience of age, or the useful lights of a well directed education. With regard to all such persons the sense of shame is heightened when we act in their presence, when our behaviour is manifest and palpable, and when our eyes meet those of the spectators; for the eyes are held to be the seat of modesty as well as impudence¹⁰; wherefore we are more on our guard with persons whom we must see daily, and with those who are minute observers. Shameful actions appear also to be aggravated, when they occur before persons of austere tempers, especially when they themselves are altogether exempt from such errors; for as men pardon most easily in others, the failings to which they are themselves liable, so their indignation is most provoked by faults at variance with their own characters. Equally to be guarded against are tattlers, news-mongers, those swelling with impatience to divulge all they know; particularly persons injured by us, and therefore on the watch to observe and make known our imperfections; and calumnious backbiters, since the

¹⁰ Κυνος ομματ' έχιον.

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slanderers of innocence cannot fail to delight in denouncing the guilty. In this class we may reckon buffoons, satirists, farce-writers; all these are tattlers and detractors by profession. Our sense of shame is more acute with those who have never refused us any favour. Such persons appear in the light of admirers; we entertain a similar delicacy with regard to those who make any application to us for the first time; for example, who for the first time solicit our friendship: this commonly arising from their favourable view of our characters, we are unwilling to lessen ourselves in their esteem; wherefore Euripides argued well, in the Syracusan assembly, that the favour solicited by the Athenians ought to be granted, because it was the first ever asked by them from Syracuse. Our old friends or acquaintances also affect us with a similar delicacy, and prove great restraints on our behaviour, provided they have never seen us on any former occasion guilty of any turpitude, or discovered in us any of the signs of vicious habits. Of all these descriptions of men we stand in awe, and not only of themselves, but of their friends and attendants, and of all likely to make our faults known to them. On the contrary, there is not any regard paid to those held incapable of observation or judgment, any more than to mere children or to irrational animals. Neither do the same causes produce shame in the case of old acquaintances and friends, and in that of persons altogether unknown to us. With friends and acquaintances, we are ashamed of

things really and intrinsically shameful; with mere strangers, the same emotion is produced by apparent and conventional evils, by things disgraceful, not absolutely, in themselves, but through the caprices of fashion or opinion.

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It appears then, in what circumstances men must be placed, in order to excite in them this passion. First of all, they must be surrounded by objects of their regard or respect; such are their admirers, or those whom they admire, or those by whom they wish to be admired; or persons on whom it depends to grant them some favour, which is itself a mark of esteem. With regard to all these, shame will be excited, especially when any improper action is done in their presence; wherefore Cydias used a fit topic in dissuading the unwarrantable usurpation of the lands of Samos, when he exhorted the Athenians to transport themselves into the midst of a circle, surrounded by all the Grecians, who would not only hear by report, but become eye-witnesses to the grievous injustice which they meditated. Next to the circumstance of being eye-witnesses, the being in our near neighbourhood, is important; or when those of whom we stand in awe are likely to be soon apprised of any baseness committed by us. As we are naturally ashamed of whatever tends to lessen us in the opinion of admirers, it follows that when fallen into low circumstances, we should be particularly unwilling to appear before our rivals, competitors, or those who envied our prosperity; for these also are admirers, con-

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sidered under a particular aspect. Shame is excited not only on our own account, but by any events or transactions of a disgraceful nature, belonging to our ancestors, our kindred, or connections; in a word, any of those in whose honour we feel a personal interest; particularly those whose actions may be traced, and, in some measure, referred to ourselves, as their companions, advisers, or instructors. In the midst of our equals in rank, and competitors for distinction, we are most alive to the impressions of honour and disgrace, and therefore to the sense of shame; and as emulation stimulates us to noble exertions which we would not otherwise make, so it restrains us from unworthy proceedings of which we might otherwise be guilty. We are most fearful of disgrace in the presence of those with whom we are obliged to live and associate; and to be thus constantly in the sight of men conscious of our infamy. When the poet Antiphon was ordered to a shameful death by Dionysius the tyrant, and saw those condemned to suffer with him muffling their faces with their cloaks, as they passed through the gates of the city, he exclaimed, "Why do you thus hide yourselves? not one of the present spectators will behold you to-morrow." So much concerning shame, the discussion of which sufficiently explains the nature of impudence, its contrary.

CHAP.
VII.

WE proceed to consider the affection of good will, or favour; towards whom this affection is

felt, from what causes it proceeds, and what is the disposition of those entertaining it. "Let this gracious disposition then, called favour, be that which induces the man actuated by it, to do acts of kindness to those needing his assistance; not that any advantage may accrue to himself, the doer, but that the receivers may be relieved or benefited." Favours are heightened and magnified by the greatness and urgency of the want; by the greatness and difficulty of the exertions made to supply it; by the critical moment of this supply; and when our benefactor, acting singly and alone, was the first to come forward and help us, or the principal agent in procuring for us any signal advantage. Our wants arise from the appetites, which, while ungratified, are always craving; and from corporal sufferings, or the mere apprehension of them; for persons suffering, or in danger, are filled with many uneasy desires. Therefore the smallest favour appears great to beggars and exiles, because these are the most needy. The seasonableness of the service done is also of great importance; such was that of throwing a wicker basket to him who was attempting to make his escape from jail, in the Lyceum. The man who would oblige, must do favours like these, or others equal or greater. Having explained what constitutes obligation, and the circumstances which heighten it, and how those are disposed by whom it is conferred or received, the pleader can be at no loss to show when it has been really incurred, and when in appearance only. In the first case,

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Of favour
and kind-
ness.

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he will show that certain persons were in a state of suffering, of want, or of danger; and that others came to their aid in time of need; and, in the second, he will show that in the assistance given, self interest was the prime motive; or that the act of benefit was casual or compulsory; or that instead of a favour bestowed, it was only a favour returned, whether knowingly or not; for on either supposition there is a real exchange, and nothing done gratuitously. To discuss the subject fully, it must be traced through all the categories, or contemplated under all its aspects; for in estimating a favour, much depends not only on the nature of the thing itself, but on its quantity, its quality, the time, and the place. It is a sign that a good deed does not proceed from mere kindness, when a much smaller favour has been refused; and also when we have done the same or greater things for our declared enemies; and when the things done or bestowed are of no use or value, and we know them to be such; for, things of this kind no one can desire, or be gratified by obtaining them. This much may suffice concerning the affection of good will; and to show whether it has, or has not, been really exerted. We now proceed to speak of pity, and to point out what are the causes, and what sorts of persons, respectively, are the objects and the subjects of their affection.

CHAP.
VIII.

“ Let pity be defined that uneasiness or pain which arises on beholding destruction, or any

very grievous suffering endured, or likely to be soon endured, by persons undeserving of it, when the suffering is of that kind to which ourselves or those dear to us are equally obnoxious." To constitute pity or compassion, it is necessary that the individual actuated by this feeling, should not regard himself as exempt from calamity, but exposed to suffer similar evils to those which he beholds. It follows, therefore, that pity cannot subsist in wretches completely miserable; because such have already endured the worst that can befall them; neither are those fit subjects of this affection, who entertain an overweening conceit of themselves and of their own superior happiness: such will be disposed to insult over distress, rather than to pity it; for, in their vain imaginations, to any similar distress they cannot believe themselves obnoxious. The persons, on the contrary, most apprehensive of suffering, and therefore most disposed to compassion, are those who had formerly been involved in kindred evils, but who have now fortunately escaped from them. Old men are commonly compassionate, because of their good sense and experience; and persons of a delicate frame and of timid dispositions; and those of cultivated minds, because they are disposed to reflection, and readily foresee consequences; in fine, the fathers of families, and all who have various relations, parents, wives, children, that are objects of their tender concern; for in these, as well as in their own persons, they may be assailed by calamity. But

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Pity defined: deductions from this definition.

Persons who are, and who are not susceptible of this passion.

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those actuated by such emotions as harden and steel the soul, the transports of anger, the conflicts of animosity and ambition, and those elated by insolence and arrogance, are all alike unsusceptible of any tender sympathy; the former being totally engrossed by the present passion, and the latter being totally blinded to the reasonable anticipations of futurity. Neither are those disposed to compassion, who stand in the opposite extreme, who live in perpetual fear, confounded and overwhelmed by the cruelest apprehensions for their own safety: engrossed by their own evils, they have no pity to spare for those of others. The disposition towards compassion will be found, therefore, in the middle between excessive fear and excessive confidence: and, to speak universally, men sympathize with those afflictions, which they either remember to have severely felt, or are apprehensive of being doomed to suffer. It follows also, from the definition of pity, that a misanthrope must be devoid of this sentiment; for he who thinks ill of mankind, cannot deem their sufferings unmerited. Such then are the natural subjects of pity; and its causes are all those physical sufferings that are destructive, or tending to destruction, and those unfortunate accidents that carry with them a certain magnitude and weight of woe. To the former kind belong death, disease, wounds, torments, the infirmities of old age, and starving indigence. To fortune we ascribe the miserable solitude to which men are reduced from the partial or total loss of

Causes of
pity.

friends and companions; also their own monstrous deformity, hideous ugliness, excessive debility, and the wretched mutilation of their bodily members; also to meet with great evil from the very quarter from which they had reason to expect much good; the frequency of this cruel disappointment; their unseasonable death at the very time when some great advantage was ready to accrue to them; as the death of poor Diopeithes, just before the king's presents were sent to relieve his wants; in a word, to be generally unfortunate, or, when any chance turns up in their favour, to have no opportunity of making it available. Such are the events and causes that excite pity; and its most natural objects are those persons with whom we are familiarly acquainted, provided they do not stand in too near a relation to us; for the misfortunes of near relatives are, in some sort, our own; wherefore king Amasis did not weep, when he beheld his son carried to execution; but the sight of one of his bottle companions begging alms¹¹, drew tears from his eyes: this latter calamity was mournful, but the former something more; it extended beyond the limits of pity; for the severities of distress, exciting horror, are incompatible with pity, destructive of this sentiment, and if long dwelt on, would injure our own cause, and profit that of our

Its objects;
how limited.

¹¹ Herodotus in Thalia. But Herodotus tells the story, not of Amasis, but of his son, Psammenitus.

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adversary.¹² Yet those great and extraordinary evils which, actually present, would overwhelm the mind with consternation, may excite compassion when viewed from a certain distance, and contemplated in the fancy. Sympathy is most naturally felt towards individuals most resembling ourselves; our equals in age, education, morals, dignity, and those of the same nation or blood; for the evils that have happened to persons similarly circumstanced, are the most likely to fall on ourselves; and it may be held a general rule, that the sufferings apprehended in our own persons, will always be the surest to excite our compassion. Since calamitous events near at hand, operate on us more powerfully than those that have happened, or are expected to happen at a time very remote from the present, it is necessary to excite pity in tragedy, that its characters be faithfully exhibited in their persons, their dress, their voice, and every circumstance of imitation. This will give to their misfortunes that energy which is essential to interest; it will place the sad events before our eyes, or bring them near to the present moment. In the same manner, the disasters of real life are affecting in proportion to their proximity, and to the variety and brightness of the signs or associations by which they are expressed: such are the bloody garments of

¹² Horrible and monstrous events repel sympathy; the mind turns from them with disgust and incredulity.

the deceased, his last actions and parting words, especially when these words and actions have marked the man of virtue: for here all circumstances concur to excite and heighten pity; the nearness of time and place, the unworthy fate of the sufferer, and the sad catastrophe strongly impressed on our senses.

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VIII.

THE passion most opposite to pity, is that of indignation; for those most disposed to grieve at undeserved misfortunes, are also the most likely to be provoked by unmerited prosperity. Both dispositions flow from the same virtuous characters, and the same love of justice; for it is right to sympathise with good men in affliction; it is right also, to feel displeasure and sorrow at the prosperity of the worthless; all unworthy treatment is injustice, and grievous to good men; wherefore indignation is ascribed to the gods. Envy also, as akin to indignation, should seem to stand in opposition to pity; for envy is an uneasy emotion at the sight of happiness in others: but these others are not the worthless only, but rather persons resembling ourselves; our competitors and equals. In both envy and indignation, the pain indeed proceeds solely from contemplating the good of others, and bears not the least reference to our own; for uneasiness at the good of others, as tending to produce any mischief to ourselves, creates the passion of fear, not indignation or envy. To these uneasy emotions, there are analogous and pleasant ones, naturally arising in contrary cir-

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IX.

Indigna-
tion and
envy.

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II.

cumstances. He who grieves at beholding virtue in distress, will naturally rejoice at the well-merited sufferings of the villain, or at least view them unaffected : the assassin and parricide cannot be objects of sympathy ; no good man, at least, will be sorry when they meet with a punishment suitable to their deserts ; for the same reason, that he delights in the rewards of distinguished merit ; both sentiments are just, and congenial to virtuous minds, who must necessarily expect that the same good consequences resulting to men who resemble them, will be likely to happen to themselves. The contrary feelings, again, belong to men of contrary characters ; for the same persons who pine with envy at their neighbour's prosperity, take a malignant pleasure in any evil that befalls him ; since, generally, that of which the presence or the existence gives pain, the absence or the removal must, of necessity, afford pleasure. Yet these sentiments, whether they proceed from envy or indignation, things very different in themselves, are adverse to compassion, and repel the natural current of sympathy. We now proceed to examine them more distinctly, beginning with indignation, and pointing out what are its causes, and who, respectively, are its subjects and its objects.

Of indignation, more particularly ; its causes, subjects, and objects.

Indignation, then, proceeds from the contemplation of unmerited prosperity ; all sorts of good things do not, therefore, rouse this passion. It is not provoked by a superiority in justice, in manhood, or any other virtue ; no more than pity is ex-

cited through defect in those glorious advantages. C H A P.
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 But the causes that create indignation are wealth, power, and such other advantages, as good men are the most worthy to enjoy. Neither is indignation provoked by those advantages which are deemed the gifts of nature; nobility of extraction, personal charms, and other distinctions of a similar kind.¹³ And since that which is derived from high antiquity, and which has been uninterruptedly held and enjoyed for a long course of time, approaches, by its stability, to what is natural, it follows that superfluous opulence in an upstart is far more offensive than in men of ancient nobility; the same holds of honours and offices, the wide circle of our friends and dependants, the flourishing state of our family, and in short any gift of fortune suddenly obtained, and any advantageous consequences following in its train. If men complain, for example, that the honours of free states should be measured by opulence, and that citizens should rise in dignity as they increase in wealth, these complaints will seem to proceed from a more just indignation when the riches, entitling to magistracy, have been recently acquired. The reason is, that men of old hereditary wealth appear to enjoy only what naturally belongs to them; and the new favourites of fortune to be usurpers of more than their due; for that which has continued always, or very long, in the same situation, will appear to be in its right and pro-

¹³ Strength, health, &c.

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II.

per place ; a certain fitness resulting from long continuance, as truth pre-eminently belongs to things constant and invariable. There being various kinds of goods and various merits of men, the former are not to be distributed promiscuously, but according to the relations which they bear to the distinctive characters of those on whom they are bestowed. Propriety requires that a magnificent suit of armour should be presented to a gallant officer, not to an upright judge ; splendid alliances in marriage belong rather to persons of high birth, than to those conspicuous for riches recently acquired ; and a certain displeasure is occasioned when the distribution is not made according to this analogy and fitness. A similar displeasure takes place when inferiors venture to contend with those far above them, especially when they are both candidates for fame in the same line. Whence Jupiter, in his indignation, withholds an ordinary warrior from combating the greater Ajax. Yet, amidst the widest difference of pursuits, unequal competitions prove offensive ; as that the skilful musician should arrogate the regard due to distinguished integrity, virtue being incomparably more valuable than mere talent. Such, then, are the causes and the objects of indignation ; and the individuals most susceptible of it, are those who, being worthy of great things, find themselves, in regard to such things, outdone or rivalled by persons of no estimation. It appears the height of injustice that equal rewards should fall to the share of such unequal deserts.

Secondly, all good and able men ; for these are most capable of appreciating the comparative value of characters, and most hurt at beholding the unequal retributions that are made to them. Thirdly, men of lofty ambition, who ardently desire and covet employments and offices actually lodged in very incompetent hands ; and all who see in such hands those things of which they deem themselves richly deserving. Wherefore, worthlessness, poor-spiritedness, and meanness, are incompatible with indignation ; for men degraded by such vices cannot reasonably aspire to preferments or honours. From the account above given of these passions, we may easily perceive the nature of the contrary emotions ; at what sort of misfortunes we rather rejoice than are sorrowful ; and what sort of persons we are not disposed to compassionate. Whence we may infer the proper means of producing this indifference in the judges, and of intercepting their compassion when claimed for individuals wholly unworthy of it.

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WHAT are the causes of envy, and who are its objects and its subjects, will in like manner appear, “ if envy be defined the pain arising from any conspicuous advantages in our equals, and that pain derived entirely from the contemplation of their prosperity, without the smallest reference to our own personal interest.” To be actuated by this passion, it is necessary therefore to have equals, or those deemed such ; persons with whom we compare ourselves, and with

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Envy defined: deductions from this definition.

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II.

whose circumstances we naturally compare our own. Such are those of the same nation, blood, age, pursuits, reputation, or fortune. These are the objects of envy; and the persons most disposed to feel this uneasy passion are the pampered children of fortune, those who fall short, by a very little only, of having reached the utmost height of external prosperity: those also whose great actions being crowned with signal and most fortunate success, have inspired them with such a fond conceit of their own exclusive felicity, that the gain or the glory of others appears to be an usurpation on their own exclusive prerogatives; and those also who have attained general and highly distinguished honours, and are looked on by the world as finished models of wisdom and happiness: the ambitious also are peculiarly disposed to envy, and those who court fame in arts and sciences; in a word, all who seek consideration and importance from the possession of certain objects, and their superiority in certain pursuits, will be liable, with regard to such objects and pursuits in particular, to the stimulations of envy: but in narrow minds, and dastardly characters, all things and all persons may occasion this uneasy passion, because, compared with their own little souls, every thing will appear to be great. The sources of envy, then, are all those advantages for which men are competitors, and all those pieces of good fortune in which they are inclined boastfully to rejoice; events which they have long desired eagerly for themselves, and objects

to which they think themselves particularly entitled ; things in which they surpass by a small difference, or by a small difference are surpassed, being in both cases, within a hair-breadth of their competitors. The objects of envy, again, must be always characterised by nearness in time, place, age, reputation ; in short by some sort of propinquity ; whence *Æschylus* says, “ kindred knows well the pangs of envy.” As envy implies competition, so does competition nearness : we cannot be competitors with those who have left the world, much less with those who ceased to live thousands of years ago. Distance of place operates like distance of time : we think not of competition with those beyond the pillars of *Hercules* ; nor with those greatly removed from us by the superiority or the inferiority of their merits ; nor on account of things that are greatly above, or greatly beneath, ourselves and our expectations. But we have competition and envy with individuals attached to the same object, or dedicated to the same pursuits ; whence the proverb,—

“ Potters hate potters ; bards envy the bard :—”

and with those who obtain with facility, what we ourselves have obtained with difficulty, or, after much labour, missed : and with those from whose acquisitions and successes a certain disgrace is reflected on ourselves, since they have succeeded in what we have failed, though in no respect our superiors ; so that the failure being entirely our own fault, will be peculiarly mortifying :

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and with those who acquire and enjoy advantages that appear to be our due, or of which we were once in possession; therefore the old are envious of the young: and with those who have gained at little cost, that which we could obtain only at a vast expense. Since, then, all these causes and occurrences give pain to the envious, it is plain that the contrary causes and occurrences will give them pleasure. By the former the uneasy passion is excited, by the latter it is gratified; so that if the party who solicits compassion, or any other favour, be shown to stand in such a relation to his judges, that they ought to be rather gratified than pained by his misfortunes, it will not be easy for him to succeed in his request.

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XI.

Emulation
defined:
its causes,
subjects,
and objects.

THE causes and objects of emulation, and the persons most likely to be moved by it, will easily be made apparent, "if we define emulation to be the pain felt at seeing distinctions of an honourable kind, and which appear to have been within our reach, attained by those naturally our equals; and not because they have gained such honours, but only because we do not partake in them." Emulation, therefore, is a laudable affection, and flowing from a virtuous character; whereas, envy is bad in itself, and proceeds from a bad source: the former animates our exertions to merit the same advantages which others have obtained; the latter inspires no such ardour, but makes the envious brood, in sullen sorrow over the hated joys of their neighbours. Emu-

lation, besides, always implies a certain sense of worthiness: men "actuated by it" must deem their powers commensurate to the honours and advantages which they are emulous to acquire; since it is impossible to aim at things of which our consciousness tells us we are totally unworthy, and which plainly appear to be beyond our reach. The young and the high-minded are easily roused to emulation, as well as those abounding in such goods of fortune as commonly fall to the share of the deserving; power, wealth, authority, troops of friends¹⁴, and others of the same kind; for these, being the signs and indications of a respectable character, inspire with a sense of worth those actually possessed of them, and make them ambitious to maintain or augment their respective advantages; and all who stand high in public estimation, themselves, their ancestors, relatives, friends, nation or commonwealth: the fame which they enjoy is their own, and they will strive, also, to appropriate the estimable qualities by which it was procured, and to surpass others in the display of them. Since emulation is excited by things good and honourable, it is plain that among these the first rank is due to the virtues which benefit and improve mankind, for all are naturally inclined to honour their benefactors; those advantages come next which naturally diffuse themselves, communicating to all around, profit or pleasure; where-

¹⁴ Πολυφιλία.

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fore wealth and beauty take precedence of health, a thing intrinsically more valuable, but whose enjoyment is confined to the possessor. It is plain, also, who are the proper objects of emulation; those, doubtless, who appear to be endowed with any of the above mentioned commendable qualities, or highly admired possessions: with manhood, wisdom, or authority; for the archons or magistrates have it in their power to benefit many: to the same class belong generals, orators, and all individuals of distinguished abilities; and those, also, who have many rivals, many friends, many admirers; whom we ourselves greatly admire, and whose praises have been celebrated by historians and by poets. The contrary qualities, and the persons degraded by them, are the causes and the objects of disdain; for disdain is contrary to emulation; and whoever is disposed to emulate¹⁵ one set of persons or qualities, will be disposed, of course, to disdain their opposites: wherefore the man emulous of virtue, will scorn the mere child of fortune, whose external advantages are unaccompanied by any real intrinsic worth. So much concerning the means of either exciting or appeasing the passions, the management of which constitutes a main point in the art of persuasion.

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XII.

Transition
to the cha-

The manners and character of men depend on their passions, habits, ages, and the circumstances of good or bad fortune in which they

¹⁵ He adds, "or to be emulated by."

are placed. This is the subject to which we now proceed. By the passions, I mean anger, the love of pleasure, and all such emotions and affections as were just now considered: to the habits belong all those virtues and vices on which we formerly discoursed, explaining the various purposes at which they aim, and the various trains of action which they respectively produce. The different ages are youth, manhood, and the declining stage of life; the circumstances of fortune are high birth, wealth, power, and their contraries; in short, all things comprehended under the names of good and bad fortune. To explain, therefore, what still remains of the subject, it may be observed that youth is naturally obnoxious to all those passions which originate in the love of pleasure; with these it abounds, hurrying to the gratification of them through every obstacle, and too often indulging in them to the most profligate excess. Yet the appetites of youth are variable in the extreme; easily excited and speedily satiated; the movements of their desire are vehement, but the commotion does not last; their volitions are keen, not strong; they are as capricious as the cravings of sickness. To the emotions which take their rise in anger, youth is also peculiarly prone. They are easily provoked, and liable to such sudden gusts of passion as completely overpower and upset them. They cannot brook the shadow of disgrace, nor the slightest sign of injustice: they love honour, and still more victory, for victory is superiority,

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racters of
men, as de-
pendent on
the cir-
cumstances
of age and
fortune.

Character-
istics of the
young.

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in which, of all things, they most delight. Money, again, is their least concern; about this they are exceedingly careless, because, as Pittacus said to Amphiaræus, time has not taught them its indispensable use. They are not ill-natured, but the contrary, being as yet unexperienced in human pravity: they are credulous, because deception has not been often practised on them. They are intoxicated with high expectations of enjoyment; for, in them, the fervour of youth operates like the warmth of wine; and they have not been sobered under the trials of adversity. Their life, indeed, is made up of a series of fond hopes, for hope has a reference to the future, as memory has to the past; and with them the past is thought to bear so small a proportion to the future, that it is quite banished from the fancy. For this reason, that they hope easily, it is very easy to deceive them; and from their propensity to hope, joined to their natural irascibility, they are of course courageous, for anger expels the fear of danger, and hope inspires the confidence of victory. In their ordinary behaviour they are, however, timid and bashful, with a keen sense of propriety, and anxious fear of disgrace; for being disciplined by the laws only, which it is their glory to obey, they suspect not any principles of action more general or more lofty; they know nothing of that science which would supersede the laws, or of that sophistry which would elude their force. They are high-minded, as not being yet humbled by many adverse acci-

dents. The lofty opinion of ourselves engenders magnanimity; and this opinion naturally accompanies youthful fervor and sanguine hopes. Their principal aim is not utility, but honour: they are governed rather by sentiment than by reason; utility being the province of reason solely, but the honour and beauty of moral action requiring also sentiments and feelings disciplined by right practice into virtue. Youth is more associating, and more disposed to friendship, than the other stages of life; because it takes greater delight in friends and acquaintances, selected and preferred, like all the other objects of its choice, from motives of pleasure, rather than views of interest. The sage advice of Chilon¹⁶, is what the young most disregard and scorn; for they are always in extremes; they love to excess, they hate to excess; in nothing do they know moderation. From this principle flows undue confidence in their opinions, and extravagant boldness in maintaining them; an intrepidity of talk, and a vehemence of assertion, as if they deemed their own knowledge infallible. The injuries done by the young are committed rather through wanton insult, than deliberate malice: to affront, not to afflict, is their aim; for they are very susceptible of pity, in consequence of too favourable an opinion of mankind, of whose honour and honesty, estimating them by their own, they think too highly, and are therefore prone to

¹⁶ Μηδεν αγαν. Ne quid nimis.

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II.

commiserate sufferings which they take to be unmerited. The young, lastly, are disposed to gaiety and laughter, and qualified for that sportive and chastised pleasantry, which is raillery void of contumely. Such are the characteristics of the young.

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XIII.

Character-
istics of the
old.

THE old, and those past the vigour of life, are characterised by qualities that are most of them the direct contraries of those just enumerated. In the course of their long lives, having been often deceived, and often disappointed, and being sensible of innumerable errors on their own part, and that most affairs have but unprofitable issues, they affirm nothing with full confidence; all their proceedings are wanting in energy; "they think such is the case, or that such will be the result," but they know nothing for certain; a "perhaps," or "it may be," is always in their mouths; ever hesitating and doubtful, in none of their opinions are they firm and constant. Old persons are also liable to the reproach of malignity; for malignity views all things on the most unfavourable side: they are prone to suspicion and distrust; and they are distrustful, because of experienced treachery. They are not warm in their love, nor bitter in their hatred, but very moderate in both affections; obeying the maxims of Bias, who advises to live with friends, as with those likely, at some future time, to become enemies; and with enemies, as with those likely, at some future time, to become friends. They are lowly and little

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XIII.
minded, being humbled and broken down by the cross accidents of life : they are not desirous of things contributing to grandeur and pre-eminence, but of those necessary or useful ; on which account they are parsimonious, for money is a thing very needful ; and they know both the difficulty with which it is commonly to be acquired, and the great facility with which it always may be lost. They are fearful, and given to anticipate all kinds of evil ; for their temperament is the reverse of that of youth ; the one cold, the other warm ; and the coldness of age prepares the way for timidity, which is in itself an actual chilling of the inward frame. As they advance in age, their love of life grows stronger, for our desire of good things is heightened, when they are ready to leave us ; and we are all most desirous to retain that of which we have but little to spare. Old persons, also, are selfish ; for selfishness is a kind of pusillanimity ; and because of selfishness, their actions are governed rather by utility than by virtue ; for utility bears a reference to what is supposed to be our own particular good ; virtue, to what is good, absolutely and universally. They are not very sensible to shame, but rather the contrary, because their actions being ruled more by interest than by honour, they are careless of appearances. They are not easily flattered by hope, because of their experience that most human affairs are either bad in themselves, or bad in their issues ; and also because of their timidity. Their thoughts, little

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II.

occupied in expectancy, consist chiefly in recollections; the time to come is short, the time past is long; hope respects the future, memory the past; and this is the cause of that talkativeness with which the old are reproached; they are delighted with the revival of past scenes, and are never tired with recalling and recording them. Of their passions, those originating in anger are rather sharp than strong; and those originating in pleasure have either ceased, or become very moderate, giving them but little molestation; but gain is their anxious pursuit, so that they pass for wise and temperate, although they have only emancipated themselves from appetite, to become slaves to interest: their actions are, therefore, governed more by reason than by sentiment; for reason alone suffices to point out what is useful, but moral feeling must concur in teaching what is praiseworthy and honourable. The injuries of the old, aim rather at positive harm, than at mere opposition, or affront; for they are not committed insolently, to display their own superiority. Old men are very susceptible of pity, not, however, for the same reason that this passion operates powerfully on the young. In the latter, pity springs from philanthropy; in the old, it proceeds from weakness. They cannot behold sufferings in others, without thinking that the same, or greater, are ready to fall on themselves; and this tendency to make the case their own, necessarily excites their compassion: from which propensity they are prone to melancholy and complaint, rather than to joy and

merriment, a disposition contrary to that belonging to youth. Such then are the characteristics of youth and old age; so that, as all are inclined to love those resembling themselves, and to approve sentiments agreeing with their own, it is plain by what means both our discourses and ourselves may be rendered acceptable to our audience.

CHAP.
XIII.

OF men in the prime of life, the character holds a middle place between the extremes just described. Their courage will not swell to audacity, nor their caution sink into cowardice. They will hit the point of propriety, avoiding excesses and deviations on either side; neither giving their confidence to all, nor distrusting all; not guided by honour solely, nor solely by interest; observing a due mean between niggardliness and extravagance. The same manly temperament will prevail throughout, and regulate all the angry passions, as well as all those originating in the love of pleasure. In youth and in old age, these different sets of passions respectively prevail, to the mutual exclusion of each other. Youth boils over with courage, but is deficient in temperance; old age is temperate with regard to pleasure, but is wanting in boldness to face danger; whereas, the full meridian of life unites moderation with manhood, and is sedate, not spiritless. It thus enjoys the advantages of the other two periods, exempt from the imperfections of either. The body is in its prime from thirty, to thirty-five years complete: the mind retains

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Character-
istics of the
prime of
life.

BOOK its utmost vigour to forty-nine. This much may
II. suffice concerning the manners appropriate to the
 different ages.

CHAP. **LET** us now examine the difference, scarcely
XV. less remarkable, occasioned by the distinctions
 of rank and fortune. In men of high birth, we
 may commonly remark an inordinate ambition,
 and love of honour: for it is natural to all
 eminently possessed of any special advantages,
 to entertain the desire of multiplying and aug-
 menting them. High birth is the accumulated
 honour of ancestry, which their descendants are
 ambitious of piling up to greater heights: the
 further back it extends, nobility is deemed the
 more illustrious, so that the old nobles are often
 filled with contempt for men resembling those
 with whom their own honours began. Noble
 birth is a thing altogether different from genuine
 native nobility of character. The former rests
 solely on the glory of our ancestors; the latter
 is our own work, when, by upholding that glory,
 we have rendered it appropriate and personal.
 This, indeed, seldom happens; for noble races
 are exhausted, like luxuriant soils. During a
 certain time, the sons will emulate, perhaps sur-
 pass, the virtues of their fathers; but at length
 the current of honour dries up, or is turned back;
 and families decline, fall, and sink from one
 degree of degeneracy into another still deeper.
 Of those most distinguished by spirit, fire, and
 energy, the posterity often degenerates into
 madmen. Of those conspicuous for prudence,

Character-
 istics of
 high birth.

Noble qua-
 lities are
 found to
 degenerate
 in different
 ways in
 different
 families.

wisdom, and great steadiness of mind, the posterity often degenerates into fools. This is exemplified in the families of Alcibiades and of Dionysius the Elder, both disgraced in their descendants by the most frantic proceedings; whereas the descendants of Cimon, of Pericles, and of Socrates, are degraded, not less notoriously, by their stupid insensibility, and lethargic dullness.

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XV.

It is easy to perceive, at the first glance, the manners resulting from a condition of great opulence. The rich are prone to ostentation and insolence, and these vices are naturally engendered by their wealth itself; for, as money is held to be the general measure of value, it appears as if all advantages were to be purchased and procured by it. They are also luxurious, both from ostentation, and from the habits of self-indulgence, which their opulence has created. Continually occupied in the use or abuse of their admired riches, they are obtrusive displayers of that tasteless magnificence, and of those frivolous accommodations, which are exclusively within their reach, and which being considered by themselves as objects of pride, vanity, and rivalry, they verily believe will appear in the same light to all others. Nor are circumstances wanting to justify this credulity; for the numbers are great, of those who stand in need of the wealthy, and condescend to crave their bounty: whence Simonides, when asked by the wife of Hieron, which was better, to be rich

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XVI.

Charac-
teristics of
the rich.

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or wise, answered, "to be rich, surely," for the wise are often seen dancing attendance at their doors. Another property to be ascribed to them, is that of arrogating, as their due, all offices of power and authority. They believe themselves already possessed of that, for the sake of which such offices are desired and exercised; and, as the end is greater than the means, they think that their wealth alone entitles them to engross all distinctions and honours. In a word, the character of a rich man, as such, and resulting from his wealth, is little better than that of a happy fool; and if his riches be recently acquired, all the evils flowing from them are thereby aggravated. An upstart, in point of wealth, is a novice in the art of using it; the occupation which fortune has assigned him. The wrongs done by the rich proceed not from malevolence, nor aim at any mortal injury. They flow chiefly from their insolence and intemperance; through the effects of which, they are often amenable to the law, now for assaults, and now for adultery.

CHAP.
XVII.

Those of
men in
power.

THE manners belonging to men in power are almost equally manifest. They have many things in common with the rich, but mixed with qualities more respectable. They are more devoted to the pursuit of honour: they have more elevation of mind, and more energy; for, with such qualities, their habitual and high employments have a tendency to adorn them; and, also, more application, more circumspection, and

more vigilance, virtues essential to the pre-
 servation of their authority. Their real or as-
 sumed dignity is also less offensive; for as their
 power makes them conspicuous, and renders all
 their actions and words, and even looks, of im-
 portance, they will aim at external propriety of
 deportment, and endeavour to recommend them-
 selves to the world, by softening their austerity,
 and lowering their loftiness. But woe to the man
 who incurs their displeasure! Their resentment
 is not to be appeased but by a signal vengeance.

CHAP.
XVII.

What is properly termed prosperity in-
 cludes nobility, wealth, and power, which are
 numbered among the highest gifts of fortune,
 and collects, therefore, into one compound sys-
 tem, the various modifications of character,
 which have been shown to proceed from those
 distinct sources. It comprehends, also, all do-
 mestic and all personal advantages; the flou-
 rishing condition of our families, the promising
 genius of our children; beauty, strength, health,
 and other bodily endowments. To be enriched
 and adorned by great prosperity, is not favour-
 able to the improvement of the understanding,
 to correct reasoning, or to sound judgment. It
 naturally inspires a certain vain elation and ne-
 glectful superciliousness; but this is only with
 regard to men, for towards the gods the highly
 prosperous are very differently disposed: to
 their signal favour, they refer the various bless-
 ings which they enjoy; in them they confide;
 and this strong disposition towards piety, is cer-
 tainly the best feature in their character. This

Those of
high pro-
sperity.

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II.

much may suffice concerning the manners resulting from the different stages and the different lots of life; for, as contrary causes produce contrary effects, we may easily infer, from what has been above said, the manners belonging to the ignoble, the poor, and the powerless.

CHAP.
XVIII.

Transition
to the
topics
alike appli-
cable to
the three
kinds of
oratory.

ALL persuasion is employed to produce in the hearers judgments conformable to those of the speaker; for oratory would be superfluous in matters with which both parties are perfectly acquainted, and concerning which their opinions are the same. Every auditory is a judicial tribunal; since all whom we wish to persuade are constituted judges of the things proposed to their assent, not less than the established umpires in juridical debates, or political discussions. In the affairs of common life, when we would bring over any one to our opinion, we immediately make him a judge; and that, whether the opinion in which we wish him to concur be practical or speculative; and whether, in maintaining it, we have an adversary to contend with, or merely an hypothesis to overthrow or to defend. In all cases alike, we advance and reinforce our own arguments, and endeavour to break down and destroy those placed in array against us. The same holds in demonstrative eloquence, that is, in those elaborate discourses directed merely, by the display of brilliant powers, to the delight of disengaged and vacant audiences: although the judges most properly so named, are those commissioned to examine some matter of interest, and to determine on which side

truth, justice, and utility lie, in juridical and political questions.

CHAP.
XVIII.

Recapitulation.

The manners corresponding with the different arrangements and forms of government, were formerly investigated ; from which investigation it appeared how the speakers in senates or assemblies, by conforming to the maxims and sentiments of their hearers, might be sure of obtaining their ready and favourable ear. It was also before shown that, in the three kinds of eloquence, the judicial, demonstrative, and deliberative, the ends respectively in view are justice, honour, and utility : and the general principles or propositions were collected, that bear an important relation to each of these three main points ; it remains now to consider the topics alike applicable to all of them ; and also to treat of instances or examples, and thus conclude this part of our subject.¹⁷ Of the common topics, possibility and impossibility are of most universal extent ; for in all kinds of speaking it is often necessary to show that certain events did, or did not happen ; and that other events will, or will not take place. Augmentation and diminution are also of a general nature ; for to amplify or extenuate, are things common with all orators, whether their object be to praise or to blame, to accuse or to defend, to procure the adoption or the rejection of any national or pub-

¹⁷ He means the *matter* of rhetoric ; that is, the thoughts ; for the *form*, or style, will be considered in the third book. We shall see, however, that many important subjects are introduced into this second book, besides those specified in the above general division.

BOOK
II.

lic measure. Amplification, however, is especially applicable¹⁸ to demonstrative eloquence, whose appropriate time was shown to be the present¹⁹: judicial oratory is conversant about the past and the necessary; the deliberative about the future and the possible.

CHAP.
XIX.

Possibility
and impos-
sibility.

LET us first speak of possibility and impossibility; concerning which we may presume that possible to exist, or to be produced, of which the contrary is possible to exist, or to be produced; for contraries, considered as such, necessarily exclude or destroy each other. Thus, health destroys sickness, and sickness health; and the possibility of the one implies that of the other. We may presume that to be possible, of which the like is possible; and if the more difficult is possible, the easier will be possible: a house surely may be built by him who can build a palace; and that may be produced and completed of which the beginning has been produced, for things impossible cannot commence, or have any tendency to accomplishment: thus the diameter of a square cannot begin to be commensurate with its side; and that of which the end is possible the beginning also must be possible, since all productions have a beginning: and if that which is subsequent in the order of production or existence be possible, that which

¹⁸ He subjoins, "as was before said," to wit, in a former chapter; which enabled me to render the order of sentences more perspicuous than they stand in the present.

¹⁹ These words, before used by him, are inserted, as necessary to complete the connection of the clauses.

is prior must be possible; thus the possibility of manhood implies that of childhood, and the latter implies the former, of which it is the beginning. Those things may be deemed possible, of which nature has implanted in us a love and desire; for our desires are commonly confined to things that appear within our reach: and those things are possible for which there are prescribed rules, and which are the objects of science or of art; and those of which the effective or productive causes are in our power, depending on persons whom we can either compel or persuade; that is, of whom we are the superiors, the masters, or the friends: and things of which the whole is possible, the parts are possible, and the reverse of this²⁰; and things whose genus is possible, the species is possible, and the reverse of this also²¹; and of correlatives²², if one is possible, so must the other; and things to be effected without art or preparation, are more likely to be effected by care and skill; whence Agathon says, —

To fortune many great effects belong,
But works of art are far more sure and strong.

And things are easily practicable, which have been done by worse men, by inferiors, and persons of less understanding; as Isocrates said, it

²⁰ Aristotle illustrates this by a shoe, and its parts; the upper leather, the quarter, and the sole. The text is corrupt, and the illustration superfluous.

²¹ This is illustrated by a vessel, and its different species of ships, boats, and gallies.

²² As part and whole, double and half, &c.

BOOK
II.

would be strange, if he should not be able to teach any thing that Euthynus could learn. From what has been said, it will be easy to discover the propositions relating to impossibilities, since they are plainly the contraries of those just stated.

Topics to prove that any supposed event has or has not happened.

To prove whether any event has or has not taken place, the following considerations will assist us. First, if things, less in the order of nature have happened, we may infer the actual occurrence of those more natural: if that which is a natural consequence has happened, we may conclude that the natural antecedent has also taken place. Actions must have been performed, with regard to which men may be proved to have had both the will and the power, for all will follow their own wills as far as they are able; and actions to which they were inclined, and to the performance of which there was no outward obstacle; and actions, in their power, and to which they were excited either by the transports of anger, or the allurements of appetite, whether of that inordinate and coarse appetite which domineers the vicious, or of that wise and well-ordered appetite and affection, which regulates the conduct of the virtuous. He who was prepared and ready to do any act, may be supposed to have done it; for preparation is commonly followed by execution. And if things naturally antecedent have happened, or which are commonly used as the means towards some proposed end, we may conclude that the consequent has

²³ He adds, those who have forgot any thing, must previously have known and learned it.

happened, or that the end has been effected. CHAP.
 Thus, a strong flash of lightning must have XIX.
 been followed by a loud roar of thunder; and
 reiterated attempts, clearly proved, may be con-
 jectured to have been sometimes followed by the
 desired success. In the same manner, from the
 occurrence of any ordinary consequence, or of any
 proposed end, we may infer that the antecedent,
 or the means, have actually taken place; thus the
 report of thunder indicates previous lightning,
 and the accomplishment of any act indicates
 that attempts at it had formerly been made. All
 these conclusions are likely; but of more or less
 cogency: and to disprove any alleged fact, it is
 plain that recourse must be had to arguments
 directly opposite. With regard to future events,
 we must reason from similar topics. That may
 be expected with certainty, which is at once
 within the reach of men, and agreeable to their
 wills, or agreeable to any of those moving prin-
 ciples by which the will is determined; anger,
 the love of pleasure, or the dispassioned dictates
 of sound and sober reason. That, also, for which
 men are prepared, and towards which they have
 discovered a strong propensity, may be supposed
 very likely to be carried into execution; and all
 those events and operations that have been pre-
 ceded by their natural signs, or by their ordi-
 nary means. In cloudy weather, we say, it will
 rain; if we see a foundation laid, we doubt not
 that the superstructure will be raised.

That any
 future
 event will
 or will not
 take place.

Concerning augmentation and diminution, Amplifica-
 every thing has been anticipated really neces- tion; its
 sary to be said. For in treating of deliberative proper
 sources.

BOOK
II.

eloquence, we spoke of advantages considered absolutely, and also compared with each other in point of magnitude or value. A similar method was pursued in the other kinds of oratory; for all the three have good solely in view, and this good wholly consists in utility, in honour, or in justice. It is plain, therefore, that our amplifications must be entirely drawn from these three sources; and, that, to investigate greatness in the abstract, without reference to the greater justice, the greater honour, or the greater utility, would be an idle speculation, altogether barren of use.²⁴ Let this much suffice concerning possibility and impossibility, the likelihood of past or of future events, and the subject of augmentation and diminution.

CHAP.
XX.

Inductive
reasoning,
examples,
and fables.

HAVING treated of the proofs from reasoning, appropriate to each species of oratory, we proceed to those common to all the three kinds of it. Considered under their more general aspect, these proofs consist either in examples, or in arguments; for what is called a saying, an adage, or maxim, will be shown to belong to the class of arguments. Let us first speak of examples. These resemble induction, or that reasoning from experience which is the great principle of all knowledge.²⁵ Of examples, there are two kinds. The first cites a case in point, that is, it relates events that have actually passed. The second creates those events, either

²⁴ To be useful, propositions must be strictly applicable to individuals, the only realities in nature.

²⁵ Vide Topic, l. iv. c. 2.

in the way of similitudes and parables, or in the way of fables, like Æsop's, called African tales.²⁵ C H A P.
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The example of the first kind, contradistinguished from parables and fables, is, as when a Greek orator should say, Preparations must be made against the king of Persia, and he must not be allowed to subdue the maritime strength of Egypt, for Darius did not invade Greece till this was effected, but when Egypt was conquered, he immediately undertook his expedition; and Xerxes did not make war on Greece till he had mastered Egypt, but as soon as this was done, he transported his army into Europe. The reigning king will, doubtless, be disposed to follow the same line of conduct; therefore, we must use every exertion to anticipate his hostile designs. Parables, again, were well illustrated in the conversations of Socrates. In order to prove that ministers and magistrates ought not to be appointed by lot, he asked whether it would be fit that the combatants in the gymnastic exercises should be chosen promiscuously from the spectators at the public games, and not rather from those best qualified to run the race, to box, or to wrestle; or whether it would be right that from all embarked in the same ship, the pilot should be chosen at random, without paying any regard to his nautical skill? The fable may be exemplified in what Stesichorus said with regard to Phalaris,

²⁵ The great division of Africa, corresponding to the Beledulgerid of the Arabs, was called by the Greeks, *Λιβυή θηριώδης*, Libya, inhabited by wild beasts; hence those tales in which beasts were the actors and speakers, acquired the name in the text.

BOOK
II.

and by what Æsop said in defence of an impeached demagogue. When the republic of Himera had chosen Phalaris for its leader, and was prepared to vote him a body-guard, Stesichorus, among other dissuasives from this measure, invented and related the following fable : — Long ago, a horse grazed, alone, in a rich meadow ; a stag came and did much mischief to the pasture. Desirous to revenge this wrong, the horse had recourse to man, and asked him whether they might not chastise the stag, by uniting their strength. The man said, “Nothing can be more easy ; let me mount your back, putting a bridle in your mouth, and well armed with javelins.” The horse consented, but instead of obtaining thereby the infliction of punishment on his adversary, he became from that moment the slave of his ally. Do you, therefore, take care, lest, in your eagerness to punish your enemies, you should incur the whole misfortune of the horse. You put the bridle in your mouths, when you elected Phalaris to the supreme command ; but if you give him a guard, you will allow him to mount your backs, and to rule you at his absolute pleasure. Æsop, again, with a view to save a demagogue tried capitally in Samos, told a story of a fox, who, having passed a river, fell into a deep cavern by its side. Unable to extricate himself, he remained a long time, dreadfully tormented by gad-flies. He was spied by a hedgehog, who happened to be creeping about among those crevices. The hedge-hog took pity on

the fox's condition, and offered to rid him of the gad-flies: the wily fox forbade him: he asked the reason of this unexpected prohibition: "Because," the fox replied, "these blood-suckers are already full: if they are removed, others will fasten on my body, who, being empty and hungry, will extract the little blood that is left me. In the same manner, O men of Samos! this demagogue will not, in future, do you much injury, for he is rich; but should you destroy him, other needy demagogues will succeed, and devour the remaining resources of your commonwealth." Fables are well adapted to popular assemblies, and have this advantage, that it is easier to compose them (this requiring but a slight effort of invention) than to produce cases in point, or parallel events in history. The latter, however, when they can be hit on, are incomparably more useful, and of incomparably more cogency: for history is the light of life; and transactions that have really passed, are the only safe guides into the scenes of futurity. Examples must serve for proofs, when there is a deficiency of arguments: when these abound, the examples ought to be thrown into the back ground, and reserved for the conclusion; for, if they were placed in the beginning of the discourse, they would wear the appearance of that inductive or tentative reasoning, which can very rarely be employed with success, in any kind of popular oratory. But, at the end, examples assume the character of testimonies, and therefore have much persuasive efficacy.

CHAP.
XX.Their comparative
cogency.When examples are
introduced
with most
efficacy.

BOOK
II.

At the beginning, to be impressive, they must be numerous ; but, at the end, a single example is powerful ; because there, it appears as a witness, and one credible witness is entitled to much weight. This may suffice concerning the different kinds of examples, as well as when and how they are to be employed.

CHAP.
XXI.

Sayings or
adages of
four kinds ;
—when
these, re-
spectively,
are most
season-
able.

As to sayings or sentences, having first explained what they are, we shall readily understand to what sort of subjects they belong, on what occasions they are seasonable, and by what sort of persons they may, with propriety, be used. A sentence, then, is an affirmation, not relating to an individual, as to pronounce any thing concerning the character of Iphicrates, but concerning a whole class of things. It is, therefore, a general proposition, though every such proposition is not a sentence. This name applies not to abstract and speculative truths, such as those of geometry²⁶, but to such truths only as bear a reference to life and action ; and since the enthymemes or arguments belonging to the three kinds of oratory, are all of them of this sort, either their premises or their conclusions will constitute sentences, when enounced separately, and thus stripped of their argumentative form. For example,—

A man that's wise will shun to make his sons
Deep-versed in subtile lore.

²⁶ He says, the distinctions between straight and crooked lines, and the opposition of curvature to straightness —

Curvo dignoscere rectum. HORACE.

This is a sentence ; but should you add the ground of the assertion,—

CHAP.
XXI.

Besides their time wasted unprofitably,²⁷
They're butts of envious malice to their townsmen :

the two taken together will be an enthymeme or argument. Again,—

Man is not made for freedom.—

This is a sentence ; but with the addition,—

The slave of money or the sport of fortune :—

the two taken together form an argument. Sentences, then, are either with the ground of the assertion, or without the ground of the assertion. Those require this addition, which contain any thing paradoxical or doubtful: those do not require it, which announce truths either previously known, or which become evident on the slightest reflection.—

Of human goods I deem good health the best.

The many are of this opinion.—

True love is constant, not by fits and starts.

To see this requires but little consideration. Of sentences with the ground of the assertion, some are parts of an argument, as,—

A man that's wise will shun to make his sons, &c.

and some, though not parts of an enthymeme or argument, are yet highly argumentative; and

²⁷ Another verse precedes this in the text—

No man e'er deem'd has happiness complete.

But the corresponding line, containing the ground of the assertion, is wanting.

BOOK II. these are justly held in most esteem, as showing the reason of what is said : thus, —

Let not a mortal keep immortal ire.

To say that “ anger ought not to last for ever,” is a sentence : but the opposition of the words “ mortal” and “ immortal” shows the cause why it ought not thus to endure. Of the same kind is the opinion sententiously enounced —

To mortals, views immortal don't belong. ²⁸

From what has been said, we may perceive that sentences are of four kinds²⁹, and also on what occasions each kind is to be employed. In matters paradoxical or doubtful, the reason ought always to be given, either prefixed or subjoined. In the foregoing example, it may be prefixed, by saying, “ Since time ought not to be unprofitably wasted, nor envy by any means to be incurred, I say that a learned education ought not to be given to youth ;” or the sentence, forbidding a learned education, may be placed first,

²⁸ Here Aristotle speaks popularly ; but in his Ethics he repels with scorn this coarse and low opinion. “ Men ought not, according to the vulgar exhortation, though they are mortal, to regard only mortal things ; but as far as possible, to put on immortality, exerting themselves to catch the joys of the intellectual life..... living not merely as partners in a frail and compound nature, but according to the simple and divine principle within them ; whose energies and virtues as far transcend all others, as the intellectual substance in which they reside, excels all other substances of which our frame consists. This is living according to the best part of what constitutes “ ourselves, which, though seemingly small in bulk, is incomparably greater in power and in value than all things besides.” Ethics b. x. p. 515.

²⁹ The order of the words is here changed, which perspicuity absolutely required.

and then followed by the reasons of the prohibition. In matters not paradoxical or very doubtful, but only obscure, the argument will be more pithy and impressive³⁰, when the reason is subjoined; and here, the brevity of laconisms, and the flash of metaphors³¹ are in their proper place: as Stesichorus said to the Locrians, "That they ought to abstain from insolence towards their neighbours, lest their grasshoppers should sing on the ground."³²

To be sententious, becomes the old only, and those much experienced in the matters of which they speak. In others, the stringing of sentences, as well as the frequent application of fables, is inept or ungraceful; the mark of native imbecillity or a neglected education: witness those ill-bred clowns, often to be met with, who are great hammerers of maxims, and perpetual retailers of proverbs.

To generalise a particular proposition, and thus convert it into a maxim or sentence, is most allowable in the transports of grief and anguish, and in the aggravation of injuries and crimes³³:

³⁰ It will be rounder and more collected in itself—*στρογγυλωτέρα*.

³¹ *Αινιγματώδη*, in the modern sense of enigma or riddle, is not here applicable; of this, more will be said in speaking of style.

³² Meaning thereby, that their trees,—palms, olives, &c. would be cut down by the enemy. The grasshoppers are represented by Homer and Anacreon, as sitting and singing on trees. *Iliad* iii. 151. Anacreon, Ode 43.

³³ The author's examples do not appear; but innumerable, to the purpose, will occur. Thus Almeria generalises in the Mourning Bride, —

For 'tis, alas! the poor prerogative
Of greatness, to be wretched, and unpitied.

BOOK
II.

and the general proposition may either immediately precede, or immediately follow the painful or the provoking circumstances to which it applies. Common sayings and proverbs are also of persuasive efficacy, when employed in their proper place. Their general reception is an indication that all are prepared to admit their force. Thus, when an army is ordered to fight, without the previous sacrifice, the command may be justified, by saying, —

The best of omens is our country's cause.

And when led into the field, against a superior enemy, they may be told, —

The chance of battle comes alike to all.

And, to justify the punishment of the innocent together with the guilty, —

Weakness ! to kill the sire, yet spare the son.

Some proverbs, though particular, have the force of general propositions or sentences. Thus, "An Athenian neighbourhood," indicates any neighbourhood that is dangerous or troublesome.³⁴

And Helen, in Ovid, when arraigning the treachery of Paris : —

Certus, in hospitibus, non est amor.

And Shakspeare, —

Frailty, thy name is woman.

And Ariosto, —

Vo' dir ch'ogni huomo sia perfido & crudele.

Man is made up of perfidy and cruelty.

³⁴ After their victories over the Persians, the Athenians, it is well known, usurped on their allies, expelled some of them from their territories, and when they suffered the old inhabitants to remain, treated them with much arrogance and cruelty.

It may sometimes be expedient to invert an adage, and to propose maxims contrary to those generally received. I mean such common maxims as, "Know thyself;" "Avoid extremes." These may be controverted, either with a view to express and excite passion, or to give an amiable exhibition of character. To express passion, a man in anger may declare it to be a false assertion, that we ought to know ourselves; for had this presumptuous child of fortune (naming the object of his indignation) had any knowledge of himself, he never would have aspired to the command of armies. To exhibit character in an amiable view, certain maxims may be inverted, as that, "of living with friends as if they were to become enemies:" this selfish prudence may be reprobated by saying, "that we ought rather to treat our enemies as persons likely to become our friends." And here, much regard is to be paid to the form of expression, that it be easy, natural, and seem to flow spontaneously from the heart. When the expression, by itself alone, is insufficient to manifest the inward feeling and deliberate purpose, it will be necessary to subjoin the reason why the one maxim is to be preferred to the other; thus, "that we ought not to love, as if love, according to the vulgar saying, were liable to change, but as if true affection were unalterable; for the contrary maxim is that of a traitor: and a real friend will behave, as if his friendship could not experience interruption, or ever come to an end." Again,

CHAP.
XXI.

Reversing
of maxims.

BOOK
II.

“nothing too much :” this may be controverted, by saying, “that bad men and their actions cannot be hated too much.”

Great efficacy of sayings or sentences, when fitly applied.

Sentences have great weight in discourse, for two reasons. The first of these originates in the vanity of hearers, who delight in general propositions, embracing and re-echoing truths conformable to their own private experience and personal observation. The following remark will render this more plain, and at the same time show how such useful sentences are to be investigated. A sentence being the declaration of a general truth, men are highly flattered, and their minds, as it were, expanded, by hearing that pronounced generally, of which they know and have felt the reality, in some particular cases. Thus, a man who had been infested by bad neighbours, or afflicted by bad children, would hear with delight, “that nothing is more troublesome than neighbourhood;” and “nothing more foolish than the rearing of children.” Whence we must endeavour to conjecture the various judgments that will be anticipated by persons variously circumstanced; and thus, to adapt our discourse to their humour. The second, and still more important use of sentences, is to exhibit by them our sentiments and character. Sentences moralise a discourse, for they stamp it with our habitual purposes and deliberate preferences; so that honourable and useful maxims indicate qualities of the same kind in him who pronounces them. Thus much concerning sen-

tences, what they are, the various kinds of them, when they are most seasonable, and the chief advantages to be derived from them in discourse.

CHAP.
XXI.

LET us now speak of enthymemes or arguments, adapted to the three kinds of eloquence respectively, and show in what manner they are to be investigated and found out; and then concerning those more general principles of persuasion, which apply to all the three kinds alike. These are of a different kind from the former, and are called topics.

CHAP.
XXII.

Con-
nec-
tion of the
subject.

It was formerly shown that enthymemes, or rhetorical arguments, are only a popular kind of syllogisms, never comprehending so long a chain of reasoning as that to which logical syllogisms frequently extend, nor expressing at full length the three propositions of which every regular syllogism is composed³⁵; for popular eloquence admits not of a long series of deductions, which could not be followed by an ignorant or careless audience; and it allows not of full and formal argumentation, which, from its plainness and simplicity, would appear to the multitude no better than babbling pedantry. On this account, men of narrow views and limited knowledge are often better qualified than their superiors, to prevail in public assemblies. Their discourse, as the poets have said, insinuates itself more smoothly and more musically into the ear of ignorance and inattention; for their reasonings are not drawn from recondite or remote sources;

Popular
eloquence.

Requisites
for success
in it.

³⁵ See Introduction, p. 54.

BOOK
II.

Resump-
tion of the
specific ar-
guments
used in the
three kinds
of oratory.

they are plain, palpable, and familiar ; the result of personal observation and daily experience. Men of enlarged minds, on the contrary, think it necessary to remount to loftier, more abstract, and more demonstrative principles : their arguments are more solid, but less striking ; more convincing, when well weighed, but not easily appreciated by a popular audience. Before such assemblies, the orator is not to argue, therefore, from all probabilities indiscriminately, but from things deemed probable by his hearers or judges, or by those individuals held by them in high estimation ; the more of these are on his side, his conclusions will be the more satisfactory, though far distant, in themselves, from complete certainty. But in all the three kinds of eloquence, and whether our reasonings be precise and philosophical, or political and popular, the main point is to have a knowledge of our subject : a certain degree of this, is indispensable ; for, if totally ignorant of the particulars belonging to the matter in hand, from what facts or principles can we reason or conclude ? If the subject of deliberation, for example, were, whether or not the Athenians ought to declare war ; how could we undertake this discussion without knowing the resources of the Athenians ? whether their national force consisted chiefly in fleets or in armies ; what was the amount of either ; how large were their revenues ; in what allies they could confide, what enemies they had to fear ; what had been the nature and result of the wars formerly waged

by them? and many other particulars appertaining to the same question. Again, were the theme of our discourse to be a panegyric on the Athenians, how could we honour them with due praise, had we no previous information concerning the battle of Salamis, or that of Marathon? were we totally unacquainted with their generous protection of the descendants of Hercules, and with all those ancient and illustrious exploits from which Athens has derived such an inheritance of glory? In the particulars that belong, or that seem to belong, to any subject, are the only grounds of praise; and particulars of a contrary kind afford the only topics for invective. Thus we inveigh against the Athenians, because they tyrannised over the Greeks; because they enslaved the citizens of Ægina and Potidæa, who had manfully co-operated with themselves in repelling the invasion of the barbarians; and by arraigning them for other proceedings of a similar description, should they, of any such, have been notoriously guilty. In the same manner, accusation or defence must be drawn from an analysis of the subject, and a careful examination of the particulars belonging to it. It matters not whether this subject be a commonwealth, as that of the Athenians or Lacedæmonians; or an individual, of a human or a divine nature. Would we exhort or dissuade, praise or blame, accuse or defend, the topics of our discourse must always be drawn from the nature, the qualities, and the relations of the subject: thus, if we would persuade Achilles to embrace a certain measure, we must

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II.

endeavour to show, that, under his circumstances, this measure will be attended with advantage: if we would praise or blame him, we must show that his conduct, on certain occasions, has been fair and honourable, or disgraceful and odious: if we would accuse or defend him, we must know when his proceedings were conformable to justice, and when they bade defiance to this queen of the virtues.³⁵ Instead of communities or individuals, should we have to treat of abstract qualities, or habits³⁶, the mode of argumentation must still be the same: if we would explain their nature and tendency, and show that they are goods or evils, we can only discuss the subject rationally, by enumerating the particulars included under these terms, and examining their mutual agreements or differences. Since, then, in all kinds of reasoning, whether philosophical or popular, the same mode must be pursued, and that this conclusion is drawn both from induction and from argument, it is plain that the only means of demonstration or proof, whether in extemporaneous or premeditated discourse, is to select the particulars belonging to the subject; and the more exclusively belonging to it, the better; for the more numerous those particulars are, the proof will be the easier; and the more appropriate they are, it will be the more impressive. Thus, in the eulogy of Achilles, to say that he was a man of valour, a demigod, and that he fought against Troy, is to

³⁵ See Introduction, p. 51.

³⁶ "For example," he says, "of justice."

bestow praises common to Achilles with Diomed, and other heroes. It is, therefore, a far less ennobling panegyric, than to select particulars that are peculiar, and exclusively his own; as that he killed Hector, the bravest of the Trojans; and also Cynus, who, being invulnerable³⁷, long prevented the debarkation of the Greeks; and that he was the youngest of the Grecian leaders, and sailed to Troy, not bound like the other heroes, by oath. This, therefore, is the main point in persuasion, to select the topics appropriate to the subject.

CHAP.
XXII.

We should now speak of the more general sources of argument, alike applicable to all the three kinds of eloquence; the roots, as it were, from which various propositions branch, and the centre in which they unite and terminate.³⁸ Let us first observe, however, that we reason with two views, either to prove or to disprove; and that, as in logic we employ syllogisms and refutations, so in rhetoric we make use of arguments and objections. The former bring together propositions agreeing with each other, and with received opinion; the latter bring together propositions at variance with each other, and with received opinion. In preceding parts of this work, we collected the propositions applicable, respectively, to the three great ends of oratory,—justice, honour, and utility; we have also treated of manners, passions, and habits; and exhibited those propositions concerning them which are the most

The common topics or sources of argument, serving to prove or disprove.

³⁷ He was strangled by Achilles. Ovid. Metamorph. l. xii. v. 142.

³⁸ Ἐστὶ σοιχείων καὶ τοπῶς, εἰς ὃ πολλὰ ἐνθυμημάτων ἐμπίπτει, p. 582. Conf. p. 569.

BOOK
II.

efficacious instruments of persuasion in all our moral reasonings. We now proceed to consider the matter under a still more general aspect, and to enumerate the topics or sources of argument applicable alike to all the three kinds of oratory; distinguishing those which serve to demonstrate or prove, from those which serve to disprove or refute; and those also, in both kinds, which are fair and legitimate, from those which are spurious and sophistical. We shall then take the same comprehensive view of solutions and objections; showing by what means the knots of sophistry may be untied, and in how many ways objections may be raised against arguments that are solid.

CHAP.
XXIII.

1. The topic derived from the nature of contraries.

OF the sources of argument, then, common to all the three kinds of oratory, we shall place first, that flowing from, the nature of contraries, and thence denominated the “topic of contraries.” As it is the nature of contraries to be endowed with contrary attributes, and attended with opposite effects, we may argue that temperance is a thing of great value, because nothing is more ruinous than intemperance, and the unrestrained indulgence of our passions; or, as the orator reasoned in his Messenian discourse, “the sufferings which you actually endure are occasioned by the war; peace, therefore, will bring back a state of enjoyment and happiness:” or, as the Iambic poet says, —

Ill, done unwittingly, is not to be resented;
What gratitude can, then, be due for good unmeant?

Again, —

As things, most false, have often passed for true,
So gravest truths will oft be disbelieved.

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The topic of contraries serves either to prove or to refute ; we prove that an attribute belongs to any subject, when the contrary attribute is found in a contrary subject ; we confute this assertion, when we show that the contrary attribute does not belong to the contrary subject.

The second topic is, “that of conjugate terms,” meaning thereby, words derived from the same root.³⁸ The qualities applicable to any one of those terms ought also to apply to all the rest. Thus, to prove that every thing that is just is not, therefore, desirable ; we may argue that every thing then, is desirable, that happens justly. Yet to be hanged³⁹ justly, is not desirable.

2. That derived from the nature of conjugate terms.

The third topic is “that of relatives :” thus, if there is justice in the doing of any thing, there must be justice in the suffering of it ; or if there is justice in the commanding it, there must be justice in the execution ; and conversely. Diomedon, the farmer of revenues, when reproached by his countrymen for the riches acquired by this traffic, replied, “If you were not ashamed to sell your revenues, why should I, to purchase them?” Yet this way of reasoning is often sophistical : for a man has suffered justly, who has justly merited death ; but perhaps you, the agent, are unjust, because it was not right in you to be his executioner. It is therefore necessary to

3. That derived from relatives.

³⁸ Vid. Topic. l. i. c. 10.

³⁹ Aristotle says, to “die justly.”

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consider the different points separately; whether, not only the sufferer suffered justly, but whether the inflicter of the punishment justly inflicted it; and to select that case which suits your occasion; for it is very possible, that the two cases may lead to different results. Thus in the Alcmaeon of Theodectes⁴⁰;—

Was not your mother by the state abhorr'd?

Alcmaeon answers, "The matter must be considered distinctively;" and Alpheisibæa asking, "How you do mean?" he rejoins,—

—'Twas right that she should die,
Not right in me to kill her.

A similar distinction occurred in the trial concerning Demosthenes, and in that of the murderers of Nicanor⁴¹; and of the man lately slain at Thebes, the murderers were acquitted on the ground, that it could not be unjust to kill a person so deserving of death.

The fourth general topic, is "that of reason-

⁴⁰ Theodectes, both a poet and an orator. In the tragedy alluded to, Alcmaeon killed his mother, Eriphylé, in punishment of her treachery to his father Amphiaraus. Being condemned for parricide, he fled to the river Phlegæus, and was interrogated by the daughter of Phlegæus, Amphesibæa, as stated in the text.

⁴¹ As the words stand in the text, it is said that Nicanor was declared "to have died justly, because those who killed him appeared justifiable in doing so." I suspect the words to be inverted, and that "the murderers were acquitted, because Nicanor appeared deserving of death." According to this sense, the case of Nicanor will accord with the other cases mentioned. It is possible, however, that Aristotle, after giving examples to show "that when the patient suffered justly, the agent was concluded to have acted justly," may have introduced this example to shew the converse, "that when the agents appeared to have acted justly, the patient was concluded to have suffered justly." Whichever supposition we make, the text is either incorrect or imperfect.

ing from the greater to the less." "If the gods," for example, "do not know all things, ought weak man to boast his omniscience?" This is to reason from the gods, who are more knowing, to man, who is less so: "and a man who is capable of beating his own father, will he refrain his violent hands from any other, who may fall in the way of his anger?" This topic, from the greater to the less, may be employed either to prove or disprove, to affirm or deny; for that which is able to produce the greater effect may be proved capable of producing the lesser, and that which is unable to produce the lesser effect may be denied to be capable of producing the greater.

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4. A fortiori,
or reason-
ing from
the greater
to the less.

The fifth general topic is "that from parity of reason." Thus,—

5. Topic
from parity
of reason.

Your father justly mourns his fallen sons,
And should not Æneus mourn slain Meleager,
The glorious son of Greece!

Again, If Theseus did not commit wrong in the rape of Helen, neither did Paris: if the sons of Tyndarus escaped punishment for carrying off the daughters of Leucippus, so neither ought the elopement with Helen to be prosecuted with vengeance. Again, If Hector incurred not blame for killing his enemy Patroclus, why should Paris be reproached with the death of Achilles?⁴² If other artizans and artists are not deemed useless in communities, why should

⁴² Hector vanquished Patroclus in equal and glorious combat; Paris killed Achilles by artifice and skill in archery. These differences are not regarded in the general topic.

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6. Topic
from consistency in
will and
conduct.

7. Topic,
argumentum ad hominem, derived from
comparison of
characters.

those studious of wisdom, and professors of the art of life? And again, If generals do not always lose their fame when worsted, why should orators and philosophers be disgraced by defeat? "If individual citizens are watchful over your glory, Athenians! so ought you, as a state, to be watchful over the general glory of Greece."

A sixth general topic is drawn "from consistency of conduct," and the propriety of acting at one time, as we would have acted at another. Thus, Iphicrates reasoned in defending his statue against Harmodius. "Had I asked this mark of honour, before the conflict sustained by me, would you have readily promised it, and can you now refuse it after my complete success? Is not this to retract, after actual benefit, the promise made in the mere expectation of it?" In the same manner, Philip reasoned with the Thebans: "You would have engaged to grant me a free passage through your country, before I defended you from the Phocians. With what face, therefore, can you refuse this demand, after I have actually done you this most important service?"

The seventh topic is personal, "arising from comparison between ourselves and our adversaries, and retorting their accusations." This topic may be employed in two ways, first⁴², as Iphicrates, when accused of treachery, argued against

⁴² Aristotle says, *Εν τῷ Τευχρῷ*. Some of the ancient interpreters think Teucer the name of a tragedy, others that of a tragedian. The text, in either case, is imperfect; but we should read *τροπῷ* in the way in which Iphicrates, &c.

Aristophon : "Would you," he said, "Aristophon, have betrayed the fleet entrusted to you, for a bribe?" Being answered in the negative, he rejoined, "Can it be believed, then, that Iphicrates should be guilty of such baseness?" This successful retort resulted entirely from the comparison of characters suggested by it, and the great inferiority of Aristophon. For such an argument would have been ridiculous, if employed against Aristides, surnamed the Just. The second way is, when a defender discredits his accuser, by retorting his own accusations; for an accuser ought to be the better man, especially in those particulars which form the matter of his accusation. The defender, therefore, by showing the contrary of this to be the case, may always discredit and disgrace his adversary; for it is the absurdity of impudence to arraign others for the very same things of which we ourselves have been guilty, or to exhort them to a conduct, which we have determined never, in our own case, to pursue.

The eighth topic is derived from the definition. Thus, in repelling the charge of atheism against Socrates, who acknowledged himself to be under the guidance of a dæmon, his scholars defined a dæmon to be either a god, or the production of a god. He who believed, therefore, in the works or productions of the gods, could not disbelieve their existence. Iphicrates reasoned in the same way, when taunted with the obscurity of his birth by some boastful descendant of Harmodius or Aristogeiton. "Nobility," he said,

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8. Topic
derived
from the
definition.

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“consisting in virtue, belonged not to Harmodius and Aristogeiton, till they had achieved a glorious enterprise: I, therefore, am more akin to them than you, since my actions more resemble theirs.” In the same manner, the oration, entitled the Defence of Paris, “declares dissolute love to be that directed to many objects; how then, can Paris be reproached with profligacy, who contented himself with Helen only?” Socrates reasoned also from a definition, when he refused the pressing invitation of King Archelaus. “He could not brook,” he said, “an affront; for it was equally an affront to receive favours beyond our power to return, and to meet with injuries beyond our power to punish.” In all these examples, the reasoning is from definitions carefully adapted to the conclusions respectively aimed at.

9. Topic
from diversity of
signification.

The ninth is from diversity of signification; which source of argument is sufficiently illustrated in our Topics; for example, in the word “rightly.”⁴³

10. From
division of
the subject
into parts.

The tenth is founded on division. Thus, “since the offence imputed to us must have proceeded from one of three motives, and that it is impossible we should have been actuated either by the first, or by the second, and that the third is of such a nature, that even our adversaries dare not ascribe it to us, it is plain that our innocence is completely established.”

11. Topic
from accu-

The eleventh source of argument is from an

⁴³ Topica, l. ii. c. 3, l. 1.

accumulation of instances. Such is the reasoning in the discourse relating to events which occurred in the Isle of Peparathus, where it is proved, that, for ascertaining the real father of a child, recourse must be had to the mother. At Athens, this was found to be the surest rule of decision in a cause managed by the orator Mantias. At Thebes, when Ismenias and Stilpon disputed which was the father of Thessaliscus, reference was made to the mother, Dodonis; and, in consequence of her averment, Thessaliscus was declared the son of Ismenias. In the same manner Theodectes reasons in his oration entitled "The Law." Since none will entrust his horse to those careless of horses, or his ship to those who have run other ships aground, surely it is madness to confide our own safety to those by whom we have seen the safety of others so shamefully neglected. Alcidas, also, by a similar induction of particulars, proves the great honour due to men of elegant or profound talents. "The Parians thus honoured Archilochus, notwithstanding the biting severity of his satire; the Chians thus honoured Homer, though he was not their fellow-citizen; and the Mitylenians thus honoured Sappho, forgetting the inferiority of her sex. The Lacedæmonians, the least addicted of any to literary pursuits, elected the sage Chilon into their senate; the Italians held Pythagoras in veneration; the citizens of Lampsacus bestowed the honours of a public funeral on Anaxagoras, though a stranger, and celebrate his memory to the present

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mulation of
instances.

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day. The Athenians lived happy while they observed the laws of Solon, and the Lacedæmonians, while they obeyed those of Lycurgus. At Thebes, the state attained its highest prosperity when it was headed by philosophers."

12. Topic
from pre-
cedent;
that is,
from judg-
ments al-
ready
passed.

The twelfth is from judgments already passed in cases exactly the same, similar, or directly contrary, since contraries mutually afford the knowledge of each other. This argument is irresistible when the judgments of all men and at all times have concurred; next to this, we are to look to the uniform judgments of the wise and good; to the previous and constant decisions of those to whom the question is referred; to those of persons in great esteem with our judges; of persons whom it is dangerous to disobey, such are our natural superiors; or whom it is indecorous to oppose, such are the gods, parents, instructors. Thus Autocles reasoned with a certain proud dame, who declined the authority of the Areopagus. "Strange! that the Areopagus, which was obeyed by the 'Terrible Goddesses'⁴⁴, should be scorned by Mixindemides." Sappho reasons on the same principle, namely, the decision of the gods. "Death is an evil; the gods have judged it to be so; otherwise they would not have preferred immortality." And Aristippus, when Plato appeared to him to speak too dogmatically, said, "This way of talking was not that of our friend," meaning Socrates. And Hegesippus, after re-

⁴⁴ The Furies submitted to the decree acquitting Orestes, whom they had pursued for the murder of Clytemnestra.

ceiving a favourable answer from the oracle of Jupiter at Olympia, when he came to consult also at Delphi, asked Apollo whether he concurred in the same judgment with his father; thinking that Apollo would be ashamed to declare his dissent. Isocrates amplified the merits of Helen, by saying that she was preferred by the discernment of Theseus; and those of Paris, by saying that he was chosen by the goddesses for their umpire. The same writer enhances the worth of Evagoras, by observing that the able and prudent Conon, when assailed by adversity, had recourse to Evagoras, rather than to any other of his numerous friends and admirers.

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Another source of argument is, from the resolution of the genus into its several species. Thus to prove that the soul is not motion, it may be observed, as in the book of Topics, "that all motion is either change of place, alteration of quality, augmentation or diminution in quantity, &c.⁴⁵ Can the soul be any one of these?" In the same manner Socrates is defended by Theodectes against the charge of impiety. He is shown to have done none of the things falling under that name. "What law of religion did he violate? What temple did he profane? Which of the gods, acknowledged by his country, did he omit to worship?"

13. Topic from resolution of the genus into its several species.

Another very general topic is that derived from consequences; and, as most things are of a mixed nature, a compound of good and evil,

14. Topic from consequences.

⁴⁵ See Introduction, p. 75.

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consequences may generally be employed in all kinds of oratory, whether the speaker wishes to excite or restrain, to accuse or defend, to praise or blame. Thus, a learned education, which leads to knowledge, exposes the scholar to envy. If we would avoid the shafts of envy, we must abandon literary pursuits; if we would attain superiority of knowledge, we cannot cultivate them too diligently. This topic, with some observations on the possible and impossible, the probable and improbable, and other generalities of a like nature, form the whole of the art of Rhetoric as delivered by Callippus.⁴⁵

15. From the consequences of contraries.

Another ground of argument is from the contrary consequences of two things which are themselves contrary; and to employ those consequences alternately as may serve our ends. Thus a certain priestess argued with her son, to deter him from the profession of oratory: "If you maintain the cause of justice, you will offend the popular assembly; if you patronise injustice, you will offend the Gods." The argument was easily reversed, and employed to the contrary end. "If I advocate the cause of justice, I shall please the Gods; if, that of injustice, I shall please my fellow-citizens." This distorted topic, tending to different goals, and producing contrary effects, corresponds with the proverb of buying at once salt and oil; salt to sharpen and oil to soften; it moves at once in opposite

⁴⁵ Aristotle says, *ὡς εἰρηται*, as mentioned above in chap. xix. of this book.

directions, like the crooked legs of lizards ; and by its shuffling gait, is well calculated for deception.

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Another topic, teaching to infer opposite conclusions, arises from the different opinions of men ; those declared by their lips, and those concealed in their breasts. Their speeches resound the praise of justice and honour ; in their lives they are too often guided by pleasure or interest. As either of these opinions may be assumed for truth, according to whichever of them our adversary reasons, his argument may always be shown to be at variance with the other, and thus to wear the appearance of paradox, than which nothing can be more prejudicial to his cause.

16. Topic from the different opinions of men: those declared, and those kept secret.

Another ground of reasoning is the proportion of magnitude, or any other analogy. Thus Iphicrates, when his son was called to perform the service of a man because of his manly stature, opposed this injustice, by saying, " If you declare great children to be men, you ought to declare little men to be children." And Theodectes, in his speech entitled " The Law," before cited, argued, " Since Strabax and Charidemus, mercenary soldiers, are to be enrolled among the citizens on account of their good behaviour, why do you not banish those other mercenaries, who have been guilty of great enormities?"

17. From analogy.

Another is to regard things as the same which infer the same consequence. Thus Xeno-

18. Topic from identifying

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things with
their con-
sequences.

phanes denounced as equally impious those who asserted the generation or origin of the Gods, and those who believed that they would be destroyed or die; because either of these propositions takes away the eternity of their existence: and generally the thing itself may be confounded with its consequence. Thus the apologists of Socrates reason, "You are now to decide, not concerning Socrates, but concerning the pursuit of intellectual improvement, and whether philosophy is at all to be cultivated." Again, "To give earth and water⁴⁶, what is it but to become slaves?" "To accede to the general peace, is it not to acknowledge a master?" But we must take care to employ the antecedent or its consequent, according to the drift of our discourse.

19. Topic
derived
from in-
consist-
ency with
previous
resolu-
tions.

The next topic is drawn from inconsistency with previous resolutions. Thus, "If, when we were driven from our country, we are determined by arms to regain it, shall we now relinquish our homes rather than take arms to defend them? Having formerly preferred war to banishment, shall we now to avoid the former, voluntarily incur the latter?"

20th topic
consists
in treating
the reason
for which
any thing
might be
done, as

Another topic is to regard the reason for which any thing might be done, as the real motive for doing it. Thus it may be said that any gift was bestowed, or any honour conferred, merely to create pain by the resumption of such

⁴⁶ The symbol of national dependence in the East. The Persians demanded from Greece earth and water, as tokens of submission. Herodotus.

favours. Thus, according to a poet,—

To many, the gods make presents, not in kindness ;
Past good but makes the future ill more grievous.

And thus, in the Meleager of Antiphon,—

'Twas not to kill the boar, the chiefs assembled,
But to behold the deeds of Meleager,
And spread his fame through Greece.

In the Ajax of Theodectes, Diomed is said to have associated Ulysses in his enterprises, not because he held him in esteem, but that he might not, in his companion, have a rival of his glory. Diomed, it is possible, might have been actuated by this motive.

Another topic, equally applicable at the bar and in the assembly, is drawn from the general causes that tend either to impel human action, or restrain it. When the impelling causes take place, the enterprise ought to be undertaken ; when the restraining are found to prevail, the project ought to be abandoned. In every undertaking the impelling causes are that the thing is practicable, easy, useful to ourselves or our friends, hurtful to our enemies ; and that, if attended with expense or danger, the expense incurred, or the risk run, will be greatly overbalanced by the good expected. In judicial questions, the same reasoning obtains ; a man will appear to be guilty or innocent of any act, accordingly as it is shown to have been more or less easy, more or less useful to him ; considerations entitled to great weight in every accusation or defence. This topic, indeed, is of such gene-

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the real
cause of
the action.

21st topic
reasons
from the
general
causes,
either im-
pelling or
restraining
human ac-
tion.

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22d topic
argues
from im-
probability
itself.

ral use, that it forms the whole of the art of rhetoric as delivered by Pamphilus and by Callippus.⁴⁷

Another topic, of a most opposite nature, is to reason from improbability itself; that is, from things so unlikely to happen, that they could never have been believed, unless they had actually occurred. Truth and probability are the causes of assent: when, therefore, assent is given to things highly improbable, this must happen because they are true. In the arraignment⁴⁸ of a law, Androcles said, "Laws require laws." And when the assembly murmured, he subjoined, "Yes; laws, to be good, require laws; as olives do oil; and fish, salt; though olives produce oil, and fish are produced in the salt sea."

23d topic
refutes
from in-
congrui-
ties.

The following topic is only applicable to refutation. It consists in bringing together particulars incongruous in point of time, place, word, or deed. This incongruity may either be confined to the proceedings of your adversary, as, "He pretends to be a patriot and to love his fellow-citizens, yet he is known to have conspired with the thirty tyrants, and to have abetted their usurpation:" or it may be confined to the proceedings of the speaker in order to show the inconsistency of the imputations charged on him: "He accuses me of being litigious, yet he cannot mention any one lawsuit

⁴⁷ Pamphilus is mentioned with little respect by Cicero de Orator. l. iii. c. 21. Callippus is spoken of above, but rather inconsistently with what is here said: his name is probably interpolated.

⁴⁸ According to the *γραφη παρανομων*. See History of Ancient Greece, P. I. vol. iii. c. 52.

in which I was ever previously engaged :” or it may extend to the proceedings of both parties : “ When did the accuser ever make the smallest disbursement for a generous purpose ? whereas many of you, at my expense, have been ransomed from slavery.”

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Another topic serving also for refutation, and for destroying aspersions cast on us by false appearances, is to explain the cause in which those appearances originated. When this cause is produced, the transaction immediately assumes a new character. In the public place, a woman was seen under a young man, clinging to him with such immoderate passion, that the bystanders were shocked at her indecency. The error ceased when it became known that a dearly beloved son had been restored to the fond embraces of his mother. In like manner, in the Ajax of Theodectes, Ulysses destroys the false opinion of his inferiority to Ajax, by giving the reason why, though really a braver man, he did not *appear* to be so.

24th refutes false appearances, by showing the real cause.

Another topic is to reason from the existence or non-existence of the cause, to the existence or non-existence of the effect ; since nothing happens without a cause, and that cause and effect mutually imply each other. Leodamas employs this argument against Thrasybulus. The latter reproached Leodamas with being posted on the pillar of infamy in the citadel⁴⁹, though his name had been erased during the usurpation of the thirty tyrants. Leodamas

25th topic argues from the improbability of the cause to that of the effect.

⁴⁹ A stone pillar, in a cavern, with the names of traitors and other public delinquents.

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26th repels
the accu-
sation of
designs, be-
cause far
better were
in our
power.

27th topic
argues
from in-
consist-
ency with
any former
action.

28th topic
converts
errors
themselves

maintained this to be impossible: "Why should the thirty have destroyed a monument of my hatred to Athens, which could only have rendered me the more trust-worthy to them, and the more zealous in abetting their tyranny?"

Another topic of refutation is afforded by considering whether the designs or actions imputed to us, might not have been better planned, or better executed. None can be suspected of doing, or of having done, under certain circumstances, what might, under other circumstances, have been done far more profitably: for in no deliberation will the worse measure be preferred, willingly, when the better is in our power. The argument, however, drawn from this topic, is not always to be relied on; for oftentimes the ground of preference, though unperceived before decision, may afterwards become manifest.

Another is derived from considering whether any thing is proposed contrary to that which has been before done. Thus Xenophanes, when consulted by the people of Elea about the ceremonies due to Leucothea, whether they should honour her by mourning, and also by sacrifice, he replied, "If she be regarded by you as a divinity, you must not mourn for her; if as a mortal, you must not worship her by sacrifice."

Another is to convert our errors themselves into a source of accusation or defence. An example of this occurs in the *Medea* of Carcinus.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Carcinus, an Athenian poet, who wrote 160 tragedies, of which one only was successful. Vid. Gyrard. Ferrarens. p. 375.

As her children had disappeared, Medea was accused of their murder: and, indeed, she exposed herself to this suspicion, by sending them away secretly. She says in her defence, "If I killed the innocent children, how grievous was my error in sparing the guilty father?" This form of argumentation is the only one touched on by Theodorus⁵¹, in his first treatise on rhetoric.

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into
grounds of
accusation
or defence.

Another source of argument is derived from playing on the name, as that branding the monstrous cruelty of Draco's laws. "They were the work, not of a man, but of a dragon."⁵²

29th topic
argues
from the
name.

In argumentations equally well conducted, the first discourse is less impressive and less convincing than the reply; for in refuting an adversary, an orator is obliged to grapple more closely with his subject, and to dwell on oppositions and contrasts. Things are known by their contraries; an argument to demonstrate or prove, is confined to one of the contraries only;

Why ar-
guments
less con-
vincing
than re-
plies.

⁵¹ Theodorus, a sophist of Byzantium, often mentioned by Plato.

⁵² The author here introduces a few more verbal allusions which cannot be translated. Thrasybulus was reproached by Conon as rash in counsel, and Thrasymachus by Herodicus as rash in fighting; such being the respective significations of their names: Hecuba, in Euripides, calls Venus the Goddess of Folly; such being the meaning of the first two syllables in her name, Aphrodité; Chæremon says of Pentheus (signifying grief), that his name betokened his approaching calamity; and the name of "Iron," belonging to one of his female characters, is employed by Sophocles, for stigmatising the hardness of her heart: and in the praises of the gods, their names are frequently converted by poets into topics of panegyric. *Zeus δ χορηγος της ζωης.* Jupiter, quasi juvans pater.

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but an argument to disprove or refute, must embrace both ; and by comprising them within a narrow compass, and placing them parallel to each other, the strongest conviction is impressed, and with the greatest clearness.

The most impressive arguments are those that are natural without being obvious.

Whether to prove or disprove, to attack or to defend, the best and most efficacious arguments are those of which the hearer either anticipates the conclusion, or of which he is prepared to admit the conclusion, as soon as it is pronounced. This flatters him with the notion of his own discernment and sagacity, especially when the conclusion, which he anticipates, does not lie too near the surface : the most striking arguments, therefore, are those that are natural, without being obvious.

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1. Fallacy, the form of argumentation void of substance.

SYLLOGISMS, as we above explained, are genuine or spurious. In genuine syllogisms, the conclusion really follows from the premises. In the spurious, it is only thought to follow by an ignorant or inattentive audience. The same holds with regard to those less formal syllogisms, called enthymemes, or arguments. In these, one great source of fallacy lies in the form of diction ; to talk argumentatively and conclusively, when no strict conclusion has been drawn. Thus, after a pretended enumeration of the different causes by which any effect may have been produced, we argue, “ It was not occasioned by the first, or by the second, or by the third, therefore it must have been brought about through the

cause which we assign." The whole force of such reasoning depends on the exactness of the enumeration : the argument fails when this enumeration is imperfect.

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A fallacy still more common is, where the want of matter is compensated by a superabundance of words : when enthymemes are accumulated, inverted, opposed, changed into all those shapes, and disguised by all those coverings, which tend to conceal their want of cogency. This varied fluency, which often quits the plain indicative mode for the suppositive or potential, which now interrogates, now commands, now marks admiration, now insinuates suspicion, constitutes the great field and region of popular and delusive oratory. One of its artifices is to collect the heads of many arguments into one heap : "He served our friends, he punished our enemies, he delivered the Greeks !" In each of these points, his merit had been proved ; but from this enumeration, a new proof of merit appears to result, different from any of the things before said, or shown, in his favour.

2. Verbo-
sity, the
great field
of sophis-
try.

Another common deception arises from the applying to a word, in one of its acceptations, that which only belongs to it in another.⁵³

3. Fallacy
from equi-
vocal
terms.

⁵³ The author mentions the Greek word *μῦς*, mouse, as deriving splendour and importance from *μυστήρια*, the mysteries; the dog, from denoting the dog-star, and its being an appellative of the god Pan in Pindar ; and also, from the Greek proverb "that he is not worth a dog : " And the word *κοινός*, applied to Mercury as the internuncius deorum, and *κοινωνικοί* derived from it, signifying communicative and generous ; and that "an account, *λογος*, is better than money, because good men are called men of account, that is, of estimation."

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Another fallacy is to conjoin, things only true, separately; or to separate, things only true, conjunctly. Thus to say, that a man knows a poem or other composition, because he knows the letters of which it is composed.⁵⁴ That because an ounce of a certain medicine might do harm, therefore half an ounce cannot do good; for how should two goods produce an evil? Polycrates said of Thrasybulus, that if the man deserved honours and rewards, who rescued his country from one tyrant, how meritorious was Thrasybulus, who had destroyed thirty? In arguing thus, he combined in one man what was true only of thirty, for the thirty tyrants of Athens formed but one tyranny. In the Orestes of Theodectes, again, the fallacy consists in division. "It is just that a woman, who has murdered her husband, should be punished with death: it is just, that a son should avenge the murder of his father. Orestes therefore acted justly in killing Clytemnestra." The conclusion does not follow, because that which is true of things separately, may not be true of them conjunctly. This argument, besides, is fallacious through deficiency, for to conceal the crime of Orestes, the orator omits to state by whom it was committed, namely, by the hand of a son raised against his own mother.

⁵⁴ Aristotle gives another example, that by which Euthydemus proved to a clown, that he knew a certain galley to be in the Piræus. You know the galley, you know, "being in the Piræus." Therefore you know the galley, "being in the Piræus." This deception in English must be operated by a grammatical error, which, however, is very common.

From the sympathy which men feel with those actuated by generous and energetic passions⁵⁴, aggravation and vehemence are great sources of sophistry. In defending ourselves against any imputation, we may paint the thing imputed to us in such odious colours, and express so warmly our detestation of its turpitude, that notwithstanding strong circumstances against us, it will not be easy to believe in our guilt. On the other hand, without bringing the case home to our adversary, we may denounce the crime charged on him in such emphatic terms, and express such generous indignation against its enormity, that he will often be held guilty upon very defective evidence.

CHAP.
XXIV.

4. The fallacy resulting from aggravation and vehemence.

Another fallacy arises from considering as a proof, that which is barely a sign. Thus, "Dionysius is a thief, for he is a bad man." The conclusion is illogical; for though every thief is a bad man, every bad man is not a thief.⁵⁵

5th fallacy consists in reasoning from accidents as if they were essentials.

Another arises from regarding as essential to the nature or definition of a thing, that which is barely an accident or appendage. Thus Polycrates magnified rats as valuable allies to the state, because they happened to disarm its enemies, by gnawing asunder the strings of their bows. In the same manner, it may be said, that nothing is a matter of more importance than an invita-

⁵⁴ Conf. Ethic. l. vi. c. 12.

⁵⁵ Aristotle gives another example: "Lovers benefit commonwealths; for the lovers, Harmodius and Aristogeiton, destroyed the tyrant Hipparchus."

B O O K
II.

tion to supper ; for Achilles, when not invited, was exasperated against the Greeks in Tenedos. It was not the denied supper, but the dishonour concurring with it, that provoked the anger of Achilles.

6th fallacy
argues
from an
ordinary
concomi-
tant, as if it
were inse-
parable.

Another fallacy is to reason from an *ordinary* concomitant. “How high-minded was Paris, who, shunning the multitude, lived alone and solitary on Ida.” The love of solitude often accompanies magnanimity. Again, “There can be no doubt that the accusation of adultery is well founded, for he is exquisitely nice in the adjustment of his person, and has been often seen prowling about in the night ;” such things being common with adulterers. In the same way, happiness may be ascribed to beggars, because they are often found singing and dancing in temples ; and to men banished, because they may live where they please : since the happy do, or have it in their power to do such things, the doers of them are concluded to be happy : as the *manner* of living where they please, is omitted, in honour or dishonour, in abundance or penury, this fallacy also deceives through deficiency or concealment.

7th fallacy
treats as
a cause, a
mere pre-
cursor.

Another fallacy is to assign for a cause that which is not a cause, but merely a precursor. This deception is often practised in popular assemblies. Thus, the administration of Demosthenes was declared by Demades to be the source of all the evils which befel the Athenians. For these evils were brought on by the war, which, as it commenced with the ascend-

ency of Demosthenes, Demades pretends to have been occasioned by it. CHAP.
XXIV.

Another fallacy is to omit any important circumstance, such as that of time. Thus, "Paris did nothing wrong in his elopement with Helen, for her father had committed to her own discretion the disposal of her person." But Helen having submitted to the authority of her husband, the father's permission could not then avail her. In the same way, "to lay violent hands on a freeman, may be declared the height of audacity:" not, however, on all occasions, for this freeman may have been the aggressor. The fallacy arising from deficiency, that is, from not including all the circumstances, and announcing that absolutely, which is only conditionally true, is much employed in the captious argumentations of logicians: hence the sophisms to prove that things non-existent exist, because they *are* non-existent; that things unknowable may be known, because we may *know* them to be unknowable: which deceptions result from applying the words absolutely in the conclusion, which are taken conditionally in the premises. In the same manner in rhetoric, that which is probable absolutely, is confounded with that which is probable only under certain circumstances or restrictions.

8th consists
in omis-
sion.

Perplexing
sophisms
thence re-
sulting.

Agathon says,—

Amidst the strange vicissitudes of life,
'Tis likely, most unlikely things should happen:

are unlikely things, therefore, likely? Not

BOOK
II.

absolutely — but they are likely in a certain and limited sense ; that is, they may be expected sometimes to happen against general likelihood. Probability cannot be opposite to probability, when the words are taken in the same acceptance ; but probability used generally and simply, may be opposite to probability with an adjunct or condition, that is, with probability taken in a particular sense. In all such specious and often perplexing sophistry, the deception arises from leaving out of sight the time, place, and other circumstances, the introduction of which would prevent the confusion, and enable us to distinguish between things really different. In teaching the artifices of this captious wrangling, the Rhetoric of Corax is employed. A man, for instance, is accused of an assault. If he appears to be of a feeble frame, how can he be suspected of it? Would he provoke, by blows, the anger of a person stronger than himself? If he appears, on the contrary, to be of an athletic form, exactly calculated for combat, how could he expose himself to an accusation which every one, who looks on him, will be inclined to believe.

In this manner, by neglecting the distinctions above mentioned, one probability may always be opposed by another, and the worse be made to appear the better reason. This sophistry, carried to the utmost height by Protagoras, provoked general indignation ; for the probabilities which he assumed were fit only for the schools of disputants, and such as no man ever acted on in the real business of life. So much concerning

enthymemes or arguments ; those that are solid, and those only specious.

CHAP.
XXIV.

THE subject, naturally following, is that of solutions ; to explain how knotty arguments may be untied. Arguments may be exposed and defeated in two ways ; either by a contrary argument, or by an objection. As probable topics may be opposed to each other, the enumeration before given will enable us to maintain any opinion, or its contrary ; that is, to state the probabilities on the other side of the question. But arguments may not only be thus attacked by arguments, but resisted by an objection : this is done in four ways ; since the objection may be drawn from the thing in question, from something like to it, from something contrary to it ; or lastly, from a previous judgment passed on the contested point. First, from the thing itself : should we investigate the nature of love, whether it be good or evil ; the objection may be either general, as that love implies want, and that want is an evil ; or particular, that if all love were good, we should not hear a Kaunian love branded with infamy.⁵⁶ Secondly, from the contrary ; should it be argued that a good man *benefits* his friends, it may be objected, that bad men do not always *injure* their friends. Thirdly, from the like, that is, from parity of reason, should it be mentioned that men hate those who have done them ill, the objec-

CHAP.
XXV.

Solutions
and objec-
tions, their
nature and
number.

⁵⁶ The incestuous amours of Kaunus and his sister Biblis.

BOOK
II.

tion may be made, that they do not always love those who have done them good. Fourthly, from a previous decision of the question by persons in high estimation. Thus, should it be pretended, that men ought not to be made answerable for crimes committed by them in a state of intoxication; it may be objected, "the sage Pittacus then decided most unwisely, when he decreed a greater punishment for drunkards."

An argument can be maintained in four ways only. First, as probable, that is, conformable to what happens for the most part; secondly, we may produce an example in its favour; thirdly, we may reason from a simple sign or indication⁵⁷; fourthly, from a test or criterion. To all these forms of reasoning, except the last, objections may always be made. For that which happens only for the most part, cannot be necessary: arguments from likelihood, therefore, always admit of an answer: their conclusion may be shown not necessarily to follow; and when this is done, the judge will often think the objector in the right, or the case too nice for his decision. For this reason, the defender enjoys an undue advantage over the accuser. The accuser was only bound to prove the probability of his charge, not its certainty; for, to be guided by probability, is to use our best judgment, and to proceed on the surest ground that the nature of the question affords. A fair objection, there-

⁵⁷ The author here repeats, briefly and obscurely, concerning examples and signs, what he had said fully and clearly, in the second chapter of the first book.

fore, is that which opposes a smaller probability by a greater ; one founded on examples more numerous or of more frequent occurrence. The proof will be the strongest, when both circumstances concur ; in which case the adversary must endeavour to show that these examples are of an inferior quality to his own ; either less weighty in themselves, or less apposite to the point in question. The last form of argument is alone irrefragable ; for the criterion is the test of truth : nothing can resist it, but showing that it does not apply to the subject ; for when it does apply, conviction is inevitable.

CHAP.
XXV.

Topics are the principles of enthymemes, the centre in which they unite, the root from which they branch. To amplify or extenuate, to augment or diminish, is not the business of topics ; for there are arguments showing things to be great or little, as well as arguments showing them to be just or unjust, beneficial or hurtful, praise-worthy or blameable. If none of these latter are topics, neither are the former ; for a topic is not an argument ; but the place as it were of arguments, the principle in which they coincide, the source from which they flow. Neither are enthymemes which refute, different in kind from those which serve to prove : they consist of similar materials ; for to refute is only to prove the contrary of that which is asserted ; that the thing is not, which is said to be, or that the thing said to have happened, has not taken place ; and this it does, either by argument, or by an objection showing that the conclusion is

Topics and
arguments
disting-
uished.

BOOK
II.

not logical, or that some falsehood has been assumed in the premises. So much concerning examples, sentiments, enthymemes, the invention of arguments, and the refutation of them; that is, of all that part of rhetoric consisting in the thought or matter ⁵⁸: we now proceed to treat of style and method.

⁵⁸ This subject is treated in Cicero's two books *de Inventione Rhetorica*, in his *Topica*, and in the first and second books *de Oratore*. It also runs through no less than six books of Quintilian's *Institutes*. In writing on Rhetoric, these illustrious Romans display their own eloquence; but Aristotle writes on Rhetoric, by no means rhetorically. He is sparing of words, and rich in things: he adheres strictly to his subject, and his explanation of every thing essential to it, is pre-eminently copious, correct, and perspicuous. His Rhetoric, therefore, (as Cicero says with admirable candour,) is distinguished above every other, by his bringing to the study and improvement of an art, which he despised, the same powerful energies of thought, which he had gloriously exerted in the wide field of universal science. *De Oratore*, l. ii. c. 38.

ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC.

BOOK III.

ARGUMENT.

Style and Action. — Action not yet an Art. — In Rhetoric, Action preferred to Style, and Style to Thought. — Causes of these Errors. — The perfection of Style, wherein it consists. — Euripides one of its best models. — Ordinary and appropriate Terms. — Plain and Primitive Ones. — Well chosen Metaphors. — The frigid and nauseous Style. — Causes thereof. — Purity of Style, wherein it consists. — Amplification and Compression. — Impassioned Oratory. — Harmony, how to be attained. — Style linked or periodic. — Antithesis. — Urbanity and Elegance, how attained. — Energy and Animation. — Compositions to be read and to be rehearsed or spoken. — Their differences. — The parts essential in Demonstrative Oratory — In the Judicial — In the Deliberative. — Narrative, how rendered Moral — And Pathetic. — The Proof in Judicial Pleadings. — The sources of Amplification in Eulogy. — The respective Occasions for employing Examples and Arguments. — How the Order of Argumentation is to be varied. — Ridicule. — The Epilogue — Its Four Parts.

THE art of oratory embraces three objects ; CHAP.
thoughts, words, and the fittest arrangement of I.
them. The thoughts, however various, all centre
in one great end, — persuasion ; which may be
Transition
to the sub
jects of

BOOK
III.style and
action.

attained in three ways, and in these only ; for men are persuaded, and give assent to our discourse, either when their understandings are convinced ; or when their passions are skilfully touched and gained over ; or when the orator has exhibited his character in so favourable a light, that his hearers are disposed to confide merely in his authority. Having previously examined the arguments and topics conducive to these three purposes, and discussed the subject of rhetoric in reference to the thoughts, it follows next to speak of the words or diction. Thoughts, proper in themselves, must also be properly expressed ; for the effect of a discourse depends greatly on the expression. The things constituting the body of the argument, doubtless, deserved precedence ; next comes the form of diction ; and thirdly, a subject of great importance, but as yet, little investigated, I mean rhetorical action.

Action rhetorical, followed the poetical, and is not yet reduced into an art.

This action was only recently considered as a separate art, even with regard to heroic poetry and tragedy : at first, the poets themselves recited and acted their own performances. There is an oratorical action as well as a poetical one, the latter of which has been treated by several writers, particularly by Glaucon of Teios. This art consists in determining the modifications of voice adapted to each affection or passion ; when the voice should be raised or lowered, or kept at the middle pitch ; what should be its intonations or accents ; the acute, the grave, or that tone intermediate between them ; and also what should be

C H A P.
I.

the quantity or rhythm, that is, the relation of sounds to each other, in point of the time spent in pronouncing them. The magnitude or loudness of sound, its intonation or accent, its rhythm or measure, thus constitute the main subjects of recitation and elocution. These, respectively, are matters of great importance in poetry and eloquence. In the poetical competitions, the best reciters or actors carry off the first prizes ; and the skilful rehearser is often in greater estimation than the poet whose works he recites. The same thing happens in oratory through faulty political arrangements ; for, where men of vulgar minds, or mean understandings, are invested with the supreme powers of government, a tuneful insinuating voice, or shrill impassioned tone, will prevail over the sense of the ablest pleaders, or most sagacious statesmen. Elocution, however, has not yet been reduced into an art ; and even style or diction has only recently been made an object of philosophical research, and that, not so much on account of the thing itself, viewed absolutely, and rightly understood, as in reference to the weakness and incapacity of the hearers, which make such speculations a matter of necessity.

Rhetoric, indeed, aims chiefly at effect ; it is conversant with appearances rather than realities : according to right reason, although the diction of the public speaker ought not to offend or give pain, so neither ought it so much to please and transport as shall divert attention from the matter. This is the essential ; and all is superfluous which

In rhetoric, action deemed more important than style ; and style than thought.

BOOK
III.

Cause of
this per-
version of
judgement.

tends not to strengthen the argument: yet, as was before said, elocution and style derive importance from the mean understandings of the audience. A certain attention to style is requisite, indeed, in all discourse that has instruction in view; for this will be better conveyed in one form of words than in another: yet the difference is not considerable, in relation to the understanding; it is rather a matter of fancy, and dependent on the taste of the hearers: in teaching geometry, who ever had recourse to the allurements of diction? Elocution, when perfected, will bear the same relation to prose, that the histrionic art does to poetry: a little has already been done in it, particularly by Thrasymachus¹, in his instructions for exciting pity. It is the nature of man to be imitative, and, therefore, stage-playing and rhetorical elocution are things highly natural; and differing, in this respect, from style and composition, which are entirely artificial. Excellence in style and composition also meets with more than its full share of reward; for as in speeches addressed to the people, the victory is gained by action or elocution, so in discourses intended only to be read, the style is more regarded than the thought. In disturbing the judgment, and altering the right estimation of things, the imitative art of poetry was the principal and primary cause; for words have an imitative power, and of all our constituent parts, our organs of voice are endowed with the greatest

¹ Thrasymachus, the noted sophist of Chalcedon, often mentioned by Plato and Cicero.

variety and extent of imitation ; hence the arts of the rhapsodist, and of the stage-player, and others of the like kind. After this, when poets, superficial and frivolous in thought, gained fame by their expression and diction, orators endeavoured to recommend themselves by adopting a poetical style, like that of Gorgias of Leontium ; and many ignorant people still regard such poetical prose as the perfection of eloquence. But the thing is far otherwise ; for the style of discourse is quite different from that of poetry. This, the practice of the poets themselves makes manifest ; for the writers of tragedy, in conformity with this distinction, have altered their mode of composition. Instead of their artificial trochaic tetrameters², they have had recourse to simple iambicks, as that kind of measure which least departs from the natural flow of dialogue or conversation ; and, for the same reason, they have ceased to use those words of foreign idiom, far-fetched or new-coined, which are still admitted, by way of ornament, into hexameter or heroic verse. It would be ridiculous therefore, to imitate in discourse a style, which even dramatic poets no longer employ ; the prose style is that, of which we have to speak ; that proper to lyric and heroic verse, was explained in our treatise on poetry.

CHAP.
I.

Poetical
diction to
be rejected
in prose :
proof
thereof.

² In chapter iv. of his Poetics, he explains why this satyric and saltatorial measure was first used in tragedy. The satyrs, those licentious companions of Bacchus, were then principal personages. The drinking and dancing measure will become their characters ; such trochaics as " Jolly mortals, fill your glasses," &c.

C H A P.

II.

Perspicuity and propriety of style.

HAVING established these conclusions, let the virtue of style be defined, and declared to consist in perspicuity. This constitutes its nature and perfection; for a style, not fitted clearly to convey our meaning, does not perform its proper work. Next to this, style ought neither to be humble and lowly, nor swelling and elevated; its excellence consists in being fitly adapted to the subject: a poetical diction may raise a discourse above meanness, but cannot fail to transport it to the contrary extreme, equally distant from propriety.

Perspicuity will be attained by using nouns and verbs in their ordinary and appropriate sense³: words of a different kind, as explained in our treatise on poetry, serve only for ornament. They embellish style, and render it more admirable; for men are affected by bold verbal distinctions, as they are by the differences between citizens and strangers. With common language, they are familiar as with their fellow-citizens; but a style, new and unusual, creates a sort of pleasing wonder, and is treated with the respect which strangers naturally inspire. In some kinds of poetry, such style is proper; the dignity of the subject requires it: not so in prose; and even in poetry itself, the diction should rise and fall with the subject; it would be ridiculous to treat light and ordinary matters with magnificence of words, or to represent boys

³ *κύρια* are words ordinary and appropriate, in opposition to *γλωττα* and *πεποιημένα*, foreign and new coined words: *οικεία* are proper words, in opposition to metaphors.

or slaves speaking in the language of heroes. CHAP.
 In prose, also, a writer will vary his style with II.
 his matter; and, according to the end in view, will sometimes abridge, and sometimes expatiate. But care must be taken to do this naturally; for if marked with the smallest signs of artifice or design, his discourse will lose all power of persuasion. It will share the fate of other painted beauties; men will be on their guard against the cheat; and reject it, as they do those mixed wines, which injure the health, to please the palate. But just and natural expression will be as affecting as the actor Theodorus⁴: other players appear only to sustain their parts, but he identifies himself with his characters, and always is the very person whom he exhibits. Of this proper and natural style, Euripides was the first good model: he does not attain beauty and dignity by a new or uncommon phraseology, but by selecting from the words and phrases in general use, those that are most affecting and most graceful; thus concealing his art, and elevating his style above the common standard, without any apparent design to do so.

Exemplified in Euripides.

To assist in this judicious choice, it may be observed, that language consists wholly of nouns and verbs⁵; and that of these, all the different kinds have been enumerated and defined in our

How these excellencies to be attained.

⁴ Theodorus, the same spoken of in the seventh book of the Politics.

⁵ Aristotle is not constant, though inclined to this opinion, which grammarians and philologists have now pretty generally approved.

BOOK
III.

treatise on poetry. Of these kinds, the foreign and far-fetched, the compound, the new-coined, are too violent a departure from ordinary speech to be proper in oratory; there are, however, fit occasions for using them, and what these are, will afterwards be explained.⁶ The ordinary appropriate term, the plain and primitive one⁷, and natural well-chosen metaphors⁸, then, are the words which afford at once clearness and

⁶ Under "Transports of passion," as explained in chapter vii.

⁷ That is the *κυριον* and *οικειον*, as above explained.

⁸ To these three, late writers have added a fourth kind. Mr. Knight says, "Epithets employed to distinguish qualities perceivable only by intellect, were originally applied to objects of sense; for as such objects are the primary subjects of thought and observation, the primary words in all languages belong to them, and are therefore applied *transitively*, though not always *figuratively*, to objects of intellect." Knight's Inquiry into Taste, p. 11. This distinction appears to Mr. Stewart equally important and just. He subjoins, "A French author of the highest rank (M. D'Alembert) had plainly the same distinction in his view, when he observed, that beside the appropriate and the figurative meanings of a word, there is another, somewhat intermediate between them, which may be called their meaning by extension. In the choice of this expression he has been less fortunate than Mr. Knight." Stewart's Essays. Essay i. c. 1. p. 219. This distinction, however, first made by M. D'Alembert, better expressed by Mr. Knight, and adopted by Mr. Stewart as an important logical discovery, is recognised in the first sentence of Aristotle's Categories. "Those things are homonymous of which the name is the same, but the definition different:" for the ingenious modern writers do not explain, any more than did the Greek philosopher, the nature and causes of this transition. D'Alembert's "meaning by extension," indeed, is nothing more but Aristotle's "meaning by accession," *κατα συμμεσηκος*, a phrase, as I have shown, universally mistaken by his commenters. "There can be no science," he says, "of infinities, nor of things coming by accession, since things innumerable may accede to the same thing." See my New Analysis, p. 72. Third Edit. The knowledge of this general truth might have saved much trouble to modern metaphysicians. All metaphors are transitive words; but all transitive words are not metaphors.

CHAP.
II.

beauty ; and by which style may be embellished, without any invidious ostentation. Of these three kinds of words, all continually make use, and in the judicious selection of them, the perfection of diction consists. Equivocal words are useful to sophists, and to those who reason to deceive ; and to poets synonymes are necessary⁹, for synonymes are words used indifferently to express the same sense : thus, “to travel” and “to march,” may be equally applied to men passing through a country. Both words are familiarly used, and both used to denote the same thing.¹⁰ The nature of these different kinds of words, as well as that of metaphors, has been explained in our treatise on poetry ; in this we, also, defined the different sorts of metaphors, and showed what vast advantages the right use of them affords, both in poetry and in prose. In the latter, indeed, they ought to be a subject of more studious attention, because prose is debarred from many other ornaments and allurements ; and to metaphors, chiefly, must, therefore, be indebted for its vivacity¹¹, its beauty, and its dignity.¹² To these, also, style owes its originality ; for they admit not of perpetual transmission, but must be, in some sort, our own invention.¹³

⁹ Versification requires words of different lengths, or more or fewer syllables.

¹⁰ This is the sense of *αμφοτέρα και κυρια και συνωνυμα*, according to the meaning of *κυρια*, explained above.

¹¹ *Το σαφες*, here means something more than perspicuity.

¹² *Το ξενικον*, as above explained.

¹³ Metaphors transmitted from one age to another, and from one

BOOK
III.

The use
and abuse
of epithets
and meta-
phors.

Epithets and metaphors must be skilfully fitted to the subject to which they are applied, and to the notion which they are employed to express. This nice adaptation arises from analogy or proportion, and when this proportion does not hold, the metaphor will be ungraceful, since things not suiting each other, the more nearly they are approximated, will offend the more by their incongruity. The fitness of things is the only genuine source of taste and intellectual pleasure. A scarlet robe may become the vivacity and gaiety of youth ; but a graver colour will please more in men of graver years. By metaphors any subject may be exalted or depressed ; when we would exalt or magnify it, the most respectable term must be employed ; when we would lessen or debase it, the most contemptible. Thus, to beg, and to pray, are two different kinds of asking : to ask is the genus, under which the species, “begging or praying,” are ranged. He, therefore, who begs, may be described as a petitioner ; and a simple petitioner may be vilified into a beggar. In this way Iphicrates insulted Callias, by calling him the wallet-bearer of the goddess, instead of her torch-bearer. Both were offices in the worship of Cybelé, but the one mean and beggarly, as much as the other was respectable. Callias, indeed, retorted the reproach, by saying, that Iphicrates, by this misapplication of names, well showed his igno-

writer to another, gradually lose their novelty and lustre ; and are thus deprived of their proper character and specific effect.

rance of the sacred mysteries, and his unworthi-
 ness of knowing them. The attendants and
 courtiers of Dionysius the tyrant, were, in the
 same way, honoured or vilified by two opposite
 names, both borrowed from employments in the
 religious service of Dionysus or Bacchus. By
 those who wished to honour them, they were
 called his artists and architects; others branded
 and reproached them as his parasites and buf-
 foons. Robbers have been called collectors;
 and the greatest enormities have been softened,
 by mild names, into venial offences; and offences
 again aggravated by strong metaphors into the
 greatest enormities.¹⁴

CHAP.
 II.

The metaphor of Telephus, in Euripides is improper, when "he talks of ruling the waves, and sailing like kings into Mysia." Such lofty expressions strike with manifest incongruity, when applied to the rowers of gallies, men exercising the poorest and meanest of all occupations.¹⁵ Metaphors are faulty, when they offend the ear by harshness. Thus, in his elegies, Dionysius, surnamed the Brazen¹⁶, called poetry the scream of Calliopé: both indeed are exclamations of animals; but it is degrading to the human voice, to be confounded with unmeaning inarticulate sounds. Metaphors ought not to be far-fetched, but drawn from things akin to each

¹⁴ The text is mutilated, but means that an act of theft may be magnified into robbery, violence, devastation.

¹⁵ See my translation of Isocrates de Pace throughout.

¹⁶ He is said to have been so called from persuading the Athenians to use brazen money. Athenæus, l. xv.

BOOK
III.

other, so that the thing named, may suggest the thing signified, to which perhaps no particular name has ever been assigned. Thus, in that celebrated ænigma,—

I saw a man with fire, (a wondrous knack,)
Glue sounding brass ¹⁷ upon another's back ;

the application of a cupping-vessel has not any particular name, but this application, and the act of glueing, are only two different ways of fastening ; so that the mention of the one operation naturally suggests the other. Well-contrived riddles, therefore, may serve to let us into the nature of good metaphors. Both, to be right, must avoid every thing mean and disgusting.¹⁸ The word containing the metaphor, as Lycimnius says¹⁹, should be of a pleasing sound, and convey an agreeable sense. These admonitions are just ; but there is a third thing necessary to be attended to, in order to refute the sophistry of Bryson. He maintained that expressions denoting the same object or the same action, could not be more indecent, the one than the other : since, whatever words were used, the same thing was signified. His reasoning is fallacious ; for, by two different words, the same thing may be signified more or less specifically ; may be exhibited with more or less vivacity and brightness ; and thus endowed with various degrees of operation on the senses and the fancy. Besides this,

¹⁷ Cupping instruments were then made of brass ; as now, of glass.

¹⁸ This is spoken generally ; such should be the ordinary character of style : the exceptions will appear hereafter.

¹⁹ Lycimnius was the scholar of Gorgias of Leontium. Dion. Halicarn. in Vit. Lysiæ.

the words signifying the same thing, may not do it in the same way; for the one may represent it by its agreeable, and the other by its disagreeable qualities. The thing signified, contains both kinds; but the same word does not express them both: the metaphor taken from things agreeable, either excludes their contraries, or very weakly suggests them. Metaphors, therefore, ought to consist in sounds pleasing to the ear, and in thoughts agreeable to the mind: they must avoid every deformity, all that offends the eye, or any of the senses. There is a difference, of which we are all sensible, in saying, "rosy-fingered morn," and "scarlet-fingered" or "red-fingered morn."²⁰ Epithets also serve to degrade or dignify the character; Orestes is exhibited as a very different man, when addressed as the killer of his mother, or as the avenger of his father. When the conqueror in the mule-race offered a small sum to Simonides, for verses to celebrate his victory, the poet refused to disgrace his art by eulogising the offspring of asses; but, a larger sum being tendered to him, he exclaimed,

Hail! daughters of coursers²¹ more swift than the wind!

Diminutives may be employed like epithets, to make things appear either better or worse; for as they lessen the signification of words denoting both good and bad qualities, it is plain, that while they detract from the worth of the one,

²⁰ The latter, Aristotle says, was, in Greek, the meaner epithet of the two.

²¹ The author observes, "they were daughters of asses also."

BOOK III. they also extenuate the worthlessness of the other.²² But in both applications of them, great moderation should be used.

CHAP. III. A COLD, lifeless diction arises from four causes :
 — first, the affectation of useless compounds, such as those used by Lycophron, “the many-visaged heaven,” “the mountain-studded earth,” “the narrow-harbour’d shore.” Gorgias, in the same way, calls flatterers “alms-inspired muses,” and talks of perjurers and abjurers; and Alcidas says, “fury-filled minds,” “fire-coloured faces,” “end-attaining courage,” “end-bringing persuasion,” and, “the azure-mantled surface of the spacious sea.” High-sounding compounds are proper in some kinds of poetry, but are cold affectations in discourse, or in ordinary composition. The second is the introduction of foreign words, not authorised by custom. Lycophron thus calls Xerxes, “that *superb* monster of a man,” and the robber Sciron, “that champion of *malefice*.” Alcidamas speaks of the *divertissement* of poetry, and of minds *acerated* by anger, and calls the production of monsters, mad *emportements* of nature.²³ A third cause of ineptness and frigidity proceeds from epithets, when they are wiredrawn, or unseasonable, or frequent. “The *white* milk” is allowable in poetry: but such expressions are ungraceful in prose; and when

The frigid, nauseous style proceeds from four causes :

1. Useless compounds.

2. The introduction of new coined or foreign words.

3. Unfit epithets.

²² Aristotle illustrates this from the “Babylonians,” a lost comedy of Aristophanes’, in the words “gold, garment, raillery, disease,” which words admit not of diminutive terminations in English.

²³ Thus the English language is corrupted by French mixtures.

they occur frequently, show too manifest an affectation of poetical ornament. Yet epithets are essential to compositions aspiring at elevation and novelty: they must be used, however, with moderation; the want of them will deprive writings of a beauty, the abuse of them will produce positive deformity. It is better to speak at random, and to employ the first words that occur, than to offend by false refinement, and disgust by tiresome verbosity. Nothing, therefore, can be more inept than the style of Alcidas.²¹ He employs ornaments, not for seasonings to discourse, but as if they were the only food to live on. His epithets intrude incessantly, thick-set, swelling, and unseasonable.²⁴ He does not say "sweat," but "the humid sweat;" a man goes not to "the Isthmian games," but to the "collected assembly of the Isthmian solemnity;" "laws" are "the legitimate kings of commonwealths," and a "race," the "incursive impulse of the soul." "Musæum" simply will not do, it must be followed by the adjunct "nature," the musæum of nature; "anxiety" must be "pungent anxiety;" a rich man is not bountiful, but he is "the artificer of universal largess;" a sweet orator is "the dispenser of pleasure to the ears of his hearers:" she did not conceal herself among "the branches," but among "the branches of the forest," nor cover "her body," but "the shameful nudity of her body;" and the love of sensual pleasure, is denominated "the emulo-

²¹ The general style of our English novels; and of histories, pictures of manners, biographies, &c., written after the novel fashion.

BOOK
III.

Verbosity
destroys
perspicuity
and how.

4. The
abuse of
meta-
phors.

antagonist²⁵ of the soul.” In this last example, the epithet is a compound; it labours, therefore, under a double deformity. Such unseasonable verbosity not only renders style frigid and ridiculous, but destroys its perspicuity: for when words are adequate to the sense, the accumulation of more words only perplexes the reader, by forcing him to pause and consider them, and to seek for a meaning where, indeed, none is to be found. As to compounds, they are very proper when a single word is wanting to express their united force, and when their component parts easily and pleasantly coalesce. Thus the word “pastime,”²⁶ and others of the same nature are familiar in discourse. But long, artificial, and sonorous compounds, are adapted only to swell the pomp of lyric poetry; as words, foreign from common use, increase the boldness and majesty of the epic; and metaphors are the natural ornament of Iambic verse, and of ordinary discourse. The abuse of these is the fourth source of the frigid. They are abused, when they rise either greatly above the subject, or sink greatly below it. In the latter case, they excite ridicule, and are much employed for this purpose, and properly, by the comic poets. In the former case, they have an air of artificial grandeur and affected majesty. Far-fetched metaphors offend, again, by their obscurity. Gorgias talks of “sanguine and pale enterprises;

²⁵ *Επιθυμία* : what the schoolmen called concupiscence, is called *αντιμιμος της ψυχης*.

²⁶ Or pass-time, *χρονοτριβειν*.

of affairs sown disgracefully, and reaped ruinously." Alcidamas calls philosophy "the bastion of laws²⁷;" Homer's *Odyssey*, "the looking-glass of human life:" again, he says of a poet wanting playfulness, "that there was no rattle²⁸ to his muse." One of the best of those metaphors, verging to the solemn and tragic, was contained in the saying of Gorgias to the swallow. While haranguing in the public place, he was bespattered by the dirt of a flying swallow: turning his eyes towards her, he exclaimed, "Most unhandsomely done, Philomela!" The happy raillery consisted in addressing her, not as the swallow, which she actually was, but as the maiden, whom she was believed to have originally been.²⁹

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III.

A COMPARISON is a metaphor, with only a small difference. When you say Achilles rushed on like a lion, this is a comparison; but when you say of Achilles, the lion rushed on, this is a metaphor: both surpassing in courage, the name of the lion is transferred to the man. Comparisons are useful in discourse, when employed sparingly, otherwise they would swell prose into poetry. Their whole effect may be

CHAP.
IV.

Compari-
sons —
their agree-
ment with
metaphors.

²⁷ From false refinement, or the love of novelty, language has a tendency to grow continually more figurative. We should not now be much offended with the "bulwark of laws," and the "mirror of human life."

²⁸ *Αθυρμα* signifies play, or a play thing. The text, however, is defective.

²⁹ According to Aristotle, and other writers, it was not Progné, but Philomela, that was changed into the swallow. See Thucydides, l. ii. p. 118.

BOOK
III.

Examples
of good
compari-
sons.

produced by metaphors, which contain the essence of the comparison, without its form. Androtion said of Idreas released from prison, that he was like a dog unchained, because a dog let loose is ready to bite; and Idreas was no sooner at large than he showed his litigious temper. Theodamas described the turpitude of Archidamas, by calling him a Euxinus³⁰, ignorant of geometry; and conversely, to persons better acquainted with Archidamas, Euxinus might have been described as Archidamas become a geometrician. Plato, in his Republic, compares the despoilers of the dead to those foolish curs, who, heedless of their real annoyers, bite the stones thrown at them. The people of Athens, again, often wilful and disobedient, he likens to able-bodied seamen, hard of hearing. And poetical compositions, he says, resemble persons in their prime, destitute of any genuine beauty; for as these are no longer pleasing, when the flower of youth has faded, so many alluring poems have nothing admirable, when divested of their regular rhythm and artificial melody. In the same way, Pericles said of the Samians, who had received ungraciously the favours of Athens, "That they resembled children, who eat their food, but crying all the while." The Bœotians, involved in perpetual broils and dissensions among themselves, he compared to a forest of the scarlet-oak, in which the trees are broken in pieces by beating against each other. Demos-

³⁰ Euxinus was a great mathematician, and also a great knave.

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IV.

thenes said of the Athenians, who could not digest the good advice given to them, that the agitations and tossings of their public affairs had given them, as it were, a sea-sickness; and Democrates³¹ compared the incendiary and selfish orators, by whom these agitations were produced, to nurses who extract for themselves the most substantial part of the food, giving mere foam and froth to their nurselings. Antisthenes likened to incense the emaciated and profligate Cephisodotus, because he delighted by his consumption.³² All these may be introduced, either as comparisons or as metaphors; and, if good in the one way, will be so also in the other; for a metaphor is merely a comparison, stripped of the comparative form. Metaphors founded on analogy, and those drawn from one species to another, must, to be good, be easily convertible: thus, if a goblet be fitly called the shield of Bacchus, a shield should be fitly called the goblet of Mars.³³ Such, then, ought to be the constituents of prose; ordinary and appropriate words, the plain and primitive ones, and well-chosen metaphors.

³¹ Stigmatised by Plutarch for his severe jokes. De Repub. Gubernand.

³² Antisthenes's saying is one that good taste will not approve, and that good nature will condemn. To make it intelligible, it became necessary to insert the epithet "profligate." I should prefer, therefore, the following translation:—"Antisthenes likened the emaciated but facetious Cephisodotus to incense, because he delighted, while he consumed." Many instances of Cephisodotus's facetiousness are given below in this book.

³³ Examples to the same purpose occur above: if youth be called the spring of life, spring may be called the youth of the year, &c.

CHAP.

V.

Purity of
style de-
pends on
five points:

1. The fit
use of par-
ticles.

2. The use
of proper
names in
preference
to circum-
locutions.

3. The re-
jection of
all equivo-
cal expres-
sions.

IN style, the first thing is, that it be Greek, and grammatically correct. This depends on five points: first, that the particles be rightly used, and made to correspond properly with each other; so that when one conjunction, for instance, is introduced, the other corresponding to it may be employed, and that without such an interval between them as would render the first liable to be forgot, before the second makes its appearance. The awkwardness will be still greater, if any unrelated particle be interposed between them, disappointing our expectation, and retarding our conception. Thus, in the following sentence: "And I, after he had thus spoken, (for Cleon came, requesting and begging me,) then went away, taking them along with me." Because of the interposition, such sentences are obscure or ungraceful. The second rule is, to use the proper names of things, in preference to circumlocutions, which would equally denote them.³⁴

A third rule is to avoid equivocal terms and doubtful expressions. Such, indeed, may designedly be chosen and prepared; but then it can only be by those who would make believe that they say something, though they have really nothing to say. Of this description are the poets like Empedocles. Their long labyrinths of ambiguous words serve to deceive their learned readers, as much as the equivocations of oracles

³⁴ This is conducive to brevity and perspicuity; and should be the general character of style. The propriety of circumlocution, in particular cases, will be shown hereafter.

serve to deceive the multitude. They are no better than, "Should Cræsus cross the Halys, he will destroy a great empire;" which may be applied, according to the event, either to his own empire, or to that of the Persians. Such oracular writers, also, deal chiefly in generals, that their futility may thus have a chance to pass undetected. At the game of odd and even, a player would never be likely to win, who should presume to assign the particular number³⁵: the circumstances of number, quantity, time, and other things useful to be known, must be omitted in such compositions; whose style, therefore, can never be imitated but for some purpose of deception. A fourth rule is to be observant of the genera, or classes of things, according to the division of Protagoras, into persons, and mere instruments: and the former male and female. The fifth, is to be alike careful as to numbers; the singular, the dual, and the plural.³⁶ On the whole, a good style ought to be easy to read and to recite.³⁷ A good writer ought not to tire by the multitude of conjunctions, and stifle by the length of his sentences. He ought not to perplex by such an ambiguous position of words, that it is difficult to distinguish them by points, and equally difficult to understand their meaning without punctuation. This is the case with the

4. and 5.
To observe
the rules
concerning
genders
and num-
bers.

A good
style illus-
trated by
its contra-
ry.

³⁵ He is safer in saying, generally, odd or even; than if he ventured by his pretended skill to assign the precise number.

³⁶ The examples given are inapplicable in English, and quite superfluous.

³⁷ Ευανάγνωστον και ευφρασον.

BOOK
III.

writings of Heraclitus, whose arrangement of words is so faulty, that you are left uncertain whether they should be joined with what precedes, or with what follows them. Thus, in the very beginning of his treatise, he says, "of the reason self-existing always men are ignorant." It is doubtful whether "always" refers to the eternal existence of the divine reason, or whether "men are said to be always ignorant of it." A solecism, and a great impropriety of speech arises from conjoining words that are not correspondent, and from applying to two or more, a word that fitly answers to one only. Thus, it would be a solecism to apply the word "seeing," not only to a beautiful landscape, but to the agreeable melody enjoyed in it. Seeing corresponds to colours, not to sounds: "perceiving" is alike applicable to both. Nothing is more adverse to perspicuity than long parentheses: things dependant on each other should be immediately connected in speech, and the substance of the parenthesis should be introduced before or afterwards. Instead of saying "I had determined, after having conversed with him on certain matters, and the manner of effectuating them,³⁸ to set out on my journey;" perspicuity requires that the words should run, "I had determined, after having conversed with him, to set out on my journey. The matters above alluded to, formed the purport of our conversation."

³⁸ Aristotle supposes that the matters are here specified and detailed, which would greatly lengthen the parenthesis.

WHEN it is the business of a speaker to en-
 large and expand, this amplification may be
 produced, first, by substituting definitions for
 names: instead of the circle, for instance, he
 may say the plain figure whose extremities are all
 equally distant from a common centre: when his
 object is to contract, he may substitute the name
 for the definition. This reciprocal substitution
 should also take place when, either in the de-
 finition or in the name, there is any meanness,
 awkwardness, or indecency. Amplification may
 also be attained by epithets and metaphors, tak-
 ing care to avoid that abuse of them above ex-
 plained, which would render our discourse too
 pompous and poetical. A similar effect will be
 produced by multiplying one into many, after
 the manner of the poets, as the "Achæan
 shores," though one harbour only was meant;
 and, "convey those sad and melancholy papers,"
 though one letter only was delivered.⁴² Ampli-
 fication is also attained by the repetition of par-
 ticles or adjuncts, instead of making the same

CHAP.
VI.

Amplifica-
tion and
compression
how
to be pro-
duced.

⁴² A learned critic has controverted this rule in the case of Milton's "fierce as ten Furies." "Fierceness," he says, "is a mental energy, and not a positive quality that can be measured by the scale of number. Ten Furies may have collectively more strength than one, because the mechanical strength of many individuals may be concentrated into one act or exertion; but this is not the case with fierceness." Knight on Taste, p. 409. In all fine writing, indeed, as Horace teaches after Aristotle, "Sapere est et principium et fons:" but in their furthest limits, as Aristotle teaches in his own words, the provinces of logic and poetry widely divaricate. It is the business of poetry to embody abstractions, and to multiply unities: το ἐν, πολλά ποιειν. Had Milton said "fierce as a Fury," he would have marred a noble verse.

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III.

article, for instance, or the same preposition serve for different words following each other, to which it will very properly apply, and to which it ought to be applied, where compression and brevity are in view. To introduce and repeat conjunctions, also serves the purpose of amplification; the contrary, that of compression: yet the omission of these connectives must not break the texture of the style. We may say, "I came and I conversed with him," or omitting the conjunction, "Having come, I conversed with him," which leaves the texture of the style unbroken. The artifice employed by Antimachus is of much use. He expands the praise of Teumessus, by describing the many bad things that do not belong to it. "A small hillock rises, refreshed by each breeze," &c. &c.⁴³ There is no end to such description, which, accordingly as the things wanting are good or bad, may be made to answer the purpose either of satire or of eulogy. On this principle, poets delight in negative terms, which give great force and beauty to their compositions⁴⁴; and no metaphors are in more esteem than those of the analogical kind, expressive of privation.⁴⁵

⁴³ Aristotle quotes merely the beginning: the verses illustrative of the eulogy by privation are wanting.

⁴⁴ Poor naked wretches, wheresoe'er you are,
That bide the pelting of this *pitiless* storm,
How shall your *houseless* heads and *unfed* sides, &c.

Lear.

⁴⁵ The Greek example is not to be translated: *μελος* bears the same relation to the lyre, which the nameless song made by a trumpet, bears to the trumpet. According to the principles above established.

PROPRIETY of style requires that it should be pathetic, moral, and exactly adapted to the subject. This adaptation consists in the observance of proportion; in not disgracing lofty topics by mean language, in not speaking of light matters with solemnity of diction, in not coupling a trivial name with a pompous and high-sounding epithet, a fault often carried to such a pitch, that some very serious works are converted by it into comedies: witness the works of Cleophon, whose epithets are as ridiculous as it would be to talk of "venerable figs." Language is pathetic, when an insult received provokes words of anger; when turpitude or impiety are treated with abhorrence and disgust, but in terms cautious and respectful to modest ears; when acts of elevated virtue are arrayed in the swelling language of admiration; when piteous scenes are expressed in a lowly, monotonous, and plaintive style; in a word, when the diction rises, falls, and varies, but always harmonises with the sentiment. This faithful correspondence has great persuasive efficacy: for as the representation is just, the thing represented will to most hearers appear to be true. Because certain events would naturally excite certain passions and expressions, they conclude from the propriety of the expressions to the reality of the events, though the whole may be no better than a well-devised fiction. Besides

C H A P.
VII.

Suitable-
ness of
style to
the sub-
ject.

Its per-
suasive
efficacy.

the music of a trumpet may, therefore, be called a "*μελος αχορδον*, or *αλυρον*," a music "not made by the lyre, and unlike that of stringed instruments."

B.O.O.K
III.

this, and independently of any judgment of the understanding, men are compelled to sympathise with a truly pathetic speaker: the contagion of passion is communicated from one breast to another, to the total overthrow of reason; this is so true, that assemblies have been thrown into mad commotion by sounds void of sense, by mere noise and uproar.⁴⁶

individual
A truly
moral
style.

That discourse only deserves to be called ethic, which exhibits the marks and signs of manners and habits⁴⁷, characterising the different classes and conditions of mankind. In a composition of this sort, you can determine from the language only, whether it be a man or a boy who speaks, a young man or an old one; what is the sex, and what the country of the speaker; whether, for instance, he be of Thessaly, or a Lacedæmonian. As those moulded by different habits, have different sentiments and opinions, so their language is not less different.⁴⁸ A clown has not the same thoughts, nor (were these the same) would he convey them in the same words that are employed by a man of liberal education. The nice delineation of manners will, therefore, have much persuasive efficacy; the reader will be not less deceived by it, than by a faithful representation of the passions.

⁴⁶ The eloquent Lord Chatham carried out the House of Commons, singing, "Gentle shepherd, tell me where."

⁴⁷ Aristotle repeats, that all habits do not serve to qualify and characterise: some are too trivial, or have too little bearing on the affairs of life.

⁴⁸ Intererit multum, Davusne loquatur an heros, &c.

HORAT. Art. Poet.

CHAP.
VII.

An artifice very useful to persuasion, though abused to satiety by some writers of speeches, is a bold imposing interrogation. "Who does not know? Can any one be ignorant?" The hearer is affected with a sort of shame, and disposed rather to admit the conclusion, than his own disgraceful and glaring inferiority. The fitness of time, the due measure, is to be observed in this, as in all other rules of oratory. But when excess has, generally, taken place, the best remedy is that the speaker be the first to condemn himself. With this corrective, very hyperbolical language may be employed, and produce considerable effect: for by showing that he knows, and is ready to acknowledge wherein he errs, he will the more easily obtain belief in what he has left uncorrected. Another hint is, not to employ simultaneously all the various means conducive to the same end. If we have spoken with much severity of language, our voice and action ought not to indicate exactly the same spirit. Too exact a correspondence would appear the effect of design, and betray that art which it was our business to conceal. The look and action, though moderated, ought not, however, to be so far softened as to be at variance with the words: this would be to deviate into the contrary affectation.

Address in
using inter-
rogations
and hyper-
boles.

In impassioned oratory, indulgence is allowed to uncouth terms; to epithets, compounds, and words of foreign idiom. Smarting with injuries and insults, a speaker may represent his wrongs

Every in-
dulgence
granted to
impassion-
ed oratory

BOOK
III.

“as broader than the heavens,”⁴⁹ and the malice of his adversary as “deeper than the abyss.”⁵⁰ No language can be too bold, when he has once obtained possession of his hearers, and filled them with enthusiasm, through the force of his praise or invective, his love or anger. Thus, Isocrates, in his Panegyric, “The fame and memory, the glory that follows the dead, and accompanies the living,” &c. And again, “Who ever endured, or can endure,” &c. Such is the language of that enthusiasm which identifies the hearers with the speaker, and which all are prepared to admit and approve, from their natural sympathy with those actuated by generous and energetic passions. Such a style is indispensable in poetry, whose very essence is enthusiasm. But in prose, it is only to be used on the occasions just mentioned; and when an uncouth and far-fetched phraseology is introduced ironically, as is done by Gorgias, and by Plato in his Phædrus.

CHAP.
VIII.

The harmony of prose, how to be produced.

COMPOSITION in prose ought neither to be regularly measured, nor yet destitute of harmony. Exact regularity of rhythm would deprive it of persuasive efficacy, as savouring too strongly of artifice; besides this, it would divert attention from sense to sound; the hearers would watch and anticipate the return of similar measures and corresponding cadences, as boys in the market-place sport with the tiresome formula of the

⁴⁹ Expressed in the compound *ερανομηκες*.

⁵⁰ Expressed in the compound *πελωριον*, prodigious.

herald, in proclaiming the liberty of a slave; and before the name escapes him, bawl out "Cleon!"⁵¹ On the other hand, style ought not to be destitute of rhythm, that is, a due relation of its component parts, in point of time, to each other. Without this, it would be indefinite and immeasurable; and would disgust both the ear and the understanding, through the want of any fit termination. That which is endless is not knowable; but the relations of all quantities are measured by number. The relations of the component parts of discourse, in point of time, or the numbers expressing those relations, constitute the rhythm, or measure, of prose, which is not, like that of poetry, confined within strict limits: and which, indeed, must have harmony to please the ear, but not that unvaried harmony which would offend the taste by the affectation of artifice. Of this harmonious prose, the measures of poetry form the divisions, more or less minute, consisting sometimes of the verses themselves, always of one or more of the feet composing them.⁵² The heroic measure, consisting of dactyls and spondees, has grandeur and solemnity; and, by its animated harmony, sustains

⁵¹ In the liberation of a slave, it was necessary for him to name his patron or protector. The name of this patron, Cleon, for instance, occurred so regularly in the herald's chant, that boys made sport of it, in the way mentioned in the text.

⁵² The reader may be reminded, that all short syllables are supposed equal, and that one long syllable is supposed equal to two short. In iambics, where the short syllable precedes the long, the rhythm is properly expressed by one to two; and in trochaics, where the long precedes the short, it is expressed by two to one, as in the text.

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III.

the reader's enthusiasm⁵³ through a long narrative. The iambic is nearly the opposite of this: it is the measure nearest to prose, insomuch that men often talk in iambic verse. The trochaic affords a kind of music, the best adapted to dancing; witness the frisking tetrameters composed of trochees only. But oratory, we have shown, requires elevation and dignity, without such melodious solemnity and regular cadence, as would divert the attention from things to words, and from sense to sound. The pæan, therefore, is the metrical ornament best adapted to eloquence; and is that which orators, from Thrasy-machus downwards, have much employed, although none of them have explained the principle by which its use is recommended. This is no other than that before alluded to: the rhythm of the pæan, though pleasing and noble, is not so easily marked, as to attract and fix attention; its artifice pleases, though the art escapes observation. For the rhythm of the pæan, which is expressed by the ratio of three to two, is less perceptible than that of dactyls and spondees, which are expressed by two to two; and of iambic and trochaic feet, which are expressed by two to one. The ratio of two to two is that of equality, so that taking the numbers in their natural order, one, two, three, the rhythm of dactyls and spondees will be the first, and most apparent, and expressed by one to one; the rhythm of iambic or trochaic verse will be the second, and be expressed by two to one, and that of the pæan will be the third, and expressed

⁵³ See above, p. 390.

by three to two. Of the three kinds of rhythm, that constituted by the pæan is, therefore, the least poetical, and the best adapted to oratory: besides this, the pæan cannot enter into any of the kinds of verse most familiar to the ear, and will, therefore, when it occurs in discourse, have least the appearance of artifice. But its use should not be confined, as it has hitherto been, to the beginning of the sentence; for there are two kinds of pæans, of which, as that beginning with a long syllable and followed by three short, is certainly the fittest for the commencement, so that beginning with three short syllables followed by a long, is certainly the fittest for the conclusion. For to end with a short syllable, and unexpectedly to abridge the period, is to mutilate and deform it. It is not enough that the close be denoted by paragraphical marks, or by punctuation; it should be clearly ascertained by the sound. We have thus shown that composition in prose ought not to be regularly measured, nor yet destitute of measure; and what ought to be the feet or rhythms, and what the arrangement of them, in order to procure for it this advantage.

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VIII.

STYLE is either linked in a long extended chain, or it is collected in itself and periodic, that is, circular. The former resembles the wild enthusiasm of dithyrambic songs⁵⁴; the latter, regular odes written in corresponding stanzas. The linked style is that which universally pre-

CHAP.
IX.

Style continuous
and periodic.

⁵⁴ See History of Ancient Greece, P. I. v. i. c. 6.

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III.

Beauty of
periodic
style:—
principle
on which
it is found-
ed.

vailed among the old writers in prose. For example: “This is the exhibition of the history, composed by Herodotus of Thurium, to the end that past transactions may not be extinguished in the memory of men, and that the great exploits of Greeks and of Barbarians may not be deprived of their praise and glory, and particularly, that the causes may be explained of their wars with each other.” Modern writers have thought fit to abandon this lengthened chain of diction, which has no necessary termination but that of the subject; and which may run on for ever, until the writer’s materials are exhausted. Such an indefinite style is unpleasant, because it fatigues; for in all things men wish to see the end, and while this is in view, their interest is engaged, and their activity invigorated: witness the contenders in the foot-race, who hold out with spirit till they reach the turning-post, but are then sensible of a sudden failure of strength; nor does their vigour revive, till a new goal rises before them. The close collected style consists of periods, that is, of parts of discourse, having each in itself a beginning and an end, and each confined to a length easily measured by the ear, and easily comprehended by the understanding. Such a style is animating, because the end is always in expectation; and each goal that he reaches, the reader will see with pleasure, being thereby made sensible of his progress. The periodic style is also impressive, and fixes itself deeper in the memory, for it is more regular in its harmony; and it is

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good writ-
ing, and
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only a higher degree of this regularity which makes poetry to be longer retained than the most elaborate prose. In good writing, the closes of the sound and of the sense ought always to coincide; the violation of this rule would mislead the reader, as in that verse of Sophocles, where the pause, ill-placed⁵⁴, makes Calydon, in Etolia, to be a town in the Peloponnesus. A period commonly consists of several clauses or members: and what is called a simple period consists of one clause only, of due length, rounded and complete in itself. However numerous its clauses, a period ought to form a whole, perfect in sense and in harmony, so as to be easily pronounced by ordinary powers of voice, without any other breaks or pauses than those required by the distinction of its members. These members ought not to be too short, for then the unexpected pause will make the hearers, as it were, to stumble; neither ought they to be too long, for then the words will run on, leaving the hearers behind them: whereas the movement of the speaker ought always to be so regulated that it shall be easily accompanied by his audience. Democritus of Chios ridiculed the prolonged drawling periods of Melanippides, parodying Hesiod's

Who injures others, injures more himself,⁵⁵ —
into,—

To tire a reader, quite undoes an author.

⁵⁴ By the ill placing of the Greek article ἡδε.

⁵⁵ Hesiod. Opera & Dies.

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The anti-
thetic style
and ex-
amples.

What is said of long-winded periods applies equally to the clauses of which they are composed. Among clauses, again, abrupt and short, the reader is continually stumbling, and ready, as it were, to fall head-long. In periods well arranged, the clauses may be either simply distinguished, or they may be placed in direct opposition. Of the first kind is the following :
 “ I have often wondered that those who established your public solemnities, and instituted your gymnastic combats, should have thought fit to reward superiority in bodily strength or address, while they allowed the powers of the mind to languish without encouragement.”⁵⁶
 Here the clauses are clearly distinguished : but in the antithetic style, they are directly opposed, two things in one clause being contrasted with two things in the other ; or when a single clause in the commencement is followed by two clauses that are contrasted. Thus Isocrates says⁵⁷,
 “ The conquests of the Athenians in Asia benefited both descriptions of Greeks, those who remained at home, and those who followed them to the warfare ; for the one, they procured richer possessions than their own territories could have afforded, and to the other they furnished competent means for subsisting in their own country.”

⁵⁶ This is the commencement of the panegyric of Athens by Isocrates.

⁵⁷ In the panegyric above referred to ; see my Translation of Lysias and Isocrates, p. 26, & seq.

The opposition consists in the words "remained at home," and "followed to the warfare," "richer possessions," and "competent means." Again, "The legislative wisdom of Athens was equally beneficial to those eager to acquire fortunes, and to those studious to enjoy them." Here the opposition is in the words "acquire" and "enjoy." Again, "In such affairs, fools often succeed, while the wise fail." Again, "Our ancestors then carried off the palm of military glory, and soon afterwards acquired the dominion of the seas." Again, speaking of Xerxes, "He marched through the sea, and sailed through the land, having joined, by a bridge, the opposite shores of the Hellespont, and having separated by a canal, the promontory of Athos from the continent." Again, he extols the liberality of the Athenians in leaving to the citizens of conquered states, the enjoyment of their municipal rights: "They determined not to make those slaves, by law, who were free by nature."⁵⁸ Again, speaking of the rout and ruin of Xerxes' army, "Part perished miserably, another was saved disgracefully." Again, "How shameful, to use Barbarians for our domestic slaves, and to suffer our Grecian allies to be reduced under national slavery by Barbarians!" Again, "What treasures of glory

⁵⁸ The orator clearly understood Aristotle's notions concerning slavery, which, by many, have been grossly mistaken. See my Introduction to the First Book of the Politics, p. 33.

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shall they, in life, enjoy, and what glorious inheritance transmit, at death, to posterity." The same antithetic style is illustrated by what a pleader said in the impeachment of Peitholaus and Lycophron: "These are the men who, before they left home, sold you to the enemy, and who, after their return, purchased you for slaves." All such oppositions are calculated to give pleasure, because they convey a clearer and fuller knowledge of the subjects to which they are applied; for contraries serve to explain each other, and how well soever they may be known singly, will be still better understood when set in opposition. This figure of antithesis resembles, indeed, the syllogism in vigour, and particularly that most cogent form of syllogism directed to the purpose of refutation; and which consists, as before said, in the juxta-position of contradictory assertions.

There are figures akin to the antithesis, one of which is made by the equality⁵⁹ of clauses, and another by their similarity.⁶⁰ This similarity may be produced by a correspondence of sound, either at the beginning or the end: at the beginning, the correspondence must be in the whole word; at the end, that of the last syllable will suffice, or the repetition of the word in a different case. Thus, in the beginning, "Placable by gifts, and persuadable by words." At the end, "When living, he was insulted; when

⁵⁹ Called *parisosis*.

⁶⁰ Called *paromoiosis*.

dead, calumniated.”⁶⁰ All the figures just mentioned may concur in the same sentence; but works are often deformed by false antitheses, that is, an appearance of opposition, where there is none in reality.⁶¹

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WE next proceed to urbanity and elegance of diction. These beauties can flow only from happy natural talents, or from minds skilfully disciplined by education and practice. It is the business of this treatise to show wherein they consist; to enumerate and describe the elements composing them. Let us begin, therefore, by observing, that to learn something new is naturally delightful, and that the delight increases with the rapidity with which our knowledge is

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diction.

⁶⁰ The repetition of a word in a different case is illustrated by the example, “Ought a brazen statue to be raised to a man not worth a bit of brass?” “Not worth a bit of brass,” was the Greek phrase to denote “good for nothing.”

⁶¹ The example is taken from Epecharmus, and runs, “Sometimes I was among them; at times among them was I.” There are two other verbal oppositions, not admitting of translation, being founded on coincidence in the last syllables of the Greek words *φροντισι*, *ελπισι*, — *δεινον*, *αργον*. In the latter part of this chapter, the author says that the oppositions or correspondences in the beginning of sentences, have been treated in the Theodectian books of Rhetoric. The expression is doubtful; it may mean either books of Rhetoric written by Theodectes, or books of Rhetoric addressed to him. The books addressed to him are the three here translated. Quintilian, l. ii. c. 16. & l. iii. c. 4. et seq. The *Θεοδεκτεῖσις* must therefore refer to some lost work, whether written by Aristotle himself, or by his scholar Theodectes. Cicer. Orator. c. 51. et Quintilian. Instit. l. iii. c. i. Writings of Theodectes existed in the time of Cicero and Quintilian; and he is mentioned by both, as distinguished by the singular power of his memory. Tuscul. Quest. l. i. c. 24. Institut. l. xi. c. 2. Cicero also commemorates the praise bestowed on him by Aristotle, as a writer highly polished. Cicero. Orator. c. 51.

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acquired. As names are significant of things, those names and words are the best and most agreeable which communicate knowledge the most speedily, and most impressively. Words of foreign extract or idiom, are not readily understood; the proper and usual term is too familiar to make any very deep impression: but the metaphor conveys knowledge speedily, and in the most complete manner. Thus when the poets substitute "stubble," instead of "old age," they refer both words to their genus, and make their similitude known, by the class of things past their bloom, to which both are readily perceived to belong. Comparisons produce a similar effect, and when made on just principles, never fail to please; but as comparisons require a greater compass of words, they are less pleasing than the metaphor, because longer: besides this, the comparison only likens one thing to another; it does not say that the one really is the other, so that the mind is not led to investigate in what respect the things are the same, and therefore deprived of the pleasure attending this discovery.

Its three
sources—
metaphor,
antithesis,
and energy.

The acquisition of knowledge is the more agreeable in proportion to its celerity. Superficial common-place affords no delight, because destitute of novelty; and far-fetched abstruse propositions offend by their obscurity; those propositions please, which, without being obvious, are so natural, that their truth is perceived as soon, or nearly as soon, as they are uttered, for such only convey knowledge, and convey it

rapidly. Style derives much force and beauty from antithesis: as when Philip said of the Athenian demagogues, "The benefits of peace common to all others, these men deemed to be war to themselves." The opposition is between peace and war; and between the common interest, and that of the demagogues. Secondly, style is enlivened by metaphors, which are neither so remote, that the sign and the thing signified cannot easily be caught at one glance, nor so near and superficial, that they scarcely produce any distinct impression. The third cause of excellence is when the objects to be communicated from one individual to another, are placed, as it were, before the eyes, and represented as performing their natural and appropriate actions. Men are less affected by what is about to happen, than by that which actually takes place. Present existence interests them far more than either that which possibly may be, or that which exists no longer. The three sources, therefore, of vivacity and force of diction, are antithesis, metaphor, and energy; meaning by energy that animation of language, which represents things as actually present and exerting their appropriate powers. Metaphors were shown to be of four kinds ⁶²; and the best are those founded on analogy: of this sort is the saying of Pericles, "that the youth taken by war from the city, was like the disruption of spring

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Examples
of these,

⁶² From genus to species, from species to genus, from one species to another, and from analogy.

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from the year ;” and that of the orator Leptines, in opposition to the design of razing Lacedæmon, “not to deform Greece into a Cyclop⁶³ :” and that of Cephisodotus against Chares, who offered to render an account of his financial administration, after he had involved the Athenians in the hot conflict about Olynthus, “that Chares expected the people to listen patiently to his accounts at the time when, through his wicked machinations, they were stifling in an oven.” The same Cephisodotus, when encouraging the Athenians to invade and punish Eubœa, said “that the decree of Miltiades⁶⁴ ought to be proclaimed against that island.” And Iphicrates, when the Athenians, at the commencement of a war, granted neutrality to Epidaurus and the neighbouring coast of Peloponnesus⁶⁵, in which they used to forage, expressed indignation “that their travelling necessaries should be left behind, just as they commenced their journey.” And Peitholaus called the great admiral-galley, *Paralus*, the club “of the Athenians ;” and the rich Hellespontian city, Sestos, “the granary of the Piræus :” in the same way Pericles, when provoked by the little rocky island *Ægina*, ex-

⁶³ Athens and Sparta were the two eyes of Greece. To raze Sparta, was to render Greece, *ετεροφθαλμον*, “one-eyed.”

⁶⁴ The decree of Miltiades means that no decree should be passed; in allusion to what happened before the battle of Marathon, when the Athenians and Plataeans, at the instigation of Miltiades, marched to battle without waiting for a decree.

⁶⁵ The fertility of Epidaurus and the neighbouring districts is still spoken of with wonder by all modern travellers into this division of Greece.

horted the Athenians "to tear off that speck from the eye of the Piræus."⁶⁶ Aesion said "that the commonwealth of Athens had poured itself into Sicily;" and again, "that Greece had exclaimed with a loud voice."⁶⁷ These are meta-

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⁶⁶ Several examples follow, which do not admit of translation. The first is founded on the ambiguity of the word *τοκος*, denoting the fruits either of marriage or of money; children or interest. To understand the sense of the passage, it must be observed that a mina contained an hundred drachmas, and the interest of a mina was sometimes not less than a drachma monthly; equal to 12 per cent. per ann. But according to agreement, the interest might be half a drachma, a third of a drachma, the tenth of a drachma: when the third of a drachma, it was named technically *ἐπὶ τριτῶν τοκῶν*; when the tenth of a drachma, it was named technically, *ἐπὶ δεκάτῶν τοκῶν*; so that the lower interest had the higher name. The third of a drachma monthly, that is, 4 per cent. per ann. was moderate interest, and such as liberal men were not ashamed of receiving. But the usurer Mærocles, who had ten children, said that he was more liberal than any of them, being contented with *ἐπὶ δεκάτῶν*. The second example is an Iambic verse of Anaxandrides to some fastidious virgins, whom he qualifies as *ὑπερημεριοί*, an epithet applicable to an unfortunate claimant, who had not availed himself of the time prescribed for urging his suit. The third was the saying of Polyeuctes against a turbulent man, Speusippus, who had been attacked and benumbed by a fit, "that he could not remain quiet, though bound by fortune in the *πεντασυριγγῶ*," an instrument employed in Athenian prisons against the most dangerous malefactors, who were tied hands and feet. In the fourth, gallies are called by Cephisodotus painted corn-mills, because, in both, culprits were condemned to hard labour, that of grinding and rowing: and in the fifth, Diogenes the Cynic stigmatised the drunkenness of the Athenians, by calling taverns the Attic Phiditia, which last word denoted the sober parsimonious tables of the Lacedæmonians.

⁶⁷ There are two sayings omitted, founded on the equivocal meaning of the word *συνδρομαί*, denoting properly hostile encounters, but from its composition of two words, signifying to run together, or assemble, applicable also to popular assemblies for deliberation. To brand the tumult which prevailed in these, Cephisodotus exhorted the Athenians to beware of holding too many *συνδρομαί*: and Isocrates, with the same view, speaks of the Athenians "trooping together" to their solemnities.

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phors, and metaphors representing actions. And in the funeral oration of those who died in the battle of Salamis : “ It is just that for such men Greece should mourn, and shave her head in sorrow, as if liberty herself were entombed together with their valour.” In addition to a metaphor, and that representing action, there is here a sort of antithesis between valour and liberty. In the same way, Iphicrates said, “ My discourse must travel through the midst of Chares’s actions.” This metaphor is founded on analogy ; and the words, “ through the midst,” makes the orator’s intellectual progress, as it were, a matter of positive sensation. And again, “ We must summon new dangers to our aid, against the dangers by which we are surrounded.” Lycoleon, when pleading for Chabrias, in the place where the statue of that general had been erected with knees bent, intreated the judges “ to respect the piteous attitude of his statue, supplicating for acquittal.” This metaphor, which animated the brazen statue, was justified by the occasion : the statue was before their eyes : it would otherwise have been foolish to talk of its supplication ; to give life and personality to a mere monument.”⁶⁸ Isocrates, speaking of the Persians, said, “ They employ their whole care and study to lessen their minds and manhood.” Their worthlessness is thus strongly represented ;

⁶⁸ The reader may see what I have said of this statue, and its singular attitude, in my History of Ancient Greece, Part I. vol. iii. chap. xxx. It had been long mistaken for a gladiator. It is pleasing to find such unexpected coincidences confirming the truth of history.

for care and study are naturally employed to augment good things, not to diminish them. CHAP. X.
 Again, "God hath placed in the soul the light of intellect:" for both are given to make things clear and manifest. Again, speaking of treaties of peace made without real amity, he says, "We do not terminate our wars, we only prorogue them." Again, "By treaties, nobler trophies are raised than by victories; for warlike trophies commemorate particular advantages, and those often small ones: but a beneficial peace is the result of a successful war, the accumulation of military glory."⁶⁹ Again, "That states have a dreadful responsibility; and that dreadful punishments are awarded them in the reproaches and condemnation of mankind."⁷⁰ We have thus shown that the beauty of diction arises from metaphors founded on analogy, and from the art of making the objects of our discourse to appear actually present.

WE must treat more fully of the art of re- CHAP. XI.
 presenting the objects of discourse to the eye, and of making hearers, as it were, spectators. Of energy, and animation of language.
 This is done by words denoting these objects in their highest activity, for it is then that they are conveyed to the mind most efficaciously.

⁶⁹ A beneficial peace bears the same relation to the whole warfare that a trophy does to a particular battle: both are signs of victory.

⁷⁰ The reproaches and condemnation of mankind are to states that which *ευθυναί*, legal punishments for malversation in office, are to individuals.

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Thus to say that "A good man is four-square," is a metaphor denoting his perfection; the firmness and stability of his character⁷¹: but it is not expressive of any action or energy, as when we say, "A youth in the vigour of his bloom;" Or say to a released captive, "You are free as coursers discharged from the service of the Gods."⁷²

Homer is full of energy; his metaphors give life and sense to inanimate objects.⁷³ Sisyphus's rock is represented as baffling his painful labours, and impudently bounding to the plain: the metaphor is analogical; the movements of the rock, after eluding the hands of Sisyphus, bearing a similar relation to him, that impudent actions bear to those in whose presence they are committed.⁷⁴ Arrows are animated with an innate power of flight; they are described as being "eager to fly;" and spears as being "eager to

⁷¹ A wicked man is unsteady in all his ways.

⁷² The horses, *αφετοι*, that had been so employed, roamed at large; it was impious to abridge their liberty.

⁷³ *Αιξαντες* was applied to the foot-racers, when they at once started at the given signal. The application of this word to men rushing to battle, would contain no metaphor in English. I have therefore omitted this first example of animated metaphors from Homer.

⁷⁴ *Αυθς επι δαπεδον τε κυλινδετο λαας αναιδης*. "The impudent stone again rolled down to the plain." *Odyss. xi. 597*. The philosopher quotes from memory. Pope's beautiful translation touches not on what Aristotle deems the main circumstance:—

With many a weary step and many a groan,
Up the high hill he heaves a huge round stone;
The huge round stone, resulting with a bound,
Thunders impetuous down, and smokes along the ground.

satiate their thirst of blood," or "trembling with desire to penetrate the breasts of men." The following is an example of the good effect produced by animating things void of life,—

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As when from gloomy clouds a whirlwind springs,
That bears Jove's thunder on its dreadful wings,
Wide o'er the blasted field the tempest *sweeps*;
Then gather'd *settles* on the hoary deeps;
The *afflicted* deeps, tumultuous, mix and *roar*;
The waves behind impel the waves before,
Wide rolling, foaming high, and *tumbling* to the shore.⁷⁵

All lives, and moves, and breathes; and real objects are brought before us by the energy of the description.

Metaphors, we before said, must be drawn from things congenial, indeed, but not too near akin: they must not, on the one hand, be far-fetched and obscure; nor, on the other, superficial and obvious. Even in philosophy, it is deemed a mark of more than ordinary acuteness, to perceive relations and resemblances between things remote. "Why," said Archytas, "is an arbitrator like an altar? Because both serve for refuge from injury." In the same way, it has been said that an anchor is a crane, since it performs a similar operation; anchors resisting forces above them, and cranes those below. It was a remote metaphor to speak of well-levelled commonwealths; thus applying the superficial smoothness of bodies to the even-handed impartiality of poli-

⁷⁵ Iliad, xiii. 998, &c.

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tical institutions. Urbanity and elegance of style result pre-eminently from metaphor, accompanied with previous deception; for our knowledge receives additional brightness when things are contrasted, and shown to be different from what we formerly supposed and believed them: the mind says, as it were, to itself; "True, it is really so, how much was I mistaken in my first conjecture." Apophthegms derive their grace from saying something different from that which the words apparently denote; for example, the apophthegm of Stesichorus, above mentioned, "Beware lest your grasshoppers sing on the ground." In the same way, riddles are a source of amusement and pleasure. They are metaphors, containing instruction, and affording, as Theodorus says, the gratification of learning something new. In fact, they surprise by the difference between what is said, and what is really intended, and afford the pleasure derived from correcting a wrong opinion too hastily taken up. A truth comes out contrary to expectation; and pleasure is thus produced, on the same principle that laughter is excited by an unexpected substitution of one word for another⁷⁶, or by those slight literal changes that occasion ludicrous associations or suggest ridiculous allusions.⁷⁷ In the same manner, equivocal words

⁷⁶ This playing on words, Aristotle says, was used by the poets, meaning the comic poets; which he exemplifies in the verse εσείχε δ' ἔχων ὑπο ποσσι χιμετρα: He marched, having "kibes on his feet;" the word expected was πεδηλα, "sandals."

⁷⁷ The examples of changes in letters exciting laughter, cannot be translated. The first was that of the player Theodorus, who was

may be employed to give that pleasure which surprise occasions. An equivocal word, admitting different acceptations, may be affirmed or denied of itself, without contradiction or tautology. Thus "Lawless" is the name of a man, and it may be said that "Lawless" is truly "lawless" or that, "Good" meaning thereby a particular man, is nothing less than good.⁷⁸ Anaxandrides said, "A man dies worthily, who has done nothing worthy of death."⁷⁹ All such sentences are improved by opposition and bre-

also a wit, to Nikon, a vain-glorious musician, and famous for his performance on the harp. Nikon, it seems, was put in a passion by some one wanting in respect to him, which Theodorus observing, instead of saying, *θραττει σε*, "He disturbs you," said, *Θραττη σε*, "a Thracian bore you," in allusion to Nikon's mother, who was a Thracian slave. The second consists in the change of the diphthong in *περσαι* into a vowel *περσα*, "You would attempt to ravage," "You, a Persian! would attempt." In all such cases, Aristotle observes that the hearers must be possessed of the information requisite to render the allusion easily intelligible by them.

⁷⁸ Aristotle's example is *ανασχετος*, "Tolerable," a name in Greece; and it was said of a person so named, that "Tolerable" was "intolerable," because his temper was not to be endured. Another example is *αρχη*, which signifies either command, or beginning. Isocrates said that the command of the sea was the beginning of evils: and it was said, in opposition to this, that the command of the sea was not the beginning of evils; for it had been the source of profit and glory. Again, *ξενος* signifies, in Greek, either a stranger, or a person connected with us by the sacred laws of hospitality. It was said, therefore, "Be not more a stranger, than becomes a stranger;" that is, an hereditary guest, who was entitled to use our house as his own.

⁷⁹ "It is a fine thing to die before doing any thing worthy of death." This saying of Anaxandrides was commended, because the word *αξιον*, which signified a fine thing, also signified worthy or deserving: "it is worthy to die before being worthy of death."

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vity : opposition affords knowledge, and brevity conveys it impressively. It would be rightly said, " that it is happy for a man to die before he has incurred guilt ;" but the expression has nothing in it of grace or novelty : it is a just observation, also, that a woman of rank should match with a man of rank ; but the thought, thus expressed, is not ingenious or striking. To deserve praise, there must be vivacity of diction, with justness of sentiment ; and the more numerous are the ornaments that fitly blend, metaphor⁸⁰, antithesis⁸¹, and what we have called energy, the beauty and the delight will be the greater. Comparisons worthy of approbation, are, as above observed, substantially the same with well-chosen metaphors. They always imply the contemplation of two distinct objects, and these objects considered simply in themselves, or in the relations which they bear, respectively, to two others. Hence metaphors are simple or analogical. The analogical are exemplified in calling a shield the cup of Mars ; and a bow, a lyre without strings ; but if we call a bow, a lyre ; or a shield, a cup ; the metaphor is simple. Comparisons are often of this latter kind, founded on the resemblance of objects themselves, not on that of their relations. Thus a man playing on the flute has been likened to a mounching

⁸⁰ He adds, the particular kind of metaphor, meaning the analogical, which he had proved to be the best.

⁸¹ Aristotle adds *παιστωσις*, the equalising and balancing of clauses in a period, above explained.

monkey, from his distorted and puckered mouth; and a blear-eyed blinker to a dripping lamp. But comparisons, to be good, must be metaphorical, that is, drawn from things not too near akin. Thus a shield is likened to a cup; the ruins of a building to the rags of a garment; and when Niceratus, the rhapsodist, was defeated by his rival, Pratys, and felt the mortification so deeply, that it was visible in his disordered and haggard aspect⁸², Thrasy-machus called him Philoctetes, stung by the serpent Pratys.⁸³ Nothing contributes more than these figures to the honour of a poet, when they are good, or to his disgrace, when they are bad; and their badness will strike the more forcibly, the more they are dwelt on and elaborated. That comparisons are metaphors in a different form, we have already said; thus, "that a crook-legged, spindle-shanked man has legs like parsley⁸⁴;" "that ill-assorted colleagues resemble the struggling group of Philammon and Corycus sweating and fighting under the same yoke⁸⁵:" these, and all thoughts similarly announced, are comparisons in form, but metaphors in substance.

⁸² Κομῶντα καὶ ἀνχμηρόν. "He let his beard grow, and forgot to anoint himself."

⁸³ The force of such allusions was much heightened by the numerous statues of persons and things, perpetually before the eyes of the Greeks.

⁸⁴ The parsley-crown, in the games, made the figure of the plant familiar.

⁸⁵ This well-known group was a fit object of comparison.

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Proverbs are also metaphors⁸⁶, and of that kind which consists in substituting one species for another. Thus, when persons anxious to appropriate any thing which they had considered as a great good, find it turn out to be a ruinous evil, the proverb says, "The isle of Carpathus with the hares;" for that island was nearly ruined by the introduction and wonderful multiplication of those animals. Hyperboles⁸⁷, if good, are also metaphors: it was said of a man with a carbuncled face, "You would have believed him a great basket of mulberries." There was a deep red in both; and the exaggeration only, constituted the hyperbole. Although the comparative form of expression had been added, the hyperbole would have still remained in substance; as in the example⁸⁸ above given, "His legs resembled those of parsley," is a comparison; "You would have thought his legs to be stalks of parsley," is a hyperbole. Hyperboles are boyish, for they manifest that effervescence of passion which is the characteristic of youth. They are therefore natural to persons fired by anger. Thus,—

Tho' gifts were heaped on gifts in number more
Than dust in fields, or sands along the shore,

⁸⁶ For *μεταφορα* means *translatio*, merely the transposing a word or phrase from one meaning to another.

⁸⁷ Aristotle repeats, "that such are the sources of urbanity."

⁸⁸ I have omitted the other example of Philammon and Corycus; because, in it, the author does not contrast the comparative with the hyperbolical form.

Atrides' daughter never shall be led
 An ill-match'd consort to Achilles' bed;
 Like golden Venus, tho' she charmed the heart,
 And vied with Pallas in the works of art.⁸⁹

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Il. ix. 510, &c.

Our light Athenian orators⁹⁰ much affect the hyperbole; this figure is, therefore, unsuitable to the gravity of men in years.

It must be carefully remembered that different occasions require different styles. A discourse intended for perusal at leisure in the closet, ought to be composed differently from one intended to be spoken: and an oration before the public assembly, should be very different in style from a judicial pleading. To speak well requires the habit of using the language properly and readily; but to write well requires, also, that skill in composition as an art⁹¹, which is essential in communicating our sentiments to persons distant in time or place; to strangers or to posterity. As in works to be read, the language ought to be distinguished by accuracy, so the oral style of judicial or political

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Compositions addressed to the reader, and those to the hearer—their different requisites.

⁸⁹ Other parts of this speech, surpassing all other oratory in vehemence, are equally hyperbolical.—

Not all proud Thebes' unrivalled walls contain,
 The world's great empress on the Egyptian plain, &c.

And,—

His gifts are hateful; kings of such a kind
 Stand but as slaves, before a noble mind.

⁹⁰ Aristotle says, "Athenian orators affect the hyperbole, this figure is *therefore*." But the conclusion does not follow, and the epithet "light" or something similar, is wanting to complete the sense.

⁹¹ Conf. Quintilian, l. x. c. 1.

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III.

conflict must be set off by imitation and action, I mean by that exact and lively expression of passions and of manners, resulting from the wide variety of circumstances in which the orator may be placed, and the various distinctions of characters, ages, and occupations, which enter into the subject of his discourse. This pathetic and moral imitation is that which chiefly recommends an author to players and rhapsodists: and authors also are studious to select, for the recitation of their works, such performers as excel in the imitation of passions and manners. Accuracy and elegance, again, are most prized in the closet; and works pre-eminent in this way accompany us in our walks, and on our journies: witness the poetical compositions of Chæremon⁹¹, penned with all the elaborate precision of an historian. The dithyrambics of Licymnius⁹² deserve the same praise. In comparing the two styles together, we shall find that compositions delightful to the reader would, in the warmth of debate, appear dry and tame to the hearer; and on the other hand, that orations admired when spoken, will be deemed nothing extraordinary when read. They were calculated, indeed, for political debate or forensic contest, but when stripped of that action and utterance which set them off to advantage, they betray their native poverty; and are found to be superficial and flimsy. To the imitative power of pronounci-

⁹¹ Conf. Demetrius Phaler. de Elocut. The loss of the works of Chæremon is much to be regretted.

⁹² The writings of this great lyricist have perished.

ation and gesture, they owed their effect ; and when stripped of these concomitants, they are unable to make the impression intended, and to accomplish their work. The omission of conjunctions, and tautology, offend in the written style ; in speaking, such licences will often contribute to the end in view, and may therefore be regarded as beauties. To repeat the same thing in different words, prepares the way for that oratorical action which inflames the passions, and thereby controls the will and the understanding. Thus, when the mover of an impeachment said, " This is the man who robbed you, this is the man who deceived you, this is the man who at last endeavoured to betray you." Examples of the same kind occur in the speeches of Rhadamanthus and Palamedes ; in that piece of Anaxandrides⁹³, entitled " The Old Fools ;" and also in his prologue to " The Religious," where the pronoun " I" is so often repeated. To each of these repetitions, the comedian Philemon gave a new signification, and a new effect ; without this excellence in acting, the speeches in question would have disgusted by an unmeaning load of words, and been obnoxious to the proverb of " using a beam, when a cane might serve the purpose." On the same principle, orators omit the connectives of discourse, " I came, I met, I entreated him." These clauses must not be pronounced with a sameness of tone and action, as if they were the same thing. The omission

⁹³ Anaxandrides of Camira. The names of some of his lost comedies are given by Athenæus and by Suidas.

BOOK III. of connectives has the peculiar advantage of making it be believed, that more things are said in the same space of time : for, as the use of conjunctions is to bind together and to unite many into one, so the rejection of them serves to disunite, and to make one into many : it therefore answers the end of amplification ; as, “ I came, I conversed, I supplicated : ” again, “ He appears to overlook what I say, what I aver. ” Homer well knew the force of this figure, and the principle on which it is founded.⁹⁴

Three ships with Nireus sought the Trojan shore,
Nireus whom Aglæe to Charopus bore,
Nireus, in faultless shape and blooming grace, &c.

Iliad, ii. 815.

Of whom many things are said, the name must often be repeated : when the name is often repeated, many things will appear, therefore, to be said. By thrice repeating the name of Nireus, Homer amplifies what is said of him, and has embalmed in the memory of his readers, a man never introduced again in his poem.⁹⁵ Popular eloquence resembles those paintings which have a strong light and shadow, but are coarse and unfinished ; for the hearers, the more numerous they are, always see, as it were, from the greater distance : in neither art, is nice finishing to be commended, because in both it would be super-

⁹⁴ The repetition even of the meanest words has sometimes a powerful effect :—

Ah! *that* way madness lies, think not of *that*, no more of *that*.

Lear.

⁹⁵ Conf. Demetrius Phalereus de Elocut. § 61.

fluous. Judicial eloquence requires more elaboration and accuracy, especially when there is but one judge : in this case, there is little room for rhetorical art : the judge discerns what belongs to the cause and detaches from it useless appendages : pure from the contagion of passion, he is not to be affected by the contentious struggles of tones and gestures. The form of eloquence ought, therefore, to be adapted to the nature, and even to the number of the hearers ; for the greater scope there is afforded to the powers of voice and action, the less of elegance and accuracy will be required. Demonstrative eloquence admits and demands the terseness of written style ; for orations turning on virtue and vice, on praise or blame, are composed for the instruction and entertainment of readers at leisure. The judicial comes next to it in accuracy ; and last of all, the deliberative, meaning thereby, political discussions before the popular assembly. To enter into farther details and distinctions, to say, for instance, that style ought to be sweet, magnificent, or lofty, are observations without meaning. It might as well be said that style ought to be liberal, or temperate, or just, or partake of any other moral excellence.⁹⁶ Delightful it necessarily will be, should it possess the qualities above enumerated, on the supposition that these qualities, in fact, constitute the whole merit of diction. Why

⁹⁶ Strong will be the proof of Aristotle's soundness of judgment in perusing the works of authors who enter into those details ; and considering how few distinct notions, and how few useful rules, are really to be derived from them.

BOOK
III.

ought our compositions to be precise and perspicuous, not verbose and drawling? It is, that they may fit the occasion, and effect their end; for a style cannot be clear and persuasive, that is either diffuse or abrupt.⁹⁶ The middle point will always be found the height of perfection; and the beauty and grace⁹⁷ of style are nothing but the due mixture of the elements above specified⁹⁸: appropriate or proper terms duly blended with the foreign and metaphorical; rhythms, or numbers, harmoniously varied; and a natural strain of composition fraught with propriety and persuasion. So much concerning style and its different kinds: it remains to treat of disposition or method.

CHAP.
XIII.

The parts essential in every discourse, the proposition of the subject, and the proof.

IN discourse, two parts are essential; the proposition of the subject and the proof; for it is impossible to demonstrate or prove, without knowing what is to be demonstrated; and by proposing the question without answering it, we cannot possibly effectuate that persuasion which is the end of discourse. These two parts, therefore, are necessary, the problem, or question; and the demonstration, or answer. The multiplicity of parts or divisions, commonly talked of, have no real foundation, and ridiculously fritter the subject; for that part interposed between the proposition and proof, called the narration, is ap-

⁹⁶ See above.

⁹⁷ See above, p. 401.

⁹⁸ Such also, are the last results of the rhetorical writings of Cicero, constituting nearly a sixth part of his admirable works, and of the copious Institutes of Quintilian. Vid. Quintilian, l. xii. c. 10. p. 1106. Edit. Burman.

propriate to judicial pleadings. In demonstrative and deliberative eloquence, there is no room for it, any more than for what is called "the refutation of adversaries, and the confirmation of arguments."⁹⁹ The exordium, the refutation, the peroration, have place, indeed, in political discussions, but it is only in the case of opposition and contradiction: and though these often occur, and that much time also is often spent in accusation and defence, yet, to sound deliberation, none of these things are essential; and when such digressions are made, the discourse quits its deliberative character. The peroration is not essential even to juridical speeches; for, if they are short, or consist of things easily remembered, what occasion can there be for an epilogue or peroration, of which the sole drift is to lop away superfluities, that the solid and commanding points may be the more easily remembered? The parts absolutely indispensable are the proposition and proof, to which may be added, as things not always necessary, yet really distinct and often useful, the exordium and peroration: for as to that called "refutation of adversaries," and "the balancing of their arguments against our own, in order to add weight to the latter," they are nothing but parts of the proof; not so the exordium and epilogue, which have

To which the exordium and peroration, may often be added with advantage.

⁹⁹ In the demonstrative, the narration runs through the whole discourse; the things done being the source of the praise or blame bestowed: the deliberative, again, respects the future; and in it, "narration," which always respects the past, cannot be introduced, except *συμβεβηκοῦς*, accessionally. See Introduction, p. 88.

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their respective uses, the former to command attention for what is going to be said, the latter to bring back recollection to what had been said previously. To divide as some writers do, is no better than the pedantry of Theodorus, who talked of "narrations, super-narrations, and pro-narrations, and refutations and super-refutations." Distinctions ought not to be made without differences, nor new names imposed, unless new things are meant by them. The contrary is only worthy of the futility and dotage of Lycimnius, who classes among the constituent parts of discourse "irruptions and aberrations, roots and branches."¹⁰⁰

CHAP.
XIV.

The exordium or prologue.

THE exordium is the beginning of a discourse, bearing to it the same relation which a prologue does to tragedy¹⁰¹; or a prelude to any musical performance: it is merely to prepare the way for entering on the subject. In demonstrative eloquence, the exordium has this further agreement with a prelude, that as the musicians are at liberty to set off with any piece in which they most delight, and which they can execute most ably, so in epideiktic¹⁰² orations, the exordium may be chosen at pleasure: all that the orator has to do, is to join it by any relation, however

¹⁰⁰ The Stagirite anticipated the too just ridicule of Hudibras:—

For all a rhetorician's rules
Teach nothing but to name his tools.

¹⁰¹ He says, "poetry," meaning the dramatic.

¹⁰² Orations for display.

remote, to his subject; and some such relation his ingenuity cannot fail to suggest. A well-known and approved example of this kind, is the panegyric of Helen by Isocrates, in which the proem turns wholly on the odious character and unworthy proceedings of those denominated Sophists; though the arraignment of such contentious and envious critics is a subject altogether foreign to the eulogy of the fair Helen: yet to discourses calculated for entertainment merely and pleasure, this mixture of topics, which produces an agreeable variety, is not unsuitable.

C H A P.
XIV.

Indefinite,
illustrated
in Isocra-
tes' enco-
mium of
Helen.

The exordiums in epideiktic orations are most naturally derived from three sources; from praise, from blame, and from the opportunity afforded, while attention is awake, of instilling into the hearers some useful maxim, or some salutary advice. Gorgias, in his Olympic oration, begins from praise, when he says, "On many accounts, O Grecians! are those worthy of admiration, who have instituted your public solemnities." Isocrates begins from blame, when he says "Most justly are those to be censured who decreed rewards for superiority in bodily endowments, while they allowed the talents of the mind to languish without encouragement:" on other occasions, he begins with communicating some maxim or advice; "To those truly good, honour is most due," on which account, he has undertaken the eulogium of Aristides the Just.¹⁰³ Again, "The proper subjects of panegyric are

Topics
thereof in
demonstra-
tive elo-
quence.

¹⁰³ I have added the epithet: the name alone sufficed for a Greek reader.

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III.

neither ordinary men, nor they whose virtues are conspicuous, but those who have been great and good in seclusion and secrecy: such was Alexander the son of Priam, whose merits I am about to commemorate." In both of these instances, practical truths are inculcated.

In demonstrative eloquence, the proem is sometimes taken from topics which, as we shall see hereafter, are more peculiarly adapted to the judicial, and which bear a reference to the hearer; as, that the subject merits his attention, being extraordinary, or his pardon, now from its difficulty, and now for its triteness. Thus Chærilus¹⁰⁴ begins, —

"Already are the noblest spoils divided,
Things vulgar only left."

Such, then, in demonstrative oratory, are the topics of exordium; praise, blame, practical truths, persuasive or dissuasive; and observations peculiarly calculated to excite the attention, or influence the disposition, of the hearers; and these proems, it has been said, may either be akin to the subject, or entirely foreign to it.

In judicial
eloquence.

In judicial eloquence, the proems resemble those of epic poetry, or the prologues of tragedy: for the ode admits of the same latitude with the panegyric: Thus, —

¹⁰⁴ Chærilus of Samos, an epic poet, who sung the wars of the Greeks against Xerxes and Darius. He is spoken of slightly by Horace, who acknowledges, however, that he sometimes writes well. De Art. Poetic. v. 357. The words cited by Aristotle belong to a fragment, not inelegant, preserved by his Greek interpreter.

For thee, thy honour'd gifts, and glorious triumphs,
O! sacred Bacchus.¹⁰⁵

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XIV.

But in judicial speeches, as in heroic poetry, the exordium proposes the subject of discourse; that the reader may not hesitate in perplexity, but have, as it were, a clue in his hand to direct his steps. Thus, —

Achilles' wrath, to Greece the direful spring
Of woes unnumber'd, heavenly Goddess, sing!

And, —

The man for wisdom's various arts renown'd,
Long exercis'd in woes, O Muse! resound.

And, —

A new and mighty war, O Goddess! tell,
How Asia's pond'rous hosts on Europe fell.¹⁰⁶

Tragedians, also, announce the subject of their piece, either immediately at the outset, as is the custom with Euripides, or at least in some part of the prologue, and before the first choral song¹⁰⁷; as Sophocles in his *Œdipus Tyrannus*,

My father's name was Polybus, &c.

The same practice is followed by writers of comedy. The essential business, therefore, of a proem is to declare the end and purpose of the work: if this end be manifest in itself, or the work be extremely short, no exordium is

¹⁰⁵ The name of the God addressed is supplied by the Greek interpreter; but as no part of the ode itself remains, the point in question receives no illustration.

¹⁰⁶ We know not precisely who this poet was, who chose the invasion of Xerxes for his subject; probably Chærilus above cited.

¹⁰⁷ This appeared necessary to be added, that the reader might not be misled by the modern signification of the word "prologue."

BOOK
III.

Artifice in
arranging
them.

requisite ; and whatever besides is thrown into it, must be regarded as not absolutely indispensable, but as said by way of removing difficulties or objections, and fit to be introduced with equal propriety in other parts of the poem or discourse. These extraneous matters in the proem relate either to the speaker, the subject, the adversary, or the audience. What relates to the speaker and his adversary, turns chiefly on accusation and defence ; the defence of himself and the accusation of his antagonist. These things, however, must not be prosecuted in the same order : when defence is the object, our apology must appear in the very front of the discourse : whereas the accusation of our adversary must be reserved for the conclusion of it. The reason is evident : before we obtrude our concerns on an audience, it is prudent to remove the obstacles that might obstruct their attention, or disturb their judgment ; but that an adversary may be defeated and condemned, our invective should be reserved for the end, that the impression made by it may remain strong and fresh in the memory of the judges. As to what relates to the judges or auditors, no pains should be spared to conciliate their goodwill to ourselves, and to turn their angry passions against the adversary ; to render them attentive to the subject ; and sometimes to divert their attention ; for occasionally this will best serve our purpose¹⁰⁸ : so that many, having no

¹⁰⁸ Quintilian seldom differs from Aristotle ; when he does, he falls into error ; as his annotators acknowledge to be the case in combating the opinion in the text. Vid. Quintilian. Burmanni, l. iv. c. i. p. 306.

serious argument to urge, do not yet give up their cause for lost, while they think it possible to create mirth, and to get the laugh on their side. Whatever procures attention (when that is the object in view) will contribute to the easy and clear intelligence of our cause; and therefore nothing is better adapted to this end, than the favourable exhibition of ourselves, as men of real worth; for such are entitled to universal regard, and will seldom fail to be heard attentively. The same disposition takes place with regard to things great, extraordinary, agreeable, or those in which the interests of our audience is involved. That such are the subjects treated of, must be impressed on the hearers, when we would rouse their attention; and when we would distract and divert it, the direct contrary; that the matters are slight, unimportant, painful, disgusting, or no wise related to themselves. Let it be remembered, however, that all such prefaces are extraneous to the cause itself: they are to be employed only when, in the judges, that impartial reason is wanting which constitutes the essence of the judicial character; men of firm integrity and clear understanding are not to be influenced by flimsy irrelevant topics: and with them, all that is necessary by way of preface, is a summary view of the speaker's purpose, that his discourse be not entered on abruptly, nor appear essentially defective, — a body without a head. Attention must be recalled, whenever it inclines to wander; but it is ridiculous to think the exordium

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XIV.

Attention
how to be
excited or
revived.

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III.

the fittest place for exciting it; since it is precisely at the beginning, that our hearers are of their own accord most disposed to listen. Whenever this disposition shall cease, we may in any part of our discourse solicit a patient hearing; “I request you to mark my words;” and, “The affair concerns not me, but yourselves;” “I have to tell a tale the most dreadful, or the most extraordinary.” This kind of address was practised, as he said, by Prodicus, who, when his auditors were disposed to slumber, threw in something about the lesson which he taught for fifty crowns.¹⁰⁹ Such preambles, though foreign to the subject, are allowable with a careless auditory; and are employed by those who would excuse themselves or accuse others, or who are afraid of entering on an offensive subject. Thus Sophocles, —

O king! what I have to declare, needs not
Disturb your quiet.

And Euripides, —

Wherefore this long preamble?
for all who have a bad cause are inclined to long prefaces, because they would rather talk of any thing else, than come to the reluctant subject. Our slaves, therefore, when in fault, never answer directly, but run into all the vagaries of tiresome circumlocution.

How to render an audience favourable, was treated above, when we explained the means of

¹⁰⁹ Fifty golden drachmas; the silver drachma, eight-pence English, was but one-tenth of the value.

exciting good will, as well as all the other affections. The great point is to make ourselves either beloved or pitied. Wherefore Ulysses says,

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O grant me ! in Phæatia's sons to move,
Or sacred pity, or endearing love. ¹¹⁰

Odyss. vi. 327.

Eulogies will be more sure of approbation, if, with the praise of those whom we wish to celebrate, we can, in any way, associate that of our hearers ; of themselves, their ancestors, or of any thing belonging to them : for Socrates well says, in the funeral oration by Plato, that it is easy to praise the Athenians among the Athenians ; the difficulty would be, to pronounce their panegyric among the Lacedæmonians, their enemies.

In political discussions, scarcely any introduction or proem is requisite, because the subject to be discussed has been publicly announced, is known to all, and interesting to all. Prefaces are not therefore essential to deliberative eloquence, considered absolutely in itself, but only in so far as it sometimes necessarily participates of the judicial. What was said concerning judicial prefaces, will then apply to

Exordium
in deliber-
ative elo-
quence.

¹¹⁰ Pope translates, —

Attend, unconquer'd maid ! accord my vows,
Bid the great hear, and pitying, heal my woes.

Cowper, more literally,

Grant we, among Phæatia's sons, to find
Benevolence and pity of my woes.

Neither of these exactly illustrates Aristotle's precept.

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III.

the deliberative ; they must bear a reference, to ourselves, our adversaries, the real value of the subject, whether it be our design to enhance or to depreciate it. Such prefaces, therefore, turn wholly on accusation or defence, augmentation or diminution ; save that something will generally be prefixed for the sake of form and ornament, that the discourse may not appear extemporaneous and crude, like Gorgias's eulogy of the Elians, which begins, without preparation or prelude, "Happy is the city Elis."

CHAP.
XV.

Its topics
turn on ac-
cusation
and de-
fence.

THE proem was said to be the place for refuting those calumnies of the adversary which, left in full force, might counteract the tendency of our discourse, and defeat its object. In this view, all the topics may be useful which serve to remove prejudices against us, whether these originate in oral accusation, or in any other source ; it being a matter universally important in all causes, to destroy unjust suspicions, and to exhibit ourselves in a favourable light.

A second way of opposing calumny, is to consider the substance of it as a point in controversy ; and then, either to deny the fact on which it is grounded ; or to show that this fact was innocent¹¹¹ ; that it contained nothing of injustice or turpitude¹¹² ; or that the bad consequences flowing from it were too trivial to merit consideration. Such circumstances constitute,

¹¹¹ " That it was not hurtful, or that it was not so to the person said to have been injured."

¹¹² " Or that the injustice was not great."

most commonly the points in dispute ; of which many may be conceded without ruining the cause ; as Iphicrates, when accused by Nausiocrates, granted that he had done the act imputed to him, and that mischief had flowed from it, but yet maintained that as he was fully entitled to do the thing of which he was accused, he had not committed injustice. Again, when the harm done is manifest, it may be extenuated or obliterated by compensation ; as that “ the measure was, indeed, disadvantageous, but honourable ; ” that “ the remonstrance was painful, indeed, but profitable, ” and other commutations of the same kind, in which the benefits obtained surpass the evils incurred. Another topic of defence against an admitted act, is, that it happened by chance ; or that it was done through mistake, or necessity. Thus Sophocles answered his accusers, saying that he trembled, not for the reason which they assigned, that he might appear old, but from dire necessity ; he could not help it, that he had passed his eightieth year.

Another topic tending to the same purpose, is to prove that the intent of any action was not that which the adversary pretended ; that though harm has been done, nothing was less in view ; and that a man would deserve hatred, who could have entertained any such unworthy design. The other topics are, to retort the accusation on the traducer, if either he himself, or any of those nearly connected with him, either actually are, or have ever been found, guilty of

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III.

any similar offence: to show that others have, on the same grounds been suspected of similar crimes ¹¹³, but, on trial, honourably acquitted: to prove that our adversary has accused others wrongfully, or has himself been justly accused; or, without any formal accusation, that, of individuals condemned to suffer the bitterest reproaches, the innocence has afterwards appeared most manifest: to arraign the accuser of baseness and treachery, for who can repose faith in the words of a man, who has shown himself to be faithless: to show that in the trial to which we are now exposed, sentence has been already passed. Thus, in his cause with Hegiænon, concerning the change of estates ¹¹⁴, Euripides was accused of impiety for saying,

My tongue did swear, my heart abjured the oath:

but he repelled the accusation, by saying that his adversary was most unjust in bringing before the ordinary tribunals, a cause already decided in the Theatre of Bacchus: that, before the competent judges there, those chosen to appreciate the merits of poetical competitors, he had already justified the verse in question, and was again ready to do so. The invective against calumny itself, may be employed for its refuta-

¹¹³ "Of adultery, for instance:" the text is corrupt; but by changing *καθαρος* into *καθαριος*, &c., and comparing this with a preceding passage, the meaning seems to be, that persons suspected of adultery, from their alluring dress and foppery, have yet been found quite clear of this crime.

¹¹⁴ The *αντιδοσις*, a cause of which I had frequently occasion to speak, in my History of Antient Greece, as well as in my translations of Lysias and Isocrates.

tion: it may be represented in such hideous shapes and such frightful colours, and as an evil of such stupendous magnitude, that the judges may be turned from the cause to the calumny involved in it, and led to decide the former favourably, by deciding strongly against the latter.

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XV.

To reason from indication and signs, is common to accusation and defence. Thus Ulysses, in the tragedy of Teucer, represents this chief as friendly to Priam, because he was born of Priam's sister, Hesioné: Teucer answers, "But my father was Telamon, most hostile to Priam¹¹⁵; and I did not denounce the Grecian spies¹¹⁶, when they were about to explore the Trojan camp."

A topic useful in accusation, is to mix praise with blame; but the praise must be for things of little value in themselves, or of no importance to the main business: if greater praises are bestowed, they must be conveyed too briefly and generally to make any deep impression: this voluntary eulogy will give efficacy and persuasion to the charges urged with force, and bearing directly on the cause: and this is, of all, the most artificial form of calumny, since even the good qualities of the accused are made subservient to his condemnation.

A topic common to accuser and defender is

¹¹⁵ Telamon was the auxiliary to Hercules in the war against Troy; and having defeated Laomedon and his son Priam, carried Hesioné, sister of the latter, into captivity.

¹¹⁶ Diomed and Ulysses, as the adventure is related by Homer.

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III.

derived from the various motives to which actions may be ascribed. An accuser will allege the worst; a defender the best. Why, in many bold enterprises, was Ulysses chosen by Diomed for his companion? Because Ulysses's valour was deserving of this preference: or, because Diomed wished for an associate too unequal in merit, ever to become a rival. Thus much concerning accusation.

CHAP.
XVI.

The narrative, how to be conducted in demonstrative eloquence.

In demonstrative eloquence, the narrative ought not to be continuous, but frequently interrupted by reflections which the actions suggest, and by the praises of which they may appear deserving. For a panygeric is composed of two parts, of which one is inartificial and independent of the orator, since he has no share in causing the actions which he applauds; and the other is a work of much labour and skill, since it depends on the orator entirely, to show the credibility of the actions related, how incredible soever they may at first sight appear; and to ascertain and display their nature, quality, magnitude, and all other important particulars belonging to them. The narrative, therefore, making great demands on the reader's attention and memory, cannot be continuous, without setting the facts that form the proof, at too great a distance from the conclusions that are drawn from them: as when the orator should say, "In the first part of my narrative, valour was evinced; in the second, wisdom; in the third, justice." This mode of composition, besides, would be jejune and flimsy: it would

want that impressive force, and that alluring variety, which arise from a due intermixture of reasoning with narrative. CHAP.
XVI.

In many panegyrical themes, no relation of facts is requisite. Who is ignorant of the actions of Achilles? But were Critias to be the subject of eulogy, his exploits, being little known, would require commemoration.

Some books of rhetoric say ridiculously, "Let your narrative be short." This is like the baker who asked, "whether he should knead his dough hard or soft?" "Cannot you knead it well?" was the fit return made to him. The same answer applies to the case before us. You ought not to be long in your narratives, nor in your preambles, nor in your proofs. For what may be called long or short is inconsistent with that happy mean which ought always to be aimed at; and which consists in saying what is necessary to explain the subject in hand, and in urging what is fit to be urged in the way of proof on the one side¹¹⁷, and of reputation on the other.

In a well-formed narrative, the speaker may bestow many oblique praises on himself, and many oblique reproaches on his adversary. Thus, "For my part, I anxiously pleaded the cause of justice and humanity, and that he would not abandon the helpless children. But he answered unfeelingly, 'Wherever I go,

¹¹⁷ Of proof that an event has happened, that harm has been done, or an injury committed.

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III.

I shall find new children.' ” The same answer is said by Herodotus¹¹⁸ to have been given to their king by the revolted Egyptians. In a well-contrived narrative, the speaker will also be careful to introduce topics pleasing to his judges: he will thus employ the two most efficacious means of procuring their good will, by exhibiting the worth of his own character, and by testifying his favourable disposition towards themselves.

The narrative in judicial eloquence should be strictly limited;

In making a defence, the narrative needs not to embrace all the particulars employed in urging an accusation. It ought to be confined to the points in dispute, showing that such an event did not happen; that the harm alleged was not done; or, that the injury pretended, was not committed. The facts acknowledged on both sides need not to be touched on, unless when the circumstances accompanying them tend to clear up the state of the cause, and to determine the point in question. It may be allowed, for instance, on both sides, that a certain act was done, occasioning harm; yet, by the circumstances accompanying this act, the defendant may be exculpated from intentional guilt, and therefore acquitted of injury.

Dreadful and piteous events may be related, without representing those particulars which excite indignation or pity¹¹⁹: witness the long

¹¹⁸ Herodotus, l. ii. c. 30.

¹¹⁹ As the text stands, Aristotle says that those things ought to be said, which would not excite pity or indignation, if seen: yet things are said by Ulysses to Alcinous, which would have excited

recital of woful and unworthy disasters made by Ulysses to Alcinous, and which are dispatched in sixty lines, when the same story is told to Penelopé. An example of the same kind occurs in the Cyclic poem of Phayllus, and in the *Æneus* of Euripides.

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XVI.

The narrative, we have said, ought to be and moral; descriptive of manners. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the means best calculated to stamp on it this moral character. The first of these is to lay open the inward preferences and purposes of the mind, for, accordingly as these are good or bad, so are our manners or morals; and the quality of our purposes themselves depends entirely on that of the ends at which they aim. If these ends are good, so will be the purposes and the actions; if the ends are bad, the purposes and actions will be bad also. In the mathematical sciences, therefore, how delightful soever to the understanding, there is nothing of morality; because such speculations involve not any end, good or bad, which can be the object of deliberation, choice,

the greatest pity and indignation, if beheld by that prince, and they are said merely with a view to excite in him these passions; but the particulars employed for that purpose, are omitted in the discourse to Penelopé, whose breast he did not wish to tear by such a lamentable tale. In the original, Aristotle says, "the tale of Alcinous," for the ancients were so familiar with Homer, that they did not refer to the books into which his works were divided, but to the different tales and episodes contained in them; as the "Grotto of Calypso, the "*νεκυνία*, or evocation of the manes," the "*νιπτροί*, the washing of Ulysses" in the sixth book of the *Odyssey* above referred to. The *νιπτροί* as well as the *Αλκίνοος ἀπολογος*, are both mentioned in the *Poetic*, c. xvi.

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III.

preference, or rejection ; and according to the quality of which end, our purposes and actions are denominated good or evil. The speculations of Socrates, on the other hand, are exclusively directed to those ends, and the means of attaining them.

To infuse morality and manners into a narrative, it will be useful to particularise the actions and gestures naturally accompanying different dispositions and habits. For example, a rude, haughty, contumelious character is thus exhibited : “ While he answered me, he continued to stride along.” If we would moralise our narratives, we must not, according to the practice of some modern orators, mould them solely after the maxims of interest and prudence ; we must often make men talk rather from sentiment than reason, rather according to the resolutions of the will, than the conclusions of the understanding. “ I wished to embrace this measure, though no advantage attended it ; for justice, not utility, was the object of my preference.” In this manner, the speaker indicates a mind less swayed by selfish prudence than by the love of honour and virtue. If the preference alleged should appear very improbable, the cause ought to be subjoined, as is done in the tragedy of *Antigoné* by Sophocles. That princess having declared that her tender concern for her brother exceeded the affection for her husband and children, assigns the cause,

My parents long descended to the grave,
A brother's loss can never be repair'd.

Should there be no reason to assign, you must acknowledge that you say things incredible to men who act on vulgar principles, guided solely by the dictates of conveniency and interest: but that such is your nature, and that you cannot help thinking and acting in a way that must to many appear very unreasonable.

What has been said concerning manners is applicable also to passions. To render a narrative pathetic, we must particularise the actions and gestures that naturally accompany each powerful emotion; we must represent the circumstances known to our hearers, and which they know to belong to ourselves or our adversaries, that from the faithful delineation of things known to them, they may draw inferences, otherwise unknown, and highly favourable to our cause. Thus, a multitude of odious passions are expressed by the words, "He went away looking askance, and measuring me with his eyes": and how clearly does Æschines exhibit the matchless impudence of Cratylus, "hissing and clapping his hands."¹²⁰ Such actions and gestures are persuasive; for the things known are signs and indications of the unknown, and the truth of the one leads us to infer that of the other. Homer will afford abundance of examples. When Penelopé consigns the unknown Ulysses to be bathed by his aged nurse Euryclea, reminding her that a long series of woes may have reduced Ulysses to a premature resemblance with this weary old stranger,

and pathetic; how it may be rendered so.

¹²⁰ I find no corresponding passage in Æschines, the orator.

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III.

The matron instant to her face applied

Both hands :

for persons beginning to cry, approach their hands to their eyes.¹²¹

At the commencement of your speech, it is especially important to inspire a favourable opinion of yourself, and the contrary of your adversary. But what is said or done with this view, must appear to be undesigned; there must be no marks of art or contrivance, which would entirely mar the purpose. That impressions may be made at the commencement of a discourse, influencing the judgment as to what is to follow, will appear evidently from what happens to persons employed by us, in any important negotiation, or to bring us any important tidings. They have scarcely begun to speak, when we conceive a notion of what they are going to say; our thoughts passing from the known to the unknown, and forming probable conjectures concerning the latter.

Narratives must often be made, or resumed in different¹²² parts of the discourse: and the beginning is sometimes not the most proper place for them.

The narrative in deliberative eloquence.

In deliberative eloquence, which always respects the future, there is the least room for narrative, which can only be drawn from the past: yet past transactions may be related by

¹²¹ Pope's translation does not illustrate the criticism:—

“ Instant, obsequious to the mild command,
Sad Euryclea rose: with trembling hand
She veils the torrent of her tearful eyes;
And thus impassioned to herself replies.”

¹²² This agrees with what is said above, where the reasons are given for mixing the narrative, with the eulogy.

way of example or exhortation ; and examples may be accompanied with much praise or blame, accordingly as the orator wishes them to be imitated or shunned. But when he thus relates, or thus praises or blames, he departs from the essential character of deliberation, and does not perform the exact office of a counsellor.¹²³

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When things very unlikely are said, you must show that you are well aware of the demand made on the credulity of your hearers, but that you have reasons to assign, which cannot fail to convince them : you must promise, from time to time, to produce these reasons, and to adopt confidently the judgment formed of them : thus Jocasta promises, in the *Œdipus* of Carcinus¹²⁴, to him who asked about her son, and Aemon in the *Antigoné* of Sophocles.¹²⁵

THAT part of a discourse, called the proof, consists in demonstrations or arguments, which should always be directed to the point in question ; and this point may be, either to ascertain whether a pretended action has taken place, whether any harm resulted from it, whether there was any bad intention in the doer : and lastly, if all these be admitted, what is the measure or degree of the harm done, or of the

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XVII.

The proof
in judicial
pleadings.

¹²³ Συμβεβησ : a person entitled to rise in the assembly, and give advice to the people.

¹²⁴ The works of Carcinus being lost, we cannot profit by the example referred to.

¹²⁵ Aemon was the son of Creon, king of Thebes, who, proposing to save *Antigoné* against the king's cruel edict, flattered him with promises that he would submit implicitly to his commands. — Sophocles, *Antigoné*.

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injury committed. On whichever of these four points, the merits of the cause depend, to this the attention of the adverse pleaders must be applied; the one party to establish, the other to overthrow it. From this opposition, it will not follow that one or other must be dishonest, except in the single case, where the same fact is affirmed by one, and denied by the other; for with regard to the harm, the injustice, or the degree of either, men may honestly entertain quite opposite opinions.

Its place in eulogy occupied by amplification.

In panegyrical discourses, the part corresponding to what is called the "proof" in judicial pleadings, is employed, for the most part, in amplification; in expanding and illumining the virtues of those whom we have undertaken to praise, in displaying and magnifying the vast benefits that have accrued from them: argumentation is not here wanted, except when the events related are so extraordinary, that it becomes necessary to establish their credibility, or when others would usurp the glory belonging to the individuals whom we celebrate.

The points in question in deliberation.

In deliberative eloquence, that is, in political discussions before the assembly, the points in question are, whether certain things are practicable; their justice, their utility, and the measure or degree in which these qualities may be ascribed to them.

Although what relates to the point in question calls for the chief attention of the orator, he ought to be vigilant in watching whether his adversary trips in any other matter, however irrelevant to the cause; a slip here, will tend to

prove that he is unworthy of credit in things of more importance. CHAP.
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In deliberative discussions before the assembly, examples are more persuasive than arguments; because deliberation respects the future, which is contingent, and of which we must judge by the past; but enthymemes or arguments are better suited to judicial pleadings, which, as they respect the past, have in them a sort of cogency and necessity, and are therefore more the objects of demonstration. These enthymemes must not, however, be multiplied and strung together in endless variety; they should be frequently interrupted by narrative, by sentences, and by pathos, and thus placed at proper intervals; for unless this is done, they will crush and destroy each other: besides, there is a satiety of all things carried beyond fit limits:

Examples more applicable in deliberation; and enthymemes in pleadings.

O friend! you speak just what the wise would say,
And nothing more.¹²⁶

Menelaus does not commend Pisistratus for speaking well, but for not speaking too much; for saying precisely what the subject required.¹²⁷ Temperance of tongue, its praise.

¹²⁶ Homer's Odyss. l. iv. ver. 204.

¹²⁷ The force of the criticism is again lost in Pope's beautiful lines:

Young and mature! the monarch thus rejoins,
In thee renewed, the soul of Nestor shines;
Formed by the care of that consummate sage,
In early bloom an oracle of age.

ver. 281. &c.

Neither would Cowper's translation illustrate the maxim; since Pisistratus's discourse is praised rather for its quality than quantity, for the *τοῖστα*, not the *τοσστα*, in opposition to what Aristotle says is done by Homer:

To whom the hero of the yellow locks:
Ah, my young friend! since nought which thou hast said
Or recommended now, would have disgraced
A man of years maturer far than thine.

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The argu-
mentative
style not
to be used
simultane-
ously with
the pa-
thetic ;

nor with
the moral.

An orator's assertions are not, all of them, to be proved by argument, lest he should fall into the absurdity of those philosophers who argue and conclude, by syllogism, to truths more evident and more convincing than the premises from which such conclusions are inferred.¹²⁸

The mind is not at the same time to be agitated by pathos, and actuated by sober argument ; for such opposite excitations cannot exist simultaneously ; either the passion will be cooled, or the argument blunted. Neither ought a speaker to intermix arguments, depending merely on the understanding, with those natural representations of manners and character which are often highly efficacious in gaining credit to his discourse ; for deductions of the understanding merely, and operations purely intellectual, have nothing in them of voluntary election and preference, and therefore nothing of morality. But moral sentences and important practical maxims should be interspersed, both in the narrative and in the proof, to stamp on those parts of the discourse a moral character, and to exhibit the speaker in a favourable light to his audience. Thus, " I gave and trusted, though well knowing that confidence ought not to be hastily reposed." And with more pathos, " Nor do I repent of my behaviour, though it has subjected me to much injustice : he has the gain, I the pleasure of having done what appeared to be right."

¹²⁸ Aristotle speaks here as if he had foreseen the folly of the schoolmen ; who, because all truths *might be proved* by syllogisms, thought that all truths *ought to be proved* by them.

Deliberative eloquence is more difficult than the judicial ¹²⁹, and the reason is plain, for the deliberative regards the future, but the judicial regards the past, which is all that Epemenides of Crete would allow even prophets to be acquainted with: he himself laid claim to this character, but declared that his sagacity did not extend to the revealing of things to come, but consisted in bringing to light things past, hitherto veiled in obscurity. Besides this, in judicial matters, the law affords a hypothesis on which to reason: and from such a fertile and definite principle, it is easy to draw a multitude of clear and convincing arguments. In political discussions, moreover, the orator has not that variety of resources which present themselves to the judicial pleader: he cannot, unless he quits the character of statesman and counsellor which he has assumed, suspend the important and urgent matter in deliberation, to speak of himself with praise, of his adversary with blame; to conciliate the kindly affections, or excite the angry passions. This ought never to be done unless when there is a deficiency of more important matter, on which occasion such digressions are made by the Athenian orators, and even by Isocrates. Thus, in his panegyrical oration destined to propose advice on important subjects of state policy, he enters into a long

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Deliberative oratory more difficult than the judicial; and why.

¹²⁹ We must keep in mind the constitution of the Athenian courts of justice, which were either juries or committees of the popular assembly.

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Digressi-
ons inde-
finite, in
demon-
strative
oratory.

accusation of the Lacedæmonians; and in his oration on the Peace, he is not less elaborate in the arraignment of Chares.

Demonstrative eloquence admits easily of episodes; for with the eulogy of any illustrious individual or community, we may naturally associate the praises of those nearly connected with them. Such is the practice of Isocrates; and such is the thing meant by Gorgias, when he boasted that matter could never fail him for panegyric; since if he had to commemorate the glory of Achilles, he might successively introduce that of Peleus, of Æacus, and of Jupiter himself. In the same manner, if he had to praise valour or justice, or patriotism, he might record the actions of all those pre-eminent in such virtues.

In defect
of argu-
ment, the
import-
ance of
stamping
our dis-
course
with a
moral cha-
racter.

Though well provided with arguments, it ought to be the orator's study to give a moral character to his discourse, and to stamp it with a favourable image of his mind and manners: but when arguments are wanting, this moral exhibition of himself is his only resource; and, when skillfully used, will often be more persuasive than the most elaborate reasoning.

Argu-
ments that
refute have
peculiar
clearness
and cogen-
cy; and
why.

Arguments which disprove and refute, have more clearness and force than those which confirm and establish; for in doing the former, we place the propositions of our adversary parallel to those which destroy them, whether these be contradictory propositions of his own, or truths equally admitted by both parties; and this placing of two contraries in direct opposition

gives a more lively and forcible impression of both. CHAP.
XVII.

The refutation depends on the same principles with the proof, and is taught by the same method; for to refute is only to deduce contrary conclusions, which is done either by offering a new argument of your own, or by opposing an objection to that of your adversary.

In deliberative, as well as in judicial eloquence, he who speaks first should begin by making good his own cause before he invalidates the arguments which are likely to be used against him; when these arguments, however, are very numerous as well as powerful, the reverse will be the more judicious practice: such was that of Callistratus in his Messenian oration; he first tore in pieces all that his adversaries were likely to object, before he urged the expediency of the measure which he wished to carry. This method is always to be pursued when your adversary has preceded in the debate. His arguments must be first combated, and the difficulties contained in them resolved, especially when his speech has produced any considerable effect; for your own would otherwise be heard with much disadvantage, like a man under an evil report, and whose cause was prejudged. Fair play must be given to your discourse by removing the prepossessions against it, and by demolishing, if possible, all the conclusions of your adversary; or, at least, the most important, the most approved, or those which admit

The order of argumentation to be varied according to circumstances.

BOOK of the easiest and clearest refutation. With
 III. this last, Hecuba begins in her reply to Helen,—

First I will aid the Goddesses, and plead the cause of Heaven,
 For Juno I revere."¹³⁰

Things
 that can-
 not be fitly
 said in our
 own per-
 son, are to
 be put into
 the mouth
 of others.

Thus much concerning the proof, as it is produced by argument ; but, in its dependence on the moral character and authority of the speaker, it may be observed that there are many things useful to be said which cannot, however, be said properly by any man of himself, since they would expose him to the shafts of opposition and envy, or betray him into that talkativeness to which all are liable on the subject of self. There are many things also which one individual cannot declare concerning another, without appearing to be guilty of rustic coarseness or misbecoming reproach. All such things, to be said without offence, must be put into the mouths of third persons, as Isocrates contrives to do in his speech addressed to Philip, and in that entitled the "Exchange." Autilochus, also, shifts from himself the reproach of his wife, Neobulé, and makes her father say,

Who shall confide in daughters!
 Nothing's so strange, but he, who swears it will not come to pass,
 May be forsworn."¹³¹

In another satire, he introduces the carpenter Charon, singing the words which begin,—

"What care I for Gyges' wealth?"

¹³⁰ It was easy to defend the gods before their devoted worshippers.

¹³¹ The words are part of a fragment still preserved in Stobæus. See his chapter on Hope.

In Sophocles, Aemon arraigns the cruelty of king Creon to his daughter Antigone, not by direct accusation and reproach, but by telling what the citizens say of him. CHAP.
XVII.

It will often have a good effect, and give weight to a discourse, to convert arguments into maxims. For example, "Prudent statesmen ought to make peace, when successful, for thus they will chiefly benefit their affairs:" argumentively, "If peace ought to be made, when the best and most advantageous conditions may be obtained, we ought certainly to make it in the season of prosperity." Arguments converted into maxims.

As to reasoning by the way of interrogation, the fit moment to employ it, is when your adversary has made some concession, in consequence of which a plain question will involve him in absurdity. Thus Pericles reasoned with Lampon, who having allowed that it was not lawful for the uninitiated to know the mysteries of Ceres, Pericles asked, "Do you know them?" Being answered in the affirmative, he immediately subjoined, "How? you! who are not initiated!"¹³² CHAP.
XVIII.

Reasoning by interrogation, its various modes.

A second mode of interrogation is when, of two propositions, the one is self-evident, and the other of such a nature that its truth is likely to be admitted by your adversary, you interrogate

¹³² "The uninitiated know not the mysteries; Lampon is uninitiated; Lampon knows the mysteries. He therefore knows, and does not know." This note is necessary to distinguish this first case from the third below; where the absurdity is immediately apparent without any intermediate proposition.

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with regard to this latter proposition or premise only, and without hinting at the former, pass immediately to the conclusion. Thus Socrates argued with Melitus, who accused him of denying the gods. "Do I acknowledge, Melitus! that there are such beings as dæmons?" "Granted." "And are not dæmons either gods, or the offspring of gods?" "Allowed." "How, then, is it possible to believe that there are children of the gods, without believing the existence of the gods themselves?"¹³³

A third opportunity for interrogation is, when the adversary will be obliged to answer something contradictory to what he has before said, or to oppose some universally received truth.¹³⁴

A fourth is, when a question may naturally be asked, which cannot be answered directly, and in few words, but with so many distinctions, or in so circuitous a manner, as will give to the answer an appearance of artifice and sophistry. For too great a demand must not be made on the patience of hearers. They will immediately cry out against those who hesitate and enter into nice distinctions, instead of being ready in their answers.

How to
meet and
defeat in-
terroga-
tories.

Except in the four cases just mentioned, interrogation is rather a dangerous expedient; for, should the respondent be firm and quick in his first answers, the weakness and impatience

¹³³ The evident proposition not hinted at, is that children imply parents; more generally, than correlatives imply the existence of each other.

¹³⁴ See the note on case first.

of the judges will not allow new interrogatories to be put to him : he will have foiled and repelled the assaults of his adversary, and will naturally be considered as victorious in the contest. This weakness of capacity, indeed, and of temper, in the audience, ought to be kept in mind by the orator in all parts of his discourse : his arguments, therefore, must be compressed, as much as perspicuity will allow ; and the form of them perpetually varied, since one form or mode of argumentation will strike and persuade when another has proved altogether ineffectual. To meet equivocal and captious interrogatories without falling into contradiction, attention must be given to make the distinctions required by the state of the question, before the adversary can draw any conclusion to your disadvantage. Your answers, therefore, must not be concise and general, but ample and particular, so as to include the solution of the difficulty in which the adversary would involve you ; for, with a little attention, you may easily perceive his drift.

The whole of this doctrine has been explained in our “ Topics,” to which we refer¹³⁵, subjoining only, that should the conclusion, which, from former concessions, might be drawn against us, be converted into a new question, we shall thus regain an opportunity of making such an answer as will foil the antagonist. Thus when Sophocles was asked by Peisander, whether he

The danger of interrogation after a conclusion has been drawn in our favour.

¹³⁵ See Topics, Book VIII.

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III.

did not agree with his fellow-delegates in establishing the government of the Four Hundred? he answered in the affirmative. Being further asked, whether this measure was not fraught with mischief? he allowed it. "But did not you concur in this evil measure?" "I did, because nothing better was to be done." In the same manner the Lacedæmonian replied, when standing trial for his mal-administration as one of the Ephori. He was asked whether his colleagues, who had previously been condemned and punished, did not appear to him to have met with their deserts? he answered affirmatively. Being farther asked, whether he had not concurred in the same obnoxious measures? he acknowledged it. But when instead of coming directly to the conclusion against him, the accuser again asked, whether he ought not to suffer the same punishment with his colleagues? he answered, "No; for they were corrupted by bribes, but I acted according to the dictates of my own judgment, believing the things done to be right." As the conclusion is the end in view, when that is attained, no further interrogatories should be put; nor can the conclusion itself be ever safely converted into a question, unless when we are sure of victory through the superabundant merits of our cause.

Ridicule.

Ridicule¹³⁶ appears to be of a certain use in

¹³⁶ The chapter *De Ridiculis* no longer exists among the fragments composing the *Art of Poetry*. The subject, however, is treated on Aristotle's principles, by Cicero, l. ii. *De Orator.*; by Quintilian, l. vi. *Institut.*; and by Demetrius Phalereus, or rather Dionysius Halicarn. *de Elocut.*

debate; and Gorgias said rightly, that serious arguments should be met by ridicule, as ridiculous ones by seriousness. But of the ridiculous, and its different kinds, we have treated in our "Poetics." Some of these kinds only are tolerable in a man of education and character; the rest are beneath him. Irony is more liberal than buffoonery, because irony is exercised for our own amusement, but buffoonery is directed to the gratification of others, for whose sakes we submit to play the fool, in order, thereby, to excite their laughter.

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THE epilogue, or conclusion, is composed of four parts, and directed to four objects. The first is to render the audience favourably disposed towards ourselves, and the contrary towards our adversary. The second is, to augment or diminish: to enhance the merit of our own proceedings, to depreciate those of our opponent; to extenuate the wrongs which we have done, to aggravate those which we have suffered. The third is to work on the passions of the hearer: and the fourth, to impress on his memory those points which the interest of our cause requires him to remember. All these matters follow naturally upon the preceding parts of the discourse; the narrative and the proof. For, after having stated the facts, and substantiated them by argument, it is natural to assume to ourselves the praise to which our own conduct may be entitled, and to load our adversary with the blame which his unwor-

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The epilogue or conclusion; its four parts, and the ends to which they are directed.

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III.

thy behaviour may deserve; and to fortify and brighten¹³⁷ both these points by every topic that ingenuity can suggest. To have done this will conciliate the judges to ourselves, and alienate them from our opponent; for there are but two ways in which we can excite their good will; we must show that our intentions and actions have been such as to merit either the general praise of mankind, or at least the particular favour and approbation of those whom we address. The direct contrary of this must be shown with regard to the adversary: and the topics which are to be employed for effecting all of these purposes, have been explained in preceding parts of this work. After having established the facts in question, it naturally follows to enlarge and magnify them; for as the enlargement of natural bodies must proceed from that of their pre-existent parts, so it is from expatiating on things previously said and proved in discourse, that we must either amplify our own merits, or aggravate the demerits of our opponents. With the topics for thus enlarging and magnifying, the reader has been already furnished, as well as with those of a contrary nature but of the same tendency; for extenuating our own misconduct, or depreciating the good conduct of an adversary. When the facts have been proved, their moral qualities ascertained, and their importance, by due exertions of skill, impressed and heightened, then is the time for

¹³⁷ επιχυλλευσιν.

an appeal to the passions, and for calling forth to our aid pity, anger, indignation ¹³⁸, hatred, envy, and resentment: and the means of exciting all these passions, and of making them subservient to our views, were investigated in the topics previously exhibited on that subject.

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The fourth and last object of the conclusion remains still to be spoken of, that of assisting the memory. This doubtless is to be done by frequent repetition; and authors have therefore advised that an abridgement of the matter should be given both at the beginning and at the end, without explaining the different principles on which these abridgements should be made. At the beginning, the matter ought to be so abridged as to show exactly the state of the question, and to serve as a perpetual admonition, to what point the hearers ought to direct their attention. At the end, a recapitulation ought to be given of proofs and arguments, with a view to recall and inculcate on the audience the matter most useful to our cause. This peroration may commence, "I have now shown the truth of all those things which I proposed to establish:" here recapitulating the speaker's various promises, and his various performances, and accordingly as circumstances require, either comparing and contrasting them with those of the adversary, or simply enumerating them, the one after the other; or, in the way of irony, "such mighty things has he at-

The matter to be abridged differently at the commencement and the conclusion.

¹³⁸ δεινωσις. See Quintilian, l. vi. c. 2. Conf. l. viii. c. 3.

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III.

tempted and effected, while I have been contented with plain matters of fact :” or, “How much would he have boasted, if, instead of feeble conjectures, he could have advanced substantial proofs like mine !” or, in the way of simple interrogation, “What has he shown? What have I not demonstrated?” In any of these figured modes of speech, the peroration may be couched ; or, as before said, in the bare recapitulation of the adversary’s arguments and our own.

The end of the whole ought to be free from conjunctions, to make the hearers aware that our discourse is at its close. “I have spoken ; you have heard ; the whole matter is before you : I now wait your decision.”¹³⁹

¹³⁹ Almost the precise words in which Lysias concludes his pleadings against Eratosthenes. See my “Translation of Lysias,” &c. p. 280.

APPENDIX.

Aristotle's Rhetoric, a model for philosophical treatises on the Arts — Compared with other works on that subject. — Longinus on the sublime — His character and merits — How explained by modern Philosophers. — Fine writing, according to Aristotle — According to Longinus and his followers. — Mr. Knight's Source of the Sublime considered. — Objections to the doctrine of dramatic delusion — Answered. — Objection to Aristotle's rule concerning the dramatic characters of Women — Answered. — The nature and end of Tragedy. — Why Aristotle preferred Tragedy to Epic Poetry. — Conclusion.

ACCORDING to Aristotle, philosophy consists in the investigation of causes, to which inquiry the present treatise is chiefly directed. The author's drift is, to obtain a principle, and to demonstrate its power. When this is done clearly and convincingly, in the simplest cases, and with regard to objects the most familiar, he often leaves its operation to be extended, by the reader's reflection, to examples more alluring, and to matters more complicated. The "Art of Rhetoric," is therefore a didactic work; and, in this view, is a model of the best manner, in which all practical arts, founded in nature, are to be either improved or explained. Men are naturally rhetoricians; but how is this natural aptitude to be converted into art? By observing when a speaker or writer has happened to attain his aim, and then tracing to the general principles of human nature the causes of

Aristotle's Rhetoric, a model for philosophical treatises on the arts.

his success, that, from the knowledge of these causes, rules may be derived productive of like success in all similar cases. To be sound and right, art must thus be built on the broad basis of experience, to the rejection of all narrow notions, all pre-conceived judgements, and all *priori* reasonings.

Comparison of it with preceding and subsequent works on the same subject.

By adherence the most scrupulous to this inductive method, Aristotle's Rhetoric threw into the back-ground the flimsy theories of Gorgias, Pamphilus, Callippus, and all preceding writers on the same art. Cicero says, that it had done this so completely in his time, that the use of those writers was totally superseded, and that no scholar thought of having recourse to any of them, but applied to Aristotle solely¹; and this decided superiority over all his precursors, procured for him the utmost reverence from all succeeding writers, Greek and Roman, on what they deemed the same important subject. The most copious of the Greeks was Dionysius of Halicarnassus, though most of his works are now reduced to mere fragments.² He extols Aristotle for his perspicuity and energy; and for qualities which this rhetorician equally admired — his sweetness and elegance.³ Quintilian, a critic equally judicious, regards the Stagirite as the prince of philosophers; and knows not what part of his character most to admire, the extent and variety of his knowledge, the multiplicity of his writings, the acuteness of his inventions, the suavity and brightness of his diction.⁴ But of all his eulogists,

¹ Cicero de Invent. Rhetor. l. ii. c. 2.

² The most complete of his works is the treatise De Structura Nominum — The collocation of words in reference to harmony, of which I have spoken in my History of Ancient Greece, P. i. vol. i. c. 5. p. 239, et seq. 6th edit.

³ Εξέτασις των Αρχαίων, p. 70. Edit. Sylburg.

⁴ Conf. Quintilian. Inst. Orator. l. i. c. 1. l. x. c. 1., l. xii. c. 11.

Cicero stands at the head⁵; and the sincerity of Cicero is attested in his own immortal works. I will not say, that the treatise “*De Oratore*,” the most elaborate of all those works, is disposed into three books, to correspond with the three books respectively into which Aristotle had divided his *Rhetoric*; but I will affirm, that both by Cicero and Quintilian, Aristotle is closely followed, and in essential points exactly copied: the same divisions and definitions, the same topics of argumentation in the three kinds of oratory, the same analysis of passions and affections, the same delineation of manners and characters, the same grounds of theory, and the same rules of practice.

Several of these rules, both in rhetoric and poetry, were enforced with too much rigour by critics, about the beginning of the last century. The Bossus, the Batteux, the Daciers, and the Dennises, demanded a scrupulous compliance with Aristotle’s rules, by no means exacted by their original proposer; who never ceases to inculcate, that practical matters neither require nor admit of metaphysical precision. But if the critics of those times erred on the side of intension and severity, those of our day err still more dangerously on that of relaxation and indulgence. Instead of exhorting the student who aspires to excellence, to dive with the Stagirite into the inmost recesses of the heart and understanding, they tell him, “that we arrive at a perfect knowledge of our

Contrasted
with those
of others.

⁵ There was this difference, he said, between Aristotle and other teachers of Rhetoric, “*quod ille eadem acie mentis qua rerum omnium vim naturamque viderat, hæc quoque aspexit quæ ad dicendi artem pertinebant.* *De Orator.* l. ii. c. 38. Pope probably thought of this passage when he said, that poets

——— stood convinc’d ’twas fit,
Who conquer’d nature, should preside o’er wit.

Essay on Criticism.

minds as we do of our native parish, without study and without attention; and that the arts to which this knowledge of the mind is applicable, are really no arts at all. The art of reasoning is no less absurd than the art of seeing or hearing, and the doctrine of rhetoric is no more useful to a speaker than anatomical dissection to a boxer.”⁶ In such ignorant and disgusting petulance, the antidote is conveyed at the same time with the poison; but the frequent repetition of such paradoxes, couched more artfully, has a tendency to corrupt the public mind: they have infected even men of real learning, and thereby given them more than due boldness in disputing maxims which length of time and general approbation had established. Of this disposition, we have an example in Mr. Knight’s valuable work on taste. Because the productions of Homer, and Pindar, and Euripides, preceded Aristotle’s “Art of Poetry,” Mr. K. is inclined to regard this latter work with little reverence, and to treat some of its most important doctrines as errors.⁷ But as a proficient in Greek learning, he has only rejected the authority of Aristotle to become the devoted disciple of Longinus, an author assuredly most estimable; but though agreeing with Aristotle in taste and feeling⁸, of all ancient critics the most unlike to him in style and method.

Longinus
on the
Sublime.

His cha-
racter and
merits.

No work is better known than that of Longinus “On the Sublime,” and none was ever better calculated to be popular: he was a philosopher, who, living in the degenerate times of imperial despotism, and infected with the loaded Alexandrian style, retained all the honest

⁶ See more of this in Edinburgh Review, October, 1809.

⁷ See Knight on Taste, p. 254. & 335, 4th Edit.

⁸ They cite the same examples with the same admiration; and for the real and genuine sources of the sublime, the reader may consult Ethic. Nicom. l. i. c. 10, & l. iv. c. 3.

and manly spirit of the ancient republics. His character was generous and lofty, his feelings were lively and keen, and his expressions, corresponding to his feelings, were animated and glowing. He has been called the *sublime* Longinus; for he should seem to have been the first who applied that term in a sense before unknown in literature or criticism.⁹ But instead of defining it after the Aristotelian method, or when a general definition is not to be found, enumerating, as Aristotle does, the various meanings in which it is used, either by the world at large or by philosophers¹⁰; instead of entering into the painful investigation of causes, Longinus proceeds at once to announce a bold, and noble, and most striking effect: "The sublime in writing," he says, "is that which raises and exalts the reader's mind; and giving to him a certain proud elevation, fills him with joy and exultation, as if he had himself produced the fine things which he has read."¹¹ This description, warm and animated as it is, deserves the praise of being correctly true; and the feelings of every man of taste reverberate those of Longinus, when transported by him into the midst of the beauties of Homer, and Plato, and Demosthenes, the critic is in-

⁹ Sublimitas is used once, I think, by Quintilian, to denote a quality of style. Inst. Orator, l. xii. c. x. p. 1091. Edit. Burman. Quintilian says, "vi, sublimitate," employing these two words to express what Dionysius calls the δεινότης of Demosthenes. Vid. Dionys. περι δεινοτητος Δημοσθεν.

¹⁰ In all his inquiries, Aristotle is attentive to the "πλεοναχως λεγομενα," the multifariam dicta. See particularly Ethic. Nicom. l. v. c. i. p. 193. Edit. Oxon. Those things are homonymous, whose names are the same but their definitions different. Categor. c. i. p. 14. Edit. Du Val. And names are transferred from one thing to another, not only according to those natural principles of association which Aristotle was the first to discriminate and explain, but from accidental, or rather accessional causes, indefinite in numbers. In reasoning, therefore, we must always regard, not merely the name itself, but its definition.

¹¹ Longinus, Sect. vii.

spired by the passages which he cites, and reflects no small portion of their original lustre. But those who think more deeply, will somewhat abate their admiration, when the treatise on the sublime is considered as a didactic work, either complete in theory or useful in practice.

And defects.

Longinus has indicated five sources of the sublime — greatness of thought, enthusiasm of passion, graceful figures of speech, a certain splendour of words, and a certain magnificence of composition.¹¹ All these things are in various ways delightful. But do they all fill the mind with joy and exultation? Instead of pausing to consider this question, Longinus hurries his readers into an assemblage of new beauties of writing, displayed with a taste exquisitely sensible to their charms. But do all these beauties, or the sources from which they are drawn, correspond, I say, not equally, but in any degree whatever, with the effect which he had announced as the test of the sublime? On the contrary, Longinus has said, and had he not said it, the thing would be equally true, that many passions, instead of expanding and exalting the soul, have a direct tendency to contract and depress it.¹² His examples are fear and sorrow; and, therefore, jealous love, of which fear and sorrow are constituent and essential elements. Yet Sappho's amatory ode, in which jealousy is delineated with natural pathos, and the strictest fidelity, is given by Longinus as a prominent example of the true sublime.¹³ Does the passion of jealousy then exalt the soul¹⁴, or can any expression of jealousy have in any degree this tendency? Such an expression may be accurate, animated, delicate, and affecting;

¹¹ De Sublim. c. viii.

¹² Sect. viii.

¹³ Sect. x.

¹⁴ Othello's occupation's gone. — SHAKESPEARE.

but sublime it never can be called, without a contradiction in terms. It should seem, therefore, that Longinus considered the sublime, as the essence of fine writing; and indeed he had described it, generally, as the height, the summit, the perfection of this talent.¹⁵

In the third book of his Rhetoric, Aristotle treated the same subject. He there explains wherein fine writing consists, and by what choice of words, and what mode of arranging them, that is, by what figures, this effect may be produced. An effect so various is not to be referred to any one head; it results from perspicuity, brevity, elevation or dignity, urbanity or elegance, animation, energy and enthusiasm. All these things give pleasure, they are all beauties¹⁶: but beauties, light and airy, neat or elegant, majestic or lofty, solemn, awful, or sublime; and the perfection of style, is that in which the several elements being rightly chosen, and fitly blended, may always suit the occasion; take its form and colour from the nature of the things signified, and rise or fall with the subject.

Fine writing, according to Aristotle :

These notions are approved, and adopted¹⁷ by all the ancient rhetoricians, and also by those moderns who adhere to the ancient school; but in later times the graceful negligence and impassioned raptures of Longinus, gained with many the ascendant, and philosophers began to examine more calmly than that ardent critic had done, the cause of the grand effect

According to Longinus, and his followers.

¹⁵ Sect. 1.

¹⁶ Beauty, whether belonging to objects of sense, to objects of fancy, or to objects of intellect, consists in magnitude and arrangement; that is, the fit disposition of the parts with regard to the whole, and to each other. Of what is too great, the parts cannot be comprehended; of what is too little, they cannot be at all perceived. De Art. Poetic. c. viii. p. 214. Edit. Buhle. But within these distinct limitations, what an endless variety of beauties is contained!

¹⁷ Conf. Cicero de Claris Orator. c. 82. et seq. and Quintilian, Inst. Orator. l. xii. c. 10.

which he had announced, and to investigate what they call the main central idea¹⁸ on which all notions of the sublime turn. Mr. Hume, with his usual originality, declared this to be merely local elevation, and bodily ascent, which carrying us in a direction contrary to the established law of gravity, calls forth our courage to oppose and resist it.¹⁹ We thus invigorate the soul, and give it an elevation, with which it would never otherwise have been acquainted. Any great elevation of place, communicates a kind of pride or sublimity of imagination. Hence, it proceeds, that "we associate in a manner, the idea of whatever is good with that of height, and evil with lowness." But this theory reached too high among the clouds long to hold together. On the slightest reflection, it occurred, that great depth affected the mind not less powerfully than great height; and that a profound genius was an object of admiration, not less than a lofty or sublime one. Nay, further, as the altitude of the heavens augments to the eye in proportion to the

¹⁸ This doctrine of a central or common idea was not derived, as Mr. Stewart thinks, (see his *Essays*, p. 214. 4to. edit.,) from the scholastic ages, but was of a far more ancient date. Socrates, as Aristotle says, *Metaph.* l. xi. p. 969. first shook its foundation, by regarding not merely the vague meaning of words, but their correct sense; and by requiring clear definitions of them. This is illustrated by his scholar, Xenophon, in his explanation of the words, "good" and "beautiful." *Vid. Memorabil. Socrat.* p. 776. Edit. Leunclav. Aristotle also refutes the same fanciful notion, which had been adopted by his master Plato, more distinctly and more scientifically. The word "good," he says, is applied to substances, to modes, and to relations; but when thus applied, is not taken in the same sense; and, therefore, does not denote any common idea. "Good" is said in as many ways as "being." It is said of God and the human mind, which are substances; of the virtues, which are qualities; of utility, which is a relation; of mediocrity, which is quantity; of a critical moment, which is time; of a fit residence, which is place. The word "good," when said of things so totally different, cannot, therefore, denote any one idea common to all those classes or categories. *Ethic. Nicom.* l. i. c. 4.

¹⁹ *Treatise of Human Nature*, vol. ii. p. 282.

wide extent of plain from which they are surveyed, it became necessary to take into the idea of sublime, magnitude in all directions, and to apply the same epithet to lofty mountains, deep and broad rivers, above all, to the vast and boundless ocean. All these objects delight by their greatness; they are all awful, and invested with a certain degree of terror, and also with a certain degree of obscurity from their greatness itself, which is not to be easily seized by the eye²⁰, retained in the memory²¹, or comprehended by the understanding.²² According to a new theory, therefore, the essence of the sublime was said to consist in terror and obscurity²³; a theory which was calculated to produce still worse effects than any of the preceding, both on the arts of design and on the rules of literary composition.²⁴

All these different accounts of the matter made their appeal to Longinus, which is also the case with a very different explanation of it given by Mr. Knight: he ascribes "all emotions of the sublime to sympathy with the expression of energetic passions."²⁵ But

Mr. Knight's account of the sublime.

²⁰ Ευσυνοπτον.

²¹ Ευμνημονευτον.

²² Ευεπακολουθητον.

²³ In the following sentence, the idea of obscurity is included in that of terror: "Terror is, in all cases whatever, either more openly or latently, the ruling principle of the sublime." Burke on the Sublime, Part p. ii. sect. 2.

²⁴ This appears, as Mr. Knight says, in the labours of its followers; "the works of many modern painters, poets, and romance writers, which teem with all sorts of terrific and horrific monsters and hobgoblins." p. 384. And again, "Nonsense can no more be sublime, than darkness and vacuity can be ponderous and elastic; and to controvert either position is in some measure to participate in its extravagance: nor should I presume to do it, did I not every day see the fatal effects of this seducing author's (Mr. Burke's) theories on the taste of the public, not only in England, but on the continent, particularly in Germany, where nonsense seems to have become the order of the day." p. 399.

²⁵ See Knight on Taste, pp. 325. 331. 335. 366. 370. 371. 572. 4th Edit.

in this position, Mr. Knight, I fear, has not sufficiently attended to the force of the word sympathy. Brute matter, whatever magnitude it may assume, cannot surely create any such emotion; even the heavens themselves, in comparison with which all other greatness is nothing, raise sublime emotions of sympathy, merely by association with the creating and sustaining power of the Almighty. For a similar reason, neither powers, nor energies, nor properties of any kind, considered abstractly, can ever produce the slightest degree of sympathy: for sympathy is feeling accompanying feeling; it can be excited only by animated individual beings; and where there is no feeling in the individuals principally concerned, there cannot possibly be any fellow-feeling in the spectators.

His objections to the judgments of Aristotle & Horace.

Inattention to this distinction should seem to have led Mr. Knight, who of all the above mentioned interpreters of Longinus appears to have come the nearest to his meaning, into several erroneous conclusions. "From the days of Aristotle," he says, "to the present time, critics have repeated, the one after the other, that terror and pity, τὸ φοβερόν καὶ τὸ ἐλεεινόν, are the fundamental principles of tragedy; but how any man in his senses, can feel either fear from dangers which he knows to be unreal, or commiseration for distress which he knows to be fictitious, I am at a loss to discover, never having found any such pliability in my own feelings, by which alone I can judge of those of others. I can sympathize with the expressions of passions and mental energies, which these fictitious events excite, because the expressions are real; and this is what I believe all other persons of just feeling do: but the acute Stagirite appears to have been led into an error on this point, by imagining that stage exhibitions are really meant to be deceptions. The most

able and acute of his followers seems to have been equally misled, by the same ill-founded notion.”²⁶

This ill-founded notion of Horace, to which Mr. Knight alludes, is conveyed with a vivacity and brightness that animates every reader's bosom, and with a resistless power to which every critic of taste had been long willing to submit²⁷: nor, with such a passage before his eyes, would Mr. K., I think, have ventured to be the first to raise a dissentient voice. But a celebrated French critic, once highly popular, has a chapter in his ingenious but often fanciful work, to prove, that the pleasure derived from dramatic entertainments does not depend on any degree of illusion²⁸; and an English critic, of not less name, has said with his usual perspicuity and intrepidity, “It is false that any representation is mistaken for reality, that any dramatic fable in its materiality was ever credible, or for a single moment was ever credited.”²⁹ But Johnson, when he wrote these words, had a cause to defend, and when this was the case, he was not always scrupulously nice about the justness of his arguments. He was a fine writer, a poet, a wit, a moralist, above all, a skilful rhetorician. What did he want to make an accomplished critic? Calm serenity of mind, and impartial candour. Independently, however, of these qualifications, he had an easy triumph in defending the anomalies of Shakspeare before an English public, seconded and supported as he was by the boundless veneration of that public for their first and

These had
been before
made by
Du Bos &
Johnson.

²⁶ Knight on Taste. p. iii. c. 1. p. 335. fourth Edit.

²⁷ Ille per extantum funem mihi posse videtur

Ire poeta, meum qui pectus inaniter angit,

Irritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet,

Ut Magus; et modo me Thebis, modo ponit Athenis.

De Art. Poet. v. 210. et seq.

²⁸ Du Bos, *Reflexions Critiques*, sect. xl. p. 420. Edit. Paris, 1719.

²⁹ Johnson's Preface to Shakspeare.

greatest tragedian, and by the transcendent merits of that tragedian himself, who is excelled by none of his Grecian precursors, no, not even by Homer, in animation, enthusiasm, and persuasive energy.³⁰ Johnson had just said, “that Shakspeare’s plays have commonly what Aristotle requires, a beginning, a middle, and an end; one event is concatenated with another, and the conclusion follows by easy consequence: but to the unities of time and place he has shewn no regard.” To justify this proceeding, for Aristotle had shewn that a certain degree at least of respect was due to those unities, to produce that delusion on which the pleasure of the drama was founded, Johnson, in bold defiance of the critics of Greece, and generally of those of all other countries, declares, that there is no delusion in the case, and that in dramatic representation none whatever is requisite.

The objections of all three answered.

But is this proposition true, or, rather, will not the supposed truth of it lead to a manifest absurdity? To excite any emotions of sympathy, qualities must be taken in the concrete, they must be regarded, not separately, but conjointly with the sentient beings to which they belong; and a belief in the personality and real existence of those individuals, more or less permanent, must therefore take place before any sympathy can possibly be awakened. This belief was distinguished by Aristotle, by a different name from that which denotes a steady and lasting conviction of the understanding.³¹ The illusion

³⁰ That is, in what Aristotle calls the *εὐπλάστον καὶ ἐκστατικὸν καὶ προομματῶν τιθεναί* Conf. Rhetor. l. iii. c. xi. p. 352. Edit. Buhle, and Poetic. cap. xviii. p. 240. True poets easily assume every form, are transported out of themselves, become the very persons whom they imitate, and thus place them before the eyes, “the mind’s eye” and there give them a real presence.

³¹ See the distinction between *ὑποληψις* and *φαντασία*. Aristot. de Anima, l. iii. c. iii. p. 651.

of the drama did not constantly, or long, prevail over this severe and rigid power; but it deceived the more indulgent powers of imagination or fancy, by means of a natural, a strong, and probable representation. To produce this deception was the end: the unities were the means; for to the unities may be referred all those rules that are necessary for rendering the action of the piece credible and consistent.³² How far these rules should extend, Aristotle does not determine. In matters of this kind, he affected not that scrupulous accuracy at which some of his interpreters have supposed him to aim. Of practical things, he often repeats, the perfection consists not in a mathematical point. They admit of a broad middle, within any part of which is all the exactness which propriety requires, all that possibly can be attained, and, therefore, all that ought to be demanded.³³ Mr. Knight, therefore, appears to me

³² Conf. Poetic. c. xviii. Edit. Böhle, and Rhetoric, l. ii. c. 8. From mistaking this matter, Dr. Johnson is led into the following remark on Shakspeare's characters: "In the writings of other poets, a character is too often an individual; in those of Shakspeare, it is commonly a species." Johnson's Works, vol. ii. p. 137. On the contrary, the characters of Shakspeare, like those of Homer, and I will add, of Cervantes, owe their singular vividness of impression to their individuality mainly. They are moral *portraits*, in which we discern the lineaments of the mind, and see and know the individual, always distinguished by something peculiar and personal from other individuals of the same specific character.

³³ Some critics, with a view to a perfect preservation of the unity of action, have proposed the amputation, Procrustes-like, of large portions of the Iliad. But a sentence in Aristotle outweighs in my mind many lucubrations of the ancient Alexandrian, or the modern German school. With regard even to the unity of action, he says, "the poems of Homer are constructed in the best manner possible," *συνεστηκεν ὡς εὐδεχεται ἀριστά*, Poet. p. 281.; that is, according to the perpetual tenour of his philosophy, have all the advantage in this particular, consistent with other advantages, which were not to be neglected. The amputating system is opposed in Mr. Penn's respectable work, on the argument of the Iliad; which, how-

Mr.
Knight's
objection
to Aristotle's rule
concerning
the dramatic
characters of wo-
men.

to have controverted with little justice the Stagirite's doctrine of the unities, and the great principle on which they are founded.

Has the ingenious critic been more fortunate when he descends to particular rules? This he has done only on one occasion, but an important one, the *dramatic* manners of women. To be good, these manners must be adapted to the age, sex, station or rank of the individuals represented. "There are manners good absolutely, and also dramatically good, when ascribed to a man; but manly courage and mental energy, laudably directed, are not with propriety to be given to a woman."³⁴ Mr. Twining has translated this passage differently. He says, "There is a manly character of courage and fierceness, that cannot with propriety be given to a woman."³⁵ How far this translation may have influenced Mr. Knight in the following stricture on Aristotle's rules, I will not pretend to determine: but he says, "Had Shakspeare followed these rules, we should have been deprived of the greatest effort of his genius, the character of Lady Macbeth."³⁶ On the contrary, it may, I think, be clearly proved, that had Shakspeare paid the strictest attention to the rules in question, he would have exhibited Lady Macbeth pre-

ever, he makes to be, "not the anger of Achilles," but "the fulfilment of the council or purpose of Jove." These two great causes united in producing the whole action of the poem; but, in the relation, the anger of Achilles is more immediately in view. It begins against Agamemnon, is renewed and continued against Hector, and completely ends with his kind hospitality to Priam, after he had raised Hector's body from the couch, and assisted with his own hands in placing it on the bier. II. xxiv. 590. The importance of funeral rites among the Greeks, gives peculiar propriety to this termination.

³⁴ Poetic. c. xvi. p. 234.

³⁵ Twining's Translation, p. 93, 4to. Edit.

³⁶ Knight. p. 354.

cisely as he has done: for the poet and the philosopher read in the same great book of nature,

“ At once the source, and end, and test of art.”

I will even go farther, and affirm, that this female character is not only proper in itself, but, according to Aristotle's rules, gives dramatic propriety to the character of her husband.

But I must first explain on what authority I translate differently from Mr. Twining. My authority is that of Aristotle himself, who on this, as on other important occasions, has been careful to define both the words employed by him. The first, *το ανδρειον*, is a quality characteristic of the prime of life; confirmed and tempered manhood, in contradistinction to the rash impetuosity of youth, and the cold timidity of age.³⁷ It is that kind of courage that encounters all honourable dangers, and them only³⁸; a courage that cannot be better described than in the words of Macbeth,

Lady Macbeth's character shewn to be proper in itself; and, according to Aristotle's doctrine, necessary for giving dramatic propriety to the character of her husband.

“ I dare do all that may become a man,
Who dares do more, is none.”

As to the second word, *το δεινον*, which Mr. Twining has translated fierceness, Aristotle observes, that there is in some men a vigour of mind and ability which qualifies them to succeed wonderfully in their undertakings, and to effectuate all their purposes. When these purposes are good, the ability by which they are attained is called *δεινότης*³⁹, a virtuous quality, and the object of high panegyric; but when the purposes are bad, the ability by which they are attained is called

³⁷ Rhetor. l. ii. c. xiv. p. 235. Edit. Buhle.

³⁸ Ethic. Nicom. l. iii. c. vi. p. 117. Edit. Oxon. Conf. Poetic. l. viii. c. iv.

³⁹ Ethic. l. vi. c. xii. p. 273.

πανουργία, a vicious quality, and an object of deep reproach. The word implying praise, cannot, therefore, denote fierceness, or any such hateful quality; and neither of the words are at all applicable to Lady Macbeth. They are equally incompatible with her character, when she says to her husband,

“ Infirm of purpose! give me the daggers.”

And when she displays her ferocity more at large,

“ I have given suck, and know
How tender 'tis to love the babe that milks me.
I would, while it was smiling in my face,
Have pluck'd the nipple from its boneless gums,
And dash'd the brains out, &c.”

It is not, therefore, mental energy, but this energy virtuously directed, that Aristotle denies to be the *dramatic* character of women; a conclusion deduced from the general history of the Greek theatre: for in the long chain of such tragic heroines as Medea, Clytemnestra, Phædra, Olympias, Eurydice⁴⁰, and Cleopatra, even Lady Macbeth herself would not have been the most direful or blackest link. Shakspeare thought exactly therefore, with Aristotle, and other deep searchers into human nature, when he represented the feebler sex, as by no means exempted by its feebleness, from the most enormous crimes, but rendered thereby the more obnoxious to them.⁴¹

I said, in the second place, that Lady Macbeth's, as a female character was proper in itself, and, according,

⁴⁰ Wife to Philip Arrhidæus and paramour of Cassander. See History of Ancient Greece, p. ii. vol. i. p. 431. 8vo. Edit.

⁴¹ Plerumque facinus infirmitate fecerunt. Quintilian Declam. ii. p. 46. Edit. Burman. And again, Sunt et feminis ad scelera vires. And again, Facilius hæc pectora, (scilicet mulierum,) metus, ira, odium corrumpunt, quoniam non habeant roboris tantum, unde vitia mentium

to Aristotle's principles, excellently contrived for giving dramatic propriety to the character of her husband. Tragedy, he says, is the representation of a serious and important action, tending, by the excitation of pity and terror to perfect the refinement of these and other passions. But pity, he continues, is inspired by those who suffer undeservedly, and terror by a certain resemblance between the sufferers and ourselves:⁴² for this passion is not to be moved by the sufferings of beings altogether unlike to us, or by evils altogether unlikely ever to happen to us. Macbeth was, therefore, with all his enormities, to be exhibited as a man, and to have been impelled by causes with which human frailty is unable to contend. What were these causes? The devil and all his devilish machinery, abetted by the resistless temptations, and, if Mr. Knight pleases, the sublime wickedness of Lady Macbeth. Against such desperate odds, what "mortal mixture of earth's "mould" could be expected to triumph: his fall was inevitable. It is this dire overwhelming necessity, which preserves in us a degree of fellow-feeling even with Macbeth, and makes us accompany with respect to the last his dauntless manhood.

" I'll not yield,
Though Birnam wood be come to Dunsinane,
And thou opposed, being of no woman born;
Yet I will try the last: Lay on, Macduff," &c.

The mistake of Aristotle's rule with respect to the dramatic characters of women, originates in the common

Aristotle's
definition of
the nature

vincant. For the character of Greek women, and the causes which conspired to form it, see *History of Ancient Greece*, part i. vol. ii. c. 13. and part ii. vol. i. c. iv. Aristotle has given an epitome of this character in his *History of Animals*, l. ix. c. i.

⁴² Poetic, cxiv. p. 227. Edit. Buhle.

and end of
tragedy ex-
plained.

error of interpreting his words by guess, and omitting, where the text is brief or corrupt, to have recourse to parallel passages, where the meaning might have been clearly ascertained. This omission has occasioned many volumes of tiresome pedantry, and what is worse, in its consequences, of ingenious sophistry, with regard to what is deemed the most important of all his critical doctrines, and which has been a stumbling-block with interpreters of all nations and ages, from the time that the imperfect text of Aristotle was brought to Rome by Sylla the dictator⁴³: — the doctrine to which I allude, is that concerning the end of tragedy. This end he makes to consist in what he calls the *purgation* of the passions, a metaphor plainly, all words being necessarily metaphorical, when they are transferred from corporeal, to mental operations or effects. On this subject he speaks in his Politics, when treating of music as a thing proper in the education of youth. “The rapturous music,” he says, “is calculated for what is called purgation. Thus it is that, at the celebration of the Orgic rites, enthusiasm vents itself and evaporates in hearing those sacred melodies, during the performance of which the mind undergoes a kind of purgation, and is cured of its phrenzy.”⁴⁴ Of this matter, however, he says that he then spoke incidentally, but would fully examine it in his “Treatise on Poetry.” But as such an examination does not appear among the inestimable fragments of that work, we must elicit his meaning from the definition

⁴³ See above, p. 18.

⁴⁴ See Translation of Aristotle's Politics, c. v. p. 314. 3rd. Edit. To explain this more fully, I brought forward a passage in Plato de Repub. l. iii. p. 625. Edit. Ficini. Where he says of persons not disciplined by music, that their sensations are neither excited, nor fomented, nor purged: *οὐκ ἐγειρομένων, οὐδὲ τρεφομένων, οὐδὲ διακαθαίρομένων τῶν αἰσθησιῶν.*

given in it of tragedy, compared with what is said in the disquisition on the passions in his Rhetoric, and in that on the virtues and habits in his Ethics. His admired master Plato, had observed, "that as man consisted of mind and body, his education ought to combine the improvement of both;" his body ought to be fortified and braced by the gymnastic exercises, his mind to be exalted and softened by music and philosophy. By this happy mixture, the odious perversions would be cured, of rude unfeeling savageness on one side, and of tender, sickly, puling susceptibility on the other. But Plato, while he spoke honourably of music, with strange inconsistency, banished poets from his republic. He vilified their art as a baneful delusion, producing a short meretricious pleasure, by the sacrifice of great and lasting profit. Tragedy was his particular aversion, "since it had a tendency to foment and nourish such strong emotions for the sufferings of others, as could not fail to incapacitate men for bearing their own patiently."⁴⁵ This latter notion must have appeared to Aristotle not less extravagant than Plato's doctrine of ideas, or that of his community of goods, wives, and children.⁴⁶ Instead of admitting, that emotions of pity or sympathy are nourished and strengthened by exercise and repetition, the drift of Aristotle's Ethics is to shew, that these, and all passive sensations whatever, are thereby much weakened; whereas our active energies are, by the same exercise and repetition, greatly invigorated. By being familiar, for instance, with scenes of danger, fear is lessened, but courage is augmented; by being accustomed to painful sights and sufferings, commiseration

⁴⁵ Plato de Repub. l. x. p. 756. Edit. Ficin.

⁴⁶ See my Translation of Aristotle's Politics, book ii. p. 90.

is weakened, but the active principles are strengthened, of fortitude to endure, or generosity to relieve them. It is thus that the weakness of one passion is the strength of another; and that all of them may be made occasional auxiliaries to reason in establishing the due balance of the mind. When effective of the wise ends for which they were implanted, they are all of them good; bad, when they fall short of these ends; and worse, when they shoot beyond them. They are thus subject to error, both from excess and from defect: it is only in their middle state that they assume the character of virtue ⁴⁷; and towards reducing them to this happy temperament, the representation of well written tragedies appeared to Aristotle eminently to contribute. Tragedy, in a peculiar sense, is philosophy teaching by examples; it teaches also in the manner the most agreeable; for of all animals, man is the most imitative; his earliest instruction is derived solely from this source; and imitation continues, through life, to be most delightful to the whole human race. ⁴⁸

How the passions are moderated and refined by the representation of things piteous and terrible.

But how, more explicitly, are the passions purified and refined by the representation of things piteous and terrible? Pity and terror are the means; the purifying of these and other passions, is the end. With sentient beings, actuated by the same feelings, and enduring the same sufferings, to which, in our own persons, we are exposed, we naturally and necessarily entertain some degree of sympathy, and are moved by the excesses which they exhibit, of pity and terror, of anger, resentment, pride, ambition, and other tragic passions. To

⁴⁷ Κατα αμφοτερα γαρ εσι ψεκτοι και καθ' υπερβολην και καθ' εκλειψιν, Mag. Moral. p. 161. et Ethic. Nicom. passim.

⁴⁸ De Arte Poet. c. v. p. 200. Edit. Buhle.

suppose that during such representations, the spectators should not often make returns on themselves, and bring home to their own bosoms the agitations and disasters which they behold, is to suppose that they are not reasonable creatures. That they do this, is proved by experience; and, amidst the passive sensations with which they are affected, they seldom fail, from regard to their own safety⁴⁹, to recal and summon up those active principles of vigilance, temperance, and self-command, by which the tumult of the passions is moderated, and the evils avoided, naturally consequent on every outrageous excess. This is felt to be more remarkably the case, when we ourselves have ever been a prey to any such passions, or were ever likely to become their victims. By frequent exercise of this kind, a secret mental energy will be created, well calculated to incite and promote in real life, and in practice, those external acts of virtue, which are essentially and indispensably requisite for the establishment of virtuous habits.⁵⁰ This is that moral effect of the theatre, which, being always uppermost in Aristotle's mind, makes him, notwithstanding all his admiration for Homer, prefer tragedy even to epic poetry.⁵¹

Our great Milton, without entering into an explanation of the means through which the work of tragedy is effected, perfectly agreed with Aristotle respecting its end. His preface to *Samson Agonistes* commences, "Tragedy, as it was anciently composed, hath ever been held the gravest, moralest, and most profitable of all

Milton's
opinion on
this subject.

⁴⁹ See Rhetoric, l. ii. c. 8. and my Translation, p. 90.

⁵⁰ This effect of tragedy is expressed by the word *παρανοουσα*, bringing to an end, that is, tending to complete and perfect the purgation of the passions; and is different from the pleasurable relief afforded to the senses by music above mentioned. p. 474. Conf. Art. Poetic, c. vii. The one points to a change occasional and temporary; the other, to a change permanent and habitual.

⁵¹ De Art. Poetic. c. ult.

other poems ; therefore said by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of these and such like passions : that is, to temper and reduce them to just measure, with a kind of delight, by seeing those passions well imitated." Milton could not fail to be confirmed in this judgment by the course of his meditations and studies. Next to the Bible and to Homer, Euripides was the book which he most delighted to read ⁵² : and among all dramatic writers, Euripides is pre-eminent in what Aristotle regards as the characteristic excellence of tragedy. ⁵³

Why Aristotle gave the preference to tragedy above the epopee.

In the comparison made by Aristotle of the two noblest kinds of poetry, he assigns to the epopee the first place in grandeur and variety, in a wider scope for the marvellous in thought, and the splendid in diction. But these advantages are balanced or surpassed in tragedy, by its more close unity, more accelerated progression, more compressed action, and more perfect illusion. ⁵⁴ " In all these, tragedy is superior, and *still farther*" he says " in its tendency to purify and refine the passions ⁵⁵ ;

⁵² See all Milton's Biographers.

⁵³ See my History of Ancient Greece, p. i. vol. ii. p. 143. 6th edit.

⁵⁴ De Art. Poet. c. ult.

⁵⁵ Το της τεχνης εργον, the work of the art. The last editor of the " Poetic," Mr. Buhle, says rightly, in a note, " Quid sit hoc opus patet ex ipsa tragediæ definitione." What is that work is plain from the definition of tragedy. Animadvers. ad Librum de Poetic. p. 441. He refers to a note of Mr. Twining's, (p. 560.) where that elegant scholar makes the " ends of epic and tragic poetry to be the same ; both being intended merely to please." Compare Twining's Translation, p. 233. 4to. edit. I also think that their ends are the same, because both are intended to instruct by pleasing. That epic poetry does this, Horace employs a whole epistle to prove. (Epist. ii. l. i.) And Aristotle tacitly admits the fact, when he says, that tragedy attains this end more completely. But I should not wonder, if many modern poets should still relish and approve Mr. Twining's interpretation, when he says, " I do not see any reason to think that the *moral* lesson of the drama, and the effects it might have in moderating the passions, through the reflections it excites in us, were at all in Aristotle's thoughts." p. 233.

its great and principal end." But these noble kinds of poetry, indeed, mix instruction with pleasure; but tragedy, as it instructs more impressively, is entitled to the preference.

I shall now dismiss this Appendix, believing that enough has been said to prove Aristotle's conclusions not less sound in matters of taste, than in those of pure reason. It will, therefore, be wise to follow his rules, till a critic shall arise to concentrate, on the same subject, a comprehension, acuteness, and vigour of mind, acquired by more unwearied and successful diligence in the study of universal nature, and until that critic's decisions shall be reflected from nobler archetypes of art, than the productions of Homer, Pindar, Euripides, Pericles, and Phidias.

And why his rules, both general and particular, are to be followed.

Learn hence for ancient rules a just esteem ;

To copy nature, is to copy them.

POPE.

In vindicating my author's philosophy, which, thinking it the best, I have laboured to explain and recommend, it was my reluctant task to controvert the doctrines of many eminent men, some of them my contemporaries. But I have never been forgetful of the respect due to their characters; nor ever suffered, I hope, a word to escape me, acrimonious, or sarcastic, or inconsistent with good manners. In me, indeed, the contrary conduct would be wholly inexcusable; for I have no quarrels to maintain, no reprisals to make, no resentments to gratify; and, on the score of external goods, continuing, as I have long been, contented with my lot, and only anxious to deserve it, I am exempt from all irritation or uneasiness with regard to those gifts of fortune, which philosophers have agreed to assign for the causes of envy.

Conclusion.



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THE END.



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